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Review of Muzaffar Ali's book by Satya Javvaji Satya Javvaji MA student, KU Luven Oct 26, 2023 Book review of Muzaffar Ali's India, Habermas and the Normative Structure of Public Sphere (Routledge, 2023) In India, Habermas and the Normative Structure of Public Sphere , Muzaffar Ali sketches the theory and procedures of an adequate public sphere in India arguing that it has to focus on accessibility and acceptability of the individual participants. In a book that is comprehensive and accessible to a wide audience, Ali gracefully tackles the question of how to think through a native context while being aware of the overbearing Western hegemony on the one hand, and of the risk of delving into nativism or nationalism on the other. The context of the book’s conception starts with Ali’s personal discomfort with the rigid Western-Indian divide in his curriculum growing up. While authors from both geographies were being taught separately, there was a dearth of how to conduct native Indian political philosophy that neither preaches a pre-modern excavation of Indian values nor blindly adopts Western concepts and categories and applies them directly to the Indian context, which oftentimes much different. The book’s first chapter deals with precisely this question - “to figure out a way to deal with the West without a complete withdrawal and yet keep the elan vital of the decolonization project intact” (p. 13). Ali responds to it by arguing for a double native approach. Firstly, since a Western theory purports a universalism in its concepts, it remains essential for a non-western theory to engage with it and critically examine its shortcomings and exclusions. Secondly, these critical engagements have to form the basis of a native and decolonised Indian political theory that adequately captures the context of the society it is speaking with. An adequate theory does not stop at pointing out a historical or contextual exception to a Western theory, thereby proving it inapplicable. Rather, it captures the relevant conditions of possibility, that are socio-historically situated, to initiate a holistic theoretical basis that can, as is successfully carried out in this book, support an Indian public sphere. With this methodology in hand, in the second chapter, Ali discusses the notion of the public sphere in Habermas, whose contribution to its theory is considered field-defining in Western literature. The public sphere is the conceptual stage upon which members of a society exchange views of social and political significance that pertain to their collective life. In the Habermasian public sphere, citizens form a rational public opinion through the medium of linguistic communication which is seen as a reservoir of meaning. While everyone is theoretically invited to the public sphere, Ali points out that the notion relies on a singular universalizing idea and emphasizes the role of rationality disproportionately, thereby striving to keep the project of modernity alive. In doing this, it ignores that firstly, there might be multiple public spheres with diametrically opposed common concerns, and secondly, that since dialogue always already takes place within certain power structures, the marginal and historically excluded voices are either not heard or, to borrow Gayatri Spivak’s famous declaration, that the subaltern simply cannot speak. With these problems in mind and the direct non-applicability of this notion of the public sphere to India (that, according to Ali, is in part due to its heavy religious context), he discusses in the third chapter, that current Indian engagements with Habermas are either comparative or evaluative. Both these engagements pose challenges to the theory and provide critical ways of engaging with it, but either lose sight of the overall conceptual structure by focusing on particular historical examples/contexts or fail to offer a way forward in terms of moving out of the Western hegemonic shadow. Instead, what Ali aims for is a thick concept of the Indian situation that can, as a full concept, interact with the Habermasian theory of the public sphere. In the fourth and fifth chapters, Ali begins with the major chunk of his creative contributions to the idea of an Indian public sphere. He starts with the observation that existing critiques are mainly concerned about the lack of accessibility and acceptability of all to the public sphere. This leads him to frame these as the twin normative principles based on which he theorizes an imagined Indian public sphere. This is so that the public sphere is “gauged by the ease of access it offers to the communities and individuals of whom it claims to be on” and it accepts “the perspectives and viewpoints of all individuals sans any ifs and buts” (p. P. 117-18). He cautions again that he is not interested in a “nativist approach to portray the Indianness” but is instead aiming for a “native approach to conceptualize Indianness” (p. 84). For theoretical and socio-historical reasons, Ali chooses to focus on religion as the social entity that informs the Indian context, the historical idea of rationality in Indian literature and the burden of colonialism with respect to how it colours the reading of texts and consequently of understanding society. With respect to religion, Ali discusses the complicated nature of secularism in India, the socialized role of caste and the deeply political nature of these issues. Through the perspective of religion, it becomes clear that in the European context, the immigration of other religions forms a new conceptual problem while dealing with a universal and apparently secular public sphere. But when it comes to the Indian context, religion has always been part of the notion of secularism and is a “perennial entity within Indian societies” (p. 97). According to Ali, “majority-minority, upper caste-lower caste, powerful-powerless, man-woman binaries within the Indian situation are often anchored in religion” (p. 111). Additionally, he argues that the procedural communicative rationality advocated by Habermas does not apply to the Indian context if acceptability and accessibility are to be taken seriously in the public sphere, and that a combination of abstract rationality and contextual rationality has to be present. This takes seriously the notion that contextual examples cannot always be universalized and translated into abstract concepts and language. At the same time, it does not mean that context-based examples are simply supporting or adding legitimacy to a universalised social procedural reason. Ali proposes the term deuniversal rationality to understand the dual nature of rationality in the Indian context. He reformulates the two aspects of deuniversal rationality as abstract rationality and experiential rationality. With the help of Merleau Ponty’s theory of the embodied self, in combination with Gopal Guru and Sundar Sarukkai’s theory of how the social sphere translates into embodied experiences, Ali argues that not only critical reflection and consequent articulation but also other aspects of the individual’s public identity namely their embodied experience, cultural conditioning and their emotional aspects of existence must have unrestricted access to the public sphere since these are not subordinated to reason but are fundamental aspects of the individual’s self-identity and hence self-expression in the social sphere. Ali writes that the aim is “to grant an epistemic passage to the lived body to enter as a medium of communication within the public sphere. The lived experience emerges as … a parallel and meaningful category for conducting the debates within the public sphere” (p. 128). Ali argues for the co-originality, to borrow Habermas’ term, of both the abstract component and the lived experience component in making up deuniversal rationality. He hopes this not only allows more people, previously excluded, into the contextual Indian public sphere but also, in recognising that the public sphere is carried as part of the individual’s lived experience, and that these very experiences are accepted as contributions to interactions in the Indian public sphere. While Ali is successful at conceptualizing a thick notion of the Indian public sphere based on deuniversal rationality that equi-prioritizes abstract rationality and lived experience, questions follow about how issues are resolved at the theoretical level when these two components contradict or disagree with each other. This sits in the wider debate about the post-structural turn in philosophy emphasizing that discourse always already happens within certain power relations that not only oppress but also produce individuals. Since Ali’s focus was on expanding who is included in the public sphere, what could possibly be clarified further is how disagreements are to be resolved once everyone is in the public sphere. This is keeping in mind the hyper-mediatized society we live in and the possibility of a fragmented and polarized public sphere that is sometimes clearly visible during discussions pertaining to national identity. Additionally, some readers could argue that according to lived experience unqualified epistemic privilege of expressing the truth complicates matters of intra-group justice and brings up the issue of intersectionality. This is because individuals, while referring to their lived experience hardly ever refer to only themselves as isolated individuals but to the group they see themselves as belonging to and speaking as part of. However, since they are simultaneously part of multiple groups and identities, it becomes important to keep in mind that all these identities affect the articulation of their lived experience and cannot be neatly separated into compartments. These are additional remarks since the intellectual involvement and theoretical rigour with which Ali takes on the ambitious project of theorizing a native Indian public sphere is commendable making the book essential reading for political philosophers, political and social scientists, theorists from the global South and everyone who wishes to understand the complexities involved in thinking about the native. Image-credit: © Yann Forget / Wikimedia Commons

Review of Bhaskarjit Neog's Book Abhishek Anant Nowbagh Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University May 16, 2024 Book review of Bhaskarjit Neog’s book What Responsibility? Whose Responsibility? Intention, Agency, Emotions of Collective Entities (Routledge 2024). The author, Bhaskarjit Neog, in the prologue of this book, provides instances of collective wrongdoing, along with the observation that "one of the reasons behind the disappearance of moral resentment from public memory is the fact that we do not always have a clear understanding of the simple question - who is responsible when a group or collective is held responsible?" (Neog, 2024, p. xiii). The author brings forth the difference between the idea of attributing moral properties to groups and collectives in general everyday moral vocabulary, easily understood in general terms, and the analytical understanding of collective responsibility, which poses serious conceptual problems. When the philosophical analysis of collective responsibility is attempted through the concept of individual moral responsibility, the idea of collective responsibility begins to emerge as a concept that needs extensive discourse. It is this discourse that the author initiates. The book has seven sections: a prologue, five chapters, and an epilogue. The sections take us through an extensive discussion related to collectivizing responsibility through collective intentions, collective agency, and collective emotions. In the first chapter, the author looks into how the structure of moral responsibility, based on the actor’s knowledge and control in individual acts, can be ascribed to collective contexts. Analysing the concept of collectives, he argues that both structured and unstructured collectives can be brought under the concept of moral responsibility. He searches for wider criteria for moral agential status for the collective beyond the argument that does not ascribe moral status to a collective. The second chapter brings forth two approaches to collective responsibility. The first is the collectivist position, which is committed to the reality of collective responsibility. The second is an individualist position that is somewhat non-committal concerning collective responsibility. The author then draws our attention to two specific issues that need to be addressed further: first, concerning the distribution of responsibility among the members of the collective and second, the relationship between individual responsibility on the one hand and the responsibility of collectives on the other. Here, the author proposes an account that "argues for a space where one is required to see things from the collective's point of view without thereby neglecting how things appear for the individuals within the collective concerned" (Neog, 2024, p. 35). He refers to this account which is neither fully collectivistic nor fully individualistic as a quasi-collectivist or non-individualist account. The author then elaborates on the justification of the proposed quasi-collectivist account from three perspectives concerning a collective: intention, agency, and guilt, which leads us to the next three chapters. The third chapter deliberates upon the intentional make-up of collectives. The author discusses the viewpoints of John Searle, Micahel Bratman, Raimo Tuomela, and Margaret Gilbert who have approached collective intentions without any metaphysical entity in their explanation; he expresses his apprehension whether such a view can encompass the understanding of collective moral action or collective moral responsibility. Firstly, he elaborates on the common-sense views about collective intentionality. Secondly, he asks the pertinent question: where does this collective intention, which drives collective action, reside? He addresses this issue by identifying two ways of approaching this concern: taking individuals as a group or taking them as a group of individuals . The author acknowledges that this is a contentious issue that has no easy answers. Thus, he analyses the views of Bratman, Searle, Tuomela, and Gilbert to draw a comprehensive picture of collective intentionality. In this context, the author takes into consideration collectivity, which he terms as the "essence that makes a particular intentional state inherently collective" (Neog, 2024, p. 59), further contemplating upon interrelationality and the collectivity of collective intentions. He argues that genuine collective intentions shall firstly not be overpowered by an authority that takes control over individuals. Secondly, collective intentions shall not completely be dissociated from the individual’s intentions that constitute that collective. This leads to the quasi-collectivist account of collective responsibility. The author explains collective intentions as the intentions of the collective . He argues for collective responsibility as "an independent normative fact with its own sui generic character, and not just an aggregation of the responsibility of the participating individuals", moving towards justifying collective responsibility as the responsibility of collectives. The fourth chapter concerns itself with collectives with an agency of their own. In the previous chapter, he points out that with regard to an individual it is the individual agency that precedes individual intention, but with regard to the collective it is the other way round. Collective agency has been looked through the prism of moral responsibility as being a collective self-being primarily responsible for its actions or outcomes. The author argues for formulating such a collective agency in this chapter. He makes a detailed analysis of the philosophical discourses concerning agency, individual and collective. In his book he argues for a collective agency that is different from the shared agency, which is a single agential unit consisting of multiple individual agents. The author further explains that shared agency is a concept of unity with diversity , but collective agency is unity in diversity . He further connects the normative point raised in the previous chapter with collective agency. This collective agency, the author claims, is crucial for recognizing collective responsibility as the responsibility of the collective per se. The author also considers emotional attitude, with respect to sharing the moral burden, of the collective agency that shall bring forth the complete moral character. This forms the basis of the next chapter. The fifth chapter emphasizes the relationship between morality and emotion. The dominant view in early philosophy was that morality concerns itself with reason, and emotion has no role to play in it. However, recent discussions in philosophy have pointed towards a more intimate relationship between morality and emotion. The author focuses on the emotion of guilt in this chapter to understand how guilt affects moral collective responsibility. There are philosophical approaches that argue that there is no strong connection between an individual’s guilt and her ability to be moral. Another argument categorizes guilt as a negative emotion that has no positive role in shaping morality. The author disagrees with such approaches, stating that "the nature of guilt and its proximity to our moral conscience needs to be understood in a wider context" (Neog, 2024, p. 105), and not based on individual instances. Further, Neog examines the feeling of collective guilt and compares and clarifies its distinction with collective shame: shame is driven by agent-centric reconstruction, but guilt is driven by action-centric reconstruction . Confusion of guilt with regret may occur when we consider collective wrongdoing, but for Neog, regret is a feeling that can occur beyond the direct involvement of an agent in the wrongdoing. He observes that the three approaches to collective guilt feeling , (i) a summation of individual guilt feelings, (ii) a feeling of membership guilt , and (iii) collective feeling of guilt, are not adequate. He offers a fourth alternative to collective guilt that takes into consideration the singularity of agency and the plurality of the experiencing subjects and tries to reconcile these two. It is such an endeavor where collective guilt is, in the singularity context, a feeling of guilt for wrongdoing committed in the name of the collective, and on the other hand, in the plurality context, it is the plurality of the individual members experiencing guilt as contributors to the collective. He terms it as positional guilt feeling that "on the one hand, retains the phenomenological elements in its constitution, on the other, recognizes the importance of collectivity by maintaining a distinction between the singularity of the agency of wrongdoing and the plurality of the experiencing subjects" (Neog, 2024, pp. 117-118). Neog finally argues that when we consider the collective agency, as discussed in the previous chapter, we can very well locate a collective moral agency, with respect to positional guilt feeling. This account of positional guilt feeling helps us understand collective responsibility. The epilogue of the book touches upon a possible assumption on the part of critics that he is subscribing to a conceptual isomorphism between individual wrongdoing and collective wrongdoing. He responds to this criticism by arguing that there can be collective wrongdoings without there being any collective intention. For him an affirmative claim can be made that collective responsibility can be understood through collective intention: given his take on collective intentionality recognises the significance of individuating the phenomena of collectivity so that keeping it away from being an overarching metaphysical superstructure and also tagging along individual intentional attitudes of the members of the collective. This leads the collective to an internal evaluation towards executing a common goal, which results in the collective agency. This collective agency is able to form emotional responses, as articulated by the discussion on guilt. As he puts it, collective guilt is "an emotional state where the referred agent behind the collective wrongdoing is the collective agent itself, although the subjects of such a feeling are the individual members" (Neog, 2024, p. 128). Neog does consider that there may be certain cases where collective wrongdoing does not have a collective intention, such as the problem of global warming. But this does not stop us from taking a retrospective stand on such issues. The book also considers instances where there is no pre-existing collective agent. The example cited is that random strangers helping a person in trouble. For Neog, in such cases, the moral demand for coordinated action can help in forming collective intentional agency, which develops through an internal evaluative perspective that develops a normative standpoint. He claims that philosophical discourse has laid forth the complexity of collective responsibility and his book attempts to "handle some of the knots and tangles of the yarn" (Neog, 2024, p. 132). Collective agency and collective responsibility are issues of utmost significance to philosophers and social scientists, since human existence as a social animal depends upon intricacies related to them, this book deliberates upon issues that matter in the perspective of understanding human co-existence. The extensive detail in which the author has looked into philosophical literature concerning responsibility, intention, agency, and guilt both in the context of the individual and the collective makes this a comprehensive account that is a must-read for everyone interested in individual-collective discourse. The quasi-collectivist account proposed in the book takes this discourse a step further. The wide-ranging use of anecdotes and instances from movies and literature about every pressing issue that this book concerns itself with helps us form a clear understanding of the complex philosophical debates in the backdrop. In this respect, this book can be considered a starting point for unversed readers in the individual-collective debate.

Review of Social Scientists in the Civic Space Shami Ulla Independent Scholar (PhD from University of Delhi) Mar 24, 2025 Book review of the volume Social Scientists in the Civic Space: Ethical Perspectives on Democratic Involvement, edited by Arundhati Virmani, Jean Boutier, and Manohar Kumar (Routledge 2024). Have you ever wondered how social scientists address the practical and ethical challenges of civic space? This excellent edited book will answer your questions and ignite your passion for understanding the role and challenges of social scientists in the civic space. Compiling 15 chapters, this scholarly work motivates us to understand how the complexities of civic space challenge social scientists and how their involvement and detachment shape ethical and political decision-making in various ways. The book holds great academic significance for those who wish to understand the role, challenges, various kinds of pressure (such as political and cultural, etc.), and the relationship between their academic integrity and public responsibility. The book talks about defining ground for civic space, interventions, and involvement of social scientists in civic space for public debate regarding policy-making and decision-making in five principal parts: part one deals with ‘Challenges of the Context’ and consists of chapters 1-3, the part two deals with ‘Interventions in the Civic Space’ and consists of chapters 4-7, the part three deals with ‘Involvement in Public Debates’ and consists of chapters 8-11, the part four deals with ‘Ethical Politics of Democracy’ and consists of chapters 12-14 and the last part five deals with ‘Perspectives’ which consist of chapter 15. The book explores the role of social scientists in civic space and examines four major questions. First, what is civic space, and how do social scientists face the challenges of defining their role within it? Second, should social scientists engage in the public domain, or should they maintain a distance from civic space? Third, how do social scientists balance their dual responsibilities—one as academicians tasked with producing knowledge and the other as civilians who engage in public debates or activism? fourth, in the era of digitalization, how can social scientists protect themselves from misinformation? The book deals with these core questions, contributing significantly to the ongoing debate on the roles and challenges of social scientists in the civic space. To be more specific, Part One of the book Challenges of the Context deals with the historical grounding for civic space. In chapter 1, Jean Boutier discusses the place and role of historians between the two World Wars. The chapter interrogates the historian’s responsibility in times of political instability, economic turmoil, and ideological extremism. Boutier raises the question: should historians’ work remain confined to academia, or do they have a duty to intervene in public affairs? Scholars such as Henri Pirenne, Max Weber, Marc Bloch, and Lucien Febvre provide a nuanced response to political crises ( p. 15). However, the chapter does not provide a clear framework for how modern scholars should navigate this tension in the face of misinformation, climate change, or political extremism that exists in civic space. In Chapter 2, Rouzean explores how a historian became an activist while researching the Rwandan genocide (p. 26). He candidly reflects on his personal biases, uncertainties, and ethical dilemmas, making the chapter a compelling meditation on the responsibilities of historians. As he admits, "I could not shy away from a form of civic commitment that I had so far rejected" (p. 27). However, the chapter leaves an important question unanswered: if writing history objectively is impossible, what ethical standards should historians adopt when engaging with politically charged topics? Despite being deeply reflective and intellectually courageous, the chapter does not fully resolve this issue. In Chapter 3, Virmani discusses the significance of contextual freedom and how nationalistic political pressures hinder the writing of true history. She argues that an activist or social scientist can achieve greater objectivity by maintaining distance and dislocation when researching the history of other countries. According to Virmani, historians from foreign countries may be better positioned to produce unbiased historical narratives, as they are less susceptible to domestic political pressures (p. 55). This perspective suggests that geographical and cultural detachment could help scholars maintain academic objectivity more effectively. Part Two of the book Interventions in the Civic Space deals with what types of interventions are being practiced and the challenges faced by social scientists in the civic space. Intervening in public debate requires a different form of expertise. In chapter 4 , Théry redefines expertise as a balance between scientific rigor, civic engagement, and democratic participation (p. 74). He argues that expertise is not a singular, monolithic practice but rather unfolds across three distinct models—service expertise, consensus expertise, and engagement expertise, which help mediate between knowledge production and civic responsibility (p. 58). In civic responsibility, all experts carry a dual responsibility or identity. For example, economists often function as public figures, as seen in the cases of Manmohan Singh, Mario Monti, Lucas Papademos, John Maynard Keynes, Paul Krugman, and Amartya Sen. Similarly, historians such as Paxton and Ginsborg, shape and enrich public debates through their engagements. (Virmani, 2024, p. 69). In Chapter 5, Virmani explores how public writing is not merely a means of communication, but a democratic responsibility. For example, Balakrishnan’s critique of the Silver Line project in Kerala exemplifies how economists can use their expertise to question state-led development narratives (p. 73). Such interventions demonstrate that economists are not merely technocratic advisors but also active participants in ongoing democratic conversations. In Chapter 6, Ashwani Kumar examines the success and failures of the MGNREGA policy in India, highlighting the realities of six districts. It explores the role of bureaucracy, political clientelism, and local power structures in shaping welfare delivery. Kumar showed that Jalpaiguri (West Bengal) and Tiruvannamalai (Tamil Nadu) implemented innovative solutions, where political competition positively transformed the livelihoods for thousands of workers. However, in other districts like Bagalkote (Karnataka), Seoni (Madhya Pradesh), Nagaur (Rajasthan), and Gaya (Bihar) welfare programs were manipulated by local politicians for vote bank politics. Additionally, the existing upper and lower caste gap hindered equal welfare delivery (p. 86-92). In chapter 7, Trannoy discusses why economists rarely emerge as public intellectuals. Trannoy argues that professional incentives, writing styles, and the technical nature of economic research limit economists' engagement in broader public discourse (p. 100). Thus, the chapter has great virtues, but a question remains: How do digital media and its influence on the dialogue between experts and the public shape economists as public figures? Part Three of the book Involvement in Public Debates deals with how experts and the public influence policy and decision-making. In Chapter 8, Swaminathan presents a critical understanding of India’s food security policies. She evaluates the Public Distribution System (PDS), debates the merits of targeted vs. universal food security, and examines the role of activism in shaping welfare policies ( p. 118). She argues that India’s food security crisis is not caused by food shortages but rather by policy failures and exclusionary welfare mechanisms (p. 123). She makes a strong case for a universal PDS, citing its proven success in states like Tamil Nadu and Chhattisgarh, where it has led to higher food security and reduced corruption. She critiques neoliberal approaches that emphasize targeted welfare and fiscal restraint. In her words, “The shift from universal to targeted PDS has neither led to a reduction in budgetary subsidies nor has it benefited the large majority of food-insecure households in the desired manner” ( p. 127). The chapter could be developed by comparing India’s food security policies with global models such as Brazil’s Bolsa Família or China’s grain distribution system, providing a broader perspective. In chapter 9, Aucante offers a comparative analysis of the role of social scientists in democratic policymaking in Scandinavia and France. Aucante argues that while Scandinavian social scientists engage with the state in a structured manner, their French counterparts are more often positioned as critics, public intellectuals, or independent commentators (p. 138). In chapter 10, Bozon presents a comparative analysis of anti-gender movements in France and Brazil. He explores their emergence, evolution, and how conservative political and religious actors weaponized gender studies, feminism, and LGBTQ+ rights as threats to national identity and social stability (p. 155). In Brazil, Bolsonaro explicitly attacked gender studies and feminist movements, cutting funding for social sciences and promoting a conservative Christian identity as the foundation of national culture. Similarly, in France, mass protests erupted in 2012–2013 against the legalization of same-sex marriage ( Le Mariage pour Tous ), led by conservative Catholic organizations and right-wing intellectuals. French conservatives accused gender scholars of corrupting children, undermining family values, and promoting radical leftist ideologies (p. 159-160). While France’s anti-gender discourse was driven by intellectual and cultural arguments, Brazil’s was more populist and religious, illustrating different pathways to the same ideological goal. In Chapter 11, Rajeshwari argues that civic space is neither neutral nor universally accessible but is shaped by structural inequalities related to gender, caste, class, and religion. Rajeshwari demonstrates how feminist research both critiques and contributes to civic discourse in India. Engaging with major feminist movements, digital activism, and contested public debates, the chapter provides a nuanced exploration of how feminist engagement challenges dominant power structures and expands democratic participation ( p. 165). Part four of the book Ethical Politics of Democracy deals with the role of the knowledge of expertise in the civic space. In chapter 12, Origgi reflects on how expert knowledge interacts with democratic principles, such as equality, neutrality, and legitimacy (p. 182). She raises questions like: Can democracies maintain both respect for expertise and genuine citizen participation, or does reliance on experts inevitably create a knowledge elite that weakens democratic legitimacy? (p. 184). She argues that the legitimacy of expertise is not automatic—it must be continually negotiated through transparency, public debate, and accountability mechanisms. Thus she writes that “Social scientists play a crucial role in mediating between expert and lay knowledge... by advancing new models that give a voice to the needs and values of society” (p. 188). This raises the question of how social media, misinformation, and alternative media platforms influence public perceptions of expertise. In chapter 13, Fatimah, Khan, & Natarajan, discuss data-driven journalism and its challenges. It highlights that journalists and social scientists need data science skills (e.g., coding, statistical modeling, machine learning), yet most professionals lack formal training (p. 197). In chapter 14, Manohar examines the role of civility in democratic discourse and protest movements. Kumar critiques the positions of Rawls and Habermas, arguing that norms of civility often privilege dominant groups while excluding marginalized voices. The chapter critiques the weaponization of civility, showing how it has been used to delegitimize disruptive but necessary movements for justice. Kumar suggests that democratic movements must balance radical disruption with strategic engagement (p. 206). Kumar states, “Disobedience uncovers a dimension of civility not as opposition, but as necessary coexistence that captures the messiness of democratic politics” (p. 216). Part five of the book Perspectives consists of the last chapter, 15. Samaddar discusses the role of social sciences in contemporary governance and policymaking and gives a metaphor of Sisyphus. The chapter questions whether social sciences, in their current form, can still serve a radical, emancipatory function or whether they have become mere tools of administrative governance (p. 222). Kumar argues that due to data-driven social science and research funding influenced by government or corporate interests, social scientists have turned from being social inquirers or whistle-blowers against power to becoming skilled practitioners of a discipline. consequently, the author urges social scientists to rethink their role in civic space (p. 226). The book is significant as it expands discussions on scholars' social roles—Weber’s detachment, Gramsci’s organic intellectuals, and Bourdieu’s public intellectuals—by addressing modern issues like digital misinformation and civic engagement beyond academia. The book explores emerging engagements like data journalism, grassroots activism, and ethical challenges in digital scholarship. The book links classical theories to modern knowledge production, showing how scholars navigate ethical dilemmas in today’s public sphere. This book aligns with Medvetz’s Think Tanks in America (2012) on expert policymaking influence and Calhoun’s Social Science for Public Knowledge (2008) on broader scholarly engagement. This book takes a global, interdisciplinary approach to ethical dilemmas in digital spaces, complementing Melzer’s The Public Intellectual: Between Philosophy and Politics (2003) by examining activism versus neutrality. The book excels in presentation. Boutier’s chapter advocates balancing public engagement and neutrality, but his historical analysis lacks a modern framework for misinformation. Rajeshwari’s chapter challenges detachment in structural inequalities. Fatimah, Khan, and Natarajans’ chapter stresses data skills but overlooks AI’s driven ethical risks. The book also misses a systematic Global North-South comparison. The book lacks discussion on social scientists in authoritarian regimes and underrepresents scholars in Africa and Latin America. It also overlooks AI-driven misinformation, surveillance, and algorithmic governance. The book could improve with chapters on social scientists under authoritarian regimes, AI’s role in civic engagement, and a Global South vs. North comparison approach to civic engagement. Adding participatory action research (PAR) would highlight scholar-community collaboration for impactful social science. Addressing these gaps would have enriched its analysis and provided a more comprehensive view of public scholarship today. Overall, the book Social Scientists in the Civic Space Ethical Perspectives on Democratic Involvement provides a thoughtful and valuable resource for students, researchers, and policymakers engaged in public domain research. The book successfully achieves its objectives, offering contextually relevant examples and ethical dilemmas that social scientists encounter in the civic space. References Calhoun, Craig. "Social science for public knowledge." Academics as public intellectuals (2008): 299-318. Medvetz, Thomas. Think tanks in America . University of Chicago Press, 2012. Melzer, Arthur M., Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman, eds. The public intellectual: between philosophy and politics . Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.

Muzaffar Ali In conversation with Varun S Bhatta (Assistant Professor, HSS, IISER Bhopal) July - August 2021 Muzaffar Ali (mamalla[AT]unipune.ac.in | younusmalla[AT]gmail.com) is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Savitribai Phule Pune University, Pune, India. He received M.Phil and PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Prior to joining Savitribai Phule Pune University, he taught philosophy at Hindu College, University of Delhi. He specializes in social and political philosophy and contemporary Indian philosophy with an emphasis on the idea of the public sphere and its normative implications in the Indian context. He is a DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst) scholar and has published in prestigious journals such as JICPR, Sophia, Culture and Dialogue, and Journal of World Philosophies. A co-edited volume, The Imbecile's Guide to Public Philosophy (2021) is published by Routledge. Varun : Muzaffar, let us start this interview by knowing a bit about your personal history. Can you please tell us where are you from? What about your earlier education and interests? Muzaffar : I am from Kashmir and studied there till my Bachelors in 2008. While my education (up to HSC) took place around my village, I moved to Srinagar city for Bachelors in 2006. My primary education took place at a school next door of which ours was the first batch. I need to mention that we were lucky to get quality education at our primary stage in education and much of the credit goes to the then collective of teachers at this school. Quite interestingly, it was my failure to secure a seat in the State MBBS entrance examination which marked my shift to Social Sciences for my Bachelors; more specifically to Psychology! The shift was initiated through advice from some close friends who were of the view that I can do better with human psychology than human physiology! Interesting to hear about the rural educational experiment. Probably, if we have time, would like to know more about this initiative and how it is doing at present. Also, fascinated to know about the twist of fate: from physiology to psychology! How was your Bachelors’? Curious to know how and why you transited from psychology to philosophy. The school was a community initiative within our village to provide quality education as an alternative to the State-run schools. However, within a matter of two decades, the shift in primary education was more towards a neo-liberal one, one where paradoxically entrepreneurship and education are supposed to share the plate! Gradually my school had a strange death as it could not withstand the shift. At the college, the social science stream (as it was then called) was offered in clubbed subjects and one had to choose one such club. With an eye on psychology, I happened to choose a club that had philosophy in it. And you won’t believe within the first year itself when I studied Greek Philosophy, I was fascinated to the core. I straight away decided that philosophy is what I am going to pursue. At the college, we hardly had teachers who could teach philosophy and I struggled to finish my undergraduate studies. I got help from a few friends who had either studied philosophy or were interested in it. A gentleman who had retired as a Govt officer but had done post-graduation in philosophy in the 70s helped a lot. The boat somehow sailed through. Once my undergraduation was over, I did not apply to any other subject as I knew philosophy awaits me somewhere. Can you tell us what aspects of philosophy caught your attention during the first encounter? In my first encounter with philosophy at college, I was handed W T Stace’s introductory book on Greek Philosophy. The moment I started going through it, the metaphysical questions raised by the early Greek philosophers captivated me. It was as if these philosophers (Thales, Pythagoras, Anaximenes, Heraclitus etc) were eager at capturing the ‘ultimate reality’ at a conceptual level. The evolution of Greek philosophy with Plato and Aristotle talking about a kind of moral nature of politics was not only interesting but refreshing as well. Unfortunately, the syllabus during those days was based on the Indian-Western binary (and it still carries much of that baggage). The binary-based curriculum did not allow us to move to the specifics of any particular tradition at the college level. Before we move on, do you remember the name of this retired government officer and any information about him? Want to imagine this person...who does post-graduation in philosophy (in the 1970s), joins a government job and at the same time assists students! As far as I remember, he was a retired horticulture officer who had done his MA at Aligarh Muslim University during the early 1970s. After his MA, he had even got an opportunity to move abroad for further studies in philosophy after securing a fellowship. However, he decided to move back to Kashmir and do a government job instead. Actually, since there were few or no teachers of philosophy available, colleges used to hire him after his retirement to teach and assist students. At times, he would not even be paid, but he would still continue to assist students like me at an informal level. I can’t remember his exact name as of now, though we fondly called him Malik Sahab. Wonder why the person did not pursue higher studies. Coming back to you, what happened after your undergraduate degree? Looks like you were clear about pursuing a Master's in philosophy. How did that go? I applied to two universities for my Master’s: Panjab University Chandigarh (PU) and Hyderabad Central University (HCU). However, as fate would have it I had to join Panjab University as the selection letter from HCU wouldn’t reach me on time due to the 2009 agitation in Kashmir following the Asia-Neelofar rape case. Interestingly the Dept at PU was imbibed with a sense of openness and seriousness for philosophy. It had a charged and vibrant atmosphere with weekly seminars, discussion groups and Professors took a keen interest in offering pedagogical clarity during and after lectures. That training gradually played its part in shaping my research interests. Dr Lallan Baghel who currently heads the Dept prodded us to submit abstracts to attend seminars and conferences at the national level. Informal discussions on concepts related to classical Indian philosophy and other subjects were a routine exercise. I fondly call the Dept as being my stepping stone as it became a platform for me to have a glimpse of global philosophy. From Habermas to Daya Krishna, Dharmakirti to Jayanta Bhatta, Husserl to Deleuze, Foucault to Chantal Mouffe, I got acquainted with a diverse range of philosophers and concepts. In essence, the groundwork for my research interests was done and the imperative need was to shape and cultivate it further. With this ground set, how did you proceed further? I secured admission to the integrated M.Phil-Ph.D programme at the Centre for Philosophy, Jawaharlal Nehru University. The Centre was small at that time and I completed my M.Phil in 2013 with my focus on the concept of sovereignty within the “Deterritorial Empire”; a concept put forward by the Political Philosophers Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt. It was during my M.Phil that I figured out that not much work is being done in the realm of political philosophy from the perspective of the Indian context. The trigger was an essay by Bhiku Parekh, “The Poverty of Indian Political Theory.” It occurred to me that the philosophical domain is overwhelmed by a kind of Western captivity which if I borrow from K. C. Bhattacharya can be considered as a part of ‘cultural subjugation.’ I was not thinking of closing myself to the West and becoming a nativist. Rather I seriously started to interrogate into the blind deployment of notions and theories that have origins in the West. The lament was that even Indian political theory is not able to offer anything beyond a certain point. After a lot of reading and discussions with faculty at JNU and outside, I was sure that my PhD research topic has to focus on this often neglected problem. Muzaffar (far left) along with his friends in Mumbai University, attending the Afro-Asian Philosophy conference (2010). I can relate to the tension between the west and Indian that one encounters while practising philosophy in India. I want to delve more into the points you mention and hear in detail. Before that, let us complete the current strand of conversation. Please tell us about your PhD research. Since I had a bit of clarity about the wider context of my research problem, I chose to understand the imagined Indian public sphere in normative terms by evaluating the Habermasian conceptualization(s) of the public sphere. The title is, “Understanding Indian Public Sphere through a Critique of Jurgen Habermas.” In my research, I didn’t evaluate or inquire into the Indian situation from the vantage point of Habermas’s normative idealization of the public sphere. Rather I employed the contemporary Indian situation as my standard measure of evaluation and inquiry into Habermas. The methodological insight for this inquiry is based on Samvada as propounded by two contemporary Indian philosophers, Daya Krishna and M. P. Rege. Among other issues, a major issue that I argue about is that the concept of rationality -- be it the enlightenment one or the communicative rationality, which shoulder the shifts and evolution of the Habermasian public sphere -- is inherently insufficient to be deployed for the understanding of Indian public sphere. As an alternative, I propose the concept of contextual rationality, as propounded by B. K. Matilal and others can be ‘finetuned’ and used for understanding and envisioning the normative conceptualization of the Indian public sphere. The fine-tuning involves the possibility of replacing the ‘illustrational’ component in the classical model of contextual rationality with the notion of ‘lived experience’ as a viable vector of meaning for a shared discourse within the public sphere. I may add that the project is still a work in progress even after I have completed my PhD and I look forward to putting it in the public domain soon. I can see how you in the PhD research successfully attempted to come up with a novel Indian political theory by making the existing concepts/theories have a conversation with the Western ones. As a person who has not delved into political philosophy, I want some clarification about your research domain and the project. (i) In what ways do you think the Indian public sphere differs from the Harbemasian one? (ii) And, even though you have clarified that you are not a nativist, but do you think concepts developed in the Indian context (like Matilal’s contextual rationality) have better conceptual compatibility to explain Indian phenomena (like the Indian public sphere)? To put it briefly, I can say that a public sphere’s publicness is to be theoretically gauged by the in-principle access it offers to individuals who intend to participate in it. The overemphasis on the concept of rationality by Habermas, (as I M Young, Nancy Fraser, and others charge) becomes an obstacle for that in-principle accessibility itself. The reason being that Habermas creates a procedural format to conduct the critical-rational debates within the public sphere. A simple way of putting this point is this. Think of a situation where matters of caste discrimination are to be discussed by everyone apart from the one’s who suffer it, primarily because they are not able to speak in the language and format as demanded by the Habermasian public sphere. The Indian public sphere, if we can imagine and theorize one, cannot simply rely on or overemphasize procedural rationality alone. While on one hand, the Indian public sphere needs to resolve the problem of accessibility and operationalize it through an alternative format and procedure for debate within it. On the other hand, such operationalization should not dilute its normative potential which may otherwise end up making it redundant. Coming to your second question, the notion of contextual rationality looks promising on these fronts if reworked and employed in an appropriate way. Matilal himself draws on the Nyaya conception of debate and makes sure that contextual rationality as an operative within debates satisfies the needs and demands of participants. While doing that, the in-principle accessibility option for the general public who can become participants is kept intact by making illustrations and examples a necessary ingredient of contextual rationality. So while the arguments cater to the debaters’ demands, the parallel woven examples and illustrations cater to the general public who are potential (not actual) participants in the debate. I play with this illustrational component to make it more tenable for an imagined Indian public sphere so that contestations present within our society can be properly responded to, at least at a theoretical level. I do not strictly adhere to the compatibility issue in my research. But at the same time, I am of the opinion that concepts developed within a certain context do share a kind of fetal relation with the context itself. And it is necessary that we as doers of philosophy underline the existence of such relation. I like the way you put it - “fetal relation”. Are there any works (published, forthcoming, work-in-progress) on the above topic that one can read? Please do also introduce us to your other research works. Yes, there are a few. Up to now, I have been more concerned about the Contemporary Indian philosophical strand of my research. In 2017, as part of a collaboration, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions: Daya Krishna on Counterposition and Dialogue ” was published in the journal Culture and Dialogue. I took it a bit further in 2018 with “ Indian Philosophy and Ethics: Dialogical Method as a Fresh Possibility” published in Sophia. The first treatment of the Social and political arena within my research is part of an upcoming co-edited volume, The Imbecile’s Guide to Public Philosophy published by Routledge. The volume is going to be out by September 2021. Apart from this, I have written a few articles on Contemporary Indian philosophers such as Margaret Chatterjee and Feminist Philosophy. Apart from the publications, I have been occupied with the malestream nature of philosophy as a discipline. I did a project under the UGC’s University with Potential for Excellence grant at my university so that the relationship between patriarchy and philosophy can be studied. The findings of the study are available as an occasional paper published by the University. Taking the focus on this question forward, I and a few colleagues from Universities in India founded the Collective for Women Philosophers in India last year. The CWPI is a voluntary effort to study the gender gap within Indian philosophical academia from multiple methodological perspectives. To begin with, we have started interviewing Women philosophers based in India to understand their perspectives on the nature and extent of the gender gap in Philosophy. We look forward to taking it further with collaborations and projects on national as well as international levels. Given that you have been through the various stages of academic philosophy, and have dabbled not only with regular academic activities (like teaching and research) but also proactively attempting to address some of the problems of the discipline, what has been your experience of doing philosophy in India? Let us (for the moment) separate doing philosophy in India into two categories; studying philosophy and practising philosophy. As far as studying philosophy is concerned, we get exposed to a lot of non-Indian philosophies, thanks to the evolution of Indian academics post-colonial influence. Unfortunately, this exposure is not symmetry-based and deep down the Indian-Western binary is inherent to it. In other words, it seems that colonial authority has paved the way to a kind of epistemic authority within philosophical discourses. If this exposure was founded on a principle of epistemic symmetry then the condition of philosophy as a discipline may have been altogether different. The asymmetry is bound to shape the practice of philosophy as well. It leaves the practitioners of philosophy with a conundrum of being faithful to both traditions simultaneously. Most of us, I think, remain entangled with solving this conundrum throughout our careers, and my experience is of similar nature. I find it difficult to strike a balance between the two traditions given the fact that the Indian-Western binary has been foundational to my career as well. J. L. Mehta, Daya Krishna, J. N. Mohanty, Ramchandra Gandhi, Margaret Chatterjee are examples of India based philosophers who have suffered this conundrum and attempted to find a way (whether successfully or unsuccessfully is a different question altogether) out of it. Honestly speaking, I am inquisitively searching this forest to look for a way out of it. Another characteristic problem within our philosophical circles is the lack of dialogue within. Much of the communication is limited to friendly circles and senior fellows. Young scholars and researchers hardly get opportunities to interact with each other. With regard to the last point you mentioned, what are the critical difficulties and concerns you think that the community of young philosophy scholars in India encounters? And what initiatives and steps we can proactively take to tackle these? One of the major predicaments that we face is to prove that philosophy is (still) relevant. I think a young philosophy professional is used to facing questions and doubts regarding the relevance and use of philosophy every now and then. The doubts do not emerge from a vacuum. Rather the general atmosphere, academic as well as non-academic, is bulldozed by a technocratic and positivist invasion which leaves very little scope for a sustained train of thought. Further, the instrumental nature of education plays a role in sidelining criticality and inquisitiveness. It falls on us to either submit to the onslaught or to keep up the ante. Our predecessors have not witnessed a difficulty of such magnitude, I believe. There are a few administrative and academic hardships as well. Administratively, there is hardly any scope for a young professional to receive focused impetus from the national councils such as the ICPR or ICSSR to sponsor research stays in acclaimed institutions. ICPR has senior fellowships among others, but I hardly find it offering a special young faculty program. Academically, it becomes difficult for any young scholar in India to share and have a conversation on his/her work. The reason is the attitude that “senior is better” which I think needs to be revisited. It is quite easy for anyone to get a senior professor’s inputs on research and teaching, but very hard (almost impossible) to get a shared or even contested view from peers. We have to figure out alternatives, such as having platforms and collectives like IPN, CWPI, etc., to communicate with each other and share works of interest. While the academic part of this difficulty has to be resolved by us and the senior colleagues in philosophy academia, the administrative one has to be sorted elsewhere. One of the challenges that I constantly encounter as an academic philosopher is the guilt of doing philosophy only in English and not doing enough of it in my mother tongue (Kannada). Even though this question resonates with the India-vs-West problem that we discussed above, they are different. Working in one’s provincial language is a way the philosopher connects to his/her immediate locale. Thought of asking your thoughts on this as I want to know what does asking this question in the context of Kashmir entail? The question is both important and interesting. The vernacular medium definitely offers a lived way of doing philosophy (or for that matter any discipline which is articulation and argumentation centric). I would have preferred to get schooled in the Kashmiri language. But alas, English as a “language of power” has so permeated our being that during my schooling Kashmiri was not even a subject in the curriculum. Even now, after being introduced, it is taken quite casually. The result of sheer neglect towards the vernacular languages has been quite drastic. We are more like hybrids. Now that I am based in Pune, a cursory comparison makes me feel that English is more commonly deployed in the northern states. States like Maharashtra, Bengal have (to a good extent) managed to preserve their vernacular languages. On a different note, while English distances me from my immediate locale, it simultaneously brings the outer world closer to me. It (as if through its sheer power) throws the world open to me, and that needs to be underlined. Somehow, we forgot to strike a balance between the openness that English offers and the belongingness that the vernacular bestows. Thanks for pointing out how vernacular and cosmopolitan languages can complement each other. Having discussed the various hurdles and characteristics of Indian academics, I want to know how all of these have come to shape your pedagogy. How do you think philosophy should be taught in India? My pedagogy has indeed been shaped by this tumultuous-yet-interesting experience. I have made it a point to rid the courses (that I teach) from the sweeping Indian-Western binaries. The courses now have a mix of Indian and non-Indian philosophers without any underlined segregation. I hope that helps free the caged bird. Second, since philosophy is a vast discipline and in India, it has been more involved with the history of philosophy, I make sure that contemporary scholars across the wider social sciences get their place (at least) in my teaching. Coming to your second question, I am of the view that we need to teach ‘philosophy as philosophy’ without reducing it to spiritual enterprise, religious conservatism or other comprehensive doctrines. The argumentative value inherent to philosophy, its inquisitiveness to interrogate, its inclination to offer and sustain critique need to be the vectors of teaching and doing philosophy.

Philosophy Education and Job Competencies Nishant Kumar Assistant Professor, Joy University (Tirunelveli, India) Nov 6, 2022 I recently switched to one private University in Tamil Nadu - Joy University. I had been assigned to frame the curriculum and course structure for BA Philosophy. While framing the curriculum, I stuck with a few questions that I thought to discuss with Indian Philosophy Network (IPN) members. Therefore in the IPN mailing, I raised a few questions in the hope to receive some responses. The questions were: what is the current trend in the job market, and how an undergraduate Philosophy student could easily get a job? Is there a job apart from academics and research for Philosophy UG students? If a Philosophy student has to go into journalism, law, HR, consultancy, etc., then why shouldn’t the student will study journalism, law, etc. respectively, and get a degree in that particular subject, instead of studying a few years of Philosophy? How Philosophy as a subject could generate jobs? These questions strike some IPN members as important to be discussed. In this regard, I acknowledge here sincere thanks to Sudakhya, Jobin Mathew Kanjirakkat, Mohan K Pillai, Siddharth, and Varun for discussing with me and giving me insight on these questions. While framing these questions, I thought that these questions would again land up to the fundamental question about philosophy - "what is philosophy?". Bertrand Russell has answered it as the love of wisdom whereby wisdom is having a comprehensive picture of reality. However, the sentence "comprehensive picture of reality" is contentious and raises further questions. How do we get a comprehensive picture without experiencing all the aspects of life? Suppose, I am a poor philosopher that earns so little that I can hardly sustain myself. However, I have been given a task to explain the life of a rich person. Can I be able to provide a comprehensive picture of a rich person without experiencing that life? Can I be able to know "what it is like to be a rich person"? Is it meant that we can never be able to provide a comprehensive picture because of our limitation to experience various aspects of life? If that would be the case, does philosophical knowledge get reduced to knowing some buzzwords, which upon hearing by common people would create an impression that philosophers are 'intellectual' persons? Is philosophy just about discussing random thoughts? Or does philosophy have some practical relevance in our day to day life? For Jobin, who is an independent philosophy scholar, the aim of philosophy is to "clarify the ideas and develop a reasonable concern for our fellow human and non human beings. Business or job-providers, on the other hand, are interested in increasing production, consumption and profits." Jobin’s statement consists of two parts (a) aim of philosophy (b) aim of job providers. Jobin has nicely summed up the aim of philosophy that having philosophical skill helps to understand various ideas in a much better manner than not having that skill. Further, by studying philosophy we would get exposure to ethical theories and thereby would be concerned for sentient beings. However, I am unsure why Jobin wants to completely differentiate the aim of philosophy from the aim of job-providers. If we differentiate it completely without considering "what it is like to be a job-provider" we are certainly restricting ourselves to know one aspect of life, i.e. aspect of a job-provider. This is because, to know about what it is like to be a job-provider, entrepreneur, business person, etc. we have to experience that state. Then only we could explain what it is like to be that person. Maybe Jobin’s view to differentiate the two aims is to point that the primary objective of philosophy is not to generate jobs and further there is less probable chance that an undergrad in philosophy could land up in high paying jobs. However, this does not seem implied from his other statement- "if an undergraduate [philosophy] program can include components of relevant aspects of business and environmental studies, it will be very helpful I think." This statement of Jobin conveys that if we will study philosophy through integrating other subjects then the importance of studying philosophy will increase among those students who want to get immediate jobs after their undergrad. The similar view is also maintained by Mohan, Sudakhya, and Siddharth. Mohan, a Trainee Counselling Psychologist, believes that learning only philosophy without integrating with other subjects or skill does not help undergrad students. He said "I do not think majoring purely in philosophy is of merit to students." Majoring purely in philosophy "does not equip you with a marketable skill, it does not familiarize you with a domain of work, it does not even give you a generic skill like teaching." However, "philosophy is an invaluable companion to other subjects". It equips ones "with the basic tools and exposure to reason and deeply understands the foundations and processes of any subject." For him, by studying philosophy we would develop self-reflecting skills as he said "philosophy offers a powerful set of tools to navigate the confusion and trials of young adulthood — where one is at that crucial phase of questioning, figuring out, and reconciling existential questions." In terms of getting a high paying job, his opinion is to combine philosophy with other subjects/domains/disciplines. This will, as he argued, "really elevate a person’s job success, and more importantly, life satisfaction." A similar opinion is also maintained by Sudakhya, a research scholar at University of Delhi. She suggests to include more subjects of applied philosophy in a curriculum of undergrad philosophy course. Her suggestion included "Philosophy of Technology, Ethical implications of IT, Business ethics/Corporate ethics, Philosophy of Law, Philosophical Counseling". According to her, these courses will help to "build practical skills" that are required in a job market. Siddharth, a philosophy faculty at Sai University, thinks the nature of philosophy is "to look beyond the immediately useful". That is, the primary aim of Philosophy course is to transcend the practical living and hence not to get involved in jobs, as he said- "I do not mean that a UG in philosophy is not likely to help you find jobs, but that this is not the primary aim of the programme". One question can arise here; isn't any phenomenon would have more than one primary aim? If it is so, why not studying philosophy courses would have two primary aims - (a) to look beyond the immediately useful (b) get a job. Why should we simply reject the practical way of living as not one of philosophy’s primary aims? I requested Siddharth to reply on this question. He responded that his comment "philosophy often seeks to look beyond the immediately useful" should not mean that philosophy does not "helps us transcend practical living and hence not get involved in jobs". Instead, it should be implied that philosophy wants us "to look beyond the immediate, to reflect on the practical (including jobs)." This last statement does not contrast with my viewpoint that philosophy course would have two aims. Furthermore, Siddharth thinks that philosophy is an important and crucial tool to help us in living in this world, and also as far as jobs and careers are concerned. This is because, philosophy can provide certain skills like "(a) reasoning in a systematic manner, (b) identifying concepts and assumptions the underlie issues, which trains them to be better at identifying problems and thinking about alternatives, and (c) an ability to organize their communication in a clear manner (especially written communication)." These skills "together be called critical thinking and communication skills." I agree with Siddharth that studying philosophy courses equips us with critical thinking and communication skills, which are essential skills for any student. According to Varun, who is a philosophy faculty at IISERB, there are two ways of thinking about the relation between philosophy and the job opportunities: (1) jobs specifically/traditionally associated with the discipline of philosophy and (2) the role of philosophy for any kind of profession. The often mentioned criticism of the discipline entailing a few choices of professions arises when we focus on just (1). Indeed, at present, we have only a limited set of imaginations of being a professional philosopher. Now, is this a "problem" or a "feature" of the discipline? Also, other Humanities and Social Science disciplines -- like literature, history and anthropology -- share these narrow possibilities of professionalism when compared to sciences and engineering. (Here, Mohan points that other Humanities and Social Sciences degrees, unlike philosophy, do offer the job opportunities as school teachers and researchers at think-tanks and other NGOs. This is yet to happen for philosophy degree holders.) Varun, thus, thinks that the job entailments should not be decided only based on (1). In contrast to this, when we consider point (2), we see that philosophy -- unlike any other discipline -- is in fact useful to a wide and diverse range of professions. Critical thinking and argumentative skills, exposure to ethics, and other philosophical perspectives are essential in every profession. Sketech by Nishant Kumar I agree with Varun and Siddharth that by studying philosophy courses, a student would be able to equip themselves with 'critical thinking and communication skills', or in short 'philosophical skills'. A philosophy student not only learns how to articulate a particular problem succinctly, but can also provide new arguments or can find the fallacies in existing arguments of any idea. However, I disagree with Siddharth that the primary aim of philosophy is not to get into a job. Instead, I strongly think that one of the primary aims of philosophy is to get into a job (a) to sustain itself (b) to get the experience of one aspect of reality, i.e. being into a job or to know ‘what it is like to be in that job’. Now two questions arise that (a) how a philosophy student can compete with other discipline/branch students to get hired by a company (b) how a company will profit by hiring a philosophy student. My opinion is that a philosophy undergrad student must take any kind of basic technical skills of their choice after their undergrad or during their undergrad to become a first preference for any company. Philosophy undergrad students will definitely learn faster because of having thinking skills that they acquired during their undergraduate program. With that technical skill they can easily get hired by any company that works in that technical domain. After getting hired, they must ensure that they will go through a training program of that job profile so that they will understand the job profile in a much better manner. With the experience of training program in company, having acquired technical skills, and having philosophical skills they can be a true asset for that company. This is because, a philosophy student with their knowledge of different cultures can understand the user demand of a product, and can explain succinctly to the team members for improvisation and innovation of any product, and can lead the team effectively. With their technical skills they can improvise a product and also can innovate new products as per the user demand. Although a philosophy student will be an asset for a company, I am skeptical that a philosophy student will stay forever in one company for the job. As Siddharth has mentioned that one of the aim of philosophy is to transcend practical living, I think that a philosophy student will definitely continuously switch to other companies to know various aspect of practical living or will go into research to find the comprehensive picture of reality.

Traditional vs Colonial: Navigating Dichotomies of Philosophy in India Ankita Kushwaha and Megha Kapoor PhD scholars, Jawaharlal Nehru University and Delhi University (respectively) and Teaching Fellows, Sai University Dec 14, 2023 The realm of philosophy in India has diverse thinking traditions reflecting a blend of orthodox, heterodox, and various local cultural ideologies. Contemporary scholars find themselves caught in a pronounced dichotomy in the engagement with traditions, primarily shaped by historical forces. They are either charged for aligning with glorifying traditional concepts or critiqued for viewing the tradition through a colonial lens. Here, we seek to explore the challenges faced by contemporary philosophers of India while engaging with the philosophical concepts embedded in various traditional sources. We argue that in engaging with these concepts, philosophers are required to address the challenges posed by the above-mentioned dichotomous relationship. Moreover, as we navigate this dichotomy, our primary purpose is to stress the importance of thoroughly looking into traditional ideas. Noteworthily, in many instances, scholars accept the text without critical analysis and provide justifications that contribute to the glorification. In light of this, our primary objective is to emphasise an urgent need for a more rigorous and discerning philosophical inquiry that furthers the development of a more detailed understanding of the traditional ways of thinking. The Importance of Engaging with Traditional Ideologies How we perceive ourselves individually and socially is impacted by the environment in which we are born and grow. Any theorisation, therefore, cannot be in isolation. The theorisation must have an understanding of our traditions and local norms; at the same time, it must encompass our present lived experiences (Guru and Sarukkai 2012). Understanding various traditional sources is essential because they encompass the lived experiences of the past, which continue to shape our present experiences. The term "traditional" is often used to describe generational practices, values, and customs. These sources manifest in classical texts, typically composed in dominant languages like Sanskrit and Persian (Chandhoke 2019, 80), offering well-structured and organised insights into tradition. These local thoughts are embedded in diverse forms such as stories, folklore, fables, songs, and other cultural expressions. They not only provide a window into the historical aspects of a particular geographical location and community but also incorporate contemporary elements unique to their context. The recent discussion regarding the decolonisation of philosophy in India operates under the assumption that the colonisers have influenced the philosophical perspective. It necessitates a decolonisation effort to address the burden of Western thought that hinders the accurate representation of Indian intellectual traditions. However, the blame on colonisation from the perspective of Brahminism needs to be revisited. When colonisation occurred, Brahmins, well-versed in Sanskrit and holding higher positions, assisted the colonisers in shaping a new understanding of India, which led to the emergence of a form of Hindu philosophy that was dominantly Sanskritised, further resulting in the under-representation of thoughts from other traditions. Interestingly, despite being practised by a small portion of the population, Brahmanism managed to establish a subcontinental identity. Its popularity can be attributed to its ritual functions, ceremonies, and the adoption of Sanskrit as a common language (Thapar 1989, 209–231). The Dichotomy of Traditional vs Colonial The texts and ideologies of India represent various philosophical thoughts that provide insight into the intricate fabric of Indian society. Engaging with these texts and ideologies in a contemporary context allows for a deeper understanding of cultural heritage, providing a platform for critical dialogue. While acknowledging their historical roots, scholars must avoid absolutism to promote further an evaluative approach accommodating evolving perspectives. Therefore, in contemporary times, a conscious effort exists to critique colonial impact on philosophy in India by reviving and re-evaluating indigenous thought systems. However, the challenge lies in avoiding oversimplification and essentialisation. This task becomes even more complex, considering that many Indian intellectuals predominantly come from upper-caste backgrounds. This background gives them a privilege that does not necessitate them to critically examine their inherited traditions (Nanda 2010, 185). Consequently, this lack of critical examination from a segment of the intellectual elite further complicates the nuanced process of re-evaluating and revitalising philosophical traditions in India in the post-colonial context. This issue can be explored more closely by delving into the Mahabharata scholarship. When scholars discuss Mahabharata[1] as a foundational text for the Indian subcontinent, their use of terminologies and explanations may suggest that it is the greatest epic of all time for India. However, it is crucial to ask for whom it holds this esteemed position. Edward Dimock describes Mahabharata as the "founding library of Brahmin-Indian civilization," emphasising its role as an encyclopedia covering history, legend, edification, religion, art, drama, and morality specific to that civilisation (Dimock 1974, 53). Janaky adds another layer to this perspective, highlighting how the Bhrgus or Brahmins asserted authority over social, political, and moral realms not by controlling princes but through their influence on Mahabharata scholarship (Janaky 1992, 1997–1999). Overlooking this aspect universalises Mahabharata as a text for all, whereas, as Ambedkar points out, sacred texts of India contain a social philosophy responsible for the degradation of non-Brahmins (Ambedkar 2019, 393-395). Ambedkar further criticises the insufficient critical engagement with sacred literature, emphasising the detrimental impact of two contrasting attitudes: the uncritical commendation by a Brahmin scholar and the unsparing condemnation by a non-Brahmin. Both approaches, according to Ambedkar, hinder the progress of historical research ( ibid , 393). The disadvantage of such an approach is that either they miss the regressive ideas or articulate them in an oversimplified manner that ultimately glorifies the regressive Brahminical ideas. Therefore, there is a need for a more nuanced and critical examination of sacred texts to understand their implications on social history in the true sense. Moreover, another aspect of evaluation exists where scholars discard or appropriate various conceptions of Mahabharata because of evaluating certain aspects of the text from a colonial lens. For instance, German Indoligists interpreted Mahabharata as "framing Brahmans as 'priests,' and presenting themselves as reformers and liberators, while they collaborated with the Prussian (and later, Nazi) state" (Adluri 2016). As a response, a group of scholars in contemporary philosophy in India talk about the need for the revival of Indian traditional and religious thought. They hold that the modern liberal framework for conceptualising Indian society is the product of colonialism, as that has constantly undermined the significance of Indian traditional and religious thoughts. De Roover argues that even though liberalism "presents itself as a freestanding conception independent from any comprehensive doctrines or substantive conceptions of the good… [but] it continues to depend on a conception of the person and human social life that secularises protestant Christian ideas by transforming them into the topoi of political thought" (De Roover 2015, 237). Thus, he emphasises that Western liberal categories of thinking are not fruitful in conceptualising Indian society and polity as they are from different historical and political contexts. Even though the revival is significant and decolonisation requires discarding the underlying colonial mindset, the problem arose because of a similar pattern. There has been a constant effort to derive the themes or subjects of political thought from traditional ideas.[2] This pattern constrains critical engagement that further ends in accusing all liberal concepts as irrelevant to the Indian context (Nandy 1988, 189) merely because they are the products of Western civilisation (De Roover 2015, 234-239). Contrary to this, Patel says there is a need to engage with tradition without romanticising the past. She also emphasises that it should not also be a denial of all modern concepts. Thus, Patel emphasises a decolonial approach, which is "not a retrieval of premodern assessments that would consist of a folkloric affirmation of the past, nor an antimodern project of the kind put forward by conservative, right-wing, populist or fascist groups, nor a postmodern project that would deny modernity and would critique all reason" (Patel 2020, 10-11). Further, she suggests that there is a need for a new approach to social theorisation that critiques the Western conceptual framework through the inclusion of the experiences of the people. Additionally, the problem in reviving the traditional ideas is that India today no longer has the same structure as it used to have earlier. Various traditional concepts are not relevant in the theorisation of contemporary society. It is crucial today to theorise the contemporary issues along with the lived experiences of the ordinary masses. At the same time, we cannot accept the colonial framework without analysing its relevance to the lived experiences of the masses. When accepted without critical analysis, a philosophical inquiry may result in the glorification of either of the categories (traditional or liberal). The need is to not unquestioningly accept or discredit the traditional norms as well as the liberal frameworks of thinking altogether. Conclusion Navigating the dichotomies of glorification of tradition vs colonial mindsets presents a challenge for contemporary scholars. The revival of philosophy in India should not be limited to a mere glorification of tradition but should involve critical analysis that engages with the complexity and dynamism of the philosophical heritage. Therefore, a few critical questions arise in the discourse of philosophy today: what approach is suitable for philosophy in India? How can we decolonise philosophy without glorifying the past? What are its challenges? How will these challenges be resolved? Answering these questions necessitates a deep understanding of the challenges posed by the dichotomy. Hence, further research is imperative to engage with these intricate philosophical inquiries, offering a more comprehensive approach to the decolonisation of philosophy in India. [1] In reference to the Mahabharata, it’s important to note that there are multiple versions. Here, we specifically refer to the ancient Mahabharata of Krishna Dvaipayana, also known as Veda Vyasa. Our focus, in this context, pertains solely to the philosophical aspects of the text. [2] As de Roover argues that liberal ideas are the topoi of Protestant Christian ideas, various Indian political concepts are also topoi of Indian Tradition. For instance, in Gandhi’s thought, secularism refers to sarvadhrama sambhava. The idea of sarvadharma sambhava is rooted in the idea that the truth has many sides and cannot be grasped by human beings completely. Therefore, according to Gandhi, we should respect all conceptions of the good (see Gandhi 1995). References Adluri, Vishwa. 2016. “How We Should Approach The Phenomenon Of Studying Hinduism.” Swarajya , https://swarajyamag.com/culture/how-we-should-approach-the-phenomenon-of-studying-hinduism . Ambedkar, B.R. 2019. The Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar , edited by V. Rodrigues. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Chandhoke, Neera. 2019. Rethinking Pluralism, Secularism, and Tolerance: Anxieties of Coexistence . New Delhi: Sage Publication. De Roover, Jakob. 2015. Europe, India, and the Limits of Secularism . New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Dimock, Edward. 1974. The Literatures of India: An Introduction . University of Chicago. Gandhi, M.K. 1995. Hindu Dharma . New Delhi: Orient Paperbacks. Guru, Gopal, and Sarukkai, Sundar. 2012. The Cracked Mirror: An Indian Debate on Experience and Theory . New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Janaky. 1992. “On the Trail of the Mahabharata: A Response.” Economic and Political Weekly 27 (37): 1997–1999. Nanda, Meera. 2010. “Arguments for an Indian Enlightenment.” In Indian Political Thought : A Reader , edited by A. Singh and S. Mohapatra, 175–186. Routledge. Nandy, Ashis. 1988. “The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 13 (2): 177–194. Patel, Sujata. 2020. “Social Theory Today: Eurocentrism and Decolonial Theory.” Madras Institute of Development Studies . Accessed November 8, 2023. https://www.mids.ac.in/assets/doc/WP_240.pdf . Thapar, Romila. 1989. “Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for a Hindu Identity.” Modern Asian Studies 23 (2): 209–231. http://www.jstor.org/stable/312738 .

Tarun Kattumana In conversation with Siddharth S (Assistant Professor, Philosophy at Sai University, Chennai) September 2023 Tarun Kattumana is currently completing his PhD in Philosophy at the Husserl Archives, Centre for Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy, at the Institute for Philosophy, KU Leuven. He is also a part of the Access to Medicines Research Centre at KU Leuven. Siddharth: Hello, Tarun. Thank you for agreeing to do this interview as part of Parichay. Could we begin with a brief biography, to let our reader know about your background? Tarun : I was born in Kerala and moved to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at a very young age when my father got a job there. My family spent some time in Sharjah and then moved to Dubai eventually, where both my parents still stay. Growing up in the UAE definitely helped mold my sensibilities and interests. The cosmopolitan environment gave me a thorough sense that my understanding of ‘normal’ was heavily influenced by my upbringing. Especially given the different ‘normal(s)’ of my friends and colleagues of my parents. After school, I went to pursue a bachelors in history at Hans Raj College in Delhi University. To say that my first year in Delhi was a culture shock would be an understatement. Being in Delhi took me outside my caste and class related comfort zones. After my bachelors in history, I felt I wanted to study more but was not really sure what I wanted to study. I had interests in sociology and philosophy. Through a serendipitous turn of events, I got accepted at the Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humanities (MCPH) where I did an interdisciplinary masters with a specialization in philosophy. This experience gave me an interest in philosophy, especially continental philosophy and felt the need to delve deeper. After working for a year under Prof. A. Raghuramaraju for the E-Pathashala project at the University of Hyderabad, I decided to pursue another master’s in philosophy from KU Leuven, Belgium. I have been here ever since apart from one semester where I was a teaching fellow at Sai University, Chennai (September 2022 -February 2023). Why did you choose to pursue a second master’s, after the first one at the Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humanities? I did not feel I had a good enough grounding in philosophy at the time. For instance, when looking at other applicants for a PhD in philosophy I felt I was not yet ready to articulate a clear area of interest with sustained engagement or a topic on which I had dealt with substantially enough to present myself as a potential scholar and thereby a competitive candidate. What has been your experience of studying and being part of academic philosophy in India? I did my bachelors in history and there was a lot of interest in philosophical themes in other disciplines. Pursuing these interests is what brought me to philosophy. The first time I encountered philosophy in a classroom was at Manipal. Starting philosophy at the masters level without the required background was daunting. There seemed to be a high barrier to enter the discourse. Or a whole range of preexisting familiarity with concept-clusters, styles of writing, and the history of philosophy, that was required. Studying philosophy came with the feeling of having to constantly catch up. A great learning through this process–something I appreciated only in retrospect–was the ability to jump into texts or discourses knowing fully well that I did not have the pre-requisite background to adequately engage with the material. The ability to make this jump seemed to me entirely contingent on a range of factors. I did not always take this jump but learning how to do it on a rare occasion was crucial for my philosophical research later on. There is never a single moment where every detail on a page is absolutely clear. But it is still required to proceed to the next page hoping things get clarified eventually with more engagement. What are your research interests in philosophy? Can you briefly describe them for our readers? I am broadly interested in Continental philosophy. The emphasis on history, sociality, and intersubjectivity spoke to me, especially given that I began studying philosophy during my masters after a bachelors in history. Currently, my research focuses on Phenomenology which was among the first continental traditions I was introduced to during my masters. I then moved to study philosophy at KU Leuven where the Husserl Archives is housed. Here I got a very different reading of phenomenology which is deeply enriching and ran counter to its general reception. For this reason, I see a strong continuity between thinkers like Husserl and developing trends in phenomenology like critical and engaged phenomenology. My PhD thesis focuses on vaccine hesitancy during the COVID-19 pandemic. This focus brought in new interests in Systems Theory. During the pandemic I was part of a research project that looked into vaccine hesitancy in Flanders, Belgium. The group from my university that was part of this project took a systems theoretic approach. In the process of working with them, I got interested in systemic analysis and combining it with phenomenology. The pandemic also brought into focus the central role of trust which has been a helpful point to bring together phenomenological and systems theoretic approaches to study vaccine hesitancy during the COVID-19 pandemic. Besides my PhD research I have a strong interest in questions of Realism and Anti-Realism. I find this to be among the core questions philosophy can and should deal with. What excites me about continental philosophy and its recent trends is the return to questions of realism in a non-naïve sense and an attempt to break the Analytic-Continental Divide. Another strong interest is in Post Colonial and Decolonial thought which gives me a vantage point to evaluate the process and place of academia in India as it deals with its colonial heritage and baggage. I am also increasingly attempting to better my understanding of Jaina philosophy when time permits. It is interesting to know that you are part of an interdisciplinary project. How has it been, working as part of such a team? Could you elaborate on your contributions to the research as a philosopher? My team consisted of anthropologists, those working in operations management (system dynamics), business engineers, sociologists, psychologists, and virologists. Working with folks from other disciplines is really tough for me. Especially given that as a student of philosophy I am not used to the project setting or used to working together as a team. Additionally, many of the methodological ways of working of other disciplines tend to underplay what would be philosophically significant. Put simply, I realized that my team members and I had been formed in different ways by our disciplinary upbringing and were predisposed to be sensitive/pay attention to different things. To be honest, I was not trying to contribute to the team as a student of philosophy. Most of the time I was conducting interviews, coding the qualitative data, and eventually writing papers with said data. It was not immediately clear to me what a philosopher was supposed to do with qualitative research or systems mapping. My main intention was to learn how practitioners in other disciplines made their academic training relevant. Over time and on occasion, some philosophical distinctions, concepts, or emphasis on history proved important. Moreover, it was the insight that everyone was predisposed to seeing things a specific way owing to disciplinary framing that made me sensitive to identifying when a certain predisposition or disciplinary attitude was getting at the object of inquiry well and when it was mischaracterizing it. This sounds fascinating! Could you share with us some of your published research? My publications have broadly been about the COVID-19 pandemic and vaccine hesitancy. A part of my philosophical research has focused on putting forward a phenomenological analysis of trust in relation to vaccine hesitancy during the COVID-19 pandemic and its role in support for conspiracy theories . I, along with Thomas Bryne, have also provided a phenomenological reading of resistance to public health interventions during the COVID-19 pandemic and a broad five part schema that situates different positions in the debate on public contestations of science in general and vaccine hesitancy in particular which is forthcoming . My interdisciplinary research has been more squarely focused on vaccine hesitancy. My co-authors and I have published on vaccine hesitancy among health care workers and experiences of navigating crises related to the pandemic . Having been part of the philosophy community both in India and in Belgium, could you share your reflections on philosophy as a discipline in India? How do you foresee the development of the discipline? Studying philosophy in India comes with some tensions. On the one hand there is a draw and a pull to study Indian Philosophy given the many interesting concepts and debates at play. On the other hand, there is a demand to become proficient with Western philosophy and its traditions. The need to specialize so early on to get admitted into a PhD program or master’s meant that this tension could not be maintained. The feeling of needing to catch up with both Indian and Western philosophical traditions is altogether heightened. So, any choice feels like a compromise. Maintaining this tension in healthy ways and better collaboration between scholars working in different traditions is a hope for the foreseeable future. Another feature of working in philosophy in India is the increasing interconnectivity. This was not the case before. I really value the work that everyone at IPN is doing. Going forward such a network would help grow collaboration and community among those pursuing philosophy in India. Lastly, but most importantly, choosing to study philosophy can be daunting for those who have pressing financial and familial pressures. Presently, philosophy only offers a career path for those who are willing to stay in academia. Others who still have an active interest but cannot or do not want to stay in academia need to have avenues to engage philosophically. Moving forward, if we are able to make philosophy viable for academic and non-academic forms of life, it might contribute to greater interest in philosophy inside and outside the classroom. I hope this happens What do students in Belgium who study philosophy for their bachelor's and master's do after their programmes? Do most of them end up pursuing a career in academia? It really depends on at what stage the student is leaving philosophy. A student leaving at the bachelor’s level might migrate to another field, work a couple of internships and move towards a stable job. A student leaving the master’s, may already be academically inclined but may migrate to a field where academics and job prospects in the policy field for instance may be a possibility. For those who leave philosophy after the PhD, it is less straightforward. There has been significant time investment in academia. Moreover, in this part of Europe once you have a PhD, your employer has to pay you a salary that is reflective of your qualifications. For this reason, starting low or the kind of opportunities a bachelors student gets may not always be available to you. What kind of career in philosophy are you yourself interested in? Ideally speaking I would be grateful for the ability to teach and do research in philosophy with one foot in academia and another in public action-oriented projects. I am currently hoping to transition into a post-doc position or teaching at a university after I complete my PhD. Could you expand on what you have in mind when you talk of 'public action-oriented projects'? More generally, how do you think philosophers and philosophy can contribute to public discourse ? I would distinguish between two kinds of public action oriented projects. This distinction is only for the sake of clarity and not a distinction that I really see in practice. The first is where the researchers are directly working with members of the general public or a particular community. The second is where the researchers are working with institutions, pressure groups, NGOs who are working on various issues in society. In both cases, the audience of the research is different. This difference influences what counts as successful research. For instance, publication in a journal behind a paywall or read by researchers alone may not count as a successful end product for the first kind of public action oriented project. In my limited experience, students of philosophy should not aim to immediately apply their theoretical ideas or concepts. This would presuppose their applicability. Rather, philosophers should first immerse themselves in the problem and try collaborating with particular actors they hope to deal with. It has become quite clear to me that the philosophical framing of a problem differs quite a bit from other framings of the problem. More concretely, I feel those from different disciplines and schools of thought have immediate or broadly expected ways of framing an issue. For instance, legal experts tend to approach a problem in a way that would differ from anthropologists. This insight is quite explicitly post-Kantian in the sense that social problems do not just exist out there to be discovered by the researcher or policy maker. Rather our observations and framing are a crucial part of the problem. I emphasize that they are a part of the problem to stress that there are 'real' problems and these are not mere constructs. That said, these 'real' problems are framed in ways that can appear natural to the one doing the framing. Once the philosopher has been able to check their own framing of the issue, they may be in a place along with others to identify what grouping of clashing frames to proceed with. Tarun, this has been a wonderful and enriching conversation. Thanks a lot for taking time to do this!

Translating philosophy: DR Nagaraj's Allamaprabhu N S Gundur Professor, Department of Studies and Research in English, Tumkur University (Karnataka, India) Jul 3, 2022 The New India Foundation’s idea of translating the scholarship in bhashas into English fascinated me. Because translating creative literature, especially poetry and fiction, has been favourite in the republic of translation, particularly in the Kannada context; it rarely pays attention to the translation of discursive prose—philosophy, criticism etc. As a teacher who offers a translation course to my postgraduate students, I have found that I am quite at home translating non-fiction, mostly from English to Kannada. As a result, I tried translating some European thinkers including Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault into Kannada. The NIF inspired me to try translating the Kannada scholarship into English. While I was pursuing my PhD at Karnatak University, Dharwad, I was drawn toward G S Amur ’s conviction that translation should happen from other languages to our own language. This, according to Amur, is primarily for two reasons: one, translation is a cultural need and it should be useful for us. Therefore, borrowing from other cultures would be a wise act. If, for example, a Kannadiga translates from the English language, the Kannada culture will be enriched. Secondly, translation is also a matter of linguistic competence. We are better at translating from our second or third languages to our own language, rather than doing it the other way round. After examining some bad translations of Kannada texts into English, I followed this conviction religiously and never tried my hand at translating Kannada texts into English. But the success story of Vanamala Viswanatha’s translation of a Kannada classic The Life of Harishchandra (Harvard University Press, 2017) changed my perception, and I began to realise the importance of translating our texts into English. Moreover, as someone doing academics in the English language, I now see my English writings as translations, because I think foremostly in Kannada. Among several factors, I must mention two that made me apply for the fellowship. First, the pride of joining the NIF community and learning from its stakeholders, if selected; second, the NIF understands translating scholarship as more than an act of translation; it is clearly mentioned in the programme description that it is a fellowship for research and translation. The seriousness with which the fellowship looked upon translation as research made me curious. Finally, translating the thought excited me, not to mention the huge amount of translation, which I came across for the first time. I, indeed, took more time to select the text than to write a proposal for it. Initially, I made a list of 5 to 6 works and took almost two months to decide on it. Thanks to friends and Kannada scholars who tolerated my endless discussions with them, and during one such conversation, my mentor Professor Prithvi Datta Chandra Shobhi, a D. R. Nagaraj's collaborator and translator too, categorically suggested Allamprabhu mattu Shaiva Pratibhe (1999). But my strategic thinking did not allow me to finalize it; I ruminated on which texts would get me the chances of obtaining the coveted fellowship. At times, I found DR’s work difficult to translate, and thought of some easily translatable texts. But my inner voice kept on reminding me of Professor Prithvi’s advice, and finally, I followed it. D. R. Nagaraj's (henceforth DR) work is an important contribution to the domain of Indian intellectual traditions. His two major books, The Flaming Feet and Other Essays: the Dalit Movement in India (2010) and Listening to the Loom: Essays on Literature, Politics and Violence (2012) are quite known to the non-Kannada reader. Allamaprabhu mattu Shaiva Pratibhe , which belongs to the mature period of his intellectual career, was published posthumously. It is the only monograph of DR that is not available in English. In fact, he wanted to write it in English or he himself could have translated it later, but he seems to have left it for my fortune. DR Nagaraj's book Allamma Prabhu Mathu Shaiva Prathibe In this book, DR was up to undertaking several intellectual ambitions, including decolonizing his own modes of inquiry and critiquing the historiography of Indian philosophy. Here, DR enters into a dialogue with contemporary historians of Indian philosophy by showing how Allama Prabhu , a 12th century Shaiva mystic, had conversations with Abhinavagupta, the Kashmiri Shaiva philosopher and Gorakhnatha, the mystic, and also with his contemporaries like Basavanna. While drawing our attention to the intellectual dimensions of the Veerashaiva movement, his close reading of Allama’s vachanas reconstructs the intellectual portrait of Allama as an argumentative Indian. Amartya Sen would have devoted a chapter on this theme in his The Argumentative Indian (2005) if this book were available to him in English. Further, the translation of this book, I am sure, would fulfill the NIF’s vision of ‘fostering comparative literature about different states and streams of progress’, besides creating ‘an expansive cultural reach for works which have thus far been confined to those who understand the original language of their composition’. As U R Ananthamurthy puts it ‘the classic work of DR has got the capacity to transform us, and DR tries to understand Allama not only in the context of medieval India but also from the viewpoint of our times; it addresses our cultural crisis.’ Those interested in the intellectual history of medieval India and understanding our dialogic traditions would be benefited from DR’s deep reflections and scholarship. If it is useful to maintain a conversation between the modern and the pre-modern, across languages and cultures, we need to engage with this kind of work. And this is how we achieve our country, by translating our thoughts for fellow Indians.

Richa Shukla In conversation with Madhvi Prasad (PhD Scholar, University of Mumbai) May 2022 Dr. Richa is Assistant Professor at Jindal Global Business School. She did her M.Phil. on Simone de Beauvoir’s Philosophy. The dissertation was titled as : Webs of Identity: A Relationship between Self and Others in Simone de Beauvoir’s Philosophy. Her PhD was on Feminist Phenomenology. Its titled as: Dialogues in Silence: A Study of Mourning, Shame and Vulnerability in India. Her theoretical leanings goes for Feminist Philosophy, Existentialism, ethics and social and political philosophy. She has numerous peer reviewed publications under her name. She has presented her work and given talks in many international and national conferences. She has worked on few international reserach projects on gender disparity. Dr Shukla is a certified philosophical counsellor from the American Philosophical Association. Dr. Shukla is one of the founders of Collective for women philosophers in India(CWPI). She is also the member of History of Women Philosophers and Scientists (HWPS) Madhvi : Greetings, Dr Richa. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. The first thing I'd like to know about you is your background, varied interests, education, beliefs, motivation and challenges that prompted you to pursue advanced studies in philosophy as well as convey these vibes through your teaching career. Richa : Well as a Philosopher I doubt if I have a very strong sense of belongingness. So I still struggle when people ask me where I belong to? Bombay (currently Mumbai ) and Benaras played a very integral role while shaping me as a human being. I did my education largely from JNU, New Delhi. There's a way educational institutes like JNU affect you. It drills your mind to understand reflection and critical thinking. Mine was no less different. As a young woman when I entered JNU with my set of preconceived notions, it asked me who am I? And the answer to this question continues… Because of the privileges of being born in a certain family, education was given priority above everything and anything. Hence, reading fiction, Hindi, English, and Marathi literature was an everyday affair. In hindsight, when I think of it, reading as a habit was passed on to me by my previous generation. As a result, my family introduced me to Kathak, classical singing. The latter I recognized I wasn't cut for. Kathak brought a certain sense of aesthetics to my life. My generation is the third generation to act as arbitrators, and attorneys hence it was a tough call to not choose the law and think about Philosophy. I see Philosophy as a partner who never abandons you, especially during your challenging times. It stays with you, by you. One of the larger Philosophical questions which I am working on is the idea of the gender gap in the Indian philosophical domain. This has been one of the challenges which I faced while reading Philosophy as a woman of color. I see how the metropolitan city has influenced you to broaden your thinking and, of course, to choose philosophy. The JNU culture has undoubtedly instilled creativity in you, and Kathak art has ingrained aesthetic principles in you. So, my question for you is concerning gender roles and how you describe your contributions to promoting gender equality in society, particularly through the implementation of values such as diversity, openness, and aesthetics. Well to be honest it's not only the cosmopolitan nature of a particular city which has broadened my thinking solely. I am thankful for the cultural capital which I have received being born in a family like mine where there's a lot of intersectionality. My Father to be more precise is the most amazing Philosopher I have seen in my life. He influenced me to pursue Philosophy. I guess the relationship between Philosophy and Law is an interesting one which reshaped my perception of doing Philosophy. But you are right about other aspects here. I think I have a two-fold response to your question. About promoting gender equality, I feel Public Philosophy is a very important tool these days. That's why I categorically started to write in popular tabloids. It helps to share your opinion, and offer multiple perspectives and also solutions. One of the steps taken in this direction came alive when we formed the Collective for Women Philosophers in India . One of the structural differences which can be bought out would be via making more inclusive courses, pedagogies should be directed as such where inclusion, gender diversity and aesthetics should intersect with each other. Heartfelt congratulations on your initiative to support Indian women philosophers. I am sure that it will restore the status and value in a society that women seek. Secondly, while your arguments made about reforming curriculum and pedagogy are fascinating, it is sometimes problematic. The reason is the increasing concerns about the accessibility of educational resources to women who are marginalized, especially rural women living in remote parts. How do you connect such inequalities to the concept of intersectionality? It's a valid observation Madhavi, I must say. But when I answered your question I was specifically speaking about the academic world and its accessibility, and how it can be more diversified in nature. I remember when I got admitted to JNU, I came across this concept called marginalized points or quartile points. It's a simple concept which believes that people come from diverse backgrounds and those who hail from complex social structures should be given advances ahead of others. I was fascinated by this concept. Hence the Canon of JNU was very diversified. It's like you become special because of your differences. I wish we could have more egalitarian steps like these where participation and accessibility can walk together. Getting back to your question, I feel inequality and intersectionality are very closely related to each other. It's like making a puzzle. As I said earlier, more egalitarian steps can help us to build the bridge, also something I realized since I started teaching is that a lot of people have taboos associated with the great rural and urban divide. There should be more dialogue to demystify this myth. I'm delighted you're addressing accessibility and participation in the teaching profession because students confront difficulties in both areas. Aside from that, you mentioned the rural-urban divide. Could you please share some suggestions for closing the gaps? Also, you expressed your personal opinions on the favourable effects of politics, demography, gender, racial, and migratory terms on your career as a philosopher. Do you have any recommendations for people who are experiencing negative effects as a result of the influence of all of the above-mentioned terms? Such as a female student who, despite having promising academic qualifications, is struggling for scholarships and resource accessibility due to her gender, financial status, demography, and migrations. Wonderful question Madhvi. Let me use an everyday example to answer your question. I see marginalization as a Bombay sandwich. Those who are and have stayed in Bombay understand, that it's multiple layers, a few we like, a few we do not. It has multiple layers. By removing one layer, you cannot expect that you got the sandwich you want to consume. Let's try understanding the web of marginalization through this metaphor. In the case of marginalization, all these layers intersect with each other. Hence, your point is very valid. Dialogue on all levels is the key to bridging the gap. There should be discomforting dialogues in families, classrooms, cafes and whatnot. Remember, feminists struggled when they said personal is political. It's important that the elephant in the room gets addressed. Secondly, there should be more policies, and scholarships to bridge the gap between these two spheres. And most importantly, more sensitization programs to help people unlearn. Unlearning the preconceived notions is the key here. Unlearning the feudal ways of looking and existing. The example of a female student which you gave could also be understood as a form of resistance, that despite every hindrance she is trying her level best. Even though the gatekeepers of morality are trying their level best to keep her silent and marginalized. I wish there could be more institutes like JNU which offers another world, another perspective, another kind of training and which give strength to all kinds of voices. And of course unless and until policies and dialogues would not happen it won't make sense. Thanks for bringing the solution so vibrantly. My next question is a bit personal. What would you do if a colleague said something racist, misogynistic, prejudiced, or otherwise offensive to you, or if you witnessed someone dealing with these issues? What stand would you take? Also, How will you encourage diversity, equality, and inclusion among your subordinates? Well, you have to corner and confront people all the time. Though it depends on whether I would use humour, satire, a movie example or whatsoever. You see, showing a mirror is important. But don't blame me, if you don't like what you see. Well, ideally I believe it should be taken care of by the institute itself. But I will share this exercise which I always do with my students. It's a social experiment called privilege walk. Here, I ask all of them to stand in a line and with the yes to each question they have to come forward, and with a no, they take a step back. It highlights exclusively the gender gap, social exclusion, etc. I usually have a Playlist of certain scenes from movies (Regional, Hindi and English) which I share with them. I think engagement is essential. That’s a superb idea and l think other people should also implement such important moves to promote diversity, equality and inclusion. Apart from this, I am also highly impressed by your teaching styles. Could you describe more about it? Well, thank you Madhvi. Because I'm a Philosopher, dialogue has been a key in my classes too. I usually begin my lectures after playing a video/ some scenes from a popular show/ movie or song. After playing it, I usually ask the students what they think about it? I try to place one different opinion over another. Then I weave concepts and introduce philosophers. This becomes a really interactive way of doing theories and it reaches people too. Secondly, I always have this segment in my class once my class gets over. It's titled, Samjho Toh. ( try to understand) Here, I ask any student to come up with anything interesting they are reading/ listening/ painting etc. Sometimes students come with prose, poetry, a line from some story, a movie character, or a painting. It helps to understand their inner world and what they are thinking. It also helps in diversification in terms of thought processes. Once the student has shared, I ask for multiple perspectives. So far it's been working good. Fingers crossed! Thank you Dr Richa for participating so actively in this interview and for elegantly expressing your ideas. Your approach to philosophy would undoubtedly bring a meaningful change to this world. I wish you success in all of your upcoming endeavours.

Jinesh Sheth In conversation with Varun S Bhatta (Assistant Professor, HSS, IISER Bhopal) January 2022 Jinesh Sheth (jineshsheth[AT]philosophy.mu.ac.in), after completing his graduation in Sanskrit and Jainism, pursued an MA degree in Philosophy. He is currently pursuing PhD as a UGC-JRF fellow at the University of Mumbai. His thesis focuses on a critical study of the Jaina theory of anekāntavāda. It engages with some of the foundations of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Varun : Hello Jinesh! Thanks for taking time and being part of this conversation. From the IPN members’ sheet, I gather that you are currently doing PhD at University of Mumbai. Can you tell us more about it? Jinesh : Hello Varun! Glad to be having this conversation with you. Yeah, I started my PhD in 2018 and I am working on anekāntavāda (non-one-sidedness) under the supervision of Prof. Meenal Katarnikar. Given the centrality of this theory to Jaina philosophy, a lot has been worked upon and yet, as I can now see, a lot remains to be uncovered. The central argument of my thesis is to make a case for different senses of the doctrine - methodological, metaphysical, epistemological - to name a few - and then deal with some of the issues that I think requires further investigation. It has been a nice journey so far reading Prakrit and Sanskrit Jaina texts, engaging with the contemporary scholarship, and along with it, trying to situate anekāntavāda in a larger philosophical discourse. Jaina’s theory of anekāntavāda has always fascinated me. However, till now, I had not had an opportunity to go beyond a superficial understanding of it. So, I am planning to make the best use of this conversation to know a bit more about it! First of all, what caught my attention is your translation of anekāntavāda as “non-onesidedness”. Why is this preferable compared to “many-sidedness”? The other question pertains to any notion of pluralism (in epistemology, metaphysics, etc.): how to make the stance more appealing without also accepting the trivial (and troubling?) dictum that “everything and anything is OK”? I am sure there would be at least one Nyaya philosopher who would have thrown this allegation at Jaina system. Would like to know your thoughts on these. I would be happy to discuss more on anekāntavāda . With respect to translation, the term non-one-sidedness is closer to the original Sanskrit as compared to any other translation. The emphasis in “non-onesidedness” is on the denial of a one-sided nature of reality, as captured by “ an ” (=denial), “ ekānta ” (=one-sided), and vāda (theory); therefore non-onesidedness. It is also possible to look at the term as “ aneka ” (not one, many) and “ anta ” (sided) but this interpretation appears to restrict the term to just ontology and is not a literal translation (the word 'anta' stands for 'dharma', which, in this context, means properties / characteristics). Some scholars translate it as ‘the doctrine of multiplexity of reality’. Non-onesidedness, on the other hand, can be taken as a theory which represents the Jaina view not only on reality, but also on thought (nayavāda, epistemic perspectives) and language (syādvāda, the theory of qualified assertion). As regards to pluralism and a kind of relativist approach towards everything, I find that these two can be differentiated to a certain extent. The interpretation of anekāntavāda along the lines of relativism is a very recent development. To say that ‘everyone can have a perspective’ is one thing, to say that ‘everyone is right from their own perspective’ is another thing and to call the latter as anekāntavāda lacks textual validation. (In the Jaina context, there is something like pseudo-nayas (false standpoints / false perspectives). Their falsity might consist in either the denial of their counterparts altogether or in seeing one part as the whole (like in the case of blind men and the elephant) or when they do not correspond to reality)). So far, I haven’t found any Jain text that would support such a view (=everyone is right from their own perspective). It is kind of self-refuting. To give an illustration from an altogether different context, Paul Feyerabend, who was greatly influenced by Thomas Kuhn as you too would probably be aware, while arguing for epistemological anarchism and for his own relativist understanding of science, builds upon Kuhn’s arguments but Kuhn never advocated such a relativist view and he even went on to categorically reject those relativist ideas while replying to his critics. So most of the criticisms of anekāntavāda - whether by Vedāntins (like Śaṅkara) or the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas (like Bhāsarvajña) or the Buddhists (like Dharmakīrti) - are more often than not directed either towards denying the possibility of two contradictory characteristics existing together in one thing or towards the problem of self-reference (is anekāntavāda absolutely true?) or some other issues. If you don't mind, may I also take the opportunity to know more about you, your philosophical interests and any current areas on which you might be working? Also, even though it has been a long time, I am curious about how did the transition happen from engineering to philosophy. Thanks for the clarifications on anekāntavāda! Have a better understanding of them now. Coming to your question, there are a few factors for the late transition -- from engineering to philosophy -- in my case. Of course, due to the parochial state education system, while growing up I was largely ignorant of the discipline. It is only during the first year of bachelors, I realised my interest for a few topics. It took some meandering and trial/error to realise that what I am interested in is called "philosophy" and another couple of years to find the conviction to change the lanes. So, the transition from engineering to philosophy happened gradually at various stages (from the interest to read a few books when I am free to pursue it "professionally"). What is your story? How did you end up pursuing research in philosophy? I see. That’s quite an interesting journey. I was primarily interested in Jaina philosophy and literature from a very young age and, for which, I went to Jaipur for five years to study at an institute (kind of a gurukul). Along with it, I completed my graduation with Sanskrit as the major subject from a college (SDJA Sanskrit college) affiliated to JRRSU , Jaipur. It was during that time that my teacher suggested me to see if philosophy might interest me. Since then, it has been a great adventure and I am amazed how it has played a role in shaping my understanding of almost everything. Jinesh, fascinating story! I want to know more about all of these “phases”. To begin with, I am jealous to know that you were interested in philosophy and literature from a young age! How did this happen? And what was your impression/understanding of philosophy in this phase (if you can recollect :) )? I am glad to know that you find it fascinating! I was fortunate to get that environment and culture where I was introduced to Jain principles from early childhood. There are paathshalas for various age groups run by the Jain community where children can get acquainted with basic ideas. My parents always motivated me to spend time going to paathshalas and some summer camps as well. My interests kept on advancing and I started listening to discourses by (non-academic) scholars which would, more often than not, involve texts. By the time I finished high school (10th grade), I can say that I might have covered basic Jaina philosophical concepts pertaining to metaphysics, epistemology and ethics that a one year diploma course in Jainology might offer. I was introduced to arguments that would deny the concept of creation of the universe by a supreme entity. I assumed I had gained some understanding of the doctrine of karma, suffering, the causes thereof, liberation, spirituality; and dualism (soul-body), consciousness, metaphysical pluralism, universals and particulars, substance, qualities, modifications etc. Of course, I had no idea about other philosophical traditions whether Indian or Western. I was also not aware of what exactly would constitute philosophy. Neither had I read any of the Jaina texts entirely. Just that now when I look back, I can locate what I had studied within a larger philosophical discourse. So it was during that time that I was given this opportunity, by my teacher as well by my parents, if I would want to study Jainism further and I eventually decided to go to Jaipur. Before we catch the thread of your story at Jaipur, I want to know more about the community paathshalas. I have heard about them, but know very little. The list of topics you mentioned does give an idea of the topics being discussed. Can you shed some light on other aspects of these communal educational practices? How were these nuanced topics taught by the instructors? And since most of the audience are young, how were these philosophical ideas made relevant to them? Given that you have studied in both traditional and university educational spaces, thought you might be in a good position to shed some light on the differences in pedagogic styles and methods. Yeah, sure. I am glad to revisit all those days because I don't recollect talking about them with great detail. If I remember correctly, I might have started going to paathshala when I was just 7 or 8. And as I reflect now, I am able to see many things which otherwise even I could not notice. And maybe I might fail to mention some other things which I don't remember now. Anyway, thanks for all the questions! Usually, most of the paathshalas are conducted in a temple. There are scholars who have written books specifically for the students at paathshalas. Along with the core topics related to Jaina philosophy, these books include poems, stories etc. as well. The books that I studied from had a conversational style (like Plato's Dialogues - the similarity being just of the style and not the content) which began with a question. Over a period of time, these have now become standard textbooks that are used almost all over India and perhaps abroad as well. Of course, this works within a community and other versions of something similar are not uncommon. The teachers are most of the time alumnis of the same paathshala or some other paathshala (if they have relocated). There were many co-curricular activities like plays, quizzes, art and craft etc. - all focused on making a particular topic easy to understand. And, of course, there were prizes. Nowadays, I also see quite a few inter-paathshala competitions taking place. Regarding how these topics were taught, I think the curiosity of the students, with respect to both knowing-how and knowing-that, was a major driving force. I too take a class once a week at the local paathshala and I am sometimes amazed at the kind of questions they ask - whether it's on ahimsa, or God, or karma or on the functioning of the universe. Sometimes, they come up with their own versions of the trolley car problem (what's the right thing to do?). Apart from that, the focus is also on memorizing the key concepts and much of the evaluation was based on that. Paathshalas used to prepare one for reading the texts (of course, the translations and not the original Prakrit or Sanskrit) and listening to discourses for further understanding. I hope I was able to answer the question. Adding here the cover page and the TOC of a few of them: The links to PDFs: Balbodh Pathmala, Part 1 , Part 2 , Part 3 and then it continues to intermediate ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) and advance levels ( 1 , 2 ). As mentioned earlier, I am sure there are many other books written by other authors and which are also used at various places. This is just one representation and from which I had studied. After reading your description, I would definitely want to visit one of these paathshala. No wonder you were convinced to pick up philosophy by class X. Can you tell us about the Jaipur institute that you went to subsequently? What did you learn there? And, do not mind me asking again, how was the pedagogy in this institute? Yeah! I started reading philosophical works, and from a philosophical perspective (!), only after I got enrolled into the Masters program at the University of Mumbai. But I was surely interested in reading and learning more about Jain philosophy at that time. And whatever I learnt about Indian philosophy in my undergrad years was via Jaina philosophical texts. I must say that I could not have taken that decision on my own. It was because my teacher suggested so and then my parents always encouraged me to pursue it. So this institute at Jaipur ( ptst.in ) is named in the memory of an 18th century Jain scholar, Paṇḍit Ṭoḍarmal. It has been running since almost five decades and students come over there to study Jainism for five years, and simultaneously, they continue their studies in Sanskrit from another academic institute - thereby graduating with a degree of Śāstrī (शास्त्री) which is equivalent to B.A. The graduate course in Sanskrit also offered several papers on Jaina philosophical texts as electives and we opted for them as well. Here are the links for the syllabus - first year (for electives on philosophy, see p. 23ff), second year (p. 18ff) and third year (p. 16ff) - for the B.A. program at JRRSU, Jaipur. And the syllabus for the course on Jainism can be found here . Starting from basic concepts to advanced texts on Jaina metaphysics, logic, epistemology, ethics, narratives, and spirituality, I had a really good time learning from all the teachers. There used to be weekly seminars throughout the year; the experts would give their critical comments and I think we learnt more from each other than on our own. We also received training on how to teach and deliver discourses. That shaped our learning as well. One starts thinking not just as a learner, but also as a teacher. Of course, there is a downside that the focus might shift, but with some caution, it added to the overall development. Another key element was memorizing the texts in their original language - Tattvārtha Sūtra being the most commonly memorized one. Now that I have spent another 6-7 years studying philosophy and Jainism in an academic atmosphere, I can say that the time spent in studying Jainism and Sanskrit was a kind of perfect beginning for me and philosophy has played a major role since then. There are several interesting aspects in what you described: importance of language training, weekly seminars, focus on teaching! Before we move further, I have one last question about traditional learning spaces that you have experience of (paathshalas and Jaipur institute). Your responses give a vivid picture of what happens in classrooms about reading/writing/teaching philosophy. Apart from discussions about “texts”, were there any other practices/activities/rituals that were taught or emphasised, either in the class or outside of the class? I am asking this for two reasons. First, I have heard that Buddhisht monastery pedagogy also emphasises on certain rituals and bodily practices (like meditation, dietary customs, etc.). Want to know whether you have experienced something similar in these places. The second reason pertains to the subsequent junction in your journey --- modern academic spaces, where “practice of philosophy” is largely understood as a mental activity and practice (writing papers, etc.), with no rituals, bodily practices being prescribed. I see. Among dietary customs, eating before sunset was an invariable practice. Students would gather in the temple (within the institute) and sing devotional hymns in the morning as well as evening. Outdoor sports like cricket, volleyball, badminton etc. were played almost throughout the year. One thing which worked in our favour during those days was not having access to the internet except while in the library. Smartphones were not allowed. All of this helped in gaining more focus and utilising time more efficiently. Of course, it seems impossible in the post-Covid world. Other activities like meditation etc. were not that much emphasized. Needless to say, all that I have mentioned so far is about one institute in which I studied and it is very much possible that other institutes might have different practices. I am sure the community living would have been quite an experience. How was your transition from this kind of place to a university system for your MA? Where did you do it and how was it? Did you find any noticeable difference in how philosophy, specifically Indian philosophy, is being taught in the university? True. It was a great experience. Having stayed away from home for five years, I wanted to come back to Mumbai. My teacher (the one who suggested me to go to Jaipur), who also happens to have a Masters degree in Philosophy, again helped me in deciding the career ahead. By the time I graduated, I had developed a further interest to pursue a career in academics. That is when I found the Master’s program at the University of Mumbai quite interesting. Besides, there is one faculty who specializes in Jain philosophy as well (my current PhD guide!). So I was thinking about spending another 7-8 years (MA + PhD) at the Department . I had not studied any of the Western philosophers until graduation. And hence I struggled a bit in my first semester, especially with contemporary analytic and continental philosophy. However, I received a lot of help from my friends as well as from a few senior members (who were pursuing PhD at that time) whenever I approached them. There is a wonderful departmental library as well. The faculty have always been kind and supportive. Also, events like seminars, guest lectures, conferences, workshops helped me in generating further interest into a diverse range of topics. I still vividly remember faculty members encouraging us (students) to ask questions and engage with resource persons! With respect to Indian philosophy, I think one of the major differences, in the modern space, is that the primary texts are not read that widely - unless the entire paper is on one text (=electives). While I read very little of (academic) secondary literature when I was at Jaipur and had no idea about contemporary developments in the field of Jaina studies, here the discourse (syllabus, suggested reading, lectures, events etc.) was more prominent on the secondary literature. Besides, as you might also be aware, students who come from a BA (Philosophy) program probably never get any exposure to Sanskrit. So that might also be a reason why a majority of students end up reading more on Western philosophical thought in comparison to Indian philosophy. The scholars who do have a strong background in Sanskrit and Indian philosophy are trained in the traditional way and are more comfortable in teaching in the same way. I hope I am responding to your questions! Jiinesh presenting a paper in a conference at University of Madras (7 January, 2020) Jinesh, I think you are raising very important questions relevant to the teaching of philosophy, especially, how Western and Indian philosophies should be taught? And I think your experience can inform and guide these questions. Therefore, would like to know your views about some of the hurdles you mention above. Let us focus on the last point: the way Indian philosophy is taught in university compared to traditional learning places. I completely agree with you that university curricula should also teach the required languages while teaching Indian and other philosophies (like Chinese and Islam philosophies). With no emphasis on language, as you mention, university education does not empower the students in pursuing these topics. With regard to the other point – primary vs secondary texts – one of the arguments for using non-primary sources (secondary sources) for teaching (either at BA/MA level) is that these texts provide an overview and presents a wider picture of a field/topic; primary texts become relevant only when focused research needs to be carried out. Thought of mentioning this argument to know your opinion. Since you have experienced both kinds of training – through primary texts (in Jaipur institute) and reading secondary texts (in the university) – what would be your suggestions for designing a philosophy curriculum? Do you think it is important to use and teach primary texts rather than secondary ones at BA/MA level? This response assumes that classical texts at the BA/MA level in the modern education space are more or less not introduced. If there are philosophy curriculums which offer a BA/MA degree in Philosophy and do involve the students into reading primary sources with respect to Indian philosophy, please let me / us know. I understand that there are always issues regarding what to include and what not to - even with reference to core philosophical topics. So further introducing primary texts would add the burden of learning a new language. Maybe summer programs/workshops can help the students to learn Sanskrit or maybe they are encouraged to take up a one-year certificate course during the BA program. Besides, the use of primary texts in the classroom at the undergraduate level need not be that rigorous (critical editions, going into the nuances of translations, manuscripts and variant readings, intensive grammar etc. can be ignored). I see quite a few students abroad who are in BA/MA programs, whether Indology or Religious Studies or Philosophy, and who are working on classical Indian texts, spending some time learning the primary language(s). Another issue that I think is that in the context of Indian philosophy, there are very few secondary sources which are completely objective and do justice to the text/tradition. I do not mean to say that being critical is not worth but that kind of critical scholarship is not helpful for an undergraduate student - especially when that student is getting introduced for the first time to a text/philosopher/tradition. I don’t think there is such a series of “Companion to” or a “very short introduction to” with reference to Indian philosophies and philosophers. Neither do we find good articles on each topic of Indian philosophy on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) or Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) (although they both cover a few topics) as we see with respect to Western philosophy. Lastly, from what I have observed, I also think that translating Sanskrit/Prakrit/Pali to English is not the same as translating Greek/German/French to English (though I hardly know anything about the latter three). So one can easily read “Republic” or “Critique of Pure Reason” (in English) without worrying to check the primary source at every instance but not so in the case of Sanskrit texts, and when there are very few good translations. So I think some access to the primary texts starting from the undergraduate level would go a long way in, as you rightly said, empowering the students in pursuing these topics. And maybe when the students pursue a Masters degree, they are equipped with skills for conducting further philosophical-textual research. Jinesh, thanks for these interesting points. I agree with your observations about the lack of academic works (like SEP, various Companions, etc.). I too miss this kind of ecosystem when exploring Indian Philosophy. However, I have a divergent opinion about Greek/Latin having a direct connection with the English language/tradition and this not being the case in the relation between Sanskrit and English. A lot of historical, social and political efforts have gone into establishing the seemingly no-gap between Greek and European traditions. Because of these efforts, it gives an impression that Aristotle and Kant are accessible in English. Also, another important query your response raises is the politics of language in the Indian context. Even though there are several classical languages relevant for studying Indian philosophies (Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrit), it's usually Sanskrit that is emphasised. So we need to discuss how to tackle this issue in our graduate courses. Probably, we can continue this conversation at a later point. Moving on, I want to know how you relate/work with different traditions of Philosophy like Analytic, Continental and even the various schools in the Indian context? Given that your current work is situated within one tradition (Jaina tradition), how do you think your work (at present and in the near future) will be? Do you want to situate yourself in a specific tradition? Or are you interested in working on specific threads that spawn across various traditions? Interested to know your views on these questions as you have straddled between different spheres of philosophical practices (traditional and modern university spaces) and also encounter doing philosophy in different languages (working on Sanskrit texts, but writing a dissertation in English). It was indeed an interesting discussion and would be happy to discuss it further on some other day. And thank you for these questions! Regarding my work, I see quite a few domains in which I can extend my current research on anekāntavāda further or maybe take up another project (within the Jain tradition) with some other fundamental topic. Some of the core areas in which I think I can work in the near future in the wider philosophical context vis-à-vis anekāntavāda are related to epistemology, ethics and logic. It is all still tentative and I too am unsure in which direction I would progress. Nevertheless, my time spent so far while doing research on anekāntavāda has certainly helped me in many ways. Given its meta-philosophical framework (this can be debated), I sometimes try to approach philosophical problems and arguments - whether emerging from continental or analytic tradition - in a non-one-sided way. Doing philosophy in different languages certainly has its own merits and demerits. On one hand, a wide variety of literature opens up for me and, on the other, writing in English was not easy in the beginning. Things have improved to a certain extent but there is a lot to learn! Translation is another issue that I constantly face. I haven’t yet published on areas central to my thesis though have been presenting them at conferences and looking forward to publishing a couple of papers by the end of my PhD. Some of the other papers that I have presented and/or published but are not directly connected to my ongoing work can be found here (researchgate) and here (academia) - not all are public but I can share via mail. I haven’t spent much time with Indian philosophy (in a comparative spirit) in the last few years such that it would result in some good output but I would like to revisit it in future. Moving forward, I would still want to continue specializing in a field related to Jain philosophy. Some of the other areas in contemporary philosophy which are of interest to me include consciousness studies, philosophy of science and hermeneutics. Comparative philosophy is another area which I would like to explore in future. So, coming to the final stages of this exciting conversation, I (and the readers as well) would like to know a little more about you, about your ongoing and upcoming research. And if possible, I would particularly be also interested in knowing how philosophy has shaped your research in natural science(s) and/or the other way round. Jinesh, thanks for your interest in my views. For me, most of the "philosophy of ___" enterprises (like philosophy of language, art, film, law, etc.) are important exercises and interventions where core philosophical tools are used to understand something else. So, the philosophy of science has primarily taught me how to apply philosophy in addressing other disciplines questions. At present, some of my works are situated in the area of philosophy of physics. I am currently developing on a topic that I could briefly cover in my PhD research: the philosophical analysis of interference phenomena in classical and quantum optics. After this, I would probably want to spend some time with specific questions of metaphysics (individuation and compositionality of objects) that have always excited me. I want to end this conversation by seeking your opinion on one last thing. According to you, what initiatives and activities would be helpful/useful for the academic philosophy community in India? How do you think we -- philosophers in India -- should organise such that it not only supports us but also creates a vibrant ecosystem for philosophy in India? Your suggestions and ideas might resonate with other readers and this could mobilise into something concrete. Not to mention, these suggestions of yours would play a crucial role in the shaping of IPN. It is fascinating to know about your current and future research. I would like to know more, hopefully, when we shall meet someday in-person! As a student and a young researcher , I think a few initiatives that might help in the long run would include: Undergraduate and / or Graduate Peer reviewed Journal (I don’t know if there exist any) Conferences specific for graduate students (which could then also result into a publication into the above journal) Writing workshops / sessions (for PhD students) - I think writing sessions are a must for postgraduate students (I can volunteer for this if someone may guide). Database of submitted theses (and linking them with those which are available on shodhganga ) - I think if we do not know or if we do not have access to the PhDs submitted earlier, there is always a fear of reproducing what has already been done. Once in a quarter or six months, an online meet of IPN members - it could be informal as well: sharing experiences and problems that one faces in their respective areas (research, teaching etc.). Sometimes, this meet may also take shape of an academic event where a guest speaker might address the IPN community. I am not sure whether these suggestions or ideas are realistic. I am also not aware if something is already being planned. That being said, I am really grateful to all the moderators and founding members of IPN. The Telegram and WhatsApp groups have helped me. Once, I had a chance to listen to David Chalmers live! It would not have been possible if not for Phil-India Telegram / WhatsApp groups. The Google group too is great. I am indeed grateful to you for all the wonderful questions and your generosity that allowed me to express myself freely throughout the conversation. The errors are still mine and I am always happy to revisit my views. Lastly, thanks to the readers for their patient reading!

Hareesh A G In conversation with Siddharth S (Assistant Professor, Philosophy at Sai University, Chennai) August-September 2021 Siddharth: Hello Hareesh! Thank you for agreeing to this interview. It would be nice if you can begin with a brief biography, to let our readers know about your background. Hareesh: I am currently working as an Assistant Professor at the department of Humanities and Social Sciences, BITS Pilani KK Birla Goa Campus. I did my Ph.D. at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Indore where I learned and explored different aspects of philosophy. All my studies before Ph.D. were in Kerala—bachelor’s and master’s from the Calicut university and B.Ed. from Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. I was born and brought up in a remote village of Kerala called Kondazhy (Thrissur District). In fact, it was life in that village that influenced me and shaped me to become a philosophy scholar. The last point you made is really interesting. But before we get to that, can you tell us what your research interests are? My specialisation during my doctoral study was in the area called the philosophy of biology and the title of my thesis was ‘Evolution and Ontological Realism: A Critical Interpretation’. It is still one of the major areas of my research interests. It is an area that has been meagerly explored in our country. I got into this topic through wondering about organic life. Since it is my focal research area, I have published some research papers focusing on the ontological issues related to evolutionary biology (' Ontological Indeterminism and Immanence – Some Aspects of the Metaphysics of Organism' ; 'Realism Through Relativism: Looking at the Possibility of Metaphysics in Species Problem' ; 'A Note on ‘Two-Way’ Ontological Practice in Biology' etc.) Apart from this, I have an intense interest in the metaphysics of science, philosophy of language (Frege, Wittgenstein, the concept of meaning and its relation to syntax). I am working on a project proposal focusing on the ontological aspect of meaning. Besides all these, I am developing an immense interest in the Indian philosophy; specifically, the naturalistic threads of Indian philosophical systems regarding the mind. In the future, I also would like to work on the ontology of memory. Could you tell us a little more about the philosophy of biology as an area of study—what are some of the key questions explored in it—and your doctoral work? In my doctoral studies I had focused more on the ontological issues related to the concepts which are unavoidable in biology. More specifically, I had analysed the ontological issues from an evolutionary point of view as it is a stringent belief that evolution theory of Darwin had given the theoretical base for biology. Remember Dobzhansky’s word that ‘nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution’. However, what interested me was the persistence of metaphysics even in our molecular biological explanations over the biologists’ claim that Darwin ‘murdered’ God by introducing a mechanism called natural selection. It is right that Darwin had put a full stop to the conventional mystic metaphysical explanations surrounding creationism. But that was not the end of the story. On the one hand he abandoned the metaphysical presence of God/deity/intelligent designer/creator etc. but on the other hand he paved the way to a new wave metaphysics concerning concepts without which the whole of biology become void. Say, life, organism, and species. Can we imagine a biological literature without a grounding in these concepts? No. But, biology still cannot define what they are. Evolution theory has an ontological commitment toward them and we take evolution theory as the theoretical framework for our explanation of living phenomena. So, I delved into these to find out a possible answer to the question of ‘why’ metaphysics in biology. How has your experience been of studying and being a part of academic philosophy in India? It was when I thought of doing bachelor’s, after higher secondary studies in science, that I first heard about philosophy. No one in my acquaintance has any idea about what-is-this-thing-called-philosophy. It was fortunate that I have got admitted to a bachelor’s programme in philosophy as the second last person among 60 students. At the time of admission, the Head of the Department told me, ‘Your mark/grade is very low, but don’t feel inferior. Study well’. Those words influenced me to move forward without humiliation. And the very first class was on logic which I found very interesting. After a few days, I held the first position in an internal assessment. And at the end, I graduated at second position in my college and came in the top 10 in the university. The master’s journey amazed me by taking me on a philosophical tour through different topics like science, mind, language, etc., which shaped my rudimentary research interests. I feel that the study of philosophy in Indian universities at bachelor’s level gets students well acquainted with the basic aspects. It is right that post-graduation is an advanced level, but most of our universities offers variety of courses that are still ‘introductory’. Instead of broadening the syllabus with different topics with superficial content, it would be better to focus on specific topics aimed at deep understanding. Could you share your reflections on philosophy as a discipline in India? How do you foresee the development of the discipline? I am proud to be a philosophy scholar in India which has an old philosophical tradition, since the Vedic period. However, I am greatly worried about the status of philosophy in India by realising the stagnancy after the establishment of conventional systems. What I mean by ‘conventional systems’ is the traditional philosophies—six orthodox systems and three heterodox systems (plus some related philosophers’ views, ancient and contemporary, on them). I am not indeed condemning contemporary Indian philosophy; there is merit in it, but it seems they have not explored enough to deal with the nuances of pragmatic life. It seems to me that Indian philosophy binds its explanations/descriptions with ethical threads whereas western traditions are bound with epistemological threads. This might be a reason for the above. Instead of preaching/teaching the conventional stuff, scholars should be ready to explore the hidden possibilities of our philosophy. We still teach different topics like philosophy of science or mind or language etc. by referring to western philosophers. Why don’t we think about the possibilities of developing our own contributions? Say, Indian philosophy of language or mind or science. I am happy that the emerging associations in India like Indian Philosophy Network and the Philosophy of Science Group in India etc. are aiming at the exploration of different aspects of philosophy. Yes, we need all philosophies irrespective of region/race. Every philosophy has its merit. May be, a comparative study of different philosophies would hint at the different hidden possibilities. Apart from these, it is our duty to make society understand the importance of philosophy in life by wiping out misconceptions about philosophy. Your mention of comparative approaches in philosophy raises an interesting question. It seems to me that in comparison to some of the other areas in philosophy, philosophy of science is still largely located within western philosophical traditions. Do you think there is scope for other traditions to contribute to philosophy of science and biology? What I find is that there are central and marginalized areas in philosophy. Most areas are centred around the west (western traditions). In eastern philosophies, such as Chinese, Indian and Middle-Eastern philosophies, we can see that there are nice contributions to medicine, and to philosophy of biology, especially from the middle-east. Whenever we check a syllabus of philosophy of biology or philosophy of science, we see that what is covered will be mostly, eighty to ninety percent, with respect to the western philosophy of science. I see very few philosophy of science or biology syllabi with mentions of eastern or middle-eastern contributions. We need to explore this. Why these became marginalized, I feel, is due to our own activities. I have searched the BA and MA Philosophy syllabi of almost all Indian universities, and I see that there very few universities introduce a critical approach to thinking and topics which people can themselves explore. In Calicut University, during my BA and MA programme, we studied the six orthodox and three heterodox systems and some contemporary Indian thought. This is the conventional practise. I believe that this will change if we give a chance—to teachers and students—to explore and put their views forward. I don’t think that Indian universities give the liberty to teachers to modify the syllabus, apart from IITs and central universities. At IITs, we have at least some liberties to modify. Of course, it is necessary to learn and teach the conventional philosophies, but apart from these, there should be room to discuss our own points—what we believe and what we think about these (conventional systems). Do you think such an approach can help in integrating Indian philosophical thought with philosophy of science? Yes. In the final year of my PhD, I learnt that many Indian contributions have greatly influenced scientific development. But they are not considered as contributions towards philosophy (of science). We started calling something as ‘science’ only after the seventeenth century. Even before that, we have made good contributions to scientific and astronomical fields. Before the seventeenth century, everything (in the west) was considered as Philosophy. But we don’t consider our ancestors who contributed to astronomy or mathematics as philosophers. When we consider them as philosophers and their contributions as philosophical contributions, and consider how these changed worldviews and social systems, we can then philosophise about them and understand them better as philosophy of science. You made a very interesting observation earlier, that it was life in your village that shaped and influenced you to become a philosophy scholar. Could you elaborate on this? I was born and brought up in a remote village. You can find that the people who lived there, or even now, are full of misconceptions, myths and false stories. For example, they believe that mumps and plagues are because of witches and witchcraft. Such kinds of misconceptions were there. I did my +2 in science and then shifted to the arts. When I started philosophy, my first aim was to concentrate on civil services. But, after a point in time, I understood that there were many questions that were unanswered in my mind since my childhood. Something like, ‘What is God?’. We all believe, we all go to temples, we all do prayers, we offer many things to God. Why do we do all these things? These were the questions that triggered me when I started doing philosophy. Then I found that many different answers could be found in philosophy. But, sometimes, our questions can be easily addressed by philosophical discussions. And we find that many of these philosophical discussions, at some point in time, will soothe our urge to know how or why something happens. One of the reasons why I became a philosophy scholar is because, I found that philosophy is solving, answering and at least partially addressing the questions that were formed in my mind through the interactions with my villagers. This is one way [in which my village life shaped my interest in Philosophy]. In my village, no one studied philosophy as a topic or as a subject for their degree. I was the first one—actually, I think I am still the only one who has studied philosophy in my village. When I joined the philosophy program, the educated people in my village blamed me: ’Why are you taking this subject. After you graduate, you are not going to get any job, or any opportunities that you can explore in the future’. My first motto was to focus on civil services. I believed that philosophy could help me in this. After my graduation, I stopped studying completely. I went to work as a truck cleaner in a quarry. I worked for almost one and a half years there. But while working in quarries and trucks, I understood that the questions in my mind were not completely answered. There were remaining questions, and I was not able to discuss them with anyone. My acquaintances then were mainly truck drivers and cleaners, and I was not able to discuss with them the questions that were on my mind. After a point, I understood that I need to go back to academics, and that my mind would cool down only if I get some answers to the different questions. It was not only metaphysical questions, but many questions that I had in my mind at that time. So, I re-joined academics, as a postgraduate student at Government College, Chittoor (Palakkad), in MA Psychology. At the same time, I got admission into MSW at Amrita University, MA Criminology and Juvenile Justice at Madras University, and MA Sociology at Loyola College, Trivandrum. I dropped all of these and joined the MA programme in Philosophy (at Calicut University). My villagers asked, ‘Why are you doing this? You belong to a family that is economically poor and you have to take care of your family. You have to focus on an area that will give you a job. Why are you focusing on philosophy?’ At that time, I did not answer them. Later, in the second year of my PG, I told them I knew how to get a job in philosophy. Apart from getting a job, in our lives, we have to address some of the basic questions that emerge in our minds. I believed that Philosophy could help me answer those. This was my answer to their questions. Apart from these, I was interested in the spiritual practises—we can even call them ‘black magic’ and sacrificial practises—in my village. When I used to watch these things, I used to ask the question, ‘Why?’. I later understood that many of the things that my family members and villagers do are nonsensical. I don’t want to be a nonsensical man in my life. This is how my village influence me in becoming a philosophy researcher. There could be some confusion when I say that some of these practises are nonsensical. It is nonsensical from a philosophical point of view, but it is very much sensible for them. What I understood was—people are going to temples, praying to God and offering many things because it soothes their mind at that point in time. Or they believe that it reveals some truth to them, or solves their problems. They believe in some ultimate reality which they call by different names. But, whenever they are doing something, they are rationally doing it, because they believe that there is a higher being that exists, which either created everything or is the cause of everything. And if we please that cause, our problem will be solved or we will get what we want—this is the rationale behind their activity. So, we cannot say that they are utterly nonsensical, but from a modern, rational point of view, or say a Marxist point of view, we might say that it is nonsensical. But there is a rationale behind it. You mentioned that after your bachelor's, you worked as a truck cleaner and you really felt the need to answer certain questions, which brought you back to academics. This, I think, raises an interesting question about the nature of the philosophy itself. Do you think that common people—people living in villages or those working in physically demanding jobs—engage, or can engage, in philosophy and philosophising? Or is philosophy restricted to academia and other ‘secluded’ institutions? I worked at an NGO sometime in 2008, which was working with sex-workers on problems related to their health. This happened before I joined as a truck cleaner—so I first finished my academics in 2008, joined this NGO and then worked as a truck cleaner. What I understood from these experiences is that everyone follows some philosophy in their lives. We can see that many of the complicated philosophical concepts are easily applied by the layman, without knowing that they are philosophical concepts. What I understood better was—they do what they need. We philosophy scholars may explore many different problems and a wide variety of concepts. Ordinary people focus, knowingly or unknowingly, only on the concepts or theories they need. What kind of career paths in philosophy are you interested in, and think are available in philosophy in India? Teaching still holds the major share among different career possibilities for philosophy scholars in India. And, in fact, I see teaching as a great profession to explore philosophy. It is good that professional and technical institutions also encourage teaching philosophy for their students by realizing its importance. What are some courses you have taught, at BITS or elsewhere? As a discipline, philosophy is dependent on dialogue and discussion, perhaps more so than other disciplines. How do you incorporate this in your teaching practise? I teach Introductory Philosophy and Applied Philosophy for UG students and Philosophical Foundations for Liberal Studies for the M. Phil. Students. As I am teaching in a technical institute, very detailed discussions on philosophical topics, beyond the syllabus, would be too ambitious. We have to stick to the syllabus and make them understand the subject. This is not easy for a large class of students whose orientation is towards technology. Some students are more enthusiastic towards philosophical discussions, so they keep asking doubts and clarifications. More or less, students have a logocentric attitude, in deconstructive terms, towards different disciplines. Most of them are scientistic in nature; an adamant attitude that what the sciences say is right. Thank you Hareesh, for a very interesting and lively conversation. I hope we get to meet each other in person sometime soon!

Review of Muzaffar Ali's book by Richa Shukla Richa Shukla Assistant Professor, IIT Bhubhaneswar Nov 13, 2023 Book review of Muzaffar Ali's India, Habermas and the Normative Structure of Public Sphere (Routledge, 2023) This text called India, Habermas and The Normative Structure of Public Sphere is an attempt by Muzaffar Ali, a contemporary Indian political philosopher, to make us revisit the hidden ambiguity behind Indian Public Sphere in reference to Habermas’s idea. He points to this ambiguity by making us think the public sphere is a space that makes us think and question. The book submits a proposition that public spheres and its institutions go hand in hand. He also mentions three criteria for calling a public space. I couldn’t help but notice a tension that Ali wants to point out between his method on how he would do Philosophy vs how ideally Indian philosophy has been done so far. The larger arguments reminded me of Hannah Arendt’s proposition while she discusses the nature of Philosophy, i.e., it's important to think about what we are doing in Philosophy.[1] The book consists of 5 chapters, excluding a preface and acknowledgements. It begins by pointing out a reflection as well as a theoretical concern on how the contemporary Indian situation is a possible glitch in the theorization of Habermas’s public sphere. Rather, it proposes ‘Samvada’, (संवाद) as a method of further analysis. The philosopher here submits that there is a coherence between contemporary Indian philosophy and Indian political theory which can very well be used to theorise the native idea of the Indian Public Sphere. It not only presents a picture of Habermas’s Public Sphere but also, brings in Indian philosophers, political theorists, and a few feminist scholars as well. The first part of the book dwells on a reflective theoretical need: Can we ever think of a native theory of the Indian Public Sphere? The book attempts to not only answer this theoretical concern but also create a 'theoretical toolbox' [2] for the same. Additionally, it revisits and re-reads old debates in Indian political theory and Indian philosophy. This, Ali suggests, can help us in rebounding the normative foundations of the Indian Public Sphere. I couldn’t help but notice that the book takes a good philosophical lurk from the past, present and future of the Indian public sphere in terms of establishing theoretical discourses. It makes an attempt to understand the timeline behind these discourses. The book concerns how one can do Indian political theory considering we no longer can use Western frameworks as it's incapable of capturing Indian reality. He has referred to political thinkers like, Aakash Singh Rathore, Gopal Guru, Sundar Sarukkai, Aditya Nigam and many others to set the theoretical tone of Indian political theory. For instance, along the lines of these thinkers, he argues that we need to understand the audience, the Indian audience horizontally as well, as so far, we have been burdened by the Western way of doing Indian Philosophy. We have been colonised in our approach to Indian Philosophy at times. While he re-visits the concept of ‘Samvada’ in this manner, I couldn’t help but draw a parallel between this and Upanishad saying: वादे वादे जायते तत्त्वबोधः which implies that it's through diverse opinions that we get to know the truth. The book while, analysing Habermas’s concept of the public sphere, critically analyses key elements from the Indian domain as well whether it's the Indian debates on religion, caste, lived experience or the corporeal body. He writes, "The conceptualized Indian situation throws up two essential markers regarding the inadequacy of the Habermasian public sphere. At the social level, the hyper-presence of religion within Indian society needs a multi-pronged instrument of public debate rather than a unilateral notion of rationality to shoulder real and true public opinion."[3] At a time when globally, the phenomenology of the public sphere is altering, this text makes a few pertinent interventions while keeping in mind Indian lived realities. While trying to establish caste as a ‘unique public lived reality’, one can look at movies like Article 15, Mulk, Sairaat, Masaan and shows like Made in Heaven , Kota factory , and Class which capture the Indian essence and the complicated relationship which we share between religion, caste and Indian public sphere. Ali looks at religion as an important aspect of India’s social context. He establishes that the role of religion cannot be underestimated in evaluating the political and social contexts of Indian societies. This has been established by drawing from political thinkers like B.R. Ambedkar, and Valerian Rodrigues. In the Indian domain, while deconstructing caste and religion, Gopal Guru argues the same.[4] He writes caste has wings, it can fly, and that’s why it reaches a place before we reach it. These aspects have lived experience to their credit too. I could think of Feminist Philosopher, Simone de Beauvoir’s description of lived experience, in her book, The Ethics of Ambiguity . She takes the example of glue and paper. The way we put paper on glue and it becomes impossible to separate them, in a similar manner, it's impossible to detach 'lived experience', from human existence and our social reality. The book walks on a thin rope of some pertinent theoretical concerns, visible criticism of Habermas’s concept and an alternative that Ali is trying to provide for the same. [1] Dolan, M. Frederick. "Arendt on Philosophy and Politics". https://philarchive.org/archive/DOLAOP [2] Term used by Ali for the same. [3] Ali, India, Habermas And The Normative Structure of Public Sphere , page no. 111. [4] Guru, Gopal. "Dalits from Margin to Margin." India International Centre Quarterly , 27: 111-116.