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Review of "Quick and Concise: Philosophy" Neeraj Umesh PhD Scholar, BITS Pilani (Hyderbad) Book Review # Jul 17, 2025 Book review of Shamik Chakravarty's Quick and Concise: Philosophy (Hachette India, 2025). Overview and Structure of the Book Shamik Chakravarty’s Quick and Concise: Philosophy serves as an accessible and engaging introductory work for readers who are in the early stages of their intellectual journey into rational inquiry and philosophical reflection. This book touches upon key philosophical problems associated with the discipline, including metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology, while skilfully avoiding the complex formalism and symbolic logic often found in academic texts. Written in a clear and conversational style, it raises questions that general readers and laypersons have likely encountered in everyday life but may not have pursued with philosophical precision. The introduction is especially notable for its tone, which adds what may be described as a ‘human touch.’ Rather than treating philosophy as a remote or purely academic exercise, Chakravarty invites the reader to see it as a deeply human pursuit, rooted in the necessity of questioning, reasoning, and examining the implications of one’s beliefs and values. This rhetorical move effectively situates philosophical inquiry in the reader’s lived context, a strength rarely seen in traditional textbooks. A particularly thoughtful inclusion is the reference to the Bhagavad Gita , which introduces Indian philosophical perspectives into the broader narrative. The author cites the famous dilemma faced by Arjuna, “This dilemma isn’t just one between a moral and an immoral choice but between two choices that have values that are compelling”, as an example of ethical conflict not easily resolved by standard normative theories. This framing reflects the nuanced character of real-world moral dilemmas. However, the analysis might have been enriched by a discussion of classical or contemporary objections to this framing, particularly from within Indian traditions themselves. One of the book’s commendable features is its pedagogical sensitivity. Rather than overburdening readers with formal logic, Chakravarty introduces logical tools gradually and in small, digestible portions. This scaffolding allows the reader to develop reasoning skills organically without the need for prior exposure to analytic methods. In the next section, I offer a closer look at several key chapters that illustrate the strengths and occasional gaps of Chakravarty’s approach. Chapter Highlights The chapter on morality is a demonstration of the philosophical depth and clarity that the author wishes to bring to his readers in his book. It surveys a broad array of ethical theories along with their standard criticisms, enabling readers to consider the strengths and limitations of each. The chapter could have benefited from engagement with contemporary moral psychology, particularly theories of moral cores or innate ethical intuitions, and examining certain positions in a bit more depth, such as Jonathan Wolff’s ‘ An Introduction to Moral Responsibility’ . Its restraint is understandable given its target audience. Chakravarty aims to provoke reflection rather than to exhaust debate. The chapter on epistemology, titled "What is Knowledge?" takes on one of the most discussed problems in the field, the Gettier problem, and presents a range of responses. The treatment is systematic and coherent. However, the transition into this topic may feel abrupt, especially for readers unfamiliar with the basics of epistemology. A more gradual introduction, perhaps beginning with the sources of knowledge such as perception, reason, and testimony, would have provided a smoother entry. In this regard, Robert Audi’s Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge offers a model worth emulating. Further, since the chapter revolves around the concept of knowledge, a brief discussion on theories of truth (correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, etc.) and the distinction between absolutist and relativist views would have significantly enhanced the general reader’s understanding. These additions could have grounded the discussion more fully and helped bridge the conceptual leap from earlier chapters. Nevertheless, the concluding section on "The Ideal Knower" is particularly engaging. The author's attempt to bridge the gap between truth and justification while integrating insights from Nyāya philosophy is a refreshing and welcome gesture toward cross-cultural dialogue in epistemology. It broadens the book's scope and invites readers to appreciate the depth of Indian philosophical traditions alongside their Western counterparts. The chapter on skepticism also deserves mention. While well-argued and rich in content, it may have been more effectively placed earlier in the book. A skeptical mindset is foundational to both philosophical reasoning and inquiry. Introducing it earlier could have framed the reader’s engagement with subsequent chapters more critically. That said, the chapter does a commendable job of introducing important concepts such as abduction and common fallacies like begging the question, which are essential tools for any aspiring philosopher. The seventh chapter, on personal identity, is arguably the most well-executed section of the book. Chakravarty presents both essentialist and anti-essentialist frameworks with clarity and balance, guiding the reader through well-established positions in the debate. The inclusion of the dialogue between Nāgasena and King Milinda is particularly effective, offering a lucid and engaging account of the Buddhist theory of non-self. This is presented with enough clarity that even readers unfamiliar with Buddhist thought can grasp its philosophical implications. For those interested in exploring this theme further, the work of Jay Garfield, especially Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration , is a valuable complement. Garfield’s argument from moral phenomenology strengthens the case that the self, while not metaphysically substantial, plays a central role in our experience and ethical life. His treatment of non-self as a lived, moral insight rather than a merely metaphysical denial is especially relevant to readers seeking to understand the ethical stakes of identity. The final chapter on aesthetics brings the book to a compelling close. Chakraborty addresses enduring questions such as “What is art?” and “What does it mean to call something a work of art?” His brief inclusion of a discussion on Nāṭyaśāstra and the concept of rasa is particularly valuable, as it introduces readers to Indian aesthetic theory, a domain often overlooked in introductory texts. Academic Perspective Shamik Chakravarty’s Quick and Concise: Philosophy is an impressive and inclusive introductory text for the general reader. It navigates difficult philosophical terrain with clarity, balance, and accessibility. While some chapters could benefit from deeper scaffolding or further engagement with counter-positions, the book as a whole succeeds in its core aim: to initiate general readers into the world of philosophical thinking without condescension or oversimplification. Beyond general readability, the book also raises questions about its utility in academic settings, especially as a possible text for undergraduate instruction. One element missing from the book, especially if used in an academic context, is a reflective feedback mechanism. Most introductory texts include end-of-chapter questions or prompts that help students consolidate learning and develop their own philosophical positions. The text is quite informative, but I feel it lacks 'Nurture' that would allow students to engage with these ideas more effectively. Perhaps incorporating a question that prompts students to form their own opinions could be beneficial. Learning philosophy and doing philosophy are two distinct activities, though I do not deny that they overlap to some degree; however, in my opinion, this text focuses on Learning Philosophy, especially from the way it is structured and would be better suited to be supplementary material for students. In sum, this work succeeds in being an accessible and culturally thoughtful entry point into philosophical inquiry. While it is not a substitute for more rigorous academic resources, it offers instructors and self-learners alike a meaningful way to begin thinking philosophically with an eye toward both Eastern and Western traditions. References Audi, Robert. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge . New York: Routledge, 2011. Garfield, Jay L. Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration . New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2022. Wolff, Jonathan. Introduction to Moral Philosophy. 2nd ed. S.L.: W W Norton, 2021.

Review of "Quick and Concise: Philosophy" Shivangi Shanker Independent Scholar, PhD from JNU Book Review # Jul 22, 2025 Book review of Shamik Chakravarty's Quick and Concise: Philosophy (Hachette India, 2025). Writing an introductory book to a discipline as rich and diverse as philosophy is profoundly challenging. Quick and Concise: Philosophy (Hachette India, 2025) by Shamik Chakravarty not only overcomes this challenge but also broadens the scope of the genre, despite its compact size. It is a pocket-sized book with themes including both Indian and Western traditions of Philosophy. The book offers a discourse on the fundamental questions of philosophy concerning meaning, free will, morality, knowledge, personal identity, and art. Shamik’s endeavour stands out as an attempt to present a comprehensive philosophical dialogue which reflects philosophical inclusivity on two levels: conceptual and contextual. Conceptual inclusivity is evident in Shamik’s incorporation of non-Western philosophy, while contextual inclusivity emerges through the integration of culturally familiar situations, names, and cities into deeper philosophical enquiries. The use of familiar Indian backdrops, such as the workplace dilemma (p.74) in a corporate context or the affirmative action (p. 71) example, makes it especially relatable to the Indian readers. What distinguishes the text further is that it does not bridge the gap between different knowledge systems through mere exposition but an application of the Socratic (Blondell 2018) and the Hegelian Dialectical methods (Houlgate 2024) [i] . In the analogy between Buddhism, deontology, and utilitarianism, or Buddhism and virtue ethics. Or its comparative analysis with Kantian ethics, which puts forth a reconciled ethical position from the point of view of Buddhism. (Chakravarty 2025, 64-70). The process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis [ii] is evident. Shamik selects a broad range of topics as compared to Bertrand Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy (Russell 2020), Thomas Nagel’s What Does It All Mean (Nagel 1987), and Edward Craig’s Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (Craig 2002). As far as the structure of Quick and Concise: Philosophy is concerned, it resembles Nagel’s What Does It All Mean and Edward Craig’s Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. But the curation of topics and the execution of the discussions surrounding it is wider and more inclusive in Shamik’s book. While Shamik includes a range of classical Indian views, Craig focuses mainly on Buddhism. All of these texts either ignore or mention in passing the discussion on the notion of art. Whereas, Quick and Concise: Philosophy not only elaborates on it, but discusses Indian Philosophy of art— Nāṭyaśāstra . Suggesting that art and aesthetics are not peripheral topics but central to philosophy. Shamik shows a shift from traditional metaphysical speculation to recent philosophical and psychological integration, bringing out an intersection of ethics, psychology, metaphysics, and applied philosophy. He discusses how Psychology deals with the dichotomy of choosing the right over the wrong by applying psychological mechanisms (pp. 68-70). The notion of free will includes an extended reference to determinism, compatibilism, agent causation, AI, neuroscience (p. 89), and ethical psychology, along with other interdisciplinary enquiries. He presents a more critical than expository outlook to the problems, which sometimes may feel overwhelming to beginners in Philosophy. But his writing eliminates this obstruction with various shifts in the tone. Given that Russell, Nagel, and Shamik write in different eras, there are differences in how they approach their work. The Problems of Philosophy offers 20th-century analytical and epistemological views, which makes it denser and limited in scope. Shamik’s work overcomes these challenges by employing a conversational style where he speaks to the readers (p. 1) [iii] . He simplifies complicated ideas, recognising the significance of critical thinking in the learning process. The book is a reflection of interactive teaching-learning techniques. Its examples and questions are relatable to the wider audience. The application of both pedagogical and philosophical methods makes the book comprehensible for general readers as well as students of philosophy. The book has eight chapters (excluding references and index), which reflect the diverse scope that the author has created. The chapters are structured thematically to make reasoned analysis, back-and-forth through thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, excelling in the pedagogical spirit. Each chapter explores a fundamental question or a theme within philosophy and presents the diverse philosophical views and critical analysis under sub-themes. The initial four chapters provide a clear orientation to its readers. It includes topics like what philosophy is. What do philosophers do? And introduces the readers to the main branches of Philosophy (p. 20), that is, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ontology, and Logic. In these chapters, the author explores the questions: What is the meaning of life, and meaning in life? What is morality? What is free will and determinism? The latter four chapters enquire into scepticism, what constitutes personal identity, the role of determinism in free will, whether people are responsible for their acts, what is art and how it relates to expression, rasa , value, and emotion. Throughout the book, the author discusses answers to these questions, then the responses are either challenged or supported by other views. The chapter’s structure reflects the integration and application of the Hegelian Dialectical (Houlgate 2025), Socratic [iv] , and philosophical argumentation (inductive and deductive) methods. For example, in the first chapter, the author explains that the job of a philosopher is to seek truth through systematic argumentation. He then questions the nature of truth itself and presents the idea of relativism of truth (p. 15). In the second chapter, the discussion on the meaning of life begins with an investigation of what meaning is [v] , rather than assuming a theory of meaning. Thereafter, it presents a thorough integration of philosophies from different traditions to show how each framework evaluates or creates meaning. For instance, the elucidation of the dilemmas in the Bhagavadgitā, that one faces amid the process of understanding the metaphysical and the ontological meaning of life, is explained through the concept of yoga ( jñāna, karma, bhaktī ). Or the snake and rope example, and in its analogy with Descartes’ dream argument. In this, the author shows the relationship between Nyāya and Descartes’ scepticism, and the reference to Vātsyāyana’s (p. 144) commentary on the Nyāya Sūtra and highlights the views of opponents of the Nyāya school. These explanations offer an integration of primary and secondary literature in a much-synthesised manner. The author intends to inform their readers about the wide-ranging concepts, opposing views, and the evolution of the philosophical debate. When he explains the notion of cultural relativism, in the third chapter, and points out the problem in accepting this view. He first creates a sense of awareness that there are subjective moral beliefs, which means there are no universal moral principles acceptable to all cultures. Then, through a representation of the problems posed by cultural relativism, the author makes the reader question the notion of moral subjectivity. Interestingly, the discussions about relativity and the presentation of a discourse on it point out the interdisciplinary nature of philosophical inquiry. Relativism is a philosophical idea, but the notion of “cultural relativism” (p. 45) is studied often by anthropologists, sociologists, linguists, philosophers and psychologists. Every discipline approaches an issue from a specific vantage point and methodology. Disciplines are said to draw from philosophical methods and concepts, and vice versa. It highlights that concepts are interconnected (pp. 2-3), thereby signifying the relevance of an interdisciplinary approach. The book explicates that Philosophy is multidimensional and that the truth of a philosophical matter revolves around a debate. Structurally, the book offers an integrated study of concepts and continuity, as we see in the sixth chapter on scepticism. The discussion on Descartes’ philosophy develops into the discussion of contemporary externalist responses, including the debate over the dream argument and the application of the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment (pp. 118, 129-130). What could have otherwise come across as a literature survey, mentioning multiple philosophers and concepts in quick succession, develops into a dialectical exploration. It gives away that the author’s intent is not to find settling answers but to inform the readers about the overall debate. For example, in the seventh chapter on Personal Identity, epistemological and metaphysical discussions are made concerning several philosophers: Derek Parfit, Sydney Shoemaker, John Locke, David Hume, and Buddhist philosophy. The dialogue between Milinda and Nāgasena (pp. 167-168) on the questions of personal identity goes beyond knowing “who am I”. And the chapter ends with an unanswered question on the nature of the soul. A similar integration is evident in the eighth chapter, which explores art from a vantage point of expression, representation, flow, meaning, pleasure, and aesthetics. The author presents the formalist, expressivist, aesthetic, and rasa theories of art, capturing the integration of philosophical subdisciplines: metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics—and thereby, rounding off the broader enquiry that initially begins with the mind-body problem and the questions of meaning and life. While the book’s scope is broad, there are certain areas whose inclusion may have added to its expansive nature. Such as the theory of Justice from the aegis of philosophers like Plato, John Rawls, and Amartya Sen. The book does not include the discussions of Philosophy of language, which is central to Epistemology, Logic, Ethics and various other disciplines. An introduction to the central figures like Wittgenstein, Frege, Austin, Searle, or Putnam may have provided a meta-enquiry of the notion of meaning. While we are introduced to Sartre’s view on meaning, Nietzsche’s contributions to understanding meaning in life are missing. The references to other orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy, and the modern Indian thinkers like Sen, Aurobindo, Vivekananda, Mohanty and others may have complemented the book’s scope. Still, the text compensates for its limitations as seen in the eighth chapter—“What is art”, though introductory in tone, explores intersecting domains: experience, emotion, rasa , value, and flow. The chapter draws on Plato’s (p. 173) and Wittgenstein’s direct and indirect contributions (p. 189) to understanding the meaning of art, informing the reader about the wider scope of their philosophical viewpoints. Another remarkable strategy is the blending of the classical Indian Philosophy and the attempts to overcome the limitations of philosophical parochialism (Konstantinović 2021) [vi] , usually prominent in the introductory level texts. Be it the integration of Buddhist ethics or the Bhagvadgītā’s teachings (p. 38), the Nyāya Philosophy (p. 143), or the Rasa theory from Natyasastra (p. 198). Alongside its philosophical inclusivity, the book employs effective pedagogical tools which engage the learner through culturally relevant (Rattanawong and Thongrin 2023) [vii] puzzles and prompts, for the initiation of a relatable understanding of concepts. Some of the culturally familiar examples or cases that the author creates in the book are worth noting. Such as the description of the experiment by Joshua Greene and Michael Koenigs (pp. 70-71), in the chapter on morality. He demonstrates the probable application of the experiment in the Indian system of Affirmative Action policies. The experiment used moral dilemmas like the trolley problem and the crying baby scenario to depict the difference that people show in emotional and cognitive responses when faced with personal moral dilemmas versus impersonal dilemmas. This experiment showed that the synthesis of deontological and utilitarian ethics can solve larger practical problems. It also helps the Indian readers to comprehend the theory in resonance with a familiar context. The author creates engaging philosophical dialogues to help the readers build an understanding step by step. The question, “If the soul isn’t the subject of experience, what is? It’s time for you, the subject of experience, to start thinking at time t 1 and come up with an answer at t 2 !” (p. 171), demands that the reader pause, think, and reflect. This approach is visible in the questions he raises: whether the comedian with a banana and duct tape produces art? And the contemplation around free will. What is more important in these endeavours is the embedding of the Socratic style that invites the readers to think independently and critically. The way the author eases philosophical perplexities with a deft shift in the tone and strategic placement of provocative phrases shows the application of an integrative teaching and learning style. In the opening chapter, the debate surrounding the mind-body problem is framed using views of several philosophers. Before the chapter gets too dense with the debate, the author lowers the intensity of the discourse with a discussion on relativism about truth. Shifting to a more familiar topic, especially one illustrated through examples like jackfruit ice cream and cultural subjectivity, eases the reader back into conceptual clarity. Even though there is a shift to a slightly casual tone, the philosophical message is never diluted, but rather enriched. For instance, “But hang on with me. There is an evil demon who is deceiving you…so you think you have hands but you don’t” (p. 117). These deliberate stylistic techniques, which maintain a balance between the academic and the casual tone, keep the readers hooked throughout the reading process. Complex discussions are eased out with similar acts by saying, “Now try to apply this to Descartes’ demon argument and the brain-in-a-vat argument and see whether it begs the question or not. Sweet dreams!” (p. 144). This sort of closing to a topic as complex as scepticism leaves the readers smiling but unsettled, forging critical reflection. Overall, the book offers both relevance and depth through the contextualisation of foundational problems in philosophy. It presents broad concepts and recent philosophical developments. The book can be beneficial for a diverse range of audiences, including undergraduate or master’s students, lay people, and young scholars. For the latter, it may serve as a useful starting point for research when supplemented with further readings. Owing to its expansive scope and pedagogically conscious style, Quick and Concise: Philosophy is a significant contribution to introductory-level philosophical literature. Footnotes [i] Refer to the discussion by Stephen Houlgate, on “Hegel's Dialectics”, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy , ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2024 Edition, accessed July 12, 2025. [ii] A way to understand the evolution of the ideas and how integration of opposing views can lead to its further development. [iii] “One of the reasons I became a philosopher…..is to argue.” [iv] Ruby Blondell, The Socratic Method: Plato's Use of Philosophical Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). [v] Different views culminate into a meta discussion on meaning of life. [vi] Mostly books in the genre of introduction to philosophy has for long ignored the discussion on Indian Philosophy. See parochialism in Radomir Konstantinović, The Philosophy of Parochialism , trans. Ljiljana Nikolić and Branislav Jakovljević, ed. Branislav Jakovljević (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2021). [vii] There is a strong relationship between the learner’s thinking process and the cultural context. References Blondell, Ruby. The Socratic Method: Plato’s Use of Philosophical Drama . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Chakravarty, Shamik. 2025. Quick and Concise: Philosophy . Bangalore: Hachette India Craig, Edward. Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Houlgate, Stephen. Hegel’s Dialectics.” The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy . Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Summer 2024 Edition. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Accessed July 12, 2025. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/hegel-dialectics/ . Konstantinović, Radomir. 2021. The Philosophy of Parochialism . Translated by Ljiljana Nikolić and Branislav Jakovljević. Edited by Branislav Jakovljević. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Nagel, Thomas. What Does It All Mean? A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy , New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Rattanawong, Amonrat, and Saneh Thongrin. “An Exploration of Culture in Listening and Speaking Materials from an English as an International Language Perspective.” LEARN Journal: Language Education and Acquisition Research Network 16, no. 1 (January-June 2023): 652–75. Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy . Mumbai: Sanage Publishing House, 2020. Originally published in 1912.

Review of Social Scientists in the Civic Space Shami Ulla Independent Scholar (PhD from University of Delhi) Book Review # Mar 24, 2025 Book review of the volume Social Scientists in the Civic Space: Ethical Perspectives on Democratic Involvement, edited by Arundhati Virmani, Jean Boutier, and Manohar Kumar (Routledge 2024). Have you ever wondered how social scientists address the practical and ethical challenges of civic space? This excellent edited book will answer your questions and ignite your passion for understanding the role and challenges of social scientists in the civic space. Compiling 15 chapters, this scholarly work motivates us to understand how the complexities of civic space challenge social scientists and how their involvement and detachment shape ethical and political decision-making in various ways. The book holds great academic significance for those who wish to understand the role, challenges, various kinds of pressure (such as political and cultural, etc.), and the relationship between their academic integrity and public responsibility. The book talks about defining ground for civic space, interventions, and involvement of social scientists in civic space for public debate regarding policy-making and decision-making in five principal parts: part one deals with ‘Challenges of the Context’ and consists of chapters 1-3, the part two deals with ‘Interventions in the Civic Space’ and consists of chapters 4-7, the part three deals with ‘Involvement in Public Debates’ and consists of chapters 8-11, the part four deals with ‘Ethical Politics of Democracy’ and consists of chapters 12-14 and the last part five deals with ‘Perspectives’ which consist of chapter 15. The book explores the role of social scientists in civic space and examines four major questions. First, what is civic space, and how do social scientists face the challenges of defining their role within it? Second, should social scientists engage in the public domain, or should they maintain a distance from civic space? Third, how do social scientists balance their dual responsibilities—one as academicians tasked with producing knowledge and the other as civilians who engage in public debates or activism? fourth, in the era of digitalization, how can social scientists protect themselves from misinformation? The book deals with these core questions, contributing significantly to the ongoing debate on the roles and challenges of social scientists in the civic space. To be more specific, Part One of the book Challenges of the Context deals with the historical grounding for civic space. In chapter 1, Jean Boutier discusses the place and role of historians between the two World Wars. The chapter interrogates the historian’s responsibility in times of political instability, economic turmoil, and ideological extremism. Boutier raises the question: should historians’ work remain confined to academia, or do they have a duty to intervene in public affairs? Scholars such as Henri Pirenne, Max Weber, Marc Bloch, and Lucien Febvre provide a nuanced response to political crises ( p. 15). However, the chapter does not provide a clear framework for how modern scholars should navigate this tension in the face of misinformation, climate change, or political extremism that exists in civic space. In Chapter 2, Rouzean explores how a historian became an activist while researching the Rwandan genocide (p. 26). He candidly reflects on his personal biases, uncertainties, and ethical dilemmas, making the chapter a compelling meditation on the responsibilities of historians. As he admits, "I could not shy away from a form of civic commitment that I had so far rejected" (p. 27). However, the chapter leaves an important question unanswered: if writing history objectively is impossible, what ethical standards should historians adopt when engaging with politically charged topics? Despite being deeply reflective and intellectually courageous, the chapter does not fully resolve this issue. In Chapter 3, Virmani discusses the significance of contextual freedom and how nationalistic political pressures hinder the writing of true history. She argues that an activist or social scientist can achieve greater objectivity by maintaining distance and dislocation when researching the history of other countries. According to Virmani, historians from foreign countries may be better positioned to produce unbiased historical narratives, as they are less susceptible to domestic political pressures (p. 55). This perspective suggests that geographical and cultural detachment could help scholars maintain academic objectivity more effectively. Part Two of the book Interventions in the Civic Space deals with what types of interventions are being practiced and the challenges faced by social scientists in the civic space. Intervening in public debate requires a different form of expertise. In chapter 4 , Théry redefines expertise as a balance between scientific rigor, civic engagement, and democratic participation (p. 74). He argues that expertise is not a singular, monolithic practice but rather unfolds across three distinct models—service expertise, consensus expertise, and engagement expertise, which help mediate between knowledge production and civic responsibility (p. 58). In civic responsibility, all experts carry a dual responsibility or identity. For example, economists often function as public figures, as seen in the cases of Manmohan Singh, Mario Monti, Lucas Papademos, John Maynard Keynes, Paul Krugman, and Amartya Sen. Similarly, historians such as Paxton and Ginsborg, shape and enrich public debates through their engagements. (Virmani, 2024, p. 69). In Chapter 5, Virmani explores how public writing is not merely a means of communication, but a democratic responsibility. For example, Balakrishnan’s critique of the Silver Line project in Kerala exemplifies how economists can use their expertise to question state-led development narratives (p. 73). Such interventions demonstrate that economists are not merely technocratic advisors but also active participants in ongoing democratic conversations. In Chapter 6, Ashwani Kumar examines the success and failures of the MGNREGA policy in India, highlighting the realities of six districts. It explores the role of bureaucracy, political clientelism, and local power structures in shaping welfare delivery. Kumar showed that Jalpaiguri (West Bengal) and Tiruvannamalai (Tamil Nadu) implemented innovative solutions, where political competition positively transformed the livelihoods for thousands of workers. However, in other districts like Bagalkote (Karnataka), Seoni (Madhya Pradesh), Nagaur (Rajasthan), and Gaya (Bihar) welfare programs were manipulated by local politicians for vote bank politics. Additionally, the existing upper and lower caste gap hindered equal welfare delivery (p. 86-92). In chapter 7, Trannoy discusses why economists rarely emerge as public intellectuals. Trannoy argues that professional incentives, writing styles, and the technical nature of economic research limit economists' engagement in broader public discourse (p. 100). Thus, the chapter has great virtues, but a question remains: How do digital media and its influence on the dialogue between experts and the public shape economists as public figures? Part Three of the book Involvement in Public Debates deals with how experts and the public influence policy and decision-making. In Chapter 8, Swaminathan presents a critical understanding of India’s food security policies. She evaluates the Public Distribution System (PDS), debates the merits of targeted vs. universal food security, and examines the role of activism in shaping welfare policies ( p. 118). She argues that India’s food security crisis is not caused by food shortages but rather by policy failures and exclusionary welfare mechanisms (p. 123). She makes a strong case for a universal PDS, citing its proven success in states like Tamil Nadu and Chhattisgarh, where it has led to higher food security and reduced corruption. She critiques neoliberal approaches that emphasize targeted welfare and fiscal restraint. In her words, “The shift from universal to targeted PDS has neither led to a reduction in budgetary subsidies nor has it benefited the large majority of food-insecure households in the desired manner” ( p. 127). The chapter could be developed by comparing India’s food security policies with global models such as Brazil’s Bolsa Família or China’s grain distribution system, providing a broader perspective. In chapter 9, Aucante offers a comparative analysis of the role of social scientists in democratic policymaking in Scandinavia and France. Aucante argues that while Scandinavian social scientists engage with the state in a structured manner, their French counterparts are more often positioned as critics, public intellectuals, or independent commentators (p. 138). In chapter 10, Bozon presents a comparative analysis of anti-gender movements in France and Brazil. He explores their emergence, evolution, and how conservative political and religious actors weaponized gender studies, feminism, and LGBTQ+ rights as threats to national identity and social stability (p. 155). In Brazil, Bolsonaro explicitly attacked gender studies and feminist movements, cutting funding for social sciences and promoting a conservative Christian identity as the foundation of national culture. Similarly, in France, mass protests erupted in 2012–2013 against the legalization of same-sex marriage ( Le Mariage pour Tous ), led by conservative Catholic organizations and right-wing intellectuals. French conservatives accused gender scholars of corrupting children, undermining family values, and promoting radical leftist ideologies (p. 159-160). While France’s anti-gender discourse was driven by intellectual and cultural arguments, Brazil’s was more populist and religious, illustrating different pathways to the same ideological goal. In Chapter 11, Rajeshwari argues that civic space is neither neutral nor universally accessible but is shaped by structural inequalities related to gender, caste, class, and religion. Rajeshwari demonstrates how feminist research both critiques and contributes to civic discourse in India. Engaging with major feminist movements, digital activism, and contested public debates, the chapter provides a nuanced exploration of how feminist engagement challenges dominant power structures and expands democratic participation ( p. 165). Part four of the book Ethical Politics of Democracy deals with the role of the knowledge of expertise in the civic space. In chapter 12, Origgi reflects on how expert knowledge interacts with democratic principles, such as equality, neutrality, and legitimacy (p. 182). She raises questions like: Can democracies maintain both respect for expertise and genuine citizen participation, or does reliance on experts inevitably create a knowledge elite that weakens democratic legitimacy? (p. 184). She argues that the legitimacy of expertise is not automatic—it must be continually negotiated through transparency, public debate, and accountability mechanisms. Thus she writes that “Social scientists play a crucial role in mediating between expert and lay knowledge... by advancing new models that give a voice to the needs and values of society” (p. 188). This raises the question of how social media, misinformation, and alternative media platforms influence public perceptions of expertise. In chapter 13, Fatimah, Khan, & Natarajan, discuss data-driven journalism and its challenges. It highlights that journalists and social scientists need data science skills (e.g., coding, statistical modeling, machine learning), yet most professionals lack formal training (p. 197). In chapter 14, Manohar examines the role of civility in democratic discourse and protest movements. Kumar critiques the positions of Rawls and Habermas, arguing that norms of civility often privilege dominant groups while excluding marginalized voices. The chapter critiques the weaponization of civility, showing how it has been used to delegitimize disruptive but necessary movements for justice. Kumar suggests that democratic movements must balance radical disruption with strategic engagement (p. 206). Kumar states, “Disobedience uncovers a dimension of civility not as opposition, but as necessary coexistence that captures the messiness of democratic politics” (p. 216). Part five of the book Perspectives consists of the last chapter, 15. Samaddar discusses the role of social sciences in contemporary governance and policymaking and gives a metaphor of Sisyphus. The chapter questions whether social sciences, in their current form, can still serve a radical, emancipatory function or whether they have become mere tools of administrative governance (p. 222). Kumar argues that due to data-driven social science and research funding influenced by government or corporate interests, social scientists have turned from being social inquirers or whistle-blowers against power to becoming skilled practitioners of a discipline. consequently, the author urges social scientists to rethink their role in civic space (p. 226). The book is significant as it expands discussions on scholars' social roles—Weber’s detachment, Gramsci’s organic intellectuals, and Bourdieu’s public intellectuals—by addressing modern issues like digital misinformation and civic engagement beyond academia. The book explores emerging engagements like data journalism, grassroots activism, and ethical challenges in digital scholarship. The book links classical theories to modern knowledge production, showing how scholars navigate ethical dilemmas in today’s public sphere. This book aligns with Medvetz’s Think Tanks in America (2012) on expert policymaking influence and Calhoun’s Social Science for Public Knowledge (2008) on broader scholarly engagement. This book takes a global, interdisciplinary approach to ethical dilemmas in digital spaces, complementing Melzer’s The Public Intellectual: Between Philosophy and Politics (2003) by examining activism versus neutrality. The book excels in presentation. Boutier’s chapter advocates balancing public engagement and neutrality, but his historical analysis lacks a modern framework for misinformation. Rajeshwari’s chapter challenges detachment in structural inequalities. Fatimah, Khan, and Natarajans’ chapter stresses data skills but overlooks AI’s driven ethical risks. The book also misses a systematic Global North-South comparison. The book lacks discussion on social scientists in authoritarian regimes and underrepresents scholars in Africa and Latin America. It also overlooks AI-driven misinformation, surveillance, and algorithmic governance. The book could improve with chapters on social scientists under authoritarian regimes, AI’s role in civic engagement, and a Global South vs. North comparison approach to civic engagement. Adding participatory action research (PAR) would highlight scholar-community collaboration for impactful social science. Addressing these gaps would have enriched its analysis and provided a more comprehensive view of public scholarship today. Overall, the book Social Scientists in the Civic Space Ethical Perspectives on Democratic Involvement provides a thoughtful and valuable resource for students, researchers, and policymakers engaged in public domain research. The book successfully achieves its objectives, offering contextually relevant examples and ethical dilemmas that social scientists encounter in the civic space. References Calhoun, Craig. "Social science for public knowledge." Academics as public intellectuals (2008): 299-318. Medvetz, Thomas. Think tanks in America . University of Chicago Press, 2012. Melzer, Arthur M., Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman, eds. The public intellectual: between philosophy and politics . Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.

Review of Bhaskarjit Neog's Book Abhishek Anant Nowbagh Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University Book Review # May 16, 2024 Book review of Bhaskarjit Neog’s book What Responsibility? Whose Responsibility? Intention, Agency, Emotions of Collective Entities (Routledge 2024). The author, Bhaskarjit Neog, in the prologue of this book, provides instances of collective wrongdoing, along with the observation that "one of the reasons behind the disappearance of moral resentment from public memory is the fact that we do not always have a clear understanding of the simple question - who is responsible when a group or collective is held responsible?" (Neog, 2024, p. xiii). The author brings forth the difference between the idea of attributing moral properties to groups and collectives in general everyday moral vocabulary, easily understood in general terms, and the analytical understanding of collective responsibility, which poses serious conceptual problems. When the philosophical analysis of collective responsibility is attempted through the concept of individual moral responsibility, the idea of collective responsibility begins to emerge as a concept that needs extensive discourse. It is this discourse that the author initiates. The book has seven sections: a prologue, five chapters, and an epilogue. The sections take us through an extensive discussion related to collectivizing responsibility through collective intentions, collective agency, and collective emotions. In the first chapter, the author looks into how the structure of moral responsibility, based on the actor’s knowledge and control in individual acts, can be ascribed to collective contexts. Analysing the concept of collectives, he argues that both structured and unstructured collectives can be brought under the concept of moral responsibility. He searches for wider criteria for moral agential status for the collective beyond the argument that does not ascribe moral status to a collective. The second chapter brings forth two approaches to collective responsibility. The first is the collectivist position, which is committed to the reality of collective responsibility. The second is an individualist position that is somewhat non-committal concerning collective responsibility. The author then draws our attention to two specific issues that need to be addressed further: first, concerning the distribution of responsibility among the members of the collective and second, the relationship between individual responsibility on the one hand and the responsibility of collectives on the other. Here, the author proposes an account that "argues for a space where one is required to see things from the collective's point of view without thereby neglecting how things appear for the individuals within the collective concerned" (Neog, 2024, p. 35). He refers to this account which is neither fully collectivistic nor fully individualistic as a quasi-collectivist or non-individualist account. The author then elaborates on the justification of the proposed quasi-collectivist account from three perspectives concerning a collective: intention, agency, and guilt, which leads us to the next three chapters. The third chapter deliberates upon the intentional make-up of collectives. The author discusses the viewpoints of John Searle, Micahel Bratman, Raimo Tuomela, and Margaret Gilbert who have approached collective intentions without any metaphysical entity in their explanation; he expresses his apprehension whether such a view can encompass the understanding of collective moral action or collective moral responsibility. Firstly, he elaborates on the common-sense views about collective intentionality. Secondly, he asks the pertinent question: where does this collective intention, which drives collective action, reside? He addresses this issue by identifying two ways of approaching this concern: taking individuals as a group or taking them as a group of individuals . The author acknowledges that this is a contentious issue that has no easy answers. Thus, he analyses the views of Bratman, Searle, Tuomela, and Gilbert to draw a comprehensive picture of collective intentionality. In this context, the author takes into consideration collectivity, which he terms as the "essence that makes a particular intentional state inherently collective" (Neog, 2024, p. 59), further contemplating upon interrelationality and the collectivity of collective intentions. He argues that genuine collective intentions shall firstly not be overpowered by an authority that takes control over individuals. Secondly, collective intentions shall not completely be dissociated from the individual’s intentions that constitute that collective. This leads to the quasi-collectivist account of collective responsibility. The author explains collective intentions as the intentions of the collective . He argues for collective responsibility as "an independent normative fact with its own sui generic character, and not just an aggregation of the responsibility of the participating individuals", moving towards justifying collective responsibility as the responsibility of collectives. The fourth chapter concerns itself with collectives with an agency of their own. In the previous chapter, he points out that with regard to an individual it is the individual agency that precedes individual intention, but with regard to the collective it is the other way round. Collective agency has been looked through the prism of moral responsibility as being a collective self-being primarily responsible for its actions or outcomes. The author argues for formulating such a collective agency in this chapter. He makes a detailed analysis of the philosophical discourses concerning agency, individual and collective. In his book he argues for a collective agency that is different from the shared agency, which is a single agential unit consisting of multiple individual agents. The author further explains that shared agency is a concept of unity with diversity , but collective agency is unity in diversity . He further connects the normative point raised in the previous chapter with collective agency. This collective agency, the author claims, is crucial for recognizing collective responsibility as the responsibility of the collective per se. The author also considers emotional attitude, with respect to sharing the moral burden, of the collective agency that shall bring forth the complete moral character. This forms the basis of the next chapter. The fifth chapter emphasizes the relationship between morality and emotion. The dominant view in early philosophy was that morality concerns itself with reason, and emotion has no role to play in it. However, recent discussions in philosophy have pointed towards a more intimate relationship between morality and emotion. The author focuses on the emotion of guilt in this chapter to understand how guilt affects moral collective responsibility. There are philosophical approaches that argue that there is no strong connection between an individual’s guilt and her ability to be moral. Another argument categorizes guilt as a negative emotion that has no positive role in shaping morality. The author disagrees with such approaches, stating that "the nature of guilt and its proximity to our moral conscience needs to be understood in a wider context" (Neog, 2024, p. 105), and not based on individual instances. Further, Neog examines the feeling of collective guilt and compares and clarifies its distinction with collective shame: shame is driven by agent-centric reconstruction, but guilt is driven by action-centric reconstruction . Confusion of guilt with regret may occur when we consider collective wrongdoing, but for Neog, regret is a feeling that can occur beyond the direct involvement of an agent in the wrongdoing. He observes that the three approaches to collective guilt feeling , (i) a summation of individual guilt feelings, (ii) a feeling of membership guilt , and (iii) collective feeling of guilt, are not adequate. He offers a fourth alternative to collective guilt that takes into consideration the singularity of agency and the plurality of the experiencing subjects and tries to reconcile these two. It is such an endeavor where collective guilt is, in the singularity context, a feeling of guilt for wrongdoing committed in the name of the collective, and on the other hand, in the plurality context, it is the plurality of the individual members experiencing guilt as contributors to the collective. He terms it as positional guilt feeling that "on the one hand, retains the phenomenological elements in its constitution, on the other, recognizes the importance of collectivity by maintaining a distinction between the singularity of the agency of wrongdoing and the plurality of the experiencing subjects" (Neog, 2024, pp. 117-118). Neog finally argues that when we consider the collective agency, as discussed in the previous chapter, we can very well locate a collective moral agency, with respect to positional guilt feeling. This account of positional guilt feeling helps us understand collective responsibility. The epilogue of the book touches upon a possible assumption on the part of critics that he is subscribing to a conceptual isomorphism between individual wrongdoing and collective wrongdoing. He responds to this criticism by arguing that there can be collective wrongdoings without there being any collective intention. For him an affirmative claim can be made that collective responsibility can be understood through collective intention: given his take on collective intentionality recognises the significance of individuating the phenomena of collectivity so that keeping it away from being an overarching metaphysical superstructure and also tagging along individual intentional attitudes of the members of the collective. This leads the collective to an internal evaluation towards executing a common goal, which results in the collective agency. This collective agency is able to form emotional responses, as articulated by the discussion on guilt. As he puts it, collective guilt is "an emotional state where the referred agent behind the collective wrongdoing is the collective agent itself, although the subjects of such a feeling are the individual members" (Neog, 2024, p. 128). Neog does consider that there may be certain cases where collective wrongdoing does not have a collective intention, such as the problem of global warming. But this does not stop us from taking a retrospective stand on such issues. The book also considers instances where there is no pre-existing collective agent. The example cited is that random strangers helping a person in trouble. For Neog, in such cases, the moral demand for coordinated action can help in forming collective intentional agency, which develops through an internal evaluative perspective that develops a normative standpoint. He claims that philosophical discourse has laid forth the complexity of collective responsibility and his book attempts to "handle some of the knots and tangles of the yarn" (Neog, 2024, p. 132). Collective agency and collective responsibility are issues of utmost significance to philosophers and social scientists, since human existence as a social animal depends upon intricacies related to them, this book deliberates upon issues that matter in the perspective of understanding human co-existence. The extensive detail in which the author has looked into philosophical literature concerning responsibility, intention, agency, and guilt both in the context of the individual and the collective makes this a comprehensive account that is a must-read for everyone interested in individual-collective discourse. The quasi-collectivist account proposed in the book takes this discourse a step further. The wide-ranging use of anecdotes and instances from movies and literature about every pressing issue that this book concerns itself with helps us form a clear understanding of the complex philosophical debates in the backdrop. In this respect, this book can be considered a starting point for unversed readers in the individual-collective debate.

Translating philosophy: DR Nagaraj's Allamaprabhu N S Gundur Professor, Department of Studies and Research in English, Tumkur University (Karnataka, India) Article # Jul 3, 2022 The New India Foundation’s idea of translating the scholarship in bhashas into English fascinated me. Because translating creative literature, especially poetry and fiction, has been favourite in the republic of translation, particularly in the Kannada context; it rarely pays attention to the translation of discursive prose—philosophy, criticism etc. As a teacher who offers a translation course to my postgraduate students, I have found that I am quite at home translating non-fiction, mostly from English to Kannada. As a result, I tried translating some European thinkers including Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault into Kannada. The NIF inspired me to try translating the Kannada scholarship into English. While I was pursuing my PhD at Karnatak University, Dharwad, I was drawn toward G S Amur ’s conviction that translation should happen from other languages to our own language. This, according to Amur, is primarily for two reasons: one, translation is a cultural need and it should be useful for us. Therefore, borrowing from other cultures would be a wise act. If, for example, a Kannadiga translates from the English language, the Kannada culture will be enriched. Secondly, translation is also a matter of linguistic competence. We are better at translating from our second or third languages to our own language, rather than doing it the other way round. After examining some bad translations of Kannada texts into English, I followed this conviction religiously and never tried my hand at translating Kannada texts into English. But the success story of Vanamala Viswanatha’s translation of a Kannada classic The Life of Harishchandra (Harvard University Press, 2017) changed my perception, and I began to realise the importance of translating our texts into English. Moreover, as someone doing academics in the English language, I now see my English writings as translations, because I think foremostly in Kannada. Among several factors, I must mention two that made me apply for the fellowship. First, the pride of joining the NIF community and learning from its stakeholders, if selected; second, the NIF understands translating scholarship as more than an act of translation; it is clearly mentioned in the programme description that it is a fellowship for research and translation. The seriousness with which the fellowship looked upon translation as research made me curious. Finally, translating the thought excited me, not to mention the huge amount of translation, which I came across for the first time. I, indeed, took more time to select the text than to write a proposal for it. Initially, I made a list of 5 to 6 works and took almost two months to decide on it. Thanks to friends and Kannada scholars who tolerated my endless discussions with them, and during one such conversation, my mentor Professor Prithvi Datta Chandra Shobhi, a D. R. Nagaraj's collaborator and translator too, categorically suggested Allamprabhu mattu Shaiva Pratibhe (1999). But my strategic thinking did not allow me to finalize it; I ruminated on which texts would get me the chances of obtaining the coveted fellowship. At times, I found DR’s work difficult to translate, and thought of some easily translatable texts. But my inner voice kept on reminding me of Professor Prithvi’s advice, and finally, I followed it. D. R. Nagaraj's (henceforth DR) work is an important contribution to the domain of Indian intellectual traditions. His two major books, The Flaming Feet and Other Essays: the Dalit Movement in India (2010) and Listening to the Loom: Essays on Literature, Politics and Violence (2012) are quite known to the non-Kannada reader. Allamaprabhu mattu Shaiva Pratibhe , which belongs to the mature period of his intellectual career, was published posthumously. It is the only monograph of DR that is not available in English. In fact, he wanted to write it in English or he himself could have translated it later, but he seems to have left it for my fortune. DR Nagaraj's book Allamma Prabhu Mathu Shaiva Prathibe In this book, DR was up to undertaking several intellectual ambitions, including decolonizing his own modes of inquiry and critiquing the historiography of Indian philosophy. Here, DR enters into a dialogue with contemporary historians of Indian philosophy by showing how Allama Prabhu , a 12th century Shaiva mystic, had conversations with Abhinavagupta, the Kashmiri Shaiva philosopher and Gorakhnatha, the mystic, and also with his contemporaries like Basavanna. While drawing our attention to the intellectual dimensions of the Veerashaiva movement, his close reading of Allama’s vachanas reconstructs the intellectual portrait of Allama as an argumentative Indian. Amartya Sen would have devoted a chapter on this theme in his The Argumentative Indian (2005) if this book were available to him in English. Further, the translation of this book, I am sure, would fulfill the NIF’s vision of ‘fostering comparative literature about different states and streams of progress’, besides creating ‘an expansive cultural reach for works which have thus far been confined to those who understand the original language of their composition’. As U R Ananthamurthy puts it ‘the classic work of DR has got the capacity to transform us, and DR tries to understand Allama not only in the context of medieval India but also from the viewpoint of our times; it addresses our cultural crisis.’ Those interested in the intellectual history of medieval India and understanding our dialogic traditions would be benefited from DR’s deep reflections and scholarship. If it is useful to maintain a conversation between the modern and the pre-modern, across languages and cultures, we need to engage with this kind of work. And this is how we achieve our country, by translating our thoughts for fellow Indians.

A Word of Caution to 'the Uniformist' and 'the Reformist' Ariba Zaidi Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Zakir Husain Delhi College Article # Feb 22, 2022 This article is part of the series of responses from philosophers on the hijab row . Through this piece of writing, my endeavour is to present my arguments to the Uniformist and the Reformist demonstrating that their attempts to get the practice of hijab banned are misplaced even if they have come to believe that their hearts are not. The term ‘Reformist’ here refers to the set of people who believe the practice of hijab or its imposition to be a regressive socio-cultural practice and therefore are calling for a prohibition by way of imposition. The term ‘Uniformist’, on the other hand, refers to the section that believes the practice to be incompatible with the various symbols of uniformity (uniforms in the current context) that are instituted to promote equality and fraternity, and through them, arguably, unity in a diverse society such as ours. Why the uniformist insistence on the hijab ban is untenable Given the current context and the likely grave implications that may follow, I would like to draw the attention of the Uniformist first. What does the symbol of uniformity represent? One may not disagree that the intent is to bring uniformity, but uniformity in itself doesn’t represent any merit in most societies unless it is a means to attain other social values, which are 'equality' and 'fraternity' and through such ideals 'unity' that binds the social fabric. My argument is – the spirit of uniformity is what gives meaning to the symbols of uniformity . Further, if a society is not able to appreciate what the spirit of uniformity means or what its significance is, and to what extent it can be pursued, the likely-hood of self-sabotaging the ends , i.e., equality, fraternity and unity for which such symbols of uniformity were instituted in the first place can’t be discounted. The spirit of uniformity is often mistaken to be seeking uniformity in all the spheres of social life. The error lies in not recognizing that not all domains of social life are equally amenable to a quest for uniformity. There are some domains where the quest for uniformity is a just and a meaningful pursuit, but there are also provinces where it cannot be accorded a justifiable place. Social, economic and political spheres are such domains where the quest for uniformity is arguably a legitimate pursuit. More so in the context of our society where economic and social hierarchies are deep-rooted, but regardless of the realities of a society, to have uniform basic minimum standards of dignified living, and absence of social hierarchies ought to be one of the prime objectives for any progressive society. Thus, the spirit of uniformity is a requisite quest in the foregoing domains. However, society is a union of more than these three stated sets. This brings me to the sphere of culture . Can we seek uniformity in the domain of culture, which in our society is composed of many diverse elements? Culture is a slightly different set than others, where each element (cultural element) of the set often happens to be the assumed identity of the ones who belong to that particular culture. For instance, should we seek uniformity in languages or dialects, in religion or its sub-sects, in rituals, customs and traditions etc.? Each of these elements can be a part of someone’s assumed identity. Any short-sighted attempt to dilute the integrity of such identities, as history indicates, are fraught with danger, often with detrimental effects to some of the goals for which the uniformity is sought in the first place, i.e., fraternity and through it unity in the society. Alternatively stated, uniformity becomes the instrument of sabotaging the same very goals to pursue which it was instituted in the first place. Thus, while instituting the symbols of uniformity such as uniforms, one ought to be guided by the spirit of uniformity, which is to strive for uniformity within the socio-politico-economic domains without undermining the diversity in the cultural domain . I am, therefore, urging all the Uniformists, who are in concurrence with the call for a hijab ban, to be guided by the spirit of uniformity. Otherwise, knowingly or unknowingly, they are grossly undervaluing the goals for which uniformity is sought. Why the Reformist insistence on the hijab ban is untenable The following sets of arguments are addressed to the Reformists, who, as I stated earlier, are those set of people who believe the practice of hijab or its imposition to be a regressive socio-cultural practice and therefore are calling for a prohibition by way of imposition. I don’t intend to keep the willful (autonomous) practice of hijab, with or without any justification, within the same bracket as the imposed or culturally-conditioned practice of it (even if some of the members fall within the intersection of the culturally-conditioned class and the autonomous class). The question is: Does the imposition of hijab or similar regressive practices regardless of their religious or cultural affiliation deserve a top-down imposition of ban or any other form of restriction? I agree with the Reformists that our society is a simmering ground of many regressive practices and arguably there is no religion that doesn’t contribute to it. It is significant for us, therefore, as a collective, to arrive at a generalization or a guiding framework to address such regressive issues and choose wisely when it comes to opting for a path to bring reforms. My attempt, through the following, is to demonstrate to the Reformists that a well-recognized framework already exists in most of the thriving democratic societies, and inference from such a framework doesn’t justify a top-down imposition of ban on hijab or similar practices. When it comes to socio-cultural reforms, one can immediately think of two preferred modes by most societies worldwide to carry out reforms viz., the consensus-based approach and the top-down impositions . One is likely to associate a consensus-based approach with a thriving democracy, but a top-down imposition isn’t entirely incompatible within a democratic political structure either. Of course, a consensus-based approach has to be the norm , but exceptions can be cited that often warrant a quick decision making, where waiting for consensus may prove to be debilitating. We have the instances of child marriage abolition, abolition of untouchability, the PNDT act, abolition of slavery in the US etc., where waiting for consensus would have proven self-defeating. I am inclined to keep abolition of sati too in this category although it was imposed by an imperialist regime. The question to be asked is what is the basis to determine whether a case for reform fits the consensus-based approach or the top-down imposition. The foregoing instances of top-down impositions and other similar incidents that have not found a mention here can probably be a promising source to inductively arrive at some generalization. In my humble attempt, I find that a breach of someone’s ‘right to life’ and ‘ right to live with dignity’ are two factors that provided the ground for impositions in all such instances. One may wish to keep disruption of peace and public order in this category, but it is also arguably one of the most misused basis by most governments to impose sanctions on our liberties. Thus, in my opinion, the breach of ‘right to life’ and ‘right to live with dignity’ seems to be the only basis for a top-down imposition in a democratic polity in most cases if not all. In all other contexts, a consensus-based approach should be the norm for any democracy to be meaningful to its citizenry. Now, the question is can school/college going hijab-wearing girls be seen as breaching any of these inalienable rights that warrant a top-down imposition. I am sure that our Reformist zeal is not blinded enough to see it that way, but there may be some who would still want to point that women forced to be behind the veil are living a less dignified life, and the situation according to the chosen parameters warrants imposition of the ban. I would like to argue that by forcing the issue of the hijab ban, it is the Reformist who is stealing the chance of a Muslim woman to live a dignified life. By forcing the issue, they are preparing a ground for many Muslim orthodox parents to not let their daughters see the corridors of schools and colleges and pushing the women who have autonomously adopted the practice to avoid such spaces. The Reformist enthusiasm of the hijab ban advocates is most likely to end up stealing a girl child’s right to education, her probably only chance to get out of this vicious trap in which her parents are trapped, her only chance to question her socio-cultural conditioning and associated cognitive biases, her only chance to make a decision for herself whether she wants to be behind the veil or not. Thus, at least to me, the Reformist demand for a ban on hijab and similar practices is unjust and uncalled for, and consensus mode seems to be the way forward. Consensus mode appears to be the way forward, but… Thus, the Reformists, if they are honest in their attempt to bring reforms, ought to pay more attention to devise ways to bring consensus amongst all the stakeholders. The essence of following this path lies in understanding what is central to building consensus . Central to any consensus building attempt, it can be argued, lies our ability to forge a constructive dialogue around the issues that require consensus. Any dialogue, as we all know, is composed of arguments, a logic-driven structure where claims are supported by premises. Likewise, the strength of the argument lies in its validity and soundness, where the truth of the premises plays a significant part. The question is where do these premises come from? In a society where education is still struggling to penetrate and expand its reach, it’s unreasonable to assume that their premises are likely to represent facts or truth by empirical standards. Most likely, socio-cultural conditionings, various forms of custom and tradition enforced beliefs or some form of authority are the general sources of many of their premises. What makes matters further complex is that almost all the sections of our society, in varying degrees, subscribe to such premises where each of these sections has its own sets of customs, traditions, social-conditioning, and authorities. A dialogue is probably difficult to conceive in a situation where participating members or sections of society appeal to different grounds of truth for many of their premises in the arguments advanced by them . Thus, what we get is a stalemate in return, and our Reformist zeal, instead of recognizing the true nemesis and finding a solution to it, pushes for the quick fixes , often in the form of top-down insensitive impositions as it can be witnessed in the context of the call for hijab ban. What a Reformist needs to do instead is to find a way to push through this stalemate and ensure that the dialogue happens , but how can they do it? The stumbling block in the dialogues seems to be ‘ the different grounds for truth ’ of their premises, but can we ensure uniformity in it. My preferred criteria would be empirical facts for obvious reasons, but can we push for it? I think we should not. Then what should be done? My take is that we ought to focus on the prospective participants in the dialogue, i.e. children and in them inculcate the skill of reflectivity . From reflectivity what I mean is the ability to challenge one’s own beliefs and those of others, the ability to seek justification for such beliefs and keep such justifications under constant scrutiny, the ability to identify fallacies and cognitive biases and the ability to overcome the conditionings enforced by the accident of birth. Given the fact that they are able to question themselves with the same intensity that they question others, participants of this kind in a dialogue are more likely to come up with some agreeable common grounds of truth for their premises and make their dialogue and consequently reforms more successful. One may ask why children alone? I am not pessimistic in this regard, but I have come to understand that, barring a few exceptions, the grown-up population is way too conditioned (even the educated ones) to give upon their rigidities. Efforts can nevertheless be made in this direction. What is it that the Reformists should do to actualise the foregoing? Considering that they are true in their intent to reform the society, and want to put an end to regressive practices without causing much of a social discord and discontentment, they should spend their energies in creating and shaping an education system that promotes reflectivity of the kind stated above in the students at the grass-root level. I am not implying here that all our social and cultural problems will be resolved once our citizenry is educated in the stated manner. It would be naïve to think so given the complexities at play, and I don’t intend to underappreciate the human tenacity to abandon reason when it suits them, but with all that could be there to impede dialogue, by adopting this course, surely we will give ourselves the best chance to reform our society without inciting social discord. These are my well-considered views, but I can be naïve in such considerations. __________________________________________________________________________________________ Read other articles in this series: Ariba Zaidi -- A Word of Caution to 'the Uniformist' and 'the Reformist’ Danish Hamid -- Back to Liberal Basics Hina Mushtaq -- Can women decide for themselves? Sania Ismailee -- The Karnataka Hijab row is about Right to Education...

Review of Modernity and its Futures Past Bhakti Gaikwad PhD Scholar, Savitribai Phule University Book Review # May 17, 2025 Book review of Nishad Patnaik's Modernity and its Futures Past (Palgrave Macmillan Cham 2023). The text Modernity and Its Futures Past by Nishad Patnaik revisits the ambiguity surrounding the concept of modernity and its historical evolution. The book challenges the dominant Eurocentric narrative that modernity is a monolithic, linear process. It instead proposes a pluralistic and nuanced understanding. By engaging with political theory, philosophy, sociology, and postcolonial studies, the book makes a compelling case for re-evaluating modernity’s foundations and considering alternative frameworks that better reflect the multiplicity of human experiences. One of the key tensions the author points out is between the conventional understanding of modernity, which assumes a break from tradition, and a more contextual approach that sees modernity as a continuous negotiation with the past. This reminded me of Walter Benjamin’s critique of progress. For Benjamin history is not necessarily forward-moving but rather a complex interplay between past and present. The book argues that modernity should not be viewed as a complete rejection of tradition but rather an ongoing process of reinterpretation and transformation. The author argues that modernity is not just a Western phenomenon but an evolving discourse shaped by various cultural, social, and historical forces. The book consists of several chapters, excluding a preface and acknowledgments. It begins by pointing out a reflection as well as a theoretical concern regarding the inadequacy of Eurocentric conceptions of modernity in explaining contemporary global realities. The text proposes alternative approaches that account for the experiences of societies outside the Western framework. It not only critiques the dominant narrative of modernity but also engages with diverse intellectual traditions, including postcolonial theorists, feminist scholars, and decolonial thinkers. The first section of the book dwells on a reflective theoretical need: Can we ever think of multiple modernities? The book attempts to not only answer this theoretical concern but also create a ‘theoretical toolbox’ for the same. Additionally, it revisits and re-reads debates in political theory, philosophy, and global history to construct an inclusive understanding of modernity. This, the author suggests, can help in reshaping the normative foundations of how we understand modernity and its futures. The book carefully maps out the ways in which different societies have grappled with modernity, emphasizing that there is no singular pathway to modernization. The text explores how we can do political theory and philosophy in a way that is not burdened by the dominance of Western frameworks. The author has referred to thinkers such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, Walter Mignolo, and Ashis Nandy to set the theoretical tone of the book. Along the lines of these thinkers, the book argues that modernity should be understood from within the realities of different societies rather than imposed as a universal model. The author critically engages with how the idea of modernity has been historically constructed, often to the exclusion of indigenous epistemologies and alternative ways of knowing. This reminded me of the Upanishadic saying: वादे वादे जायते तत्त्वबोधः, which implies that it is through diverse opinions that we get to know the truth. The book similarly advocates for a plurality of perspectives in understanding modernity, arguing that different cultures bring their own lived experiences and knowledge systems to bear on the modern condition. The book, while analyzing modernity, critically examines key elements from various domains, including religion, caste, lived experience, and the corporeal body. As Patnaik (2023) notes, “The conceptualized modern experience throws up two essential markers regarding the inadequacy of Eurocentric modernity. At the social level, the hyper-presence of local traditions and alternative rationalities needs a multi-pronged instrument of public debate rather than a unilateral notion of Western reason to articulate real and true modern experiences” (p. 101). The text further explores how globalization and digital modernity have transformed traditional understandings of modernity. The book suggests that in an era of technological advancements and rapid social change, modernity is no longer confined to a singular trajectory but is increasingly shaped by hybrid identities, transnational movements, and economic interdependence. At a time when globally, the nature of modernity is altering, this text makes a few pertinent interventions while keeping in mind lived realities. While trying to establish the idea of ‘multiple modernities,’ one can look at contemporary cultural productions such as films and literature that capture the nuanced relationship between modernity and traditional structures. The book acknowledges that modernity is not an abstract theoretical construct but something that is deeply embedded in the everyday experiences of people. In doing so, it argues that we must move beyond grand narratives and focus on the lived realities of individuals and communities as they navigate modern life. The author looks at religion as an important aspect of modernity’s social context. The book establishes that the role of religion cannot be underestimated in evaluating the political and social dimensions of modernity. This argument is reinforced by drawing from political thinkers like B.R. Ambedkar and scholars like Talal Asad. The text suggests that rather than viewing modernity and religion as opposing forces, it is more productive to analyze their complex interrelationship. This discussion also touches upon the limitations of secularization theory, arguing that the assumption that modernity leads to the decline of religion is not universally applicable. The book draws on examples from different societies to show how religious traditions have adapted to and shaped modernity in their own ways. The text further explores the question of crisis within modernity. It argues that modernity is not a stable or fixed concept but is continually in flux, responding to crises that emerge from within its own structure. The author examines various contemporary challenges; ranging from climate change and economic inequality to political instability and social unrest; as symptoms of modernity’s inherent contradictions. This discussion reminded me of Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of ‘liquid modernity,’ where he describes the increasing instability and fragmentation of modern life. The book extends this argument by suggesting that modernity’s future depends on its ability to transform in response to these crises. The text proposes alternative pathways for modernity that emphasize sustainability, inclusivity, and a more holistic approach to progress. In its concluding chapters, the book turns to the question of modernity’s future. Can modernity be reformed, or does it need to be fundamentally rethought? The author suggests that while modernity’s foundations are deeply problematic, there is still room for transformation. By embracing a more pluralistic and inclusive approach; one that values diverse epistemologies and challenges existing power structures; modernity can evolve in ways that are more just and equitable. This discussion resonates with thinkers like Ashis Nandy, who have argued for a reimagining of modernity that is not dictated by Western models but instead rooted in indigenous and alternative traditions. The book’s vision of modernity’s future is both critical and hopeful, acknowledging the deep-seated problems of modernity while also recognizing the potential for new possibilities. Modernity and Its Futures Past is a deeply insightful and timely exploration of one of the most pressing intellectual debates of our time. It challenges readers to reconsider their assumptions about modernity, offering a nuanced and multidimensional perspective that is both critical and constructive. The book is particularly valuable for scholars of political theory, philosophy, sociology, and postcolonial studies, but its accessible style and engaging analysis make it relevant to a broader audience as well. The book walks a fine line between critique and reconstruction, offering not only a powerful analysis of modernity’s limitations but also a vision for its possible futures. In doing so, it makes an important contribution to contemporary debates on modernity and globalization, urging us to think critically about the world we inhabit and the futures we hope to create. References ● Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity . Polity Press. ● Chakrabarty, D. (2000). Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial thought and historical difference . Princeton University Press. ● Mignolo, W. D. (2011). The darker side of Western modernity: Global futures, decolonial options . Duke University Press.

Review of "Ecophenomenology and the Environmental Crisis in the Sundarbans" Sourav Garain PhD Scholar, Visva-Bharati Book Review # Aug 12, 2025 Book review of Kalpita Paul's Ecophenomenology and the Environmental Crisis in the Sundarbans: Towards a Community-Based Ethics (Routledge, 2025). Overview and Structure Kalpita Bhar Paul’s Ecophenomenology and the Environmental Crisis in the Sundarbans is a timely and philosophically rich engagement with the ecological precarity of the Indian Sundarbans. The book departs from conventional technocratic and anthropocentric frameworks by advancing an ecophenomenological method that reorients environmental discourse through field-based philosophical inquiry. Drawing from immersive fieldwork and long-term interaction with island communities, Paul constructs an original framework rooted in care, relationality, and a refusal of reductive “solutionist” thinking. The book argues that environmental crisis must be understood not merely as a managerial or policy failure, but as a crisis of meaning. Through the concepts of ontological humility and ethical responsiveness, Paul situates the Sundarbans not simply as a vulnerable ecosystem, but as a lived lifeworld – a space of co-constituted meaning between human and nature. Engaging thinkers like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, alongside posthumanist and decolonial theorists, Paul advances a distinctive vision of community-based ethics anchored in experiential knowledge and plural ontologies. Structured across eight chapters, the book unfolds a layered ethical and philosophical argument. Each chapter introduces a conceptual metaphor – such as “land-eaters,” “floating land,” or “accident”- that interrogates mainstream discourses and foregrounds indigenous categories of understanding. Through these metaphorical devices, Paul not only critiques dominant ecological imaginaries but also constructs an epistemological framework attentive to care, place, and lived relationality. Chapter Discussions The introductory chapter outlines the central philosophical and methodological orientation of the book. Paul situates her ecophenomenological approach against the backdrop of crisis thinking in the Anthropocene. Instead of advocating policy-based answers, she argues for a shift in how we think about what it means to be human and what is right and wrong. She says that climate change and natural loss should be seen as signs of a greater loss of relationship to place and care. She positions herself not as an external observer, but as a co-witness to the unfolding ecological realities in the Sundarbans. Chapter Two, titled Phenomenology of Land and Land-Eaters , explores the existential and political significance of land in the Sundarbans. Paul uses the metaphor of "land-eaters" to criticise the means by which that development drags communities out of their homes in the name of progress and protection. In this regard, land is not just a legal or geographical term; it is also an important moral and psychological centre that holds memory, connection, and the passing down of traditions from one generation to the next. Chapter Three, Phenomenology of Land-Water-Scape , turns to the relational geography of the delta. Paul contests the rigid separation between land and water prevalent in technoscientific frameworks. Using native phrases like "thirsty land" and "floating land," she shows how local knowledge doesn't fit neatly into two categories and instead shows a more fluid, co-emergent view of ecology. This criticism also shows how modern methods of emergency management are unfair because they don't take into account traditional ecological knowledge. In Chapter Four, Place and “Replace” , Paul focuses on the historical processes of place-making in the Sundarbans, from colonial forestry policies to postcolonial developmentalism. She engages with Heidegger’s notion of “oblivion” to highlight how state-led interventions have alienated local communities from their environments. The replacement of relational space with administered space, she argues, represents a deeper ethical crisis that echoes the philosophical violence of modernity. Chapter Five, Phenomenology of Accident , is one of the book’s most original interventions. Addressing human–animal encounters, particularly with the Royal Bengal Tiger, Paul introduces the concept of “accident” as an ontological event. She contrasts calculative bureaucratic responses to tiger attacks with meditative thinking rooted in lived acceptance and coexistence. Rather than treating such encounters as deviations, she explores how they expose the fragility and interdependence of human and nonhuman life in the Sundarbans. In Chapter Six, Paul introduces saṃsāra as a non-Western ontological category that better captures the dynamic, impermanent, and relational nature of environmental life in the Sundarbans. Reframed phenomenologically, saṃsāra becomes the foundation of a community-based ethic that values difference, embeddedness, and mutual care. Importantly, Paul resists the romanticization of the “local” by attending to internal differences and labour hierarchies within the community. Chapter Seven applies this ethical framework to the question of moral motivation and environmental behaviour. Paul critiques mainstream environmental psychology for focusing on policy instruments and behavioural incentives, arguing instead that ethical consciousness arises from relational attunement. Through comparative urban case studies, she shows how environmental ethics must be grounded in embodied experience rather than abstract principles. The final chapter, Beyond the Crisis of Imagination , returns to the philosophical stakes of the book. Paul critiques the representation of the Sundarbans as a natural museum frozen in time and instead calls for a plural, open-ended environmental imagination. She uses Heidegger's idea of "letting be" to argue for an ecological ethics that doesn't allow either dominance or withdrawal. This ethics starts with listening and ends with caring. Critical Engagement Kalpita Bhar Paul’s Ecophenomenology and the Environmental Crisis in the Sundarbans offers a thoughtful and intellectually ambitious intervention in the field of environmental philosophy. The book moves with confidence between the abstract and the situated, navigating Heideggerian and Merleau-Pontian thought while grounding its conceptual framework in the textures of lived experience in the Sundarbans. This ability to hold the theoretical and the empirical in sustained dialogue gives the work a notable depth. The author’s decision to position local inhabitants not as research subjects but as co-inquirers adds an important dimension to the study’s ethical and epistemological orientation. In doing so, the book not only avoids the extractive tendencies often associated with environmental field research, but also makes space for different modes of knowing to shape the philosophical project. One finds here a welcome refusal to treat philosophy as an abstract, universalizing endeavor; instead, the book demonstrates that philosophical reflection can be porous to the world, responsive to context, and open to voices often left out of theoretical discourse. At the same time, readers unfamiliar with phenomenology may find some sections demanding. The conceptual density, particularly in the more abstract discussions of Heideggerian ontology, may require sustained attention. For readers outside philosophy, particularly those from environmental management, policy, or development studies, this could pose a challenge. Still, the book does not aim for accessibility in the conventional sense; it invites readers into a different mode of thinking, one that slows down interpretation and resists the immediacy of solutions. That invitation, while rigorous, is also generative. It's clear that the book wants to criticise, especially when it talks about dominating conservation stories, developmentalist frames, and the modern urge to dominate nature. Its reframing of saṃsāra as an ecological concept is especially compelling, providing a culturally situated counterpoint to the Eurocentric assumptions that often shape environmental ethics. The ethical perspective that arises focuses more on fostering awareness, accountability, and collective vulnerability than on altering behaviour. Some readers may wonder how the book’s philosophical insights might be translated into institutional or policy settings. While it refrains from offering prescriptive models, its ethical orientation resonates with the principles of Post-Normal Science (PNS), which foregrounds extended peer communities, participatory deliberation, and ethical reflexivity in contexts marked by uncertainty and conflict. The Sundarbans, as Paul shows, are precisely such a site, where questions of livelihood, resilience, and identity cannot be resolved by technical means alone. From this perspective, her ecophenomenological approach offers not a toolkit, but a reframing of how environmental questions are posed and lived. Equally, Actor-Network Theory (ANT) offers a valuable conceptual complement. While Paul foregrounds relationality through phenomenological and ethical lenses, ANT could further illuminate the socio-material entanglements she describes – dykes, boats, monitoring devices, solar panels, and the tiger itself are not just background elements but actors within a distributed network of agency and meaning. Though ANT is not explicitly invoked, the book’s posthumanist orientation and resistance to anthropocentric framing would sit well in conversation with its insights. Such a dialogue could open further possibilities for understanding how infrastructures, technologies, and institutions mediate ecological experience and shape ethical imaginaries. It is not a text of solutions, but of reorientations. This book is a great resource for students and researchers who are interested in environmental phenomenology, decolonial thought, and environmental ethics. It makes us think and listen more carefully, and act with more humility in the face of ecological precarity. Relevance and Readership Ecophenomenology and the Environmental Crisis in the Sundarbans is essential reading for scholars in environmental philosophy, phenomenology, development studies, anthropology, and the environmental humanities. It will also resonate with practitioners interested in participatory environmental ethics, postcolonial ecology, and community-led resilience practices. The book offers a rich conceptual toolbox for thinking through the ethical and ontological dimensions of environmental change. For those looking to further explore the themes Paul raises, it would be fruitful to read this work alongside Bruce Foltz’s Inhabiting the Earth , David Abram’s The Spell of the Sensuous , Ted Toadvine’s Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Nature , and Dipesh Chakrabarty’s The Climate of History in a Planetary Age . These works, which are similar to Paul's, examine the complexities of existence, geographical location, and morality in the context of ecological change. Paul's work, by renouncing abstraction and being deeply committed to lived experience, is a significant contribution to the reevaluation of environmental degradation in the Anthropocene. It challenges us not only to reconsider how we conceptualize crisis, but also how we choose to live, dwell, and relate in a world increasingly defined by vulnerability and interdependence. References 1. Chakrabarty, D. (2021). The climate of history in a planetary age . University of Chicago Press. 2. Funtowicz, S. O., & Ravetz, J. R. (1993). Science for the post-normal age. Futures , 25(7), 739–755. https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-3287(93)90022-L 3. Heidegger, M. (1977). The question concerning technology and other essays (W. Lovitt, Trans.). Harper & Row. 4. Jonas, H. (1984). The imperative of responsibility: In search of an ethics for the technological age . University of Chicago Press. 5. Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory . Oxford University Press. 6. Marcuse, H. (1964). One-dimensional man: Studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society . Beacon Press. 7. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception (C. Smith, Trans.). Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1945) 8. Toadvine, T. (2009). Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of nature . Northwestern University Press .

The Karnataka Hijab row is about Right to Education, not Freedom of Religion Sania Ismailee PhD Scholar, Department of HSS, IIT Delhi Article # Feb 22, 2022 This article is part of the series of responses from philosophers on the hijab row . The Karnataka case is not a hijab ban case per se. It is the case of imposing a uniform which happens to impose a disadvantage over religious people who display religious symbols like hijab, turban, kirpan, etc. Note a rosary under my collar or a religious bangle/thread hidden under my sleeve will not be incompatible with a prescribed dress code. The central question is then whether the burden imposed by the uniform on religious students constitutes unfairness that must be accommodated for ensuring justice (here, equal opportunity for education). In this specific case, we know that forcing the uniform without accommodating the demands of hijabi Muslim women will hinder their access to education which will be detrimental to their development. It will curtail their opportunities, mainly because we know the economic backwardness of the Muslim community in general and how it may affect Muslim women's opportunities to access education and employment. Religious women will not take off their hijab to go to school but prefer sitting at home. This happened in France and reduced the integration of Muslim women into French society . Therefore, it is incumbent upon the state to accommodate their demands rather than marginalizing an already marginalized group. The uniform rule does not stop anyone from being a Muslim with a hijab but hinders her access to education by disallowing wearing hijab on school premises. This is a subtle but pertinent distinction. I don't think an essential practice test is required to arrive at a solution. The essential practice test is used by Indian courts to scrutinize a controversial religious practice. For instance, whether Hinduism stops women of menstruating age from entering the Sabarimala temple. In the Karnataka case, the central concern is not whether the religious practice is contentious given the specificities of the case. The centrality of the hijab to the integrity and identity of these women is sufficient to accommodate their demands without curtailing their access to education. The centrality of hijab to their "ethical integrity" and identity offers valid grounds for distinguishing the hijab from other clothes like shorts or clown caps. The burden of making education accessible is on the state, not on the religious student. Therefore, the salience of these issues renders insufficient the "I want to distance myself from the BJP to support the Muslim woman" argument. Sundar Sarukkai's argument on the relationship between uniform and equality doesn't address the central issue by eliminating the Muslim figure. Besides, uniforms do play a role in ensuring equality, other things remaining equal. A cursory theme of the Karnataka row is whether the hijab is a patriarchal and forced practice or a case of false choice. Or whether the Quran prescribes hijab as a specific dress code or whether "it is high time for Muslims to accept social reform and move on." We often conflate what is practiced in Muslim societies as Islamic. This is an unconscious jump because oppressive practices by patriarchs (men and women) are justified in the name of Islam. But that doesn't necessarily mean it is indeed an Islamic practice. Here, I disagree with the claim that the hijab is a forced practice "always" (see Nilüfer Göle's study on the different reasons women do hijab--not always religious but not always forced as well). I am not saying hijab is "never" forced. I agree with the argument from control over women's bodies: imposing upon the woman to cover or not to cover is exercising control over their bodies. Take the case of triple talaq or nikaah halala. Powerful Muslim women's movements have used the Quran and sharia to fight patriarchy. So, claims that the Quran is an archaic text are false. Because if it was an archaic seventh-century text with no relevance, how do these religious women use it to secure their rights? (See the brilliant work by MUSAWAH on Muslim family law reform around the world). I am not suggesting that religion is never a tool for oppression. Over here, it is crucial to realize that religion can be a powerful source for reform. Liberal scholars like Martha Nussbaum and Ayelet Shachar have explained how the liberal dismissal of religion as patriarchal leaves the religious woman in a dilemma where either you can be religious or be liberated; there is no middle ground. This is a false dilemma. You can be religious and liberated. Powerful Muslim women's movements around the world are challenging this dilemma rooted in the Western liberal feminist framework along with fighting against orthodox religious interpretations and state repression of minority voices (see Amina Wadud's and Asma Barlas' works). The liberal feminist framework projects itself as a false universal such that if you fall short of its standards, you are branded as illiberal. Discourses on decolonizing theory have pointed this out. So the Muslim woman does not "need saving" from Islam by liberals ( Lila Abu Lughod ). Most people don't know anything about Islam's position on women and mistakenly conflate oppressive practices of Muslim societies with Islam. Of course, it is never enough to say this is not Islamic, even if it is justified in the name of Islam (similar arguments made in the context of violence in Islam and terrorism). But one must acknowledge religion as a powerful tool for reform. For instance, Raja Rammohan Roy used Hindu scriptures, not secular reasons, to argue against sati. For a philosophical piece defending the hijab in the French ban context, see Cecile Laborde . ___________________________________________________________________________________________ Read other articles in this series: Ariba Zaidi -- A Word of Caution to 'the Uniformist' and 'the Reformist’ Danish Hamid -- Back to Liberal Basics Hina Mushtaq -- Can women decide for themselves? Sania Ismailee -- The Karnataka Hijab row is about Right to Education...

Response and Reply: Theories of Recognition Muzaffar Ali; R Krishnaswamy Paper Review # Nov 15, 2025 Response from Dr Muzaffar Ali Malla (Assistant Professor, Averroes Centre for Philosophical Studies, Islamic University of Science and Technology) R. Krishnaswamy’s insightful essay, “ Recognition across Axel Honneth and Paul Ricoeur: Making a Case for Solicitude ” explores the theories of recognition by Axel Honneth and Paul Ricoeur. Krishnaswamy argues that Ricoeur’s notion of recognition-through-solicitude can address the limitations in Honneth's theory of recognition-through-solidarity as it provides a more inclusive model for recognition and justice. Krishnaswamy argues that Honneth builds on Hegel’s philosophy, emphasizing that moral values emerge from social interactions within a community (lifeworld). Honneth identifies three forms of recognition: family, law within community, and solidarity (with reference to social esteem and collective pride). However, Honneth's approach faces twin challenges such as moral relativism and discursive over-determination and Krishnaswamy discusses the second in detail. As an alternative, Krishnaswamy explores Ricoeur's Idea of solicitude and argues that it emphasizes mutuality and trust thereby avoiding the Honnethian emphasis on abstract reciprocity and “standards of the Traid” (family, law and solidarity). Ricoeur’s perspective focuses on personal, affective bonds such as philia (friendship) built on agape (unconditional love) and gift-giving, where actions are not bound by expectations or equivalence, and have a situational (and not standard-oriented ) outlook. The following questions demand consideration: Since language (gestural or vocal) remains the major medium of seeking recognition within communities, the limitation in Honneth’s approach may have more to do with “structural over-determination” rather than “discursive over-determination.” While Ricour’s idea of solicitude grants precedence to the idea of “unconditionality” and “situationality” in relations, our societies are burdened by conditional relationships that are purely transactional, although (at times) justified (for example market, division of labor). Therefore, solicitude while moving beyond and ahead of Honneth’s solidarity model may lead to over-simplification and one-dimensional exploration of the social realm. Further its application to understand the gender and caste based relations and the cry for recognition within these relations demand further engagement. Can the notion of simplified and generalized other be replaced with the notion of “other-within” and “other-without” to deal with the deadlock emerging from Honneth’s focus on generalization and Ricoeur’s focus on individuality? Reply from R Krishnaswamy (Associate Professor, Jindal School of Liberal Arts and Humanities) Muzzaffar Ali has raised three questions from a careful reading of my article on Honneth and Ricoeur. Given the limited space I will not answer each question sequentially. I will make some remarks that will answer hopefully different aspects of al the three questions. My aim in that article is to point to the limitations that may arise within a society to justice in so far as those institutions are not able to capture recognitional truths, as it were, that are self-evident to victims of social violence and injustice. Muzzafar Ali is right in that though I have formulated the problem in terms of language, it can also be applied to structures in general. The idea is that there can't be a structure within human society without it being mediated by concepts or ideology or language. To that extent, whatever I have said about linguistic over-determination applies to structural over-determination. Muzzafar Ali has noted that Ricoeur's view can't quite capture the social realities of injustice which are historically inherited like race or caste or gender. He says that in Ricoeur's model of solicitude, there is a danger of over-simplification in terms of social dynamics works. I am not sure here whether Muzzafar Ali wishes to raise a complaint against Ricoeur's explanation of social reality or whether he finds Ricoeur's prescription to adopt solicitude as the norm to be defective. If it is the former, I am sure Ricoeur would also agree, that he is not really trying to explain how injustices can happen as much as giving us a prescriptive plan as to how to avoid social violence that may emerge out of mis-recognition. Ricoeur's work on recognition is not therefore descriptive and thus to say that Ricoeur is not helping us to understand social reality is being unfair to Ricoeur. If Muzzafar Ali is trying to say the whole device of solicitude itself is ineffective or inadequate because if everyone adopts solicitude as the norm of social engagement where would ordinary transactional relationships go? Most of our everyday interactions are temporary and are purposed to fulfill some of our immediate needs and aims. Two points, one is there is no prima facie reason why we can't have transactional relationships with solicitude. One can be solicitous and still maintain temporary relationships bound by contextual concerns. Solicitude doesn't have to be permanent. The second point I wish to make is that even if solicitude and transactionality (if I may call it) are mutually exclusive, Ricoeur's view would still be something to take seriously, if we can maintain solicitude in some of our more important social engagements, if not in all.

Review of Muzaffar Ali's book by Satya Javvaji Satya Javvaji MA student, KU Luven Book Review # Oct 26, 2023 Book review of Muzaffar Ali's India, Habermas and the Normative Structure of Public Sphere (Routledge, 2023) In India, Habermas and the Normative Structure of Public Sphere , Muzaffar Ali sketches the theory and procedures of an adequate public sphere in India arguing that it has to focus on accessibility and acceptability of the individual participants. In a book that is comprehensive and accessible to a wide audience, Ali gracefully tackles the question of how to think through a native context while being aware of the overbearing Western hegemony on the one hand, and of the risk of delving into nativism or nationalism on the other. The context of the book’s conception starts with Ali’s personal discomfort with the rigid Western-Indian divide in his curriculum growing up. While authors from both geographies were being taught separately, there was a dearth of how to conduct native Indian political philosophy that neither preaches a pre-modern excavation of Indian values nor blindly adopts Western concepts and categories and applies them directly to the Indian context, which oftentimes much different. The book’s first chapter deals with precisely this question - “to figure out a way to deal with the West without a complete withdrawal and yet keep the elan vital of the decolonization project intact” (p. 13). Ali responds to it by arguing for a double native approach. Firstly, since a Western theory purports a universalism in its concepts, it remains essential for a non-western theory to engage with it and critically examine its shortcomings and exclusions. Secondly, these critical engagements have to form the basis of a native and decolonised Indian political theory that adequately captures the context of the society it is speaking with. An adequate theory does not stop at pointing out a historical or contextual exception to a Western theory, thereby proving it inapplicable. Rather, it captures the relevant conditions of possibility, that are socio-historically situated, to initiate a holistic theoretical basis that can, as is successfully carried out in this book, support an Indian public sphere. With this methodology in hand, in the second chapter, Ali discusses the notion of the public sphere in Habermas, whose contribution to its theory is considered field-defining in Western literature. The public sphere is the conceptual stage upon which members of a society exchange views of social and political significance that pertain to their collective life. In the Habermasian public sphere, citizens form a rational public opinion through the medium of linguistic communication which is seen as a reservoir of meaning. While everyone is theoretically invited to the public sphere, Ali points out that the notion relies on a singular universalizing idea and emphasizes the role of rationality disproportionately, thereby striving to keep the project of modernity alive. In doing this, it ignores that firstly, there might be multiple public spheres with diametrically opposed common concerns, and secondly, that since dialogue always already takes place within certain power structures, the marginal and historically excluded voices are either not heard or, to borrow Gayatri Spivak’s famous declaration, that the subaltern simply cannot speak. With these problems in mind and the direct non-applicability of this notion of the public sphere to India (that, according to Ali, is in part due to its heavy religious context), he discusses in the third chapter, that current Indian engagements with Habermas are either comparative or evaluative. Both these engagements pose challenges to the theory and provide critical ways of engaging with it, but either lose sight of the overall conceptual structure by focusing on particular historical examples/contexts or fail to offer a way forward in terms of moving out of the Western hegemonic shadow. Instead, what Ali aims for is a thick concept of the Indian situation that can, as a full concept, interact with the Habermasian theory of the public sphere. In the fourth and fifth chapters, Ali begins with the major chunk of his creative contributions to the idea of an Indian public sphere. He starts with the observation that existing critiques are mainly concerned about the lack of accessibility and acceptability of all to the public sphere. This leads him to frame these as the twin normative principles based on which he theorizes an imagined Indian public sphere. This is so that the public sphere is “gauged by the ease of access it offers to the communities and individuals of whom it claims to be on” and it accepts “the perspectives and viewpoints of all individuals sans any ifs and buts” (p. P. 117-18). He cautions again that he is not interested in a “nativist approach to portray the Indianness” but is instead aiming for a “native approach to conceptualize Indianness” (p. 84). For theoretical and socio-historical reasons, Ali chooses to focus on religion as the social entity that informs the Indian context, the historical idea of rationality in Indian literature and the burden of colonialism with respect to how it colours the reading of texts and consequently of understanding society. With respect to religion, Ali discusses the complicated nature of secularism in India, the socialized role of caste and the deeply political nature of these issues. Through the perspective of religion, it becomes clear that in the European context, the immigration of other religions forms a new conceptual problem while dealing with a universal and apparently secular public sphere. But when it comes to the Indian context, religion has always been part of the notion of secularism and is a “perennial entity within Indian societies” (p. 97). According to Ali, “majority-minority, upper caste-lower caste, powerful-powerless, man-woman binaries within the Indian situation are often anchored in religion” (p. 111). Additionally, he argues that the procedural communicative rationality advocated by Habermas does not apply to the Indian context if acceptability and accessibility are to be taken seriously in the public sphere, and that a combination of abstract rationality and contextual rationality has to be present. This takes seriously the notion that contextual examples cannot always be universalized and translated into abstract concepts and language. At the same time, it does not mean that context-based examples are simply supporting or adding legitimacy to a universalised social procedural reason. Ali proposes the term deuniversal rationality to understand the dual nature of rationality in the Indian context. He reformulates the two aspects of deuniversal rationality as abstract rationality and experiential rationality. With the help of Merleau Ponty’s theory of the embodied self, in combination with Gopal Guru and Sundar Sarukkai’s theory of how the social sphere translates into embodied experiences, Ali argues that not only critical reflection and consequent articulation but also other aspects of the individual’s public identity namely their embodied experience, cultural conditioning and their emotional aspects of existence must have unrestricted access to the public sphere since these are not subordinated to reason but are fundamental aspects of the individual’s self-identity and hence self-expression in the social sphere. Ali writes that the aim is “to grant an epistemic passage to the lived body to enter as a medium of communication within the public sphere. The lived experience emerges as … a parallel and meaningful category for conducting the debates within the public sphere” (p. 128). Ali argues for the co-originality, to borrow Habermas’ term, of both the abstract component and the lived experience component in making up deuniversal rationality. He hopes this not only allows more people, previously excluded, into the contextual Indian public sphere but also, in recognising that the public sphere is carried as part of the individual’s lived experience, and that these very experiences are accepted as contributions to interactions in the Indian public sphere. While Ali is successful at conceptualizing a thick notion of the Indian public sphere based on deuniversal rationality that equi-prioritizes abstract rationality and lived experience, questions follow about how issues are resolved at the theoretical level when these two components contradict or disagree with each other. This sits in the wider debate about the post-structural turn in philosophy emphasizing that discourse always already happens within certain power relations that not only oppress but also produce individuals. Since Ali’s focus was on expanding who is included in the public sphere, what could possibly be clarified further is how disagreements are to be resolved once everyone is in the public sphere. This is keeping in mind the hyper-mediatized society we live in and the possibility of a fragmented and polarized public sphere that is sometimes clearly visible during discussions pertaining to national identity. Additionally, some readers could argue that according to lived experience unqualified epistemic privilege of expressing the truth complicates matters of intra-group justice and brings up the issue of intersectionality. This is because individuals, while referring to their lived experience hardly ever refer to only themselves as isolated individuals but to the group they see themselves as belonging to and speaking as part of. However, since they are simultaneously part of multiple groups and identities, it becomes important to keep in mind that all these identities affect the articulation of their lived experience and cannot be neatly separated into compartments. These are additional remarks since the intellectual involvement and theoretical rigour with which Ali takes on the ambitious project of theorizing a native Indian public sphere is commendable making the book essential reading for political philosophers, political and social scientists, theorists from the global South and everyone who wishes to understand the complexities involved in thinking about the native. Image-credit: © Yann Forget / Wikimedia Commons

Traditional vs Colonial: Navigating Dichotomies of Philosophy in India Ankita Kushwaha and Megha Kapoor PhD scholars, Jawaharlal Nehru University and Delhi University (respectively) and Teaching Fellows, Sai University Article # Dec 14, 2023 The realm of philosophy in India has diverse thinking traditions reflecting a blend of orthodox, heterodox, and various local cultural ideologies. Contemporary scholars find themselves caught in a pronounced dichotomy in the engagement with traditions, primarily shaped by historical forces. They are either charged for aligning with glorifying traditional concepts or critiqued for viewing the tradition through a colonial lens. Here, we seek to explore the challenges faced by contemporary philosophers of India while engaging with the philosophical concepts embedded in various traditional sources. We argue that in engaging with these concepts, philosophers are required to address the challenges posed by the above-mentioned dichotomous relationship. Moreover, as we navigate this dichotomy, our primary purpose is to stress the importance of thoroughly looking into traditional ideas. Noteworthily, in many instances, scholars accept the text without critical analysis and provide justifications that contribute to the glorification. In light of this, our primary objective is to emphasise an urgent need for a more rigorous and discerning philosophical inquiry that furthers the development of a more detailed understanding of the traditional ways of thinking. The Importance of Engaging with Traditional Ideologies How we perceive ourselves individually and socially is impacted by the environment in which we are born and grow. Any theorisation, therefore, cannot be in isolation. The theorisation must have an understanding of our traditions and local norms; at the same time, it must encompass our present lived experiences (Guru and Sarukkai 2012). Understanding various traditional sources is essential because they encompass the lived experiences of the past, which continue to shape our present experiences. The term "traditional" is often used to describe generational practices, values, and customs. These sources manifest in classical texts, typically composed in dominant languages like Sanskrit and Persian (Chandhoke 2019, 80), offering well-structured and organised insights into tradition. These local thoughts are embedded in diverse forms such as stories, folklore, fables, songs, and other cultural expressions. They not only provide a window into the historical aspects of a particular geographical location and community but also incorporate contemporary elements unique to their context. The recent discussion regarding the decolonisation of philosophy in India operates under the assumption that the colonisers have influenced the philosophical perspective. It necessitates a decolonisation effort to address the burden of Western thought that hinders the accurate representation of Indian intellectual traditions. However, the blame on colonisation from the perspective of Brahminism needs to be revisited. When colonisation occurred, Brahmins, well-versed in Sanskrit and holding higher positions, assisted the colonisers in shaping a new understanding of India, which led to the emergence of a form of Hindu philosophy that was dominantly Sanskritised, further resulting in the under-representation of thoughts from other traditions. Interestingly, despite being practised by a small portion of the population, Brahmanism managed to establish a subcontinental identity. Its popularity can be attributed to its ritual functions, ceremonies, and the adoption of Sanskrit as a common language (Thapar 1989, 209–231). The Dichotomy of Traditional vs Colonial The texts and ideologies of India represent various philosophical thoughts that provide insight into the intricate fabric of Indian society. Engaging with these texts and ideologies in a contemporary context allows for a deeper understanding of cultural heritage, providing a platform for critical dialogue. While acknowledging their historical roots, scholars must avoid absolutism to promote further an evaluative approach accommodating evolving perspectives. Therefore, in contemporary times, a conscious effort exists to critique colonial impact on philosophy in India by reviving and re-evaluating indigenous thought systems. However, the challenge lies in avoiding oversimplification and essentialisation. This task becomes even more complex, considering that many Indian intellectuals predominantly come from upper-caste backgrounds. This background gives them a privilege that does not necessitate them to critically examine their inherited traditions (Nanda 2010, 185). Consequently, this lack of critical examination from a segment of the intellectual elite further complicates the nuanced process of re-evaluating and revitalising philosophical traditions in India in the post-colonial context. This issue can be explored more closely by delving into the Mahabharata scholarship. When scholars discuss Mahabharata[1] as a foundational text for the Indian subcontinent, their use of terminologies and explanations may suggest that it is the greatest epic of all time for India. However, it is crucial to ask for whom it holds this esteemed position. Edward Dimock describes Mahabharata as the "founding library of Brahmin-Indian civilization," emphasising its role as an encyclopedia covering history, legend, edification, religion, art, drama, and morality specific to that civilisation (Dimock 1974, 53). Janaky adds another layer to this perspective, highlighting how the Bhrgus or Brahmins asserted authority over social, political, and moral realms not by controlling princes but through their influence on Mahabharata scholarship (Janaky 1992, 1997–1999). Overlooking this aspect universalises Mahabharata as a text for all, whereas, as Ambedkar points out, sacred texts of India contain a social philosophy responsible for the degradation of non-Brahmins (Ambedkar 2019, 393-395). Ambedkar further criticises the insufficient critical engagement with sacred literature, emphasising the detrimental impact of two contrasting attitudes: the uncritical commendation by a Brahmin scholar and the unsparing condemnation by a non-Brahmin. Both approaches, according to Ambedkar, hinder the progress of historical research ( ibid , 393). The disadvantage of such an approach is that either they miss the regressive ideas or articulate them in an oversimplified manner that ultimately glorifies the regressive Brahminical ideas. Therefore, there is a need for a more nuanced and critical examination of sacred texts to understand their implications on social history in the true sense. Moreover, another aspect of evaluation exists where scholars discard or appropriate various conceptions of Mahabharata because of evaluating certain aspects of the text from a colonial lens. For instance, German Indoligists interpreted Mahabharata as "framing Brahmans as 'priests,' and presenting themselves as reformers and liberators, while they collaborated with the Prussian (and later, Nazi) state" (Adluri 2016). As a response, a group of scholars in contemporary philosophy in India talk about the need for the revival of Indian traditional and religious thought. They hold that the modern liberal framework for conceptualising Indian society is the product of colonialism, as that has constantly undermined the significance of Indian traditional and religious thoughts. De Roover argues that even though liberalism "presents itself as a freestanding conception independent from any comprehensive doctrines or substantive conceptions of the good… [but] it continues to depend on a conception of the person and human social life that secularises protestant Christian ideas by transforming them into the topoi of political thought" (De Roover 2015, 237). Thus, he emphasises that Western liberal categories of thinking are not fruitful in conceptualising Indian society and polity as they are from different historical and political contexts. Even though the revival is significant and decolonisation requires discarding the underlying colonial mindset, the problem arose because of a similar pattern. There has been a constant effort to derive the themes or subjects of political thought from traditional ideas.[2] This pattern constrains critical engagement that further ends in accusing all liberal concepts as irrelevant to the Indian context (Nandy 1988, 189) merely because they are the products of Western civilisation (De Roover 2015, 234-239). Contrary to this, Patel says there is a need to engage with tradition without romanticising the past. She also emphasises that it should not also be a denial of all modern concepts. Thus, Patel emphasises a decolonial approach, which is "not a retrieval of premodern assessments that would consist of a folkloric affirmation of the past, nor an antimodern project of the kind put forward by conservative, right-wing, populist or fascist groups, nor a postmodern project that would deny modernity and would critique all reason" (Patel 2020, 10-11). Further, she suggests that there is a need for a new approach to social theorisation that critiques the Western conceptual framework through the inclusion of the experiences of the people. Additionally, the problem in reviving the traditional ideas is that India today no longer has the same structure as it used to have earlier. Various traditional concepts are not relevant in the theorisation of contemporary society. It is crucial today to theorise the contemporary issues along with the lived experiences of the ordinary masses. At the same time, we cannot accept the colonial framework without analysing its relevance to the lived experiences of the masses. When accepted without critical analysis, a philosophical inquiry may result in the glorification of either of the categories (traditional or liberal). The need is to not unquestioningly accept or discredit the traditional norms as well as the liberal frameworks of thinking altogether. Conclusion Navigating the dichotomies of glorification of tradition vs colonial mindsets presents a challenge for contemporary scholars. The revival of philosophy in India should not be limited to a mere glorification of tradition but should involve critical analysis that engages with the complexity and dynamism of the philosophical heritage. Therefore, a few critical questions arise in the discourse of philosophy today: what approach is suitable for philosophy in India? How can we decolonise philosophy without glorifying the past? What are its challenges? How will these challenges be resolved? Answering these questions necessitates a deep understanding of the challenges posed by the dichotomy. Hence, further research is imperative to engage with these intricate philosophical inquiries, offering a more comprehensive approach to the decolonisation of philosophy in India. [1] In reference to the Mahabharata, it’s important to note that there are multiple versions. Here, we specifically refer to the ancient Mahabharata of Krishna Dvaipayana, also known as Veda Vyasa. Our focus, in this context, pertains solely to the philosophical aspects of the text. [2] As de Roover argues that liberal ideas are the topoi of Protestant Christian ideas, various Indian political concepts are also topoi of Indian Tradition. For instance, in Gandhi’s thought, secularism refers to sarvadhrama sambhava. The idea of sarvadharma sambhava is rooted in the idea that the truth has many sides and cannot be grasped by human beings completely. Therefore, according to Gandhi, we should respect all conceptions of the good (see Gandhi 1995). References Adluri, Vishwa. 2016. “How We Should Approach The Phenomenon Of Studying Hinduism.” Swarajya , https://swarajyamag.com/culture/how-we-should-approach-the-phenomenon-of-studying-hinduism . Ambedkar, B.R. 2019. The Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar , edited by V. Rodrigues. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Chandhoke, Neera. 2019. Rethinking Pluralism, Secularism, and Tolerance: Anxieties of Coexistence . New Delhi: Sage Publication. De Roover, Jakob. 2015. Europe, India, and the Limits of Secularism . New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Dimock, Edward. 1974. The Literatures of India: An Introduction . University of Chicago. Gandhi, M.K. 1995. Hindu Dharma . New Delhi: Orient Paperbacks. Guru, Gopal, and Sarukkai, Sundar. 2012. The Cracked Mirror: An Indian Debate on Experience and Theory . New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Janaky. 1992. “On the Trail of the Mahabharata: A Response.” Economic and Political Weekly 27 (37): 1997–1999. Nanda, Meera. 2010. “Arguments for an Indian Enlightenment.” In Indian Political Thought : A Reader , edited by A. Singh and S. Mohapatra, 175–186. Routledge. Nandy, Ashis. 1988. “The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 13 (2): 177–194. Patel, Sujata. 2020. “Social Theory Today: Eurocentrism and Decolonial Theory.” Madras Institute of Development Studies . Accessed November 8, 2023. https://www.mids.ac.in/assets/doc/WP_240.pdf . Thapar, Romila. 1989. “Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for a Hindu Identity.” Modern Asian Studies 23 (2): 209–231. http://www.jstor.org/stable/312738 .