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Academic writing support for philosophers in India IPN Colloquium This is a bimonthly colloquium, held every Saturday, 10.30-1200 PM, where a philosophy scholar (faculty or research scholar) will present their work, published or work-in-progress. Through this colloquium, we aim to build a platform through which philosophers become familiar with the works of their colleagues, and create a space where researchers can share early drafts of their work for comments and suggestions. The colloquium will be open to all philosophy scholars. If you would like to attend the colloquium, please write to colloquiumipn@gmail.com . If you would like to present at the colloquium, please fill this form and we will get back to you. The current moderators of IPN Colloquium are: R. Krishnaswamy (Jindal Global University), Shinod K (University of Hyderabad), Shruti Bhat (Thapar University), Siddharth S (Sai University), Sushruth Ravish (IIT Kanpur), Varun Bhatta (IISER Bhopal) and Vivek Radhakrishnan (Krea University). The below sheet lists the talks in IPN colloquium till now. (Click here to view the google-sheet.)

Indian Philosophy Network (IPN) is a platform for academic philosophers in India. Indian Philosophy Network (IPN) is a network for professional philosophers in India, both within and outside academia. Currently, IPN comprises more than five hundred members from various avenues -- M.Phil/Ph.D students and faculty from various institutes, college teachers, and philosophy professionals working in non-academic spaces. Join IPN The current moderators of IPN are Siddharth S (Assistant Professor, Sai University) and Varun S Bhatta (Assistant Professor, IISER Bhopal) Home: Welcome IPN aims to build an equitable eco-system for philosophers in India to provide crucial peer support for research, teaching and other professional activities. The network enables better awareness of scholars working in specific areas, thereby facilitating interactions and collaborations. With members from institutes across India, IPN serves as a common platform to share information and resources pertaining to philosophy. Home: About

Review of "Quick and Concise: Philosophy" Shivangi Shanker Independent Scholar, PhD from JNU Jul 22, 2025 Book review of Shamik Chakravarty's Quick and Concise: Philosophy (Hachette India, 2025). Writing an introductory book to a discipline as rich and diverse as philosophy is profoundly challenging. Quick and Concise: Philosophy (Hachette India, 2025) by Shamik Chakravarty not only overcomes this challenge but also broadens the scope of the genre, despite its compact size. It is a pocket-sized book with themes including both Indian and Western traditions of Philosophy. The book offers a discourse on the fundamental questions of philosophy concerning meaning, free will, morality, knowledge, personal identity, and art. Shamik’s endeavour stands out as an attempt to present a comprehensive philosophical dialogue which reflects philosophical inclusivity on two levels: conceptual and contextual. Conceptual inclusivity is evident in Shamik’s incorporation of non-Western philosophy, while contextual inclusivity emerges through the integration of culturally familiar situations, names, and cities into deeper philosophical enquiries. The use of familiar Indian backdrops, such as the workplace dilemma (p.74) in a corporate context or the affirmative action (p. 71) example, makes it especially relatable to the Indian readers. What distinguishes the text further is that it does not bridge the gap between different knowledge systems through mere exposition but an application of the Socratic (Blondell 2018) and the Hegelian Dialectical methods (Houlgate 2024) [i] . In the analogy between Buddhism, deontology, and utilitarianism, or Buddhism and virtue ethics. Or its comparative analysis with Kantian ethics, which puts forth a reconciled ethical position from the point of view of Buddhism. (Chakravarty 2025, 64-70). The process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis [ii] is evident. Shamik selects a broad range of topics as compared to Bertrand Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy (Russell 2020), Thomas Nagel’s What Does It All Mean (Nagel 1987), and Edward Craig’s Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (Craig 2002). As far as the structure of Quick and Concise: Philosophy is concerned, it resembles Nagel’s What Does It All Mean and Edward Craig’s Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. But the curation of topics and the execution of the discussions surrounding it is wider and more inclusive in Shamik’s book. While Shamik includes a range of classical Indian views, Craig focuses mainly on Buddhism. All of these texts either ignore or mention in passing the discussion on the notion of art. Whereas, Quick and Concise: Philosophy not only elaborates on it, but discusses Indian Philosophy of art— Nāṭyaśāstra . Suggesting that art and aesthetics are not peripheral topics but central to philosophy. Shamik shows a shift from traditional metaphysical speculation to recent philosophical and psychological integration, bringing out an intersection of ethics, psychology, metaphysics, and applied philosophy. He discusses how Psychology deals with the dichotomy of choosing the right over the wrong by applying psychological mechanisms (pp. 68-70). The notion of free will includes an extended reference to determinism, compatibilism, agent causation, AI, neuroscience (p. 89), and ethical psychology, along with other interdisciplinary enquiries. He presents a more critical than expository outlook to the problems, which sometimes may feel overwhelming to beginners in Philosophy. But his writing eliminates this obstruction with various shifts in the tone. Given that Russell, Nagel, and Shamik write in different eras, there are differences in how they approach their work. The Problems of Philosophy offers 20th-century analytical and epistemological views, which makes it denser and limited in scope. Shamik’s work overcomes these challenges by employing a conversational style where he speaks to the readers (p. 1) [iii] . He simplifies complicated ideas, recognising the significance of critical thinking in the learning process. The book is a reflection of interactive teaching-learning techniques. Its examples and questions are relatable to the wider audience. The application of both pedagogical and philosophical methods makes the book comprehensible for general readers as well as students of philosophy. The book has eight chapters (excluding references and index), which reflect the diverse scope that the author has created. The chapters are structured thematically to make reasoned analysis, back-and-forth through thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, excelling in the pedagogical spirit. Each chapter explores a fundamental question or a theme within philosophy and presents the diverse philosophical views and critical analysis under sub-themes. The initial four chapters provide a clear orientation to its readers. It includes topics like what philosophy is. What do philosophers do? And introduces the readers to the main branches of Philosophy (p. 20), that is, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ontology, and Logic. In these chapters, the author explores the questions: What is the meaning of life, and meaning in life? What is morality? What is free will and determinism? The latter four chapters enquire into scepticism, what constitutes personal identity, the role of determinism in free will, whether people are responsible for their acts, what is art and how it relates to expression, rasa , value, and emotion. Throughout the book, the author discusses answers to these questions, then the responses are either challenged or supported by other views. The chapter’s structure reflects the integration and application of the Hegelian Dialectical (Houlgate 2025), Socratic [iv] , and philosophical argumentation (inductive and deductive) methods. For example, in the first chapter, the author explains that the job of a philosopher is to seek truth through systematic argumentation. He then questions the nature of truth itself and presents the idea of relativism of truth (p. 15). In the second chapter, the discussion on the meaning of life begins with an investigation of what meaning is [v] , rather than assuming a theory of meaning. Thereafter, it presents a thorough integration of philosophies from different traditions to show how each framework evaluates or creates meaning. For instance, the elucidation of the dilemmas in the Bhagavadgitā, that one faces amid the process of understanding the metaphysical and the ontological meaning of life, is explained through the concept of yoga ( jñāna, karma, bhaktī ). Or the snake and rope example, and in its analogy with Descartes’ dream argument. In this, the author shows the relationship between Nyāya and Descartes’ scepticism, and the reference to Vātsyāyana’s (p. 144) commentary on the Nyāya Sūtra and highlights the views of opponents of the Nyāya school. These explanations offer an integration of primary and secondary literature in a much-synthesised manner. The author intends to inform their readers about the wide-ranging concepts, opposing views, and the evolution of the philosophical debate. When he explains the notion of cultural relativism, in the third chapter, and points out the problem in accepting this view. He first creates a sense of awareness that there are subjective moral beliefs, which means there are no universal moral principles acceptable to all cultures. Then, through a representation of the problems posed by cultural relativism, the author makes the reader question the notion of moral subjectivity. Interestingly, the discussions about relativity and the presentation of a discourse on it point out the interdisciplinary nature of philosophical inquiry. Relativism is a philosophical idea, but the notion of “cultural relativism” (p. 45) is studied often by anthropologists, sociologists, linguists, philosophers and psychologists. Every discipline approaches an issue from a specific vantage point and methodology. Disciplines are said to draw from philosophical methods and concepts, and vice versa. It highlights that concepts are interconnected (pp. 2-3), thereby signifying the relevance of an interdisciplinary approach. The book explicates that Philosophy is multidimensional and that the truth of a philosophical matter revolves around a debate. Structurally, the book offers an integrated study of concepts and continuity, as we see in the sixth chapter on scepticism. The discussion on Descartes’ philosophy develops into the discussion of contemporary externalist responses, including the debate over the dream argument and the application of the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment (pp. 118, 129-130). What could have otherwise come across as a literature survey, mentioning multiple philosophers and concepts in quick succession, develops into a dialectical exploration. It gives away that the author’s intent is not to find settling answers but to inform the readers about the overall debate. For example, in the seventh chapter on Personal Identity, epistemological and metaphysical discussions are made concerning several philosophers: Derek Parfit, Sydney Shoemaker, John Locke, David Hume, and Buddhist philosophy. The dialogue between Milinda and Nāgasena (pp. 167-168) on the questions of personal identity goes beyond knowing “who am I”. And the chapter ends with an unanswered question on the nature of the soul. A similar integration is evident in the eighth chapter, which explores art from a vantage point of expression, representation, flow, meaning, pleasure, and aesthetics. The author presents the formalist, expressivist, aesthetic, and rasa theories of art, capturing the integration of philosophical subdisciplines: metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics—and thereby, rounding off the broader enquiry that initially begins with the mind-body problem and the questions of meaning and life. While the book’s scope is broad, there are certain areas whose inclusion may have added to its expansive nature. Such as the theory of Justice from the aegis of philosophers like Plato, John Rawls, and Amartya Sen. The book does not include the discussions of Philosophy of language, which is central to Epistemology, Logic, Ethics and various other disciplines. An introduction to the central figures like Wittgenstein, Frege, Austin, Searle, or Putnam may have provided a meta-enquiry of the notion of meaning. While we are introduced to Sartre’s view on meaning, Nietzsche’s contributions to understanding meaning in life are missing. The references to other orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy, and the modern Indian thinkers like Sen, Aurobindo, Vivekananda, Mohanty and others may have complemented the book’s scope. Still, the text compensates for its limitations as seen in the eighth chapter—“What is art”, though introductory in tone, explores intersecting domains: experience, emotion, rasa , value, and flow. The chapter draws on Plato’s (p. 173) and Wittgenstein’s direct and indirect contributions (p. 189) to understanding the meaning of art, informing the reader about the wider scope of their philosophical viewpoints. Another remarkable strategy is the blending of the classical Indian Philosophy and the attempts to overcome the limitations of philosophical parochialism (Konstantinović 2021) [vi] , usually prominent in the introductory level texts. Be it the integration of Buddhist ethics or the Bhagvadgītā’s teachings (p. 38), the Nyāya Philosophy (p. 143), or the Rasa theory from Natyasastra (p. 198). Alongside its philosophical inclusivity, the book employs effective pedagogical tools which engage the learner through culturally relevant (Rattanawong and Thongrin 2023) [vii] puzzles and prompts, for the initiation of a relatable understanding of concepts. Some of the culturally familiar examples or cases that the author creates in the book are worth noting. Such as the description of the experiment by Joshua Greene and Michael Koenigs (pp. 70-71), in the chapter on morality. He demonstrates the probable application of the experiment in the Indian system of Affirmative Action policies. The experiment used moral dilemmas like the trolley problem and the crying baby scenario to depict the difference that people show in emotional and cognitive responses when faced with personal moral dilemmas versus impersonal dilemmas. This experiment showed that the synthesis of deontological and utilitarian ethics can solve larger practical problems. It also helps the Indian readers to comprehend the theory in resonance with a familiar context. The author creates engaging philosophical dialogues to help the readers build an understanding step by step. The question, “If the soul isn’t the subject of experience, what is? It’s time for you, the subject of experience, to start thinking at time t 1 and come up with an answer at t 2 !” (p. 171), demands that the reader pause, think, and reflect. This approach is visible in the questions he raises: whether the comedian with a banana and duct tape produces art? And the contemplation around free will. What is more important in these endeavours is the embedding of the Socratic style that invites the readers to think independently and critically. The way the author eases philosophical perplexities with a deft shift in the tone and strategic placement of provocative phrases shows the application of an integrative teaching and learning style. In the opening chapter, the debate surrounding the mind-body problem is framed using views of several philosophers. Before the chapter gets too dense with the debate, the author lowers the intensity of the discourse with a discussion on relativism about truth. Shifting to a more familiar topic, especially one illustrated through examples like jackfruit ice cream and cultural subjectivity, eases the reader back into conceptual clarity. Even though there is a shift to a slightly casual tone, the philosophical message is never diluted, but rather enriched. For instance, “But hang on with me. There is an evil demon who is deceiving you…so you think you have hands but you don’t” (p. 117). These deliberate stylistic techniques, which maintain a balance between the academic and the casual tone, keep the readers hooked throughout the reading process. Complex discussions are eased out with similar acts by saying, “Now try to apply this to Descartes’ demon argument and the brain-in-a-vat argument and see whether it begs the question or not. Sweet dreams!” (p. 144). This sort of closing to a topic as complex as scepticism leaves the readers smiling but unsettled, forging critical reflection. Overall, the book offers both relevance and depth through the contextualisation of foundational problems in philosophy. It presents broad concepts and recent philosophical developments. The book can be beneficial for a diverse range of audiences, including undergraduate or master’s students, lay people, and young scholars. For the latter, it may serve as a useful starting point for research when supplemented with further readings. Owing to its expansive scope and pedagogically conscious style, Quick and Concise: Philosophy is a significant contribution to introductory-level philosophical literature. Footnotes [i] Refer to the discussion by Stephen Houlgate, on “Hegel's Dialectics”, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy , ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2024 Edition, accessed July 12, 2025. [ii] A way to understand the evolution of the ideas and how integration of opposing views can lead to its further development. [iii] “One of the reasons I became a philosopher…..is to argue.” [iv] Ruby Blondell, The Socratic Method: Plato's Use of Philosophical Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). [v] Different views culminate into a meta discussion on meaning of life. [vi] Mostly books in the genre of introduction to philosophy has for long ignored the discussion on Indian Philosophy. See parochialism in Radomir Konstantinović, The Philosophy of Parochialism , trans. Ljiljana Nikolić and Branislav Jakovljević, ed. Branislav Jakovljević (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2021). [vii] There is a strong relationship between the learner’s thinking process and the cultural context. References Blondell, Ruby. The Socratic Method: Plato’s Use of Philosophical Drama . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Chakravarty, Shamik. 2025. Quick and Concise: Philosophy . Bangalore: Hachette India Craig, Edward. Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Houlgate, Stephen. Hegel’s Dialectics.” The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy . Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Summer 2024 Edition. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Accessed July 12, 2025. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/hegel-dialectics/ . Konstantinović, Radomir. 2021. The Philosophy of Parochialism . Translated by Ljiljana Nikolić and Branislav Jakovljević. Edited by Branislav Jakovljević. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Nagel, Thomas. What Does It All Mean? A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy , New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Rattanawong, Amonrat, and Saneh Thongrin. “An Exploration of Culture in Listening and Speaking Materials from an English as an International Language Perspective.” LEARN Journal: Language Education and Acquisition Research Network 16, no. 1 (January-June 2023): 652–75. Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy . Mumbai: Sanage Publishing House, 2020. Originally published in 1912.

The Karnataka Hijab row is about Right to Education, not Freedom of Religion Sania Ismailee PhD Scholar, Department of HSS, IIT Delhi Feb 22, 2022 This article is part of the series of responses from philosophers on the hijab row . The Karnataka case is not a hijab ban case per se. It is the case of imposing a uniform which happens to impose a disadvantage over religious people who display religious symbols like hijab, turban, kirpan, etc. Note a rosary under my collar or a religious bangle/thread hidden under my sleeve will not be incompatible with a prescribed dress code. The central question is then whether the burden imposed by the uniform on religious students constitutes unfairness that must be accommodated for ensuring justice (here, equal opportunity for education). In this specific case, we know that forcing the uniform without accommodating the demands of hijabi Muslim women will hinder their access to education which will be detrimental to their development. It will curtail their opportunities, mainly because we know the economic backwardness of the Muslim community in general and how it may affect Muslim women's opportunities to access education and employment. Religious women will not take off their hijab to go to school but prefer sitting at home. This happened in France and reduced the integration of Muslim women into French society . Therefore, it is incumbent upon the state to accommodate their demands rather than marginalizing an already marginalized group. The uniform rule does not stop anyone from being a Muslim with a hijab but hinders her access to education by disallowing wearing hijab on school premises. This is a subtle but pertinent distinction. I don't think an essential practice test is required to arrive at a solution. The essential practice test is used by Indian courts to scrutinize a controversial religious practice. For instance, whether Hinduism stops women of menstruating age from entering the Sabarimala temple. In the Karnataka case, the central concern is not whether the religious practice is contentious given the specificities of the case. The centrality of the hijab to the integrity and identity of these women is sufficient to accommodate their demands without curtailing their access to education. The centrality of hijab to their "ethical integrity" and identity offers valid grounds for distinguishing the hijab from other clothes like shorts or clown caps. The burden of making education accessible is on the state, not on the religious student. Therefore, the salience of these issues renders insufficient the "I want to distance myself from the BJP to support the Muslim woman" argument. Sundar Sarukkai's argument on the relationship between uniform and equality doesn't address the central issue by eliminating the Muslim figure. Besides, uniforms do play a role in ensuring equality, other things remaining equal. A cursory theme of the Karnataka row is whether the hijab is a patriarchal and forced practice or a case of false choice. Or whether the Quran prescribes hijab as a specific dress code or whether "it is high time for Muslims to accept social reform and move on." We often conflate what is practiced in Muslim societies as Islamic. This is an unconscious jump because oppressive practices by patriarchs (men and women) are justified in the name of Islam. But that doesn't necessarily mean it is indeed an Islamic practice. Here, I disagree with the claim that the hijab is a forced practice "always" (see Nilüfer Göle's study on the different reasons women do hijab--not always religious but not always forced as well). I am not saying hijab is "never" forced. I agree with the argument from control over women's bodies: imposing upon the woman to cover or not to cover is exercising control over their bodies. Take the case of triple talaq or nikaah halala. Powerful Muslim women's movements have used the Quran and sharia to fight patriarchy. So, claims that the Quran is an archaic text are false. Because if it was an archaic seventh-century text with no relevance, how do these religious women use it to secure their rights? (See the brilliant work by MUSAWAH on Muslim family law reform around the world). I am not suggesting that religion is never a tool for oppression. Over here, it is crucial to realize that religion can be a powerful source for reform. Liberal scholars like Martha Nussbaum and Ayelet Shachar have explained how the liberal dismissal of religion as patriarchal leaves the religious woman in a dilemma where either you can be religious or be liberated; there is no middle ground. This is a false dilemma. You can be religious and liberated. Powerful Muslim women's movements around the world are challenging this dilemma rooted in the Western liberal feminist framework along with fighting against orthodox religious interpretations and state repression of minority voices (see Amina Wadud's and Asma Barlas' works). The liberal feminist framework projects itself as a false universal such that if you fall short of its standards, you are branded as illiberal. Discourses on decolonizing theory have pointed this out. So the Muslim woman does not "need saving" from Islam by liberals ( Lila Abu Lughod ). Most people don't know anything about Islam's position on women and mistakenly conflate oppressive practices of Muslim societies with Islam. Of course, it is never enough to say this is not Islamic, even if it is justified in the name of Islam (similar arguments made in the context of violence in Islam and terrorism). But one must acknowledge religion as a powerful tool for reform. For instance, Raja Rammohan Roy used Hindu scriptures, not secular reasons, to argue against sati. For a philosophical piece defending the hijab in the French ban context, see Cecile Laborde . ___________________________________________________________________________________________ Read other articles in this series: Ariba Zaidi -- A Word of Caution to 'the Uniformist' and 'the Reformist’ Danish Hamid -- Back to Liberal Basics Hina Mushtaq -- Can women decide for themselves? Sania Ismailee -- The Karnataka Hijab row is about Right to Education...

Review of Venusa Tinyi's book by Aribam Uttam Sharma Aribam Uttam Sharma Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, North-Eastern Hill University Dec 28, 2023 Book review of Venusa Tinyi's On the Foundational Concepts of Norms and Normative Systems (Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, 2023) The author, Venusa Tinyi, makes a case that formalizations that aim to clarify normative concepts like obligation, permission, and prohibition that have a bearing on our actions are inadequate. Based on this claim, the book offers to make amends by proposing a model that offers an alternative approach. The book assumes that there is more to logic than its concern for truth. If logic is understood as a language and the business of language is more than making assertions (Austin 1962), then it should not surprise us that logic's concern cannot be contained by the concern for truth. This wider concern now accorded to logic plays out in the book's take on the prescription/description distinction. Here, the distinction incarnates as that between "What ought to be the case" and "What ought to be done". Whether the logic of norms ought to be theoretical or practical in intent forms a motivational undercurrent of the book. At the center of logic is the notion of logical consequence, i.e., what follows from what. Deontic logic deals with the theoretical interests of how normative concepts contribute and act in logical consequence (McNamara and Putte 2022) . Since normative concepts are supposed to inform our actions, any study of them has to be sensitive to their pragmatic aspect. Thus, deontic logic inherits something of the tension between the prescriptive and descriptive in classical logic. Tinyi rehearses the problems inherent in the formalization of normative concepts and the logic of norms, especially deontic logic. He asserts that there is no aspect of deontic logic that is not fraught with difficulties. He gives attention to von Wright-Anderson debate on the attempts to reduce deontic logic to alethic modal logic. He does this to show that such reduction is futile. Jorgensen’s dilemma , which arises due to the difficulty of reasoning about norms within truth-functional logical apparatus, drives home this point. The particular difficulty encountered in interpreting negation prefixed to an act category also suggests that the logic of norms is a different beast altogether from other standard forms of logic. Deontic logic has been identified as modal logic (Sider 2010) . Yet, drawing parallels between it and other well-known modal systems is ungainly. The author notes that the Axiom of Reflexivity , which says that necessity implies actuality, cannot be adopted in deontic logic. An act, which is obligatory (read as necessary), need not be performed (read as actualized) with or without the pain of punishment. At least in this world, sinners do escape punishment. Around this difficulty, and on the question of the externality of sanction to norms, H. L. A. Hart’s critique of Hans Kelsen and J. L. Austin is given an exposition. The author enters these debates to stress that values, desires, and intentions cannot be divorced from norms. Any formalization, analysis, or reduction that attempts this divorce is deemed inadequate. The author forays into the nature of legal systems. von Wright, the pioneer of modern deontic logic, and whom the author credits for inspiring his book, erred, according to the author, when he tried to analyze deontic terms through legal terms like immunity, liability, punishment, and so on. The author takes this failure as a sign that deontic concepts do have an "axiological" tint that cannot be done away with without making it grate against our intuition. Difficulties and inadequacies give impetus for developments and corrections. This applies to the development of logic too. When one finds problem in the formalization of a domain of reasoning, the usual course of action can either be i) augmentation of the expressive power of the initial formalism, if the fault lies in the inadequacy of expressive power of the said formalism or ii) replacement or modification of the initial formalism, if there is a fundamental problem with the initial formalism itself (McNamara and Putte 2022) . Tinyi finds that the problem with the logic of norms (deontic logic) is of a fundamental kind. So, the book sets out to make amends by replacing/modifying the initial formalism. But he takes this amendment in a novel way. For the same reason, this is a high-stakes approach. When he proposes a quasi-theoretical or quasi-formal model named D-Model , he avoids overhauling the semantics of existing formalism that he has found faulty i.e., modal logic. Rather, he provides a model, which would capture our intuition about basic normative concepts that in one way or the other formed the conceptual base of hitherto existing formalisms. The heart of the book lies in the author's development of D-model that captures our intuitions about normative concepts and the roles they play in the normative aspects of our lives. The proposal is based on the author's conviction that the semantic tools meant for propositional logic (descriptive expressions) cannot determine the significance of deontic expressions. Here the book traces a genealogy of ideas that led to D-model. In this vicinity, a bit of caution is called for. In the D-model context, the reader must be ready to modify the standard understanding of models associated with the semantics of logical systems. And again, since there is already a well-known model called Model-D in modal logic, care could be taken not to mistake the D-model for its more famous kin. The construction of D-Model takes cues from possible world semantics. The basic normative concepts that play central roles in deontic logic are analyzed and put in relation through attendant concepts that are developed around this construction. Deontic heaven, deontic hell, repressive norms, restorative norms, and prospective norms are some of these attendant concepts. There are times one might feel that the author's focus on the analysis of normative concepts pays scant attention to questions of validity, proof procedures, soundness and completeness. But this relegation, to defend the author's intent, is understandable. The author takes D-Model to be "metaphorical". It is not intended to be part of a formal structure that would be prescriptive of normative reasoning. Metaphor, the author observes, is to be judged by the degree of illumination it affords. Measuring by this yardstick, D-model provides illumination on some alternate pathways to understand the core concepts operative in deontic logic, the logic of norms, and our intuitions about these concepts. Through the notion of a deontological gap — the difference between worlds like ours, and the worlds that we would like to be in — the purpose and significance of norms are analyzed as that which induce the narrowing of such gaps. Tinyi gives reasons for not amending the problems of deontic logic with a different formal apparatus. Logical principles, which were once considered unassailable — for example, the traditional laws of thought —- have been challenged via formalisms in which they are locally or globally made to break down. We find this in the logical treatments of paraconsistency, intuitionism, possibilism (Mortensen 1989) . The author cites this fact to warrant the novel approach he takes. Another, perhaps better, reason for this novelty, which the author mentions, is the difficulties that are engendered by a model-theoretic approach to the semantics of deontic logic. These are unique to deontic logic and are not encountered in other standard logical systems. Russell once said to Wittgenstein, "Are you thinking about logic or about your sins?" "Both," Wittgenstein replied (Russell 1968). One could take Wittgenstein's reply as an affirmation of a deep link between logic and ethics. The logic of norms therefore has held interests not only to logicians but also to those concerned by how one should act. Those with interests in logic, ethics, legal studies, the history of philosophy, and their interfaces would find Tinyi’s book engaging and rewarding. References Austin, J. L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words . Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. McNamara, Paul and Frederik Van De Putte, "Deontic Logic", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/logic-deontic/ Mortensen, Chris. 1989. "Anything Is Possible." Erkenntnis (30): 319-337. Russell, Bertrand. 1968. The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell: 1914-1944 . Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Sider, Theodore. 2010. Logic for Philosophy . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reading groups in IPN Reading Groups IPN enables focused philosophy reading and research groups. The details of currently active groups are given below. Please get in touch with the respective moderators to join a specific group. Metaethics Reading Group Themes : moral epistemology, moral motivation, moral reasoning, moral judgement, moral normativity, moral realism/irrealism and history of metaethics Moderators : Sushruth Ravish (PhD Student, IIT-Bombay) and Vivek Kumar Radhakrishnan (PhD Student, Manipal Academy of Higher Education) Contacts: sushruth.ravish[AT]gmail.com or vivek.logos[AT]gmail.com Realism/Anti-realism and Philosophy of Mind Reading Group Themes : epistemological and metaphysical realism/anti-realism; scientific realism/anti-realism; Kantian transcendental idealism; epistemic humility; mind-body problem; mental causation; self-awareness. Moderators: Siddharth S (Sai University, Chennai) and Nishant Kumar (PhD Scholar, IIT Madras) Contacts: siddharth.nias[AT]g mail.com or nishant.iitmadras[AT]g mail.com

Academic writing support for philosophers in India IPN Lectures Lectures and seminars in academic philosophy in India are usually either introductions to specific topics or presentations of research carried out. There are few forums that discuss important questions about the 'doing' of philosophy itself, such as: How do we teach philosophy? How do we conceptualise and execute philosophy projects? How do we do research, write and publish our work? IPN Lectures aim to initiate conversation and deliberation on these dimensions of philosophy. The first set of IPN Lectures focuses on the theme of writing and publishing in philosophy. These lectures would be aimed at addressing some common questions that philosophy researchers are likely to have, such as: How do I prepare an article for submission to a peer-reviewed journal, and what can I expect from the peer-review process? Which academic journal should I publish in? I have submitted/defended my thesis. How do I convert my thesis into a book? There is an interesting and fertile idea that deserves discussion from various stakeholders in the debate. How do I propose and work on an edited volume on this topic? I have an idea for a book. How do I build a book proposal, and approach publishers? How do I write non-academic articles for the public, and where can I publish them? Any queries regarding the lecture series on writing and publishing can be e-mailed to Sushruth Ravish (sushruth.ravish@gmail.com ) and Siddharth S (siddharth.nias@gmail.com ). If you would like to take the lead on organising lectures on a particular theme, please send an email to indianphilosophynetwork@gmail.com Upcoming and Past Lectures Publishing in Analytic Philosophy Prof. Anand J Vaidya San Jose State University 11 March 2023 From a Thesis to a Treatise Prof. Muzaffar Ali Malla Savitribai Phule Pune University 29 April 2023 Navigating Philosophy Journals: Steering Towards Acceptance Prof. Mitch Green University of Connecticut Editor-in-chief, Philosophia 28 July 2023 Editing Philosophical Writing Prof. Kranti Saran Ashoka University 10 August 2023 Paper Incubator Grants in God and Consciousness in Indian Traditions Prof. Ricardo Silvestre Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 4 Dec 2023

Srajana Kaikini In conversation with Sahana Rajan (Lecturer, Jindal Global Business School) February 2022 Dr Srajana Kaikini's work spans across curatorial, artistic and philosophical domains. She received her PhD in Philosophy from Manipal Centre for Humanities, and has a Masters in Arts and Aesthetic from JNU. She was at de Appel Art Centre’s Curatorial Programme in 2012-13, is the recipient of 2013 FICA Research Fellowship and was Curator at KK Hebbar Gallery and Arts Centre (2015-2019) at Manipal. Some of her recent curatorial projects include Searching for the Present, Where? Being-Becoming in Akbar Padamsee’s Figurations (1995 – 2006) at the Guild, Mumbai (2021), Backstage of Biology (2019), at Archives at the National Centre for Biological Sciences, Bangalore, Mukhaputa (2017) at the KK Hebbar Gallery and Arts Centre and Vectors of Kinship (2016) at the 11th Shanghai Biennale. She has been resident artist-curator at the Delfina Foundation, London and the International Studio and Curatorial Program, New York and is a regular contributor to writing platforms on philosophy, arts and aesthetics. Her academic writing has been published in journals such as Ethical Perspectives, Voices in Bioethics, Deleuze and Guattari Studies, Kunstlicht, Journal for Cancer Research and Therapeutics amidst others. She is on the Editorial Boards of SciPhiWeb Repository of Reflections on Science, Philosophy and Gaming and Barefoot Philosophers and member of the Bioethics Forum - Collaborative for Palliative Care at Columbia University. She is currently working on her forthcoming book Philosophy of Curation (Routledge) and teaches as Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the School of Interwoven Arts and Sciences at Krea University, India. Sahana: Lets start this conversation by knowing your research interests Srajana : I am interested in philosophy as a creative practice. As an artist-philosopher, it is extremely exciting to dive into the work of philosophy through practice, be it in my curatorial work, in my studio practice or by way of writing and teaching. This also means having a keen commitment to being inconspicuously soaked in philosophy while engaging with the world. Implicit and the ineffable registers of experience haunt my philosophical enquiry. I am curious about the ways in which relationalities emerge. The disciplinary probes then develop in service of this keenness. Aesthetics and Metaphysics are my core areas if one looks for #keywords . Philosophy for me is my practice. For more details on my work, one may find sufficient information on internet repositories. Please provide a brief biography of yourself I grew up in Bombay, a city that shapes my childhood and later in Bangalore. For the past decade, I have been mostly nomadic - from New Delhi to Amsterdam to London to Manipal to Bangalore and now to Pulicat - each place has given me so much. Two places that hold a special place for me are Suriname and Japan. A moment I recall in recent past, is when I touched a viking rune etched on a parapet of Hagia Sophia. For this context, I’d like to stick to this sparsed out geo-biography. What has been your experience of studying and being part of academic philosophy in India? I came to philosophy out of a personal necessity - to engage with certain concepts that haunted me - these were questions about my practice that I wanted to think through and wanted to learn from my teacher. The term academia does not hold much of an importance to me in qualifying my philosophical belonging. I was first introduced to philosophy during my Masters in JNU through my teachers who were scholars as well as artists. Art has always been part of the lived atmosphere at home. The experience of studying philosophy is mostly one of auto-didactism - even when one is taught by a teacher, the teacher’s success is in teaching the student how to teach herself. I was grateful for all my teachers who have made philosophy meaningful and lovable for me. I am grateful to continue learning from my teachers and peers, the barefoot philosophers. I consider this an ongoing process. I prefer not to dwell too much on what I am part of and what I am not. Could you share your reflections on philosophy as a discipline in India? How do you foresee the development of the discipline? The discipline of philosophy in India needs more affirmative attention - keeping in mind the place of philosophy for its people. There is a necessity for a way of engaging with concepts, contexts and their ideas, and to have meaningful dialogues, discussions and debates addressing questions that matter to you, me, the various kinds of ‘us’ that we inhabit or long for. As with any other discipline, when philosophers concern themselves with the work that can be done by philosophy, the discipline becomes self-sustainable. What kind of career path in philosophy are you interested in, or you think are available in philosophy in India? As an artist-philosopher I consider myself as a creative practitioner of philosophy. I curate, I sing, I make art, I write, I teach, I walk by way of doing philosophy. Philosophers are potentially everywhere around us. They are the policy-makers, the advisors, the mediators, the listeners, the poets, the storytellers, the caregivers, the gardeners, the carpenters, the bus drivers. I resist becoming a salesperson for the discipline, precisely because it does not need selling.

Review of "Ecophenomenology and the Environmental Crisis in the Sundarbans" Sourav Garain PhD Scholar, Visva-Bharati Aug 12, 2025 Book review of Kalpita Paul's Ecophenomenology and the Environmental Crisis in the Sundarbans: Towards a Community-Based Ethics (Routledge, 2025). Overview and Structure Kalpita Bhar Paul’s Ecophenomenology and the Environmental Crisis in the Sundarbans is a timely and philosophically rich engagement with the ecological precarity of the Indian Sundarbans. The book departs from conventional technocratic and anthropocentric frameworks by advancing an ecophenomenological method that reorients environmental discourse through field-based philosophical inquiry. Drawing from immersive fieldwork and long-term interaction with island communities, Paul constructs an original framework rooted in care, relationality, and a refusal of reductive “solutionist” thinking. The book argues that environmental crisis must be understood not merely as a managerial or policy failure, but as a crisis of meaning. Through the concepts of ontological humility and ethical responsiveness, Paul situates the Sundarbans not simply as a vulnerable ecosystem, but as a lived lifeworld – a space of co-constituted meaning between human and nature. Engaging thinkers like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, alongside posthumanist and decolonial theorists, Paul advances a distinctive vision of community-based ethics anchored in experiential knowledge and plural ontologies. Structured across eight chapters, the book unfolds a layered ethical and philosophical argument. Each chapter introduces a conceptual metaphor – such as “land-eaters,” “floating land,” or “accident”- that interrogates mainstream discourses and foregrounds indigenous categories of understanding. Through these metaphorical devices, Paul not only critiques dominant ecological imaginaries but also constructs an epistemological framework attentive to care, place, and lived relationality. Chapter Discussions The introductory chapter outlines the central philosophical and methodological orientation of the book. Paul situates her ecophenomenological approach against the backdrop of crisis thinking in the Anthropocene. Instead of advocating policy-based answers, she argues for a shift in how we think about what it means to be human and what is right and wrong. She says that climate change and natural loss should be seen as signs of a greater loss of relationship to place and care. She positions herself not as an external observer, but as a co-witness to the unfolding ecological realities in the Sundarbans. Chapter Two, titled Phenomenology of Land and Land-Eaters , explores the existential and political significance of land in the Sundarbans. Paul uses the metaphor of "land-eaters" to criticise the means by which that development drags communities out of their homes in the name of progress and protection. In this regard, land is not just a legal or geographical term; it is also an important moral and psychological centre that holds memory, connection, and the passing down of traditions from one generation to the next. Chapter Three, Phenomenology of Land-Water-Scape , turns to the relational geography of the delta. Paul contests the rigid separation between land and water prevalent in technoscientific frameworks. Using native phrases like "thirsty land" and "floating land," she shows how local knowledge doesn't fit neatly into two categories and instead shows a more fluid, co-emergent view of ecology. This criticism also shows how modern methods of emergency management are unfair because they don't take into account traditional ecological knowledge. In Chapter Four, Place and “Replace” , Paul focuses on the historical processes of place-making in the Sundarbans, from colonial forestry policies to postcolonial developmentalism. She engages with Heidegger’s notion of “oblivion” to highlight how state-led interventions have alienated local communities from their environments. The replacement of relational space with administered space, she argues, represents a deeper ethical crisis that echoes the philosophical violence of modernity. Chapter Five, Phenomenology of Accident , is one of the book’s most original interventions. Addressing human–animal encounters, particularly with the Royal Bengal Tiger, Paul introduces the concept of “accident” as an ontological event. She contrasts calculative bureaucratic responses to tiger attacks with meditative thinking rooted in lived acceptance and coexistence. Rather than treating such encounters as deviations, she explores how they expose the fragility and interdependence of human and nonhuman life in the Sundarbans. In Chapter Six, Paul introduces saṃsāra as a non-Western ontological category that better captures the dynamic, impermanent, and relational nature of environmental life in the Sundarbans. Reframed phenomenologically, saṃsāra becomes the foundation of a community-based ethic that values difference, embeddedness, and mutual care. Importantly, Paul resists the romanticization of the “local” by attending to internal differences and labour hierarchies within the community. Chapter Seven applies this ethical framework to the question of moral motivation and environmental behaviour. Paul critiques mainstream environmental psychology for focusing on policy instruments and behavioural incentives, arguing instead that ethical consciousness arises from relational attunement. Through comparative urban case studies, she shows how environmental ethics must be grounded in embodied experience rather than abstract principles. The final chapter, Beyond the Crisis of Imagination , returns to the philosophical stakes of the book. Paul critiques the representation of the Sundarbans as a natural museum frozen in time and instead calls for a plural, open-ended environmental imagination. She uses Heidegger's idea of "letting be" to argue for an ecological ethics that doesn't allow either dominance or withdrawal. This ethics starts with listening and ends with caring. Critical Engagement Kalpita Bhar Paul’s Ecophenomenology and the Environmental Crisis in the Sundarbans offers a thoughtful and intellectually ambitious intervention in the field of environmental philosophy. The book moves with confidence between the abstract and the situated, navigating Heideggerian and Merleau-Pontian thought while grounding its conceptual framework in the textures of lived experience in the Sundarbans. This ability to hold the theoretical and the empirical in sustained dialogue gives the work a notable depth. The author’s decision to position local inhabitants not as research subjects but as co-inquirers adds an important dimension to the study’s ethical and epistemological orientation. In doing so, the book not only avoids the extractive tendencies often associated with environmental field research, but also makes space for different modes of knowing to shape the philosophical project. One finds here a welcome refusal to treat philosophy as an abstract, universalizing endeavor; instead, the book demonstrates that philosophical reflection can be porous to the world, responsive to context, and open to voices often left out of theoretical discourse. At the same time, readers unfamiliar with phenomenology may find some sections demanding. The conceptual density, particularly in the more abstract discussions of Heideggerian ontology, may require sustained attention. For readers outside philosophy, particularly those from environmental management, policy, or development studies, this could pose a challenge. Still, the book does not aim for accessibility in the conventional sense; it invites readers into a different mode of thinking, one that slows down interpretation and resists the immediacy of solutions. That invitation, while rigorous, is also generative. It's clear that the book wants to criticise, especially when it talks about dominating conservation stories, developmentalist frames, and the modern urge to dominate nature. Its reframing of saṃsāra as an ecological concept is especially compelling, providing a culturally situated counterpoint to the Eurocentric assumptions that often shape environmental ethics. The ethical perspective that arises focuses more on fostering awareness, accountability, and collective vulnerability than on altering behaviour. Some readers may wonder how the book’s philosophical insights might be translated into institutional or policy settings. While it refrains from offering prescriptive models, its ethical orientation resonates with the principles of Post-Normal Science (PNS), which foregrounds extended peer communities, participatory deliberation, and ethical reflexivity in contexts marked by uncertainty and conflict. The Sundarbans, as Paul shows, are precisely such a site, where questions of livelihood, resilience, and identity cannot be resolved by technical means alone. From this perspective, her ecophenomenological approach offers not a toolkit, but a reframing of how environmental questions are posed and lived. Equally, Actor-Network Theory (ANT) offers a valuable conceptual complement. While Paul foregrounds relationality through phenomenological and ethical lenses, ANT could further illuminate the socio-material entanglements she describes – dykes, boats, monitoring devices, solar panels, and the tiger itself are not just background elements but actors within a distributed network of agency and meaning. Though ANT is not explicitly invoked, the book’s posthumanist orientation and resistance to anthropocentric framing would sit well in conversation with its insights. Such a dialogue could open further possibilities for understanding how infrastructures, technologies, and institutions mediate ecological experience and shape ethical imaginaries. It is not a text of solutions, but of reorientations. This book is a great resource for students and researchers who are interested in environmental phenomenology, decolonial thought, and environmental ethics. It makes us think and listen more carefully, and act with more humility in the face of ecological precarity. Relevance and Readership Ecophenomenology and the Environmental Crisis in the Sundarbans is essential reading for scholars in environmental philosophy, phenomenology, development studies, anthropology, and the environmental humanities. It will also resonate with practitioners interested in participatory environmental ethics, postcolonial ecology, and community-led resilience practices. The book offers a rich conceptual toolbox for thinking through the ethical and ontological dimensions of environmental change. For those looking to further explore the themes Paul raises, it would be fruitful to read this work alongside Bruce Foltz’s Inhabiting the Earth , David Abram’s The Spell of the Sensuous , Ted Toadvine’s Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Nature , and Dipesh Chakrabarty’s The Climate of History in a Planetary Age . These works, which are similar to Paul's, examine the complexities of existence, geographical location, and morality in the context of ecological change. Paul's work, by renouncing abstraction and being deeply committed to lived experience, is a significant contribution to the reevaluation of environmental degradation in the Anthropocene. It challenges us not only to reconsider how we conceptualize crisis, but also how we choose to live, dwell, and relate in a world increasingly defined by vulnerability and interdependence. References 1. Chakrabarty, D. (2021). The climate of history in a planetary age . University of Chicago Press. 2. Funtowicz, S. O., & Ravetz, J. R. (1993). Science for the post-normal age. Futures , 25(7), 739–755. https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-3287(93)90022-L 3. Heidegger, M. (1977). The question concerning technology and other essays (W. Lovitt, Trans.). Harper & Row. 4. Jonas, H. (1984). The imperative of responsibility: In search of an ethics for the technological age . University of Chicago Press. 5. Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory . Oxford University Press. 6. Marcuse, H. (1964). One-dimensional man: Studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society . Beacon Press. 7. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception (C. Smith, Trans.). Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1945) 8. Toadvine, T. (2009). Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of nature . Northwestern University Press .

IPN Blog Guidelines The blog at IPN is a platform for philosophers and others to write about philosophy in India and also to express philosophically informed opinions. What kind of articles are published in the IPN blog? Philosophy for Society and Public – Articles that explore the questions and events of society from philosophical viewpoints. Life of philosophy and philosophers in India – Articles that explore and document the experiences of philosophers and the nature of philosophy – as a discipline/practice/profession – in India. Academic Philosophy – Articles that introduce (either to fellow academicians or the public) a specific topic in Philosophy. We publish brief, accessible summaries by researchers about their latest publications for wider dissemination. The articles can also be reviews of philosophy books. Who can write for the IPN blog? Given the aim of the IPN blog is to enable a dialogue between philosophers and the public, we accept articles from both philosophers and the public. Philosophers who are not members of IPN, especially undergraduate and graduate philosophy students, can also submit. Kinds of submissions Articles related to the above themes can be sent to the blog-editorial team. If you have a topic for an article in mind, and want to check its viability, you can also send the abstract. Proposals for a series of articles can also be sent. In this case, please submit a concept note on the theme. Submission Guidelines Please email abstract/article/series-proposal to ipnblogteam@gmail.com . The suggested length of articles is around 1000 words. While submitting the article, please share the document over google-doc. The article can also be submitted as a standalone docx file. The article can be in English or any of the vernacular languages. Please use Chicago Manual Style author-date in-line citations and end bibliography. Use endnotes instead of footnotes. Please use Grammarly or other tools to remove spelling and grammar mista kes. We have a non-negotiable policy against plagiarism. Review process The article will be reviewed by the editorial team and suitable comments will be provided Wherever necessary, the editorial team will reach out to other scholars for their feedback and recommendation. Editorial team Manohar Kumar (Faculty, IIIT Delhi) Sania Ismailee (PhD Scholar, IIT Delhi) Siddharth S (Faculty, Sai University) Sushruth Ravish (Faculty, IIT Kanpur) Varun S Bhatta (Faculty, IISER Bhopal)

What Responsibility? Whose Responsibility? Bhaskarjit Neog Associate Professor, Centre for Philosophy, JNU Feb 7, 2024 An excerpt from Bhaskarjit Neog's book What Responsibility? Whose Responsibility: Intention, Agency and Emotions of Collective Entities (2024, Routledge, India). Published with permission from Routledge (India). Examples of collective wrongdoings abound across societies. The moral history of human society is full of such cases – the bloody wars, mob violence, racism, communal and ethnic riots, oppression by colonial powers, exploitation in the name of caste and class, and numerous incidents of coups, gang wars, corporate frauds, and terrorist activities. Their impacts on the moral community are so startling that we do not know how to reconcile ourselves to any punitive measures offered by any existing arrangements of a society. We go out in public and argue why the activities of such groups or collectives are reprehensible, and why we must excoriate them. In most cases, however, public rage dies down over a period of time without receiving much moral attention or condemnation. One of the reasons behind the disappearance of moral resentment from public memory is the fact that we do not always have a clear understanding of the simple question – who is responsible when a group or collective is held responsible? We do not seem to know much about the idea of moral responsibility for collective wrongdoings as much as we know about moral responsibility of individual wrongdoings. Although collective wrongdoings of this kind are ultimately carried out by individuals, it seems quite appropriate to first talk about the moral culpability of the whole organization or entity of which they are part. On the face of it, this idea of attributing moral properties to groups or collectives is uncomplicated and a matter of our everyday moral vocabulary. We can easily comprehend why a group or community deserves to be condemned for any action or omission, just the way any individual does. Non-philosophically speaking, the fact that, say, Nazi Germans are collectively blamed for their cruelty against the Jews is no more complex a matter to understand than it is to understand why Hitler is blamed for the same cruelty. As far as the normal comprehension of the meaning of blame is concerned, it hardly makes any difference whether the concept of blame is used in a collective or an individual context. The collective/individual contrast seems immaterial to the semantics of "blame" or other responsibility-bearing moral notions. But, to view it more analytically, there appears a serious conceptual problem. The idea of collective responsibility tends to become somewhat slippery and eludes our understanding when we try to understand it by following our easy grasp of the concept of individual moral responsibility. That Hitler is blamed for inhuman actions is easy enough to understand, because there is, or was, an individual human person in space and time that constituted the determinate target of our attitude of blame. In other words, there is a clear answer to the question: “Who is to be blamed?” or “Who experiences the feeling of guilt?” In contrast, there is no distinct identifiable target through which the idea of collective responsibility can be made sense of. Thus, when we talk about collective responsibility, one might bluntly respond with questions: What responsibility? And whose responsibility are you talking about? A collective – whether with a structure or without it – unlike its constituent individuals, does not seem to have any clear responsibility-bearing make-up. For it is not an embodied entity with its own consciousness and rationality required for being a moral agent. To track down its blameworthy character we need to know how and in what sense their actions and inactions are intentional or purposeful. Given that intentions and other responsibility-making psychological states are paradigmatically understood as a matter of minded entities, groups and collectives being non-minded, cannot be said to have such conscious states. Similarly, unlike their individual members, they cannot have or experience any moral emotions when they are made aware of their reprehensilizable behaviours. Neither can they sympathize or empathize with the victims of their actions in the way required of them. Nevertheless, it is a hard normative fact that we do talk about the moral responsibility of collectives, and we do hold them seriously morally accountable for many things. Many a time our responsibility statements about individuals are in fact grounded in a language of the responsibility of groups or collectives to which they belong. So, the questions that linger in our deliberative mind are: Is the phenomenon of collective responsibility really real, or is it metaphorical – a mere façon de parler , as many would like to call it? If it is real, is it a summation or incorporation of the moral responsibility of individuals, or is it something different from them – both in terms of its contents and meaning? And what gets added or obliterated in our standard understanding of responsibility when we see it through the prism of a collective framework? Besides, normatively speaking, how do we evaluate the moral status of individuals who stand up and raise their voice against the things that are done in the name of their group? For instance, how do we make sense of the moral status of those protestors who hit the streets with slogans such as NotInOurName or NotInMyName? This book offers a modest ground for judiciously responding to some of these questions. It aims to redeem collective responsibility by defending the consistency and legitimacy of collective intentions, collective agency, and collective emotions. It talks of collective moral responsibility as the responsibility of collectives without either reducing it to the moral responsibility of the collective members or making it a case where their exact moral positions are effectively made blurred. The ground for defending this account is thus a non-individualist or quasi-collectivist ground – a ground located in the contested space between two prominent approaches – collectivism and individualism. Three components may be considered for a standard justification of moral responsibility – intention, agency, and affective or reactive attitudes of the subject concerned. These components show why, how, and on what ground a subject may be taken to be an appropriate candidate of our moral evaluations. Intentions refer to the psychological state of a subject with which the action concerned is performed. Agency is the capacity that the subject has for being able perform a morally considerable action or omission. And affective or reactive attitudes are humane reactions of the relevant subject’s putative moral agency that is amenable for the attribution of moral responsibility. These components are important not just for the justification of moral responsibility of structured collectives but also for the less-structured collectives. To proceed on this path, I draw on the latest resources of two theoretically interconnected areas of analytic philosophy – first, collective intentionality, a newly developed area in the intersection of philosophy of action and mind, and the second, somewhat old but now a freshly rejuvenated field called social ontology with perspectives from psychology, sociology, cognitive sciences and other disciplines. Both these areas investigate the nature and functions of variety of cognitive and non-cognitive properties such as beliefs, desires, intentions, guilt, remorse, and others that underly the constitutions of collective affairs. While the justification of a substantive account of collective responsibility along this line has been in the know for quite some time, there has not been a systematic effort of bringing together two equally compelling approaches, namely the cognitivist and emotivist ways. I explore the possibility of combining them in a way that would elevate the debate of collective responsibility from the narrow confines of both individualism and collectivism. This is a book on morality of groups with a special focus on the concept of collective responsibility. So, naturally it is a book that can be catalogued under moral philosophy. But since it is a product of weaving and stitching resources of multiple areas of philosophy and other allied disciplines, its significance may also be seen in other fields of humanities and social sciences where the issue of collectivity is discussed and debated. The prospective audience of the book thus includes, but not restricted to, moral philosophers, political theorists, legal theorists, just war theorists, business ethicists, policy makers, and others who take interest in the general question of moral responsibility in collective contexts.

Review of R. Krishnaswamy's Book Adreeja Sarkar PhD Scholar, Jawaharlal Nehru University Jun 2, 2024 Book review of R. Krishnaswamy's book The Call for Recognition: Naturalizing Political Norms (Routledge 2023). In our decision-making procedures, our reasons for actions are ushered by norms, whether they be of the informal kind or in the form of decrees and sanctions. Norms are effective means to acquire and conserve social welfare. Like symbiotic fungi that enable nutrient transfer and ecological restoration, norms are the ties that bind us in a system of social cooperation and collective growth. The relation between norms and agents is thus, a mutual one. Agents in any social group or collective need norms for the proper functioning of the group just as norms require performing agents to coordinate and cooperate so that the overall normative framework of the group can evolve for the better. The relation is also dynamic because in order to evolve together, both norms and behavioural attitudes and actions of agents demand flexibility and openness to change as prerequisites. The structure of norms appears to be (a) heavily influenced by the socio-cultural contexts from which they arise while simultaneously aiming towards (b) a 'transcendence' through the attainment of universalizability. Even though parochial socio-cultural group beliefs may differ in character, there prevails some homogeneity among the contents of specific norms despite differences. There is an everlasting debate regarding whether normativity [1] arises through social agreement (anti-foundationalism) or is it entirely objective in nature (essentialism), i.e., where the truth or 'rightness' of values have an 'essence' (independently) existing out there in the world, free from any subjective preferences. Analyzing the structure of social norms constitutes a critical step in the process of interpreting social justice. If norms are solely anthropological, then they eventually suffer from absolute relativism. Contrarily, if norms are solely objective or universal then justice or fairness becomes a very rigid domain ignoring socio-cultural specificities. The sources of these norms aren't easy to decipher, more so, when one delves into their formation, functionality, purpose and impact in our everyday lives. One also needs to bring into the discussion the concepts of identity, autonomy, intention, motivation, behaviour and action in both individual and collective contexts. Krishnaswamy’s book can be considered as an inquiry into the grounds of normativity involving these aspects. He takes up questions like – what constitutes our social and political norms, how do we understand social agency (in theory and praxis) and how a right political institution can be crucial in enabling the required grounds for these norms. In the process of doing so, he provides a panoramic picture of the traditional and current interpretations of political agency and the interactions between socio-political principles and subjecthood. The book, as he states in his introduction, can be divided into two phases. In the initial chapters, he performs the job of a critic by assessing the various traditions of political theories and citing the incompatibilities or dis-connect existing between their notions of the right political institution and social agency. The latter chapters focus more on constructing a different perspective in viewing norms, social agency and the roles of a political institution. At the heart of his normative framework lies the shaping of our identity as political subjects on the basis of ‘recognition’. Simply put, he provides a recognitional model [2] as a normative ideal in understanding our behaviour as social agents. In a recognitional model, political agency is understood from an inter-subjective perspective as in, how we recognize the other and are recognized by them. To recognize any entity, he states, is to apply a social identity to that entity which further reveals the various relations that the said entity exists in, within a community. We are first and foremost, social beings and any talk on normativity has to take into consideration our existence in relations. However, this model of recognition is not a mere static representation of reality for the author. He considers it to be a dynamic and flexible process where we not only learn how to situate each other socially but also moderate social categories while acknowledging novel experiences individually and collectively. Recognition, to him, acts as a way out of the extremities of subjectivism and objectivism in the analysis of normativity. The normative agency in a recognitional model is a social given. There are no prior conditions that might act as a foundation to what an agent ought to do. In fact, that one is an agent is sufficient enough a reason to consider her as a legitimate subject for (a) dispensing social categories and (b) being the bearer of social norms. Krishnaswamy argues that the need for equal normative status is justified by the mere existence of a 'society' and the existence of people living in the society. Social violence or silencing occurs when any agent is denied their fundamental normative right i.e., the right to participate in any normative discourse within the society. One of his major claims in the book is that only a recognitional political framework, through its non-essentialist, relational ethic can help us arrive at the legitimacy of norms in attaining collective welfare. The method he cites in developing such a recognitional framework is to first situate agency and autonomy as inseparable from the natural and social environments they are based in. Accordingly, he goes on to explain that intentionality/self-realization emerges as a normative quality guided by biological forces. He interprets internalization of laws as the recognition or knowledge that – "the patterns of behavioural change are consequences of other normative rules which dictate how naturalistic laws inform our agency".[3] In the following phase of the analysis, he aims to show that the standards for normative actions are public in nature by virtue of containing shared intentions. Norms become public due to the intentional performance of the individuals of a group and eventually become historical, capable of providing motivational impact over longer periods of time. Regarding the interrelation between normative behaviour and natural dispositions, Krishnaswamy (following anti-essentialist claims) argues that our reasons for actions cannot belong to a different cognitive realm from the actions themselves. Here, he uses the example of learning languages (where one needs to follow rules but a cognitive grasp of the rules prior to speaking doesn’t necessarily help in actually speaking the language) to reiterate that situating norms in a different realm separate from pre-cognitive level of conscious actions would rarely help in comprehending the structure of our normative behaviour. Norms are constructed out of the interpretations and reactions of multiple agents of the collective towards each other and their immediate environment. Social coordination among individuals of a collective arise due to shared intentions.[4] Planning structures of individual agencies form the connecting link between individual and shared agencies. Our capacity for planning agency, as Bratman puts it, is a core capacity that underlies interrelated forms of mind-shaped practical organization: cross-temporal organization of individual agency, shared agency, social rules, and rule-guided organized institutions. One function of our capacity for planning agency is the preference for these forms of practical organization.[5] These planning structures lead to the continuity between individual agency and shared agency. In order to establish the larger aim of his thesis – that rules or norms have to emerge out of people’s natural and social contexts – he points at how intentions while being collective also need to be cognitively 'recognized' by agents. Normative political programmes will always be lacking in their discussions about justice and fairness if they ignore the realities of our practical lives. The far removal from practical predicaments would result in a dissonance between how people cognize they should act and how they actually act in everyday circumstances. According to him, norms are created through collective action by 'joint agreement'. Mutual commitments and obligations arise from the moral grounding that our social and cultural realities provide. Our understanding of moral right or wrong arises from our lived experiences. Practical instances in life almost often inculcate implicit agreements that make joint action towards shared goals possible. This differs from how joint agreement works in social contract frameworks where agreement is required to be individualistic and explicit. Krishnaswamy claims that the fact that we can plan and intend goals is what gives us the capacity to commit. Following Gilbert[6], he argues that collective goals are separate from personal goals, and normative commitments are social in nature. He shows how singularist accounts of intentionality and normative commitments lead to individualist political philosophies. To create a good social and political theory of obligation we ought to begin with exploring how norms are a natural part of our collective existence. He further argues that if norms are public and are generated out of collective behaviour then rules of social action get their power to be obligatory only when they are recognized by all the members of that group. The formal conditions for institutional behaviour is based on collective dispositions, i.e., the recognition of norms along with relevant normative expectations shared by agents. The recognition of norms entails the acceptance of that norm and the readiness to bind ourselves to the norm. Political institutions since they aim to regulate behaviour through collective rules need continual performative reinforcement by the people to whom those rules are directed. It becomes important that institutions then take into consideration the natural social conditions of the people by analyzing pragmatic instances. It is through this that social silencing and injustice can be checked. Political injustice occurs either through coercion or the deliberate or non-deliberate overlooking of contextual differences prevailing in intersubjective recognition. Recognitional ethics requires equal participation of agents as well as institutions in rule formation and enactment. Krishnaswamy quite aptly puts forward one limitation of such a normative framework. While normative reflexivity of agents is a product of inter-personal interactions, interpretation of norms is bound to vary from person to person. Demands for conformity among group members may lead to coercion or ostracization if some members do not conform to the group identity. He holds the opinion that group conformity might not always ensure the absence of discrimination. In order to avoid such cases, political institutions must create safe spaces where silencing and feelings of hurt and discrimination can be conceptually addressed. The book aims to analyze natural social conditions phenomenologically to find solutions to the limitations of the objectivist idea of justice. His stance of political naturalism is a novel interdisciplinary attempt to bridge the gap between objectivist and relativist approaches to social reality and justice. A Few Challenges The author does not, however, draw a very distinct line as to where the 'natural' ends and the 'social' begins in the 'natural social conditions' that he talks about. As such, the sources of normativity or normative agency remain a bit hazy. Intersubjective understanding and knowledge demands detailed analysis of how a recognitional model would define collective intentionality. Whether collective intentionality and group agency are reducible to individual intentions or whether it is the case that one common intention is jointly shared by all the members need to be assessed. The recognitional model has to explain how to bridge the gaps between emotivism and intuitionism when it comes to intersubjective interpretations. (Assuming that a recognitional model implements the concepts of empathy and trust for its functioning, it also needs to be addressed how empathy and trust would function in intersubjective interpretations.) If joint agreements imply individual planning capabilities for forming norms and institutions, what ensures agent A that another agent B would respond likewise? If we base our inter-subjective interpretations on ‘collective intentionality’ while simultaneously retaining intentional capabilities of individual agents, then this would lead to the problem of circularity. How should we then understand the plurality of subjectivity in contexts involving collectives like institutions as well as contexts including random groups? Again, in a country like India, for instance, with diverse inherent contextual features, how should the justification of uniform truths/norms be done? Krishnaswamy’s book initiates interesting arenas for further discussions on the concepts of coordination, agreement and collaboration in dealing with epistemic injustice. His recognitional model takes up a naturalistic approach to social construction. For the model to be seen as an explanation, some clarification about its justification is needed. The Call for Recognition: Naturalizing Political Norms sets up room for interdisciplinary analysis and will be an intriguing read for scholars of law, social and political philosophy, social epistemology, meta-ethics and social ontology. Endnotes [1] Normativity is the capacity to describe any claim as action-guiding in the sense of right/wrong and good/bad. [2] Influenced by Hegelian anti-essentialism. [3] Chapter 6: Socio-Natural Embeddedness, p-123. The Call for Recognition: Naturalizing Political Norms . 2023 [4] Bratman, 2014; Gilbert, 2006; Velleman, 2000 [5] Bratman, Planning and Its Function in Our Lives , Volume41, Issue1 Special Issue:Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Lecture 2023 Symposium , p-1-15, feb 2024. [6] Gilbert, 2006. References Bratman, Michael. (2014). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together . Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. —- Planning and Its Function in Our Lives , Volume41, Issue1. Special Issue:Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Lecture 2023 Symposium , p-1-15, feb 2024. Gilbert, Margaret. (2006). A Theory of Obligation Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society . Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Velleman, David. (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason . Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.