Search Results

IPN Blog Guidelines The blog at IPN is a platform for philosophers and others to write about philosophy in India and also to express philosophically informed opinions. What kind of articles are published in the IPN blog? General articles about philosophy. Articles can be about Philosophy for Society and Public – Articles that explore the questions and events of society from philosophical viewpoints. Life of philosophy and philosophers in India – Articles that explore and document the experiences of philosophers and the nature of philosophy – as a discipline/practice/profession – in India. Academic Philosophy – Articles that introduce (either to fellow academicians or the public) a specific topic in Philosophy. Academic engagements like Brief, accessible summaries by researchers about their latest publications (books or papers) for wider dissemination Reviews of philosophy books Critical responses to papers Who can write for the IPN blog? Given that the aim of the IPN blog is to enable a dialogue between philosophers and the public, we accept articles from both philosophers and the public. Philosophers who are not members of IPN, including undergraduate and graduate philosophy students, can also submit. Submission Guidelines Critical Responses to Journal Papers There are two ways of initiating these response articles for the IPN Blog: A scholar can send a response to a recently published paper to the editors. The editors will try to reach the author for a reply to the response-note submitted. If a scholar has published an article recently, the scholar can get in touch with the blog editors with a few suitable respondents’ names (preferably faculty or advanced PhD scholars). Scope of response articles to journal papers at the IPN blog: Responses are limited to papers written by philosophy scholars in India. Only responses to peer-reviewed papers in respected journals are accepted. The paper, preferably, should not be older than 10 years. Points about structure: The response articles will consist of two parts: (a) the critical response by a scholar and (b) the reply from the author Each of these parts is around 300 words. A critical response should not just be a summary of the paper. It attempts to critically, and yet briefly, evaluate the paper by doing any of the following: raises some challenges to the paper’s claims, provides further clarifications/support for the claims, or extends the paper’s claims to other domains of debate. The author of the paper, in turn, replies to the points raised by the responder. Book Review There are two ways of initiating book reviews for the IPN Blog: A scholar can send a review of a recently published book to the editors. If a scholar has published a book recently, the scholar can get in touch with the blog editors with a few suitable reviewers’ names (preferably faculty or advanced PhD scholars). General points for all articles While submitting the article, please share the document over google-doc. The article can also be submitted as a standalone docx file. Please use the Chicago Manual Style author-date in-line citations and end bibliography. Use endnotes instead of footnotes. Please use Grammarly or other tools to remove spelling and grammar mista kes. We have a non-negotiable policy against plagiarism. Review process The article will be reviewed by the editorial team and suitable comments will be provided Wherever necessary, the editorial team will reach out to other scholars for their feedback and recommendations. Editorial team Manohar Kumar (Faculty, IIIT Delhi) Varun S Bhatta (Faculty, IISER Bhopal)

Mulla Nasrettin's Cogito Danish Hamid Independent Scholar Article # Jan 13, 2025 One day, while wandering through the Old Venetian bazār, I, Mulla Nasrettin, stumbled upon a rather attractive looking leather bound book, titled Meditations written by a certain Descartes. Now, you know me—I’m a man of reflection, and the word "meditations" has always had a certain allure. “Perhaps,” I thought, “this book might guide me to some inner peace or reveal hidden truths of the soul that this French philosopher has discovered.” So I bought it, tucked it under my arm, and made my way home, thinking I’d sit down with it after Isha. The night was quiet, perfect for a bit of soul-searching. I lit a small lamp, sat comfortably by the fire, and picked up the book. Meditations by Monsieur Descartes. “Let’s see what wisdom your little book has for me,” I muttered to myself. I opened the book with great anticipation. But alas! The first few pages were filled with long-winded ramblings about method, and oh! How this Descartes fellow loved to talk about himself! His achievements, his credentials, his method—Method this, method that! I sighed. “Where is the meditation, the wisdom, the Lubbu'l-Lubâb of the matter?” I asked aloud. “Am I reading about the vanity of an old man or a guide to truth?” But then—finally!—I came across something more practical. This Descartes began doubting things. Ah! Now we’re getting somewhere, I thought. Doubting existence, doubting knowledge—this was something I could work with. Nasrettin Hoca likes a good doubt as much as anyone, especially when it comes to doubting about dreams, even in one's dreams. And so, I followed Descartes’s reasoning. I, too, would doubt the world around me, doubt my senses, doubt everything until only one thing remained. “I think, therefore I am,” Descartes concluded, and there it was—the grand revelation! I jumped from my seat. “Aha! I exist! I think, therefore I am!” But wait. This didn’t feel right. A different doubt now gnawed at me. Could it be that this Monsieur hadn’t doubted hard enough? He stopped too soon. He was content to rest at thinking. How could he be sure thinking was enough, enough to show I exist? I sat back down and rubbed my chin. “This Descartes fellow... He doubts, yes, but not quite as far as one must go. He should have doubted his own doubting! After all, if I’m to doubt everything, then why not doubt the very fact that I am doubting? Could it be that even my doubts are the product of someone—or something—else? I mean, who is to say these thoughts are mine at all?” With that thought, I stood again, pacing. “What if I am simply imagining my doubts? What if, in truth, I am a figment of someone else’s imagination?” And just then, my donkey, who had been lazily resting outside, brayed loudly. I turned to the door and squinted. “Ah, yes. The donkey. Could it be...?” My heart raced with this impossible thought. “What if it is not me imagining these doubts, but my donkey?” I strode outside to face the old beast. The donkey stared back at me, chewing slowly on his grass, completely indifferent to my hypothesis. “Tell me, old friend,” I said, crouching down to eye level with the creature. “Are you the one thinking me into existence? Is it you who doubts for me, making me question whether or not I exist?” The donkey blinked lazily. For a moment, the thought made me dizzy, but… I couldn’t dismiss it so easily. After all, if Descartes could doubt the existence of everything but his own thoughts, why couldn’t I go a step further? If I was to doubt everything, I must doubt that I am the one doing the doubting. Maybe the donkey—silent, patient, always observing—was the true thinker here, and I was merely his daydream. I stood, perplexed. “I doubt, therefore I am? No. Perhaps it is: The donkey doubts, therefore we are!” I walked back to my bed, shaking my head. This Descartes is too dubious a fellow, apart from being totally full of himself. The West must have come to really bad times when this guy is their star new philosopher. Oh to the good old days of Aristu, and Eflatun the Divine! But as I lay down to sleep that night, I couldn't help but worry. “Whether it’s my doubt or the donkey’s that gives me existence, one thing’s for sure—I can never look at the beast the same way again.” And with that, I drifted off, my mind slowly going into a haze….am I dreaming of the donkey, or does the donkey still dream of me?

Modernity and its Futures Past Nishad Patnaik Faculty, IIIT Delhi Book Excerpt # Jan 8, 2025 An excerpt from Nishad Patnaik's book Modernity and its Futures Past: Recovering Unalienated Life (2023, Palgrave Macmillan, India). The basic claim of the book is that the contemporary figuration of modernity, in the positivistic understanding of nature, and capitalist form of society (as two sides of the same coin), constitutes the reification of the original universal, critical-rational impulse of the Enlightenment. Such reification sets up a tension between the universalizing and particularizing tendencies of reason, reflected, for instance, in the current dominance of the de-territorializing forces of globalized capitalism, on the one hand, and the simultaneous reemergence of xenophobic forms of nationalism, based on narrow, territorially bounded identifications along religious, ethnic or linguistic lines on the other. The tension between the universal and the particular, symptomatic of this deeper structural tendency towards reification, leads to a series of impasses in the interconnected theoretical, ethical, political and economic spheres, which come to constitute our sense of alienation. The book responds to this problematic by attempting to reconcile this tension in dialectical fashion, and thereby articulate an ‘alternative’, non-reified conception of modernity, from within the modernist tradition . Thus, instead of understanding the tension between the universal and the particular, the one and the many, the same and the other etc., as representing a mutually exclusive either-or choice, the book approaches these issues by elaborating their mutually constitutive co-dependence. As a corollary, it shows that the series of impasses to which modernity succumbs in the interconnected theoretical, ethical, political and economic spheres, stem from the attempt to reduce the ‘universal’ to the ‘particular’ or vice versa. The work argues that if we resist this tendency towards reduction, we can still renew the emancipatory promise that Enlightenment modernity once held, for providing a rational-universal self-foundation for humanity, while simultaneously avoiding the pitfalls of a reified form of universality. As we know, (and as Husserl elaborates with his evocation of the sense of ‘crisis’ in what he calls the ‘European Sciences’) the early optimism and ‘naïve faith’ in ‘universal reason’ has long since given way to skeptical resignation in the face of the positivistic form of reason that comes to dominate. The ‘positivistic reduction’ of reason has resulted in a morass of ‘posts’—'post-modernism’, ‘post-truth’, post-structuralism, post-Marxism etc., at the level of theory, which indicate a tendency towards the ‘empiricization’ of reason. The effects of such empiricization are felt in the intertwined ethical, political, and economic domains. And yet, at the level of socio-political and economic history, as the long, sordid past of the contemporary capitalist figuration of modernity, marked by the violence of colonialism, slavery etc., shows, any straightforward positing of the universal dimension of reason, in the face of such skepticism and resulting empiricization, is no longer possible. For, it is precisely in the name of ‘universal reason’, mediated through the inherent expansionary economic logic of capitalism, that colonial subjugation and exploitation (primary/‘primitive accumulation of capital’ in Marx’s terminology) unfolded (and I argue, continues to unfold in a transformed modality under the current neoliberal regime, which imposes its own neo-imperialist tendencies). Indeed, the skeptical reaction to the universal claims of ‘enlightened’ reason, leading to their empiricization (positivistic reduction), stems, in large measure, from these effects of an uncritical, reified universalism, which (qua concrete or determinate universal’ in the Hegelian sense) tend to exclude certain cultures, peoples (and their interests), and modes of thought. This is because, as many thinkers such as Charles Taylor, Judith Butler etc. have pointed out, any determinate universal, qua determinate, must necessarily be limited in its scope. The scope of the universal has historically determined, and continues to determine, the constitution of identity and difference, the ‘same’ and the ‘other’, that is, those that are included in, and excluded from, its scope. In modernity, as the scope of the universal is extended, at least in principle, to include all human beings (and now increasingly non-human species), it can set up a movement where the excluded can come to ‘haunt’ the universal, forcing its expansion (but also possible contraction). This also indicates the possibility of modernist ethics as an ethics without specific content, or a negative ethics, that is committed only to the ‘gap’ between any concretization of the universal—the ethically invested content/normative order of any political discourse, and the empty universal it represents—its indeterminate ‘horizonal beyond’ by which it is necessarily oriented, such that the former is always subject to critique and revision in light of the latter. Explicating this movement (‘hauntology’) Butler, for instance, writes, modern “democratic polities are constituted through exclusions that return to haunt the polities predicated upon their absence. That haunting becomes politically effective precisely in so far as the return of the excluded forces an expansion and re-articulation of the basic premise of democracy itself” (Butler, 2000, 11) . These considerations make visible, the basic dialectic between the ‘universal’ and the ‘particular’, in its enmeshed ‘theoretical’ and ‘material’ aspects. That is, they make visible both the constitutive interrelation and dependence between the universal and the particular, as well as the tendency towards reduction/reification of this interrelation to one of its poles (dialectical ‘one-sidedness’) that gives rise to the tensions or impasses inherent in our contemporary (alienated) modernity. It follows that the ultimately ethical task of renewing the emancipatory potential inherent in the critical-rational and universal dimension of reason that constituted the original impetus of Enlightenment modernity, in the face of its contemporary reified ‘theoretical’ and ‘material’ configuration, calls for a revised, non-reified conception of universality. The latter, I argue, can be nothing but a negative universality—a universality in constant ‘becoming’, (therefore, in its processive movement, nothing but a negative dialectic). Further, as I noted, the rearticulation of universality in this transformed, negative sense, in the face of reified (positivist and capitalist) modernity, amounts to the (re)articulation of an ‘alternative’, non-reified conception of modernity, from within the modernist tradition . For, as we know, the critical thrust of enlightened reason lies in the disenchantment of the world—stripping it of ‘meaning’ and ‘purposiveness’, which come to be seen as merely anthropomorphic projections. The disenchanted world, particularly in its capitalistic figuration, alienates human beings from nature and from each other. Thus, to rearticulate human emancipatory possibilities calls for the rearticulation of a non-alienated conception of both nature and society. However, the disenchantment wrought by the critical-reflective rationality of the Enlightenment cannot simply be undone in a return to pre-modern ‘enchantment’ —to a sacralised conception of the world, and to some posited ‘original’ unity with it in unalienated ‘immediacy’. For, on the one hand, the historically emergent critical-reflective experience of disenchantment (as an expression of reflective distance, transcendence vis-a-vis ‘immediacy’, inescapable mediation, or universality in a negative sense etc.), constitutive of our modernist form of consciousness and society, cannot simply be obliterated, in what would amount to ‘collective amnesia’ (although the dangers of such amnesia are always present, and become exacerbated in times of socio-economic and political crises). On the other, the earlier ‘enchanted’ conceptions of the world, with their naturalized/sacralised order and hierarchy, where the source of power and legitimacy lay in a transcendent ‘beyond’, were subject to their own modes of (unthematized) reification, and therefore, (implicit forms of) alienation. Thus, the rearticulation of human emancipatory possibilities, which can accommodate irreversible disenchantment, (or the negativity inherent in critical-reflective distance), must take the form of the recovery/renewal of an unalienated mode of existence, from within a non-reified modernity. The study begins by posing a question regarding our contemporary situation—why are we witnessing the resurgence of various forms of xenophobic nationalism, and the re-emergence of narrow, pre-modern solidarities along religious or ethnic lines, precisely when globalized, finance-driven capital is purportedly breaking down the traditional territorial and cultural boundaries of the nation-state? It elaborates this tension inherent in the present, by taking into consideration aspects of the arguments presented by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire (2000), as well as by Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities (1983), while critiquing both. Whereas Hardt and Negri emphasize the supra-national tendencies of capital (captured in the de-territorialized sovereignty of ‘empire’), Anderson emphasizes the continued existence of nations and territorial boundaries. Yet, the present juncture is marked by both these tendencies, that is, both universalism (in the economic and juridical-normative domains) and particularism (nationalist parochialism). I argue that thinking of these tendencies as mutually opposed and exclusive, leads to an impasse both on the economic and political front, constitutive of contemporary capitalist modernity. More broadly, it results in a reified conception of modernity, which is the source of contemporary alienation. The latter then manifests itself in the regression to various pre-modern, parochial forms of identification and identity. This calls for a revised understanding of the present—one which does not merely emphasize one set of processes (universalistic tendencies), to the exclusion of the other (particularistic tendencies), but can account for their simultaneous co-existence. I account for this co-existence by arguing for their mutually constitutive co-dependence. By showing how the nation-state is essential to the wide-spread implementation of neo-liberal economic policies, I introduce the notion of hegemony (of the latter), as a possible, initial explication of this co-dependence. I take up this problematic in a concrete sense, through an analysis of the historical emergence of nationalist consciousness, and the ‘nation’, as a new, specifically modernist form of identity and political formation. It seems obvious that the modalities of nationalist consciousness and the conception of the nation itself, must differ depending on the historical and geographical contexts of their birth. That is, the birth of the nation state in the West, usually traced to the Westphalian peace treaties (1648) in Europe, and its emergence through the colonial encounter and anti-colonial struggle in Asia and Africa, in the 19th and 20th centuries, cannot be exactly the ‘same’ in their form, and certainly not, in their ‘content’. Yet, they do share certain continuities of form, arising from the universalizing tendencies inherent in capitalism, that give rise to colonial expansion, anti-colonial struggles, and the affirmation of nationalist consciousness/identities, on the part of the colonized. I elaborate these claims through an examination of Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism (1983) and Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983), to compare and critique their analyses concerning the emergence of the ‘nation’. I show that Gellner does not take the ‘universal’ (both in its ‘structural’ and ‘normative’) dimension, inherent in capitalism too seriously. Thus, he does not see the close interconnection between the emergence of capitalist modernity, the rise of modern ‘nation-state’ (in Europe) and colonialism, preferring instead to restrict his analysis to an empirical level. Anderson in contrast, does take the normative dimension of ‘universality’ into account in his idea of the nation as an ‘imagined community’, only to rigidly fix its structural aspect in a ‘modular’ form that first arises in Europe, and is then transplanted to other parts of the world, through the colonial encounter. I discuss Partha Chatterjee’s critique of Anderson’s ‘modularity thesis’, in relation to the emergence of nationalist consciousness in post-colonial ‘imaginations’, in his The Nation and its Fragments (1993). I argue that the colonial encounter cannot be understood either on the ‘modular’ conception, or on Chatterjee’s ‘inner-spiritual’ and ‘outer-material scientific’ divide and the communitarian alternative that, he thinks, flows from it. Rather, its processive movement (which Chatterjee captures, but interprets differently) reveals the ‘inner dialectic’ (where Chatterjee’s conception of the inner-outer can be accommodated terms of the ‘unhappy consciousness’ phase that emergent self-consciousness goes through) constitutive of the nationalist consciousness that emerges in colonized subjects, in and through the struggle for independence. This incremental critique of Gellner’s, Anderson’s, and Chatterjee’s positions clears the decks for rethinking the possibility of unalienated forms of co-existence under conditions of modernity. That is, without taking recourse to various, ultimately pre-modern, sacralized conceptions of ‘community’, understood as modernity’s suppressed ‘other’. One such articulation of the ‘conditions of possibility’ of an unalienated form of life, which attempts to accommodate modernist disenchantment, is represented by Akeel Bilgrami’s work. Bilgrami shows how the tension between ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’, running through the Enlightenment, becomes the defining feature of modern liberal-democratic (and capitalistic) societies and cannot be resolved within it. This sets up the basic coordinates within which an unalienated form of society, in a modern, desacralized sense, must be thought. For, such a society must be able to reconcile the tension between ‘liberty’ and equality, which hitherto have always been thought in an oppositional sense, that is, as an opposition between individual liberty and collective equality. In his essay, Gandhi (and Marx) (2014), Bilgrami, in a two-step argument, first prepares the ground for an alternative, modernist form of unalienated life by bringing to light the contingent ‘hegemony’ of late capitalism. By tracing the historical and intellectual genealogy of capitalist modernity, and how it impinged on emergent nationalist consciousness in India under colonial rule, Bilgrami underscores both the historically, and rationally contingent character of the capitalist form that modernity takes. Yet, its contingency is not seen as such. That is, capitalism appears not as one possible configuration of modernity (that was ‘in fact’ realized) among other, equally historically and rationally viable possibilities (that, it so happened, were not realized), but as ‘objective’ (universal, rational) ‘reality’. Yet, I argue that on the one hand, the historically extant alternative visions that Bilgrami invokes (Levelers and Diggers, Gandhi), involve a sacralized conception of nature and of the human (and are therefore, not really ‘modernist’, but invoke a certain nostalgia for the pre-modern past). On the other, insofar as his rational, counterfactual argument, based on ‘opportunity costs’ remains a primarily negative critique of the rational argument (based on social contract) for capitalism (the rational justification of the privatization of the commons), it does not sufficiently account for the skeptical consequences inherent in the notion of ‘contingent hegemony’. In other words, it does not address the possibility that these skeptical consequences end up undercutting not only the claim to the (rational) universality of capitalist social organization, but also that of any alternative conception of modernity based on universal reason, understood in its positive institutional-social configuration. Bilgrami’s argument ends up affecting a split between reason and history that is in keeping with the tendency towards empiricization, where the movement of history, and specifically the socio-political domain, becomes nothing but an endless series of contestations and provisional victories (in the form of a temporary hegemonic consensus). To mitigate these skeptical effects of empiricization/particularism, I turn to the dialectical model of thought which emphasizes the movement of history through the movement of determinate negation, which is itself based on the processive character of reification. Through the latter, the universal dimension of rationality inherent in the historical emergence of modernity comes to be ‘reduced’ to the capitalist form of society on the one hand, and inseparable from it, the techno-scientific understanding of nature on the other. Such reduction, constitutes the source of our alienation in relation to others, and to ‘nature’. I trace this sense of alienation and its basis in reified modernity, via the ‘disenchantment’ of nature and of human relations, brought about through the historical trajectory and shape that modernity comes to take in the Enlightenment. I elaborate the imbricated historicities of the techno-scientifically mediated conception of ‘nature’ (as disenchanted), and the capitalist form of social organization (which permits the fullest manipulation and exploitation of ‘disenchanted’, quantified nature), through a discussion of Hegel’s Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, and Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s writings. Once this idea of a reified modernity determined by the capitalistic and techno-scientific framework, is established, it brings to the fore the question of the possibility of an ‘alternative unalienated form of modernity’. Yet, on the one hand, as I noted, such a recovery cannot mean a return to a pre-modern, sacralized conception of community and nature, since these forms of existence involve their own unreflective modes of reification, (in terms of deified, hence, ‘naturalized’ social hierarchies etc.), and therefore, unthematized modes of alienated existence. On the other, it cannot entail an orientation which, either in the present or in the future, attempts to restore or realize the immediacy of the ‘real’ (a ‘metaphysics of presence’) in the objective-universal sense (conceived either as ‘material’ or ideal-rational reality), specific to reified modernity. From an epistemological perspective, such immediacy (presence) is ruled out in principle—as varied philosophical traditions, from transcendental idealism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, deconstruction etc. have argued. But, in a related sense, it is also critiqued from a political-normative perspective, insofar as the attempt to realize the impossible ideal/telos of a ‘society without antagonisms’, leads to a totalizing conception, which can have totalitarian consequences—a charge often brought against communist societies, which are said to exemplify a reified, distinctly modernist form of totalitarianism. Thus, the task of articulating an ‘alternative conception of modernity’, in and through the articulation of unalienated existence, calls for a ‘non-reified’ account of modernity. More precisely, as I elaborate in my reading of Marx, since the process of reification is inevitable (due to our spatio-temporal finitude, as Kant had already shown) it calls for an account where this process is reflectively and institutionally acknowledged, and thus rendered ‘harmless’ (echoing the Kantian sense of the term in the Transcendental Dialectic ) that is, where the institutionalized modes of such reflective acknowledgment circumvent the deleterious consequences of reification. Insofar as this task is explicitly political, it gives rise to further issues concerning the very possibility and scope of political-emancipatory projects. I trace these issues to universalistic and particularistic tendencies in the political domain. I noted how, when seen merely as contradictory, or mutually exclusive, the universalistic and particularistic orientations result in the reification of modernity, and in the economic and political impasses that flow from such reification. On the political front, the impasse manifests itself in the perpetual back and forth movement between politics conceived as merely empirical, that is, as an endless game of conflicts and provisional hegemonic formations in the name of the universal; and as making genuinely universal claims based on ‘justice’, or as the historical struggle/‘progress’ towards the realization of a ‘universally’ just, non-hierarchical, equal society. In contrast, I show that these particularistic and universalistic tendencies are mutually constitutive in a dialectical sense. How the mutual dependence and interconnection between the ‘particular’ and the universal in the political sphere, and therefore, the notion of dialectics itself, is to be understood, is the subject of debate between Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek in their book— Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (2000). I analyze this debate, and focus on Butler’s notion of a ‘universal in becoming’, as an elaboration of the constitutive relation between the particular and universal within the political, and thus, of the recovery and articulation of a non-reified modernity. The notion of a ‘universal in becoming’ raises further conceptual and ‘practical’ issues. Are appeals to ‘universality’ (the appeals to justice, rights etc.) that articulate contemporary politics, appeals to a ‘ contingent universality’ (as Laclau contends), constituted by projecting particular claims as apparently universal, but which come to acquire legitimacy only by acquiring hegemony ? Or can political claims and struggles be articulated by a universality that remains explicitly empty—devoid of determinate content, hence a processive universal always in becoming, and it is this very emptiness that constitutes its normative legitimacy, as both Butler and Žižek argue, although in different ways? I address this problem through a return to the writings of Marx and Hegel, which form the background of this debate. In returning to Marx and Hegel, I underscore the centrality of the dialectic for explicating how the notion of a ‘universal in becoming’, plays out in the in the domain of political economy. However, with this return, the dialectic is no longer restricted to the present—to the oscillation between the particular and the universal constitutive of the impasse of the political in contemporary, reified modernity. Rather, I take up the notion of the dialectic in its historical movement, in order to provide a revised interpretation of both Marx’s (and Hegel’s) positions. This revision shows how Hegel’s theoretical conception of ‘absolute knowing’, and Marx’s political-normative project of overcoming (capitalist) alienation (and the realization of unalienated existence), does not culminate in the dead-end of absolute self-presence. That is, it does not entail the ‘end of history’, where the ‘subject’ and ‘object’ of history finally come together in reflective self-coincidence, in a society fully transparent to itself—without antagonisms, difference etc. Instead, I argue that since reification is inevitable, (Hegel’s and) Marx’s position cannot amount to the overcoming of reification (in reflective self-coincidence or transparency) but to its reflective acknowledgement, an acknowledgement that is institutionally realized in post-capitalist, unalienated society. In other words, I show how the post-Marxist, post-modern critique of Marx, based on the claim that he succumbs to a ‘metaphysics of presence’ conflates the processes of reification and alienation. Marx’s aim is to overcome capitalist alienation, but this does not entail overcoming (structural) reification. This interpretation provides fresh impetus to the ‘universalistic’ dimension of the political, thus, to the possibility of universal political-emancipatory projects, in the face of the hegemony of the capitalist form of reified modernity. In the final part of the study, I further explicate this universalist dimension, qua ‘universal in becoming’, by turning to Adorno’s notion of ‘ negative dialectics ’. Through a discussion of this idea, against the background of the Hegelian (and Marxian) conception of dialectics in our revised sense (not merely as ‘determinate negation’, as Adorno insists), I bring to light points of continuity (despite Adorno’s critique of Hegelian dialectics), between the two conceptions. The negative element of the dialectic (movement of thought), that is, a dialectic that does not culminate, each time, in a determinate negation, or assert ‘the identity of identity and non-identity’, but stays in the moment of negativity, that is ‘points beyond its own identifying movement’, amounts to a reflective awareness of our own finitude. It indicates the ‘non-closure’ of the social, from within the social, and not as (empirical) contingency etc. In other words, as Adorno, explicating the ‘double bind’ in relation to social, argues, Marx’s critique of ‘identity’ qua equivalent exchange under capitalism, does not aim at abolishing that equivalence as a ‘matter of fact’. For, not only is form/identity inescapable in principle, but a return to earlier ‘forms’ of non-equivalence/non-identity would reinstate the injustice inherent in those earlier societies. Rather, as Adorno asserts, it aims at making the “inequality within equality” visible, and thus, “aims at equality too”. When we criticize the barter principle as the identifying principle of thought, we want to realize the ideal of free and just barter. To date, this ideal is only a pretext. Its realization alone would transcend barter. Once critical theory has shown it up for what it is—an exchange of things that are equal yet unequal—our critique of inequality within equality aims at equality too […]. If no man had part of his labour withheld from him anymore rational identity would be a fact, and society would have transcended the identifying mode of thinking. (Adorno, 2003, 147) Therefore, the basic principle of negative dialectics, including the “double bind” inherent in it, that Adorno indicates, also holds for post-capitalist society. The difference, in relation to capitalism, as I have underscored, lies in reflective thematization of this necessary intertwinement and movement between identity and non-identity. In other words, ‘inequality’/non-identity becomes discernible only from within the seeming ‘totality’/’closure’ of ‘equality’, of equivalent exchange; and yet, the critique that uncovers ‘inequality within equality’ also ‘aims at equality’—in the sense that the recognition of inequality cannot remain in the negative moment of critique, but must take the ‘positive form’ of the realization of equality as a “matter of fact”. Therefore, the basic principle of negative dialectics, including the “double bind” inherent in it, that Adorno indicates, also holds for post-capitalist society. The difference, in relation to capitalism, as I have underscored, lies in reflective thematization of this necessary intertwinement and movement between identity and non-identity. In other words, ‘inequality’/non-identity becomes discernible only from within the seeming ‘totality’/’closure’ of ‘equality’, of equivalent exchange; and yet, the critique that uncovers ‘inequality within equality’ also ‘aims at equality’—in the sense that the recognition of inequality cannot remain in the negative moment of critique, but must take the ‘positive form’ of the realization of equality as a “matter of fact”. This, Adorno writes, “comes close enough to Hegel”. The difference with respect to Hegel lies in the direction of ‘intent’ of negative dialectics. The latter does not, theoretically or in practice, maintain the primacy of identity—claim that identity is ‘ultimate’ or ‘absolute’ in a final reconciliation (of identity and difference, universality and particularity etc.) that constitutes the telos of the dialectical unfolding of reason. Rather, for negative dialectics, “[…] identity is the universal coercive mechanism, which we, too, finally need , to free ourselves from universal coercion, just as freedom can come to be real only through coercive civilization, not by way of any “Back to nature””. (Adorno 2003, 147) In the book my endeavor also has been to open up the space of non-identity within identity, in order to (re)imagine a different world, a world where freedom (in noncoercive identity/equality) becomes a “matter of fact”. By reaffirming the possibility of the political in this specific sense of a ‘universal in becoming’ that is, one which involves neither a return to some pre-modern sacralized conception, nor to a reified modernist conception of universality qua ‘presence’, I bring to light the possibility and scope of an unalienated mode of existence from within the modernist tradition. The central claim that I make is that the recovery of unalienated existence in this modernist sense, implies an acknowledgement of our finitude and dependence, with respect to nature and to each other. This reflective realization of our finitude is nothing but the acknowledgement of the ‘double bind’ (oscillation between relative and absolute difference, negativity etc.) in which we are always caught. I attempt to show, how Marx’s vision of a post-capitalist society amounts to an institutional acknowledgement our finitude in this specific sense of the ‘double bind’, to which the movement of thought/reason is subject. It is in this sense therefore, that the recovery of an alternative, non-reified conception of modernity, covered over in the course of the historical emergence of contemporary modernity and the reified form it takes, must be understood. References Adorno, T. W. (2003). Negative Dialectics . New York, London: Continuum. Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined Communities . New York, London: Verso. Bilgrami, A. (2014). Secularism, Identity and Enchantment . Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Butler, J. (2000) “Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism”. In, Butler, J., Laclau, E., Zižek, S., Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left . New York, London: Verso Chatterjee, P. (1993). The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post-colonial Histories . New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism . Ithaca: Cornell University Press Hardt, M., and Negri, A. (2000). Empire. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Husserl, E. (1970). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy . Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Review of Muzaffar Ali's book by Richa Shukla Richa Shukla Assistant Professor, IIT Bhubhaneswar Book Review # Nov 13, 2023 Book review of Muzaffar Ali's India, Habermas and the Normative Structure of Public Sphere (Routledge, 2023) This text called India, Habermas and The Normative Structure of Public Sphere is an attempt by Muzaffar Ali, a contemporary Indian political philosopher, to make us revisit the hidden ambiguity behind Indian Public Sphere in reference to Habermas’s idea. He points to this ambiguity by making us think the public sphere is a space that makes us think and question. The book submits a proposition that public spheres and its institutions go hand in hand. He also mentions three criteria for calling a public space. I couldn’t help but notice a tension that Ali wants to point out between his method on how he would do Philosophy vs how ideally Indian philosophy has been done so far. The larger arguments reminded me of Hannah Arendt’s proposition while she discusses the nature of Philosophy, i.e., it's important to think about what we are doing in Philosophy.[1] The book consists of 5 chapters, excluding a preface and acknowledgements. It begins by pointing out a reflection as well as a theoretical concern on how the contemporary Indian situation is a possible glitch in the theorization of Habermas’s public sphere. Rather, it proposes ‘Samvada’, (संवाद) as a method of further analysis. The philosopher here submits that there is a coherence between contemporary Indian philosophy and Indian political theory which can very well be used to theorise the native idea of the Indian Public Sphere. It not only presents a picture of Habermas’s Public Sphere but also, brings in Indian philosophers, political theorists, and a few feminist scholars as well. The first part of the book dwells on a reflective theoretical need: Can we ever think of a native theory of the Indian Public Sphere? The book attempts to not only answer this theoretical concern but also create a 'theoretical toolbox' [2] for the same. Additionally, it revisits and re-reads old debates in Indian political theory and Indian philosophy. This, Ali suggests, can help us in rebounding the normative foundations of the Indian Public Sphere. I couldn’t help but notice that the book takes a good philosophical lurk from the past, present and future of the Indian public sphere in terms of establishing theoretical discourses. It makes an attempt to understand the timeline behind these discourses. The book concerns how one can do Indian political theory considering we no longer can use Western frameworks as it's incapable of capturing Indian reality. He has referred to political thinkers like, Aakash Singh Rathore, Gopal Guru, Sundar Sarukkai, Aditya Nigam and many others to set the theoretical tone of Indian political theory. For instance, along the lines of these thinkers, he argues that we need to understand the audience, the Indian audience horizontally as well, as so far, we have been burdened by the Western way of doing Indian Philosophy. We have been colonised in our approach to Indian Philosophy at times. While he re-visits the concept of ‘Samvada’ in this manner, I couldn’t help but draw a parallel between this and Upanishad saying: वादे वादे जायते तत्त्वबोधः which implies that it's through diverse opinions that we get to know the truth. The book while, analysing Habermas’s concept of the public sphere, critically analyses key elements from the Indian domain as well whether it's the Indian debates on religion, caste, lived experience or the corporeal body. He writes, "The conceptualized Indian situation throws up two essential markers regarding the inadequacy of the Habermasian public sphere. At the social level, the hyper-presence of religion within Indian society needs a multi-pronged instrument of public debate rather than a unilateral notion of rationality to shoulder real and true public opinion."[3] At a time when globally, the phenomenology of the public sphere is altering, this text makes a few pertinent interventions while keeping in mind Indian lived realities. While trying to establish caste as a ‘unique public lived reality’, one can look at movies like Article 15, Mulk, Sairaat, Masaan and shows like Made in Heaven , Kota factory , and Class which capture the Indian essence and the complicated relationship which we share between religion, caste and Indian public sphere. Ali looks at religion as an important aspect of India’s social context. He establishes that the role of religion cannot be underestimated in evaluating the political and social contexts of Indian societies. This has been established by drawing from political thinkers like B.R. Ambedkar, and Valerian Rodrigues. In the Indian domain, while deconstructing caste and religion, Gopal Guru argues the same.[4] He writes caste has wings, it can fly, and that’s why it reaches a place before we reach it. These aspects have lived experience to their credit too. I could think of Feminist Philosopher, Simone de Beauvoir’s description of lived experience, in her book, The Ethics of Ambiguity . She takes the example of glue and paper. The way we put paper on glue and it becomes impossible to separate them, in a similar manner, it's impossible to detach 'lived experience', from human existence and our social reality. The book walks on a thin rope of some pertinent theoretical concerns, visible criticism of Habermas’s concept and an alternative that Ali is trying to provide for the same. [1] Dolan, M. Frederick. "Arendt on Philosophy and Politics". https://philarchive.org/archive/DOLAOP [2] Term used by Ali for the same. [3] Ali, India, Habermas And The Normative Structure of Public Sphere , page no. 111. [4] Guru, Gopal. "Dalits from Margin to Margin." India International Centre Quarterly , 27: 111-116.

Back to Liberal Basics Danish Hamid PhD Scholar, Department of HSS , IIT Bombay Article # Feb 22, 2022 This article is part of the series of responses from philosophers on the hijab row . First a story, or what we like to call pretentiously – a thought experiment. Imagine that two brothers, Ravi and Vijay have ventured on a camping trip with a group of friends. They are all near the same age, there being no hierarchy between them. While walking through the forest, Vijay indulges his habit of plucking a single leaf from every low-hanging tree that he comes across. Ravi asks Vijay what he is doing. Of course, he can see what he is doing. What Ravi means is that he must explain his actions as being something worthwhile, sensible, and which someone might have a reason to do. In other words, ‘better give a good reason for doing this, or else, Stop.’ Is Vijay under any obligation to explain it to Ravi? I think not, unless he wants to. The others in the group agree with him. Ravi then turns back to Vijay and asks him to justify it, or offer an excuse for what he is doing. Now, “unlike explanations, justifications and excuses presume at least prima facie fault, a charge to be rebutted”. (Benn, 87) Is Vijay under an obligation to offer a justification for his innocent indulgence? After all, what’s so wrong about plucking a leaf every now and then? And it is not as if he was trespassing in a grove of threatened, near-extinct plants and trees, and neither is Ravi the resident Forest Officer, and last they checked, it was not a crime in any of the books of law. Such being the case, Vijay has “no obligation to meet a challenge to justify his performance until there is a charge to answer”. (ibid) Suppose, however, that in his capacity as an enterprising vigilante on behalf of Chlorophyll everywhere, Ravi decides to handcuff Vijay, thereby preventing him from his indulgence. Now, Vijay can properly demand a justification from him, and a mere ‘tu quoque’ reply (literally – ‘you also!’) that Vijay, on his part had also not offered Ravi a justification for plucking leaves, would just not fly. This is because Vijay’s actions had done nothing to interfere with Ravi’s. “The burden of justification falls on the interferer, not on the person interfered with” (ibid). So while Vijay might properly resent Ravi’s interference, Ravi has no ground of complaint against Vijay. Suppose now that the priggish Ravi does come up with a justification. Vijay, he says, is wasting his time – instead of pointless leaf-plucking, he could be doing something useful - helping the group plan the adventure, or listening to an ebook, or entertaining everyone with the song “Keh duun tumhe”. But, of course, Vijay doesn’t have to accept this justification for interference. Even if Ravi were right, and Vijay could have been doing something useful, what has it to do with Ravi? “An unfavorable evaluation of someone else's action does not necessarily warrant one's interfering to prevent it.” (ibid) The upshot for the Hijab Case – or any analogous case of interference Now, this story, a fabricated mish-mash from Yash Chopra’s Deewar and Stanley Benn’s A Theory of Freedom (1988) , is supposed to convey a simple point. Volatile and non-conformist though Vijay is, he is under no requirement to demonstrate to Ravi that he has good reasons for doing what he was doing. On the other hand, it is required of the conscientious but self-righteous Ravi that he must justify his interference in Vijay’s actions. The two demands for justification are incommensurable so to speak, which is philosopher’s talk to mean that they are not equal or equivalent and thus cannot be spoken of synonymously in any meaningful way. This is the most minimum, yet characteristic claim in liberal political thought – that unless your act is harming someone, nobody has a right to interfere in your actions, or prevent you from carrying them out. What constitutes harm in a given situation will be a job of a 500 page book by someone like Joel Feinberg in which the political philosopher will flesh out all her claims, followed by replies to all anticipated objections and counter-responses by other philosophers. How fun! However, this basic commitment of non-interference, if not an axiom in liberal political philosophy, is still something incredibly intuitive accepted by nearly all liberal political thoughts and its off-shoots, including modern day conservatives, socialists, many feminists, etc. It would just require a very strong argument to refute, and in the Hijab case, no one has offered any persuasive arguments yet. John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty is still the best place to begin thinking about this problem, and a fine example of philosophical writing where the writer anticipates many well worn counter-arguments and writes with characteristic verve. The upshot of this for the Hijab controversy should be clear enough. The Hijab is seemingly a harmless piece of clothing. To prevent women, or in this case specifically, pupils and teachers from wearing it to school would require a justification. Thus, the Preventers ought to justify why there ought to be no Hijabs in school. The Wearers, Donners, Hijabis, have to offer no justification on the liberal view that I laid out above, unless of course the Wearers, Donners, Hijabis, have themselves been forced to wear it (Some, primarily feminist thinkers, include conditioning and socialization also as reasons sufficient enough to question the Hijab. But very few go to the extent of supporting state coercion to wish to remove it). For the Preventers, matters complicate further when they want to single out Hijab over other religious symbols – the most obvious case being turbans sported by Sikh boys and men. But States are Special?! My readers might question me and say that I am misrepresenting the issue, and that the story I have related doesn’t fit the facts of the Hijab controversy. In my story, the characters are equal, there being, recall, ‘no hierarchy between them’. Those are not the facts in the Karnataka Hijab controversy. The state has decided that Hijabs are impermissible. The State is unlike Ravi and Vijay. Is the state, per me, under an obligation to provide any reasons of the sort that Ravi was sought to provide? Now we are in the realm of what Jeremy Waldron calls political Political theory – the nature of state and governmental institutions, political representation, accountability, secularism, the separation of church and state, and the rule of law. Explicating the limits and confines of state power, its relation with religion, with minorities, with religious minorities – that’s another 500 page book. What a fun topic – but certainly what a short article like this would hesitate to go into. It seems obviously true that a State is a different kind of animal, and certainly not like individuals. So while it isn’t OK for me to demand protection-money from you in exchange for protection, the state manages to collect taxes, and on my refusal to pay, may even fine me, or attach my properties, or send me to prison. So the State is special, apparently, and states have rights to make coercive laws and force individuals to do things which other individuals just don’t have. But this is too quick. Maybe the State has the power to do this, in exchange for protecting citizens' rights (and enforcing contracts, and preventing crime, and increasingly in the 20th century, in providing, healthcare, education, even jobs) because citizens agree that the state may be given these powers, along with all the corresponding duties, all neatly enshrined in a constitution, backed by the constituent power of the people. This doesn’t automatically mean that the State has the power to interfere in my personal life – what I eat, what I wear, who I worship, who I sleep with. Furthermore, it takes no philosopher to see that the State doesn’t speak in its own impersonal voice. It usually speaks in the voice of the Parliament, a legislative body, or occasionally the courts. On what grounds ought the Parliament decide an issue? Well, many, if not most liberals, would insist that any coercive rule argued for by any individual, or group which speaks for a proposition in the Parliament (from Parler. French, literally ‘talk shop’) ought to be based on a reason which is not sectarian, biased, or idiosyncratic in such a way that it is not acceptable to or justifiable, to all those persons over whom the rule is going to have authority. In a modern democracy, where free and equal citizens disagree with each other over profound or profane matters, including morals, religion, economics, and what constitutes the ‘good life’, how shall any moral or political limits be placed on us? The answer that is usually given by a version of liberalism called justificatory liberalism, is that any such imposition should be justified by an appeal to ideas, values, arguments that all those persons who are affected by said coercive rule, might be able to reasonably accept or endorse. Variations, qualifications, additions on this basic idea, will be a subject of, you guessed it, some more massive tomes by Rawls, Wolterstorff, Eberle, Talisse and other brilliant philosophers. The unsuccessful evasion of Philosophy So, philosophers might bring their tools to dissect and explore all these questions, and make us all the wiser about how the relationship between state, the individual and religious symbols in the public sphere all hang together, and some philosophers have offered to do in the (web)pages on this very network. But some others might suggest that in the interest of time and considering how disputatious philosophers are, there is no need to enter philosophical discussion in the first place. They might suggest that we ought to look instead at the nature of the Indian Constitution, its own version of secularism, the state of case-law and the practice of the Supreme Court. What do the courts say, and how to they decide these issues? What does the Constitution say? It is that document and no other that ought to tell us what the correct answer to this quandary is. So what does the Constitution say? Pertinent to this issue, a cursory look at the state of Indian Constitutionalism will tell us that it promises to its citizens the rights to equality, freedom of expression, right to life with dignity, and many others, while also giving the centre and state right to make laws such as the Karnataka Education Act. The truth is that whether the anti-philosophers like it or not, in deciding a question like this, the court will also have to dip into philosophical complexities. It will have to either balance the rights of the States and the individual (if that is meaningfully possible), or it will have to uphold the right of one party and not the other. In doing that, it will have implicitly and inevitably made a decision about which rights it deems inviolable. So as with everyone else, even the court will have to argue philosophically. One can do it well, and one can do it badly. And the truth is that, these questions are hard. So we might want to be humble, and err on the side of caution, and not be very confident in our considered opinions, to say nothing about our pre-reflective prejudices. The liberal view, I suggest, does just that. It keeps the peace, while seeking to protect the rights of all. And it often succeeds! Where do I stand? After this short explainer (written especially for non-philosophers), it should be obvious that on this Hijab issue, and any such issue where social or state interference prevents individuals from exercising their choice, I come down, unapologetically, on the side of the liberal principle. For me, Mill’s harm principle is not the last word on such matters, but it still ought to be first word. And therefore, I have to come down on the side of those who say that the girls have the right to wear the Hijab to school. I am not particularly invested in what the Muslim women in question choose to do eventually. They owe me or anyone else no explanations. In fact, I go even further. I do not like the mandate of uniforms. Sure, uniforms may have a useful purpose if they help channel the energies of pupils towards education, sport and play, and help them along in the direction of healthy socialization, instead of displaying the stark divides in wealth and incomes. On the flip side, they do seem to privilege regimentation and obedience over spontaneity and creative self expression. Be that as it may, in accordance with my liberal sympathies, I don’t agree that even these goods that I mentioned above are enough reason to force me to conform to uniforms, any uniforms (!), if I don’t want them. The reason you don’t see me (and many others like me) on the streets demonstrating against uniforms is perhaps because it doesn’t seem worth all the trouble, and frankly, a uniform isn’t egregious after all. I don’t like it in principle, but I’m willing to tolerate it. I’d prefer there weren’t any, but they don’t warrant a rebellion. [That’s the problems with us liberals, we did all the protesting we had to hundreds of years ago, when feudal and monarchical power didn’t respect our (liberal) rights to live, liberty and property, err...the pursuit of happiness. Now we wake up only when these rights are threatened...which is happening a little bit too often these days.] Between pragmatism and principle But I digress. There is a time to discuss the perils and benefits of uniforms. But this is not that time. Because the issue here is not merely about uniforms. If it were, then teachers wouldn’t have been seen removing Hijabs outside school premises before entering their classes (a scene which many onlookers have described as humiliating). This issue is after-all a conflict between religious self-expression and the right to education. Moreover, the mandate on ‘ uniform uniforms’ is sure to come a cropper, as soon as we consider other religious symbols such as the Turban. Considering that the mandate is soon to encompass the religious expression of other communities, in a country as diverse as India, one wonders whether an order like this is even rational. More importantly, to put a portion of a religious community in the unenviable position of having to choose between religious expression and education is prima facie unjust. In order to navigate around the above problem, we have seen recourse to pragmatic solutions in the past – such as that the courts shall decide whether a particular religious symbol is ‘essential’ to a particular religion. Now, given that different religious sects, trends, and tendencies in the same religion differ among themselves in their practices of reading, hermeneutical traditions, and their own debates of authority, it is difficult to see how even a constitutional court may be able to adjudicate on complex issues such as this. Anyone who knows anything about how scripture is interpreted is familiar with the deep and complex interpretive controversies, together with the demand of knowing the tradition in and out, along with expertise in a classical language, usually a dead one. What is essential to one sect is non-essential to another. I encourage readers to look up the case of Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri v The State of West Pakistan, where the Pakistani Court held that the legal process in incapable of determining the answer to the question ‘who is a Muslim?’, until this question was then determined by a Constitutional Amendment, leading to the change in the legal status of the Ahmadis from being Muslims to a non-Islamic religious minority. My own view is that Courts shouldn’t decide on such abstract issues of doctrine as what constitutes an essential practice, unless the rights of some individuals or vulnerable groups cannot be protected through any other means, or when the traditionalists are bent on abusing the rights of their congregants or other members of the community. Therefore, it is a mistake to go into the theological and scriptural niceties right now (or perhaps ever), about whether the Hijab is obligatory or optional in Islamic scriptures. What is important, however, is this Liberal minimum - that no organ of the state must interfere in the religious expression of a community as long as it doesn't harm people from another community or others within that religious community. Since no such prima facie case has been made, this rule appears coercive and oppressive. On the question of reform ‘Reform’ is a weasel word. What is reform to one section of a community is oppression and persecution for another. The liberal must take the principled stance against interference, without necessarily seeing every instance of it as morally pernicious per se. If an arm of the State is to be mobilized to protect the rights of those who do not wish to wear Hijab, and if this to be called ‘reform’, that is fair too, and that doesn’t by itself go against the principle of non-interference. However, if the reformist goal is the much ambitious one of ‘liberating’ Muslim, whatever that might mean, it is best that it must come from within the Muslim community itself, through dialogue, discussion, education. The truth is that only those who feel stifled by traditional authority and its imposition of Hijab will choose to call it reform. For many others, the word ‘reform’ is an affront against their avowal of religious identity. The state ought to protect those individuals who are harmed by those elements which seek to impose their view of the good life on them. But experience has shown that a purely statist ‘reformist’ interventions will only bury the problem and not solve it. The example of Ataturk’s and successive governments’ restraints on religious expression in the Turkish public sphere is right in front of us. As soon as political conditions in Turkey changed and the Erbakan- Erdogan Islamist governments came to power, Hijabs in a thousand flowery prints bloomed in Taksim Square. Therefore, one, the argument for coercive state intervention in this case needs to be very strong, and I haven't seen any one which I find persuasive. Two, even if those who wish to impose a Hijab-ban are right, their victory won’t be a permanent one. If they believe that educated, rational and reflective human beings would not wear a patriarchal relic like Hijab, they must allow girls to receive a good education, and one which inculcates critical thinking and see where the chips fall. The long march toward secular-reason Now, some might question me and say that the burden of my song has been to exonerate the Hijab, and its advocates. Quite the contrary. My position is that, as a non-Hijab donning man, it is not really my place to comment on the meaning of Hijab for many Muslim women. Although the more vocal among them have come for, against and even, believe it or not, for-and-against it. However, being a naive believer in the (liberal) dogma that correct opinions win out in the long term, if given enough breathing space and a conducive environment, I wish only to urge more discussion on the issue, which is not backed by the coercive arm of the state and the blunt instrument of the law. It seems to me that the correct (justificatory) liberal position is to let Muslim women decide. But what about the appeals to scripture, you may say. How can a liberal be pleased with a situation where religious people decide the issue invoking religious scripture, and speaking in a characteristically religious vocabulary? Well, one response is that ‘religious people, like all people, should get to decide what they want, as long as it doesn’t hurt anyone else.’ That is the quintessential liberal claim. But this aside, there is an academic/historical question about the upshot of religious-style argumentation. I shall quote Jeffrey Stout on this point ...consider the early-modern debates among Christians of various types over moral and political questions. Here we have numerous groups, all of which were committed to treating the Christian Bible as an authoritative source of normative insight into how such questions should be answered. Yet they did not differ only on what this text says and implies. They also differed on who is entitled to interpret it, on whether it is the sole authoritative source of normative insight into such matters, and on who is entitled to resolve apparent conflicts between it and other putative sources of normative insight. Because they differed on all of these points, they eventually found themselves avoiding appeals to biblical authority when trying to resolve their ethical and political differences. The reason was simple; the appeals did not work. So the differing parties increasingly tried to resolve their differences on other grounds. In this respect, their ethical discourse with one another became secularized. (Stout, 93-4) Muslims, including both scholars and the laity, are increasingly coming towards discussions on all issues, about the proper role of religious, pietistic and rational or secular reasons in deciding all kinds of moral and ethical questions, and increasingly in the 20th Century the Muslim world is going through a similar process, that Stout has described above. The increasingly diverse conclusions that interpreters have come to after reading the verses that relate to, or at least seem to relate to something analogous to Hijab, tells us that in order to come to any sort of consensus on the topic, the discourse among Muslims themselves will have to eventually become secular, in that it will have to employ a vocabulary that doesn’t always invoke religious argument. Now, whether between all these competing tendencies it manages to reach a harmonious conclusion or merely a modus Vivendi, will be there for us to see. Regardless, statist interventions will only stifle this process of churning. If anything, the debate needs to be nudged along, not stopped. Unfortunately, in this case, it appears that some secular voices, and not religion, are becoming the conversation-stopper. And that is just not the ‘liberal’ thing to do. References Benn, Stanley. A Theory of Freedom, 1998. Cambridge University Press. Stout, Jeffrey. Democracy and Tradition, 2004. Princeton University Press ___________________________________________________________________________________________ Read other articles in this series: Ariba Zaidi -- A Word of Caution to 'the Uniformist' and 'the Reformist’ Danish Hamid -- Back to Liberal Basics Hina Mushtaq -- Can women decide for themselves? Sania Ismailee -- The Karnataka Hijab row is about Right to Education...

Review of "Quick and Concise: Philosophy" Neeraj Umesh PhD Scholar, BITS Pilani (Hyderbad) Book Review # Jul 17, 2025 Book review of Shamik Chakravarty's Quick and Concise: Philosophy (Hachette India, 2025). Overview and Structure of the Book Shamik Chakravarty’s Quick and Concise: Philosophy serves as an accessible and engaging introductory work for readers who are in the early stages of their intellectual journey into rational inquiry and philosophical reflection. This book touches upon key philosophical problems associated with the discipline, including metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology, while skilfully avoiding the complex formalism and symbolic logic often found in academic texts. Written in a clear and conversational style, it raises questions that general readers and laypersons have likely encountered in everyday life but may not have pursued with philosophical precision. The introduction is especially notable for its tone, which adds what may be described as a ‘human touch.’ Rather than treating philosophy as a remote or purely academic exercise, Chakravarty invites the reader to see it as a deeply human pursuit, rooted in the necessity of questioning, reasoning, and examining the implications of one’s beliefs and values. This rhetorical move effectively situates philosophical inquiry in the reader’s lived context, a strength rarely seen in traditional textbooks. A particularly thoughtful inclusion is the reference to the Bhagavad Gita , which introduces Indian philosophical perspectives into the broader narrative. The author cites the famous dilemma faced by Arjuna, “This dilemma isn’t just one between a moral and an immoral choice but between two choices that have values that are compelling”, as an example of ethical conflict not easily resolved by standard normative theories. This framing reflects the nuanced character of real-world moral dilemmas. However, the analysis might have been enriched by a discussion of classical or contemporary objections to this framing, particularly from within Indian traditions themselves. One of the book’s commendable features is its pedagogical sensitivity. Rather than overburdening readers with formal logic, Chakravarty introduces logical tools gradually and in small, digestible portions. This scaffolding allows the reader to develop reasoning skills organically without the need for prior exposure to analytic methods. In the next section, I offer a closer look at several key chapters that illustrate the strengths and occasional gaps of Chakravarty’s approach. Chapter Highlights The chapter on morality is a demonstration of the philosophical depth and clarity that the author wishes to bring to his readers in his book. It surveys a broad array of ethical theories along with their standard criticisms, enabling readers to consider the strengths and limitations of each. The chapter could have benefited from engagement with contemporary moral psychology, particularly theories of moral cores or innate ethical intuitions, and examining certain positions in a bit more depth, such as Jonathan Wolff’s ‘ An Introduction to Moral Responsibility’ . Its restraint is understandable given its target audience. Chakravarty aims to provoke reflection rather than to exhaust debate. The chapter on epistemology, titled "What is Knowledge?" takes on one of the most discussed problems in the field, the Gettier problem, and presents a range of responses. The treatment is systematic and coherent. However, the transition into this topic may feel abrupt, especially for readers unfamiliar with the basics of epistemology. A more gradual introduction, perhaps beginning with the sources of knowledge such as perception, reason, and testimony, would have provided a smoother entry. In this regard, Robert Audi’s Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge offers a model worth emulating. Further, since the chapter revolves around the concept of knowledge, a brief discussion on theories of truth (correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, etc.) and the distinction between absolutist and relativist views would have significantly enhanced the general reader’s understanding. These additions could have grounded the discussion more fully and helped bridge the conceptual leap from earlier chapters. Nevertheless, the concluding section on "The Ideal Knower" is particularly engaging. The author's attempt to bridge the gap between truth and justification while integrating insights from Nyāya philosophy is a refreshing and welcome gesture toward cross-cultural dialogue in epistemology. It broadens the book's scope and invites readers to appreciate the depth of Indian philosophical traditions alongside their Western counterparts. The chapter on skepticism also deserves mention. While well-argued and rich in content, it may have been more effectively placed earlier in the book. A skeptical mindset is foundational to both philosophical reasoning and inquiry. Introducing it earlier could have framed the reader’s engagement with subsequent chapters more critically. That said, the chapter does a commendable job of introducing important concepts such as abduction and common fallacies like begging the question, which are essential tools for any aspiring philosopher. The seventh chapter, on personal identity, is arguably the most well-executed section of the book. Chakravarty presents both essentialist and anti-essentialist frameworks with clarity and balance, guiding the reader through well-established positions in the debate. The inclusion of the dialogue between Nāgasena and King Milinda is particularly effective, offering a lucid and engaging account of the Buddhist theory of non-self. This is presented with enough clarity that even readers unfamiliar with Buddhist thought can grasp its philosophical implications. For those interested in exploring this theme further, the work of Jay Garfield, especially Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration , is a valuable complement. Garfield’s argument from moral phenomenology strengthens the case that the self, while not metaphysically substantial, plays a central role in our experience and ethical life. His treatment of non-self as a lived, moral insight rather than a merely metaphysical denial is especially relevant to readers seeking to understand the ethical stakes of identity. The final chapter on aesthetics brings the book to a compelling close. Chakraborty addresses enduring questions such as “What is art?” and “What does it mean to call something a work of art?” His brief inclusion of a discussion on Nāṭyaśāstra and the concept of rasa is particularly valuable, as it introduces readers to Indian aesthetic theory, a domain often overlooked in introductory texts. Academic Perspective Shamik Chakravarty’s Quick and Concise: Philosophy is an impressive and inclusive introductory text for the general reader. It navigates difficult philosophical terrain with clarity, balance, and accessibility. While some chapters could benefit from deeper scaffolding or further engagement with counter-positions, the book as a whole succeeds in its core aim: to initiate general readers into the world of philosophical thinking without condescension or oversimplification. Beyond general readability, the book also raises questions about its utility in academic settings, especially as a possible text for undergraduate instruction. One element missing from the book, especially if used in an academic context, is a reflective feedback mechanism. Most introductory texts include end-of-chapter questions or prompts that help students consolidate learning and develop their own philosophical positions. The text is quite informative, but I feel it lacks 'Nurture' that would allow students to engage with these ideas more effectively. Perhaps incorporating a question that prompts students to form their own opinions could be beneficial. Learning philosophy and doing philosophy are two distinct activities, though I do not deny that they overlap to some degree; however, in my opinion, this text focuses on Learning Philosophy, especially from the way it is structured and would be better suited to be supplementary material for students. In sum, this work succeeds in being an accessible and culturally thoughtful entry point into philosophical inquiry. While it is not a substitute for more rigorous academic resources, it offers instructors and self-learners alike a meaningful way to begin thinking philosophically with an eye toward both Eastern and Western traditions. References Audi, Robert. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge . New York: Routledge, 2011. Garfield, Jay L. Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration . New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2022. Wolff, Jonathan. Introduction to Moral Philosophy. 2nd ed. S.L.: W W Norton, 2021.

Review of "Quick and Concise: Philosophy" Shivangi Shanker Independent Scholar, PhD from JNU Book Review # Jul 22, 2025 Book review of Shamik Chakravarty's Quick and Concise: Philosophy (Hachette India, 2025). Writing an introductory book to a discipline as rich and diverse as philosophy is profoundly challenging. Quick and Concise: Philosophy (Hachette India, 2025) by Shamik Chakravarty not only overcomes this challenge but also broadens the scope of the genre, despite its compact size. It is a pocket-sized book with themes including both Indian and Western traditions of Philosophy. The book offers a discourse on the fundamental questions of philosophy concerning meaning, free will, morality, knowledge, personal identity, and art. Shamik’s endeavour stands out as an attempt to present a comprehensive philosophical dialogue which reflects philosophical inclusivity on two levels: conceptual and contextual. Conceptual inclusivity is evident in Shamik’s incorporation of non-Western philosophy, while contextual inclusivity emerges through the integration of culturally familiar situations, names, and cities into deeper philosophical enquiries. The use of familiar Indian backdrops, such as the workplace dilemma (p.74) in a corporate context or the affirmative action (p. 71) example, makes it especially relatable to the Indian readers. What distinguishes the text further is that it does not bridge the gap between different knowledge systems through mere exposition but an application of the Socratic (Blondell 2018) and the Hegelian Dialectical methods (Houlgate 2024) [i] . In the analogy between Buddhism, deontology, and utilitarianism, or Buddhism and virtue ethics. Or its comparative analysis with Kantian ethics, which puts forth a reconciled ethical position from the point of view of Buddhism. (Chakravarty 2025, 64-70). The process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis [ii] is evident. Shamik selects a broad range of topics as compared to Bertrand Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy (Russell 2020), Thomas Nagel’s What Does It All Mean (Nagel 1987), and Edward Craig’s Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (Craig 2002). As far as the structure of Quick and Concise: Philosophy is concerned, it resembles Nagel’s What Does It All Mean and Edward Craig’s Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. But the curation of topics and the execution of the discussions surrounding it is wider and more inclusive in Shamik’s book. While Shamik includes a range of classical Indian views, Craig focuses mainly on Buddhism. All of these texts either ignore or mention in passing the discussion on the notion of art. Whereas, Quick and Concise: Philosophy not only elaborates on it, but discusses Indian Philosophy of art— Nāṭyaśāstra . Suggesting that art and aesthetics are not peripheral topics but central to philosophy. Shamik shows a shift from traditional metaphysical speculation to recent philosophical and psychological integration, bringing out an intersection of ethics, psychology, metaphysics, and applied philosophy. He discusses how Psychology deals with the dichotomy of choosing the right over the wrong by applying psychological mechanisms (pp. 68-70). The notion of free will includes an extended reference to determinism, compatibilism, agent causation, AI, neuroscience (p. 89), and ethical psychology, along with other interdisciplinary enquiries. He presents a more critical than expository outlook to the problems, which sometimes may feel overwhelming to beginners in Philosophy. But his writing eliminates this obstruction with various shifts in the tone. Given that Russell, Nagel, and Shamik write in different eras, there are differences in how they approach their work. The Problems of Philosophy offers 20th-century analytical and epistemological views, which makes it denser and limited in scope. Shamik’s work overcomes these challenges by employing a conversational style where he speaks to the readers (p. 1) [iii] . He simplifies complicated ideas, recognising the significance of critical thinking in the learning process. The book is a reflection of interactive teaching-learning techniques. Its examples and questions are relatable to the wider audience. The application of both pedagogical and philosophical methods makes the book comprehensible for general readers as well as students of philosophy. The book has eight chapters (excluding references and index), which reflect the diverse scope that the author has created. The chapters are structured thematically to make reasoned analysis, back-and-forth through thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, excelling in the pedagogical spirit. Each chapter explores a fundamental question or a theme within philosophy and presents the diverse philosophical views and critical analysis under sub-themes. The initial four chapters provide a clear orientation to its readers. It includes topics like what philosophy is. What do philosophers do? And introduces the readers to the main branches of Philosophy (p. 20), that is, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ontology, and Logic. In these chapters, the author explores the questions: What is the meaning of life, and meaning in life? What is morality? What is free will and determinism? The latter four chapters enquire into scepticism, what constitutes personal identity, the role of determinism in free will, whether people are responsible for their acts, what is art and how it relates to expression, rasa , value, and emotion. Throughout the book, the author discusses answers to these questions, then the responses are either challenged or supported by other views. The chapter’s structure reflects the integration and application of the Hegelian Dialectical (Houlgate 2025), Socratic [iv] , and philosophical argumentation (inductive and deductive) methods. For example, in the first chapter, the author explains that the job of a philosopher is to seek truth through systematic argumentation. He then questions the nature of truth itself and presents the idea of relativism of truth (p. 15). In the second chapter, the discussion on the meaning of life begins with an investigation of what meaning is [v] , rather than assuming a theory of meaning. Thereafter, it presents a thorough integration of philosophies from different traditions to show how each framework evaluates or creates meaning. For instance, the elucidation of the dilemmas in the Bhagavadgitā, that one faces amid the process of understanding the metaphysical and the ontological meaning of life, is explained through the concept of yoga ( jñāna, karma, bhaktī ). Or the snake and rope example, and in its analogy with Descartes’ dream argument. In this, the author shows the relationship between Nyāya and Descartes’ scepticism, and the reference to Vātsyāyana’s (p. 144) commentary on the Nyāya Sūtra and highlights the views of opponents of the Nyāya school. These explanations offer an integration of primary and secondary literature in a much-synthesised manner. The author intends to inform their readers about the wide-ranging concepts, opposing views, and the evolution of the philosophical debate. When he explains the notion of cultural relativism, in the third chapter, and points out the problem in accepting this view. He first creates a sense of awareness that there are subjective moral beliefs, which means there are no universal moral principles acceptable to all cultures. Then, through a representation of the problems posed by cultural relativism, the author makes the reader question the notion of moral subjectivity. Interestingly, the discussions about relativity and the presentation of a discourse on it point out the interdisciplinary nature of philosophical inquiry. Relativism is a philosophical idea, but the notion of “cultural relativism” (p. 45) is studied often by anthropologists, sociologists, linguists, philosophers and psychologists. Every discipline approaches an issue from a specific vantage point and methodology. Disciplines are said to draw from philosophical methods and concepts, and vice versa. It highlights that concepts are interconnected (pp. 2-3), thereby signifying the relevance of an interdisciplinary approach. The book explicates that Philosophy is multidimensional and that the truth of a philosophical matter revolves around a debate. Structurally, the book offers an integrated study of concepts and continuity, as we see in the sixth chapter on scepticism. The discussion on Descartes’ philosophy develops into the discussion of contemporary externalist responses, including the debate over the dream argument and the application of the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment (pp. 118, 129-130). What could have otherwise come across as a literature survey, mentioning multiple philosophers and concepts in quick succession, develops into a dialectical exploration. It gives away that the author’s intent is not to find settling answers but to inform the readers about the overall debate. For example, in the seventh chapter on Personal Identity, epistemological and metaphysical discussions are made concerning several philosophers: Derek Parfit, Sydney Shoemaker, John Locke, David Hume, and Buddhist philosophy. The dialogue between Milinda and Nāgasena (pp. 167-168) on the questions of personal identity goes beyond knowing “who am I”. And the chapter ends with an unanswered question on the nature of the soul. A similar integration is evident in the eighth chapter, which explores art from a vantage point of expression, representation, flow, meaning, pleasure, and aesthetics. The author presents the formalist, expressivist, aesthetic, and rasa theories of art, capturing the integration of philosophical subdisciplines: metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics—and thereby, rounding off the broader enquiry that initially begins with the mind-body problem and the questions of meaning and life. While the book’s scope is broad, there are certain areas whose inclusion may have added to its expansive nature. Such as the theory of Justice from the aegis of philosophers like Plato, John Rawls, and Amartya Sen. The book does not include the discussions of Philosophy of language, which is central to Epistemology, Logic, Ethics and various other disciplines. An introduction to the central figures like Wittgenstein, Frege, Austin, Searle, or Putnam may have provided a meta-enquiry of the notion of meaning. While we are introduced to Sartre’s view on meaning, Nietzsche’s contributions to understanding meaning in life are missing. The references to other orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy, and the modern Indian thinkers like Sen, Aurobindo, Vivekananda, Mohanty and others may have complemented the book’s scope. Still, the text compensates for its limitations as seen in the eighth chapter—“What is art”, though introductory in tone, explores intersecting domains: experience, emotion, rasa , value, and flow. The chapter draws on Plato’s (p. 173) and Wittgenstein’s direct and indirect contributions (p. 189) to understanding the meaning of art, informing the reader about the wider scope of their philosophical viewpoints. Another remarkable strategy is the blending of the classical Indian Philosophy and the attempts to overcome the limitations of philosophical parochialism (Konstantinović 2021) [vi] , usually prominent in the introductory level texts. Be it the integration of Buddhist ethics or the Bhagvadgītā’s teachings (p. 38), the Nyāya Philosophy (p. 143), or the Rasa theory from Natyasastra (p. 198). Alongside its philosophical inclusivity, the book employs effective pedagogical tools which engage the learner through culturally relevant (Rattanawong and Thongrin 2023) [vii] puzzles and prompts, for the initiation of a relatable understanding of concepts. Some of the culturally familiar examples or cases that the author creates in the book are worth noting. Such as the description of the experiment by Joshua Greene and Michael Koenigs (pp. 70-71), in the chapter on morality. He demonstrates the probable application of the experiment in the Indian system of Affirmative Action policies. The experiment used moral dilemmas like the trolley problem and the crying baby scenario to depict the difference that people show in emotional and cognitive responses when faced with personal moral dilemmas versus impersonal dilemmas. This experiment showed that the synthesis of deontological and utilitarian ethics can solve larger practical problems. It also helps the Indian readers to comprehend the theory in resonance with a familiar context. The author creates engaging philosophical dialogues to help the readers build an understanding step by step. The question, “If the soul isn’t the subject of experience, what is? It’s time for you, the subject of experience, to start thinking at time t 1 and come up with an answer at t 2 !” (p. 171), demands that the reader pause, think, and reflect. This approach is visible in the questions he raises: whether the comedian with a banana and duct tape produces art? And the contemplation around free will. What is more important in these endeavours is the embedding of the Socratic style that invites the readers to think independently and critically. The way the author eases philosophical perplexities with a deft shift in the tone and strategic placement of provocative phrases shows the application of an integrative teaching and learning style. In the opening chapter, the debate surrounding the mind-body problem is framed using views of several philosophers. Before the chapter gets too dense with the debate, the author lowers the intensity of the discourse with a discussion on relativism about truth. Shifting to a more familiar topic, especially one illustrated through examples like jackfruit ice cream and cultural subjectivity, eases the reader back into conceptual clarity. Even though there is a shift to a slightly casual tone, the philosophical message is never diluted, but rather enriched. For instance, “But hang on with me. There is an evil demon who is deceiving you…so you think you have hands but you don’t” (p. 117). These deliberate stylistic techniques, which maintain a balance between the academic and the casual tone, keep the readers hooked throughout the reading process. Complex discussions are eased out with similar acts by saying, “Now try to apply this to Descartes’ demon argument and the brain-in-a-vat argument and see whether it begs the question or not. Sweet dreams!” (p. 144). This sort of closing to a topic as complex as scepticism leaves the readers smiling but unsettled, forging critical reflection. Overall, the book offers both relevance and depth through the contextualisation of foundational problems in philosophy. It presents broad concepts and recent philosophical developments. The book can be beneficial for a diverse range of audiences, including undergraduate or master’s students, lay people, and young scholars. For the latter, it may serve as a useful starting point for research when supplemented with further readings. Owing to its expansive scope and pedagogically conscious style, Quick and Concise: Philosophy is a significant contribution to introductory-level philosophical literature. Footnotes [i] Refer to the discussion by Stephen Houlgate, on “Hegel's Dialectics”, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy , ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2024 Edition, accessed July 12, 2025. [ii] A way to understand the evolution of the ideas and how integration of opposing views can lead to its further development. [iii] “One of the reasons I became a philosopher…..is to argue.” [iv] Ruby Blondell, The Socratic Method: Plato's Use of Philosophical Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). [v] Different views culminate into a meta discussion on meaning of life. [vi] Mostly books in the genre of introduction to philosophy has for long ignored the discussion on Indian Philosophy. See parochialism in Radomir Konstantinović, The Philosophy of Parochialism , trans. Ljiljana Nikolić and Branislav Jakovljević, ed. Branislav Jakovljević (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2021). [vii] There is a strong relationship between the learner’s thinking process and the cultural context. References Blondell, Ruby. The Socratic Method: Plato’s Use of Philosophical Drama . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Chakravarty, Shamik. 2025. Quick and Concise: Philosophy . Bangalore: Hachette India Craig, Edward. Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Houlgate, Stephen. Hegel’s Dialectics.” The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy . Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Summer 2024 Edition. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Accessed July 12, 2025. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/hegel-dialectics/ . Konstantinović, Radomir. 2021. The Philosophy of Parochialism . Translated by Ljiljana Nikolić and Branislav Jakovljević. Edited by Branislav Jakovljević. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Nagel, Thomas. What Does It All Mean? A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy , New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Rattanawong, Amonrat, and Saneh Thongrin. “An Exploration of Culture in Listening and Speaking Materials from an English as an International Language Perspective.” LEARN Journal: Language Education and Acquisition Research Network 16, no. 1 (January-June 2023): 652–75. Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy . Mumbai: Sanage Publishing House, 2020. Originally published in 1912.

Review of Social Scientists in the Civic Space Shami Ulla Independent Scholar (PhD from University of Delhi) Book Review # Mar 24, 2025 Book review of the volume Social Scientists in the Civic Space: Ethical Perspectives on Democratic Involvement, edited by Arundhati Virmani, Jean Boutier, and Manohar Kumar (Routledge 2024). Have you ever wondered how social scientists address the practical and ethical challenges of civic space? This excellent edited book will answer your questions and ignite your passion for understanding the role and challenges of social scientists in the civic space. Compiling 15 chapters, this scholarly work motivates us to understand how the complexities of civic space challenge social scientists and how their involvement and detachment shape ethical and political decision-making in various ways. The book holds great academic significance for those who wish to understand the role, challenges, various kinds of pressure (such as political and cultural, etc.), and the relationship between their academic integrity and public responsibility. The book talks about defining ground for civic space, interventions, and involvement of social scientists in civic space for public debate regarding policy-making and decision-making in five principal parts: part one deals with ‘Challenges of the Context’ and consists of chapters 1-3, the part two deals with ‘Interventions in the Civic Space’ and consists of chapters 4-7, the part three deals with ‘Involvement in Public Debates’ and consists of chapters 8-11, the part four deals with ‘Ethical Politics of Democracy’ and consists of chapters 12-14 and the last part five deals with ‘Perspectives’ which consist of chapter 15. The book explores the role of social scientists in civic space and examines four major questions. First, what is civic space, and how do social scientists face the challenges of defining their role within it? Second, should social scientists engage in the public domain, or should they maintain a distance from civic space? Third, how do social scientists balance their dual responsibilities—one as academicians tasked with producing knowledge and the other as civilians who engage in public debates or activism? fourth, in the era of digitalization, how can social scientists protect themselves from misinformation? The book deals with these core questions, contributing significantly to the ongoing debate on the roles and challenges of social scientists in the civic space. To be more specific, Part One of the book Challenges of the Context deals with the historical grounding for civic space. In chapter 1, Jean Boutier discusses the place and role of historians between the two World Wars. The chapter interrogates the historian’s responsibility in times of political instability, economic turmoil, and ideological extremism. Boutier raises the question: should historians’ work remain confined to academia, or do they have a duty to intervene in public affairs? Scholars such as Henri Pirenne, Max Weber, Marc Bloch, and Lucien Febvre provide a nuanced response to political crises ( p. 15). However, the chapter does not provide a clear framework for how modern scholars should navigate this tension in the face of misinformation, climate change, or political extremism that exists in civic space. In Chapter 2, Rouzean explores how a historian became an activist while researching the Rwandan genocide (p. 26). He candidly reflects on his personal biases, uncertainties, and ethical dilemmas, making the chapter a compelling meditation on the responsibilities of historians. As he admits, "I could not shy away from a form of civic commitment that I had so far rejected" (p. 27). However, the chapter leaves an important question unanswered: if writing history objectively is impossible, what ethical standards should historians adopt when engaging with politically charged topics? Despite being deeply reflective and intellectually courageous, the chapter does not fully resolve this issue. In Chapter 3, Virmani discusses the significance of contextual freedom and how nationalistic political pressures hinder the writing of true history. She argues that an activist or social scientist can achieve greater objectivity by maintaining distance and dislocation when researching the history of other countries. According to Virmani, historians from foreign countries may be better positioned to produce unbiased historical narratives, as they are less susceptible to domestic political pressures (p. 55). This perspective suggests that geographical and cultural detachment could help scholars maintain academic objectivity more effectively. Part Two of the book Interventions in the Civic Space deals with what types of interventions are being practiced and the challenges faced by social scientists in the civic space. Intervening in public debate requires a different form of expertise. In chapter 4 , Théry redefines expertise as a balance between scientific rigor, civic engagement, and democratic participation (p. 74). He argues that expertise is not a singular, monolithic practice but rather unfolds across three distinct models—service expertise, consensus expertise, and engagement expertise, which help mediate between knowledge production and civic responsibility (p. 58). In civic responsibility, all experts carry a dual responsibility or identity. For example, economists often function as public figures, as seen in the cases of Manmohan Singh, Mario Monti, Lucas Papademos, John Maynard Keynes, Paul Krugman, and Amartya Sen. Similarly, historians such as Paxton and Ginsborg, shape and enrich public debates through their engagements. (Virmani, 2024, p. 69). In Chapter 5, Virmani explores how public writing is not merely a means of communication, but a democratic responsibility. For example, Balakrishnan’s critique of the Silver Line project in Kerala exemplifies how economists can use their expertise to question state-led development narratives (p. 73). Such interventions demonstrate that economists are not merely technocratic advisors but also active participants in ongoing democratic conversations. In Chapter 6, Ashwani Kumar examines the success and failures of the MGNREGA policy in India, highlighting the realities of six districts. It explores the role of bureaucracy, political clientelism, and local power structures in shaping welfare delivery. Kumar showed that Jalpaiguri (West Bengal) and Tiruvannamalai (Tamil Nadu) implemented innovative solutions, where political competition positively transformed the livelihoods for thousands of workers. However, in other districts like Bagalkote (Karnataka), Seoni (Madhya Pradesh), Nagaur (Rajasthan), and Gaya (Bihar) welfare programs were manipulated by local politicians for vote bank politics. Additionally, the existing upper and lower caste gap hindered equal welfare delivery (p. 86-92). In chapter 7, Trannoy discusses why economists rarely emerge as public intellectuals. Trannoy argues that professional incentives, writing styles, and the technical nature of economic research limit economists' engagement in broader public discourse (p. 100). Thus, the chapter has great virtues, but a question remains: How do digital media and its influence on the dialogue between experts and the public shape economists as public figures? Part Three of the book Involvement in Public Debates deals with how experts and the public influence policy and decision-making. In Chapter 8, Swaminathan presents a critical understanding of India’s food security policies. She evaluates the Public Distribution System (PDS), debates the merits of targeted vs. universal food security, and examines the role of activism in shaping welfare policies ( p. 118). She argues that India’s food security crisis is not caused by food shortages but rather by policy failures and exclusionary welfare mechanisms (p. 123). She makes a strong case for a universal PDS, citing its proven success in states like Tamil Nadu and Chhattisgarh, where it has led to higher food security and reduced corruption. She critiques neoliberal approaches that emphasize targeted welfare and fiscal restraint. In her words, “The shift from universal to targeted PDS has neither led to a reduction in budgetary subsidies nor has it benefited the large majority of food-insecure households in the desired manner” ( p. 127). The chapter could be developed by comparing India’s food security policies with global models such as Brazil’s Bolsa Família or China’s grain distribution system, providing a broader perspective. In chapter 9, Aucante offers a comparative analysis of the role of social scientists in democratic policymaking in Scandinavia and France. Aucante argues that while Scandinavian social scientists engage with the state in a structured manner, their French counterparts are more often positioned as critics, public intellectuals, or independent commentators (p. 138). In chapter 10, Bozon presents a comparative analysis of anti-gender movements in France and Brazil. He explores their emergence, evolution, and how conservative political and religious actors weaponized gender studies, feminism, and LGBTQ+ rights as threats to national identity and social stability (p. 155). In Brazil, Bolsonaro explicitly attacked gender studies and feminist movements, cutting funding for social sciences and promoting a conservative Christian identity as the foundation of national culture. Similarly, in France, mass protests erupted in 2012–2013 against the legalization of same-sex marriage ( Le Mariage pour Tous ), led by conservative Catholic organizations and right-wing intellectuals. French conservatives accused gender scholars of corrupting children, undermining family values, and promoting radical leftist ideologies (p. 159-160). While France’s anti-gender discourse was driven by intellectual and cultural arguments, Brazil’s was more populist and religious, illustrating different pathways to the same ideological goal. In Chapter 11, Rajeshwari argues that civic space is neither neutral nor universally accessible but is shaped by structural inequalities related to gender, caste, class, and religion. Rajeshwari demonstrates how feminist research both critiques and contributes to civic discourse in India. Engaging with major feminist movements, digital activism, and contested public debates, the chapter provides a nuanced exploration of how feminist engagement challenges dominant power structures and expands democratic participation ( p. 165). Part four of the book Ethical Politics of Democracy deals with the role of the knowledge of expertise in the civic space. In chapter 12, Origgi reflects on how expert knowledge interacts with democratic principles, such as equality, neutrality, and legitimacy (p. 182). She raises questions like: Can democracies maintain both respect for expertise and genuine citizen participation, or does reliance on experts inevitably create a knowledge elite that weakens democratic legitimacy? (p. 184). She argues that the legitimacy of expertise is not automatic—it must be continually negotiated through transparency, public debate, and accountability mechanisms. Thus she writes that “Social scientists play a crucial role in mediating between expert and lay knowledge... by advancing new models that give a voice to the needs and values of society” (p. 188). This raises the question of how social media, misinformation, and alternative media platforms influence public perceptions of expertise. In chapter 13, Fatimah, Khan, & Natarajan, discuss data-driven journalism and its challenges. It highlights that journalists and social scientists need data science skills (e.g., coding, statistical modeling, machine learning), yet most professionals lack formal training (p. 197). In chapter 14, Manohar examines the role of civility in democratic discourse and protest movements. Kumar critiques the positions of Rawls and Habermas, arguing that norms of civility often privilege dominant groups while excluding marginalized voices. The chapter critiques the weaponization of civility, showing how it has been used to delegitimize disruptive but necessary movements for justice. Kumar suggests that democratic movements must balance radical disruption with strategic engagement (p. 206). Kumar states, “Disobedience uncovers a dimension of civility not as opposition, but as necessary coexistence that captures the messiness of democratic politics” (p. 216). Part five of the book Perspectives consists of the last chapter, 15. Samaddar discusses the role of social sciences in contemporary governance and policymaking and gives a metaphor of Sisyphus. The chapter questions whether social sciences, in their current form, can still serve a radical, emancipatory function or whether they have become mere tools of administrative governance (p. 222). Kumar argues that due to data-driven social science and research funding influenced by government or corporate interests, social scientists have turned from being social inquirers or whistle-blowers against power to becoming skilled practitioners of a discipline. consequently, the author urges social scientists to rethink their role in civic space (p. 226). The book is significant as it expands discussions on scholars' social roles—Weber’s detachment, Gramsci’s organic intellectuals, and Bourdieu’s public intellectuals—by addressing modern issues like digital misinformation and civic engagement beyond academia. The book explores emerging engagements like data journalism, grassroots activism, and ethical challenges in digital scholarship. The book links classical theories to modern knowledge production, showing how scholars navigate ethical dilemmas in today’s public sphere. This book aligns with Medvetz’s Think Tanks in America (2012) on expert policymaking influence and Calhoun’s Social Science for Public Knowledge (2008) on broader scholarly engagement. This book takes a global, interdisciplinary approach to ethical dilemmas in digital spaces, complementing Melzer’s The Public Intellectual: Between Philosophy and Politics (2003) by examining activism versus neutrality. The book excels in presentation. Boutier’s chapter advocates balancing public engagement and neutrality, but his historical analysis lacks a modern framework for misinformation. Rajeshwari’s chapter challenges detachment in structural inequalities. Fatimah, Khan, and Natarajans’ chapter stresses data skills but overlooks AI’s driven ethical risks. The book also misses a systematic Global North-South comparison. The book lacks discussion on social scientists in authoritarian regimes and underrepresents scholars in Africa and Latin America. It also overlooks AI-driven misinformation, surveillance, and algorithmic governance. The book could improve with chapters on social scientists under authoritarian regimes, AI’s role in civic engagement, and a Global South vs. North comparison approach to civic engagement. Adding participatory action research (PAR) would highlight scholar-community collaboration for impactful social science. Addressing these gaps would have enriched its analysis and provided a more comprehensive view of public scholarship today. Overall, the book Social Scientists in the Civic Space Ethical Perspectives on Democratic Involvement provides a thoughtful and valuable resource for students, researchers, and policymakers engaged in public domain research. The book successfully achieves its objectives, offering contextually relevant examples and ethical dilemmas that social scientists encounter in the civic space. References Calhoun, Craig. "Social science for public knowledge." Academics as public intellectuals (2008): 299-318. Medvetz, Thomas. Think tanks in America . University of Chicago Press, 2012. Melzer, Arthur M., Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman, eds. The public intellectual: between philosophy and politics . Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.

Review of Bhaskarjit Neog's Book Abhishek Anant Nowbagh Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University Book Review # May 16, 2024 Book review of Bhaskarjit Neog’s book What Responsibility? Whose Responsibility? Intention, Agency, Emotions of Collective Entities (Routledge 2024). The author, Bhaskarjit Neog, in the prologue of this book, provides instances of collective wrongdoing, along with the observation that "one of the reasons behind the disappearance of moral resentment from public memory is the fact that we do not always have a clear understanding of the simple question - who is responsible when a group or collective is held responsible?" (Neog, 2024, p. xiii). The author brings forth the difference between the idea of attributing moral properties to groups and collectives in general everyday moral vocabulary, easily understood in general terms, and the analytical understanding of collective responsibility, which poses serious conceptual problems. When the philosophical analysis of collective responsibility is attempted through the concept of individual moral responsibility, the idea of collective responsibility begins to emerge as a concept that needs extensive discourse. It is this discourse that the author initiates. The book has seven sections: a prologue, five chapters, and an epilogue. The sections take us through an extensive discussion related to collectivizing responsibility through collective intentions, collective agency, and collective emotions. In the first chapter, the author looks into how the structure of moral responsibility, based on the actor’s knowledge and control in individual acts, can be ascribed to collective contexts. Analysing the concept of collectives, he argues that both structured and unstructured collectives can be brought under the concept of moral responsibility. He searches for wider criteria for moral agential status for the collective beyond the argument that does not ascribe moral status to a collective. The second chapter brings forth two approaches to collective responsibility. The first is the collectivist position, which is committed to the reality of collective responsibility. The second is an individualist position that is somewhat non-committal concerning collective responsibility. The author then draws our attention to two specific issues that need to be addressed further: first, concerning the distribution of responsibility among the members of the collective and second, the relationship between individual responsibility on the one hand and the responsibility of collectives on the other. Here, the author proposes an account that "argues for a space where one is required to see things from the collective's point of view without thereby neglecting how things appear for the individuals within the collective concerned" (Neog, 2024, p. 35). He refers to this account which is neither fully collectivistic nor fully individualistic as a quasi-collectivist or non-individualist account. The author then elaborates on the justification of the proposed quasi-collectivist account from three perspectives concerning a collective: intention, agency, and guilt, which leads us to the next three chapters. The third chapter deliberates upon the intentional make-up of collectives. The author discusses the viewpoints of John Searle, Micahel Bratman, Raimo Tuomela, and Margaret Gilbert who have approached collective intentions without any metaphysical entity in their explanation; he expresses his apprehension whether such a view can encompass the understanding of collective moral action or collective moral responsibility. Firstly, he elaborates on the common-sense views about collective intentionality. Secondly, he asks the pertinent question: where does this collective intention, which drives collective action, reside? He addresses this issue by identifying two ways of approaching this concern: taking individuals as a group or taking them as a group of individuals . The author acknowledges that this is a contentious issue that has no easy answers. Thus, he analyses the views of Bratman, Searle, Tuomela, and Gilbert to draw a comprehensive picture of collective intentionality. In this context, the author takes into consideration collectivity, which he terms as the "essence that makes a particular intentional state inherently collective" (Neog, 2024, p. 59), further contemplating upon interrelationality and the collectivity of collective intentions. He argues that genuine collective intentions shall firstly not be overpowered by an authority that takes control over individuals. Secondly, collective intentions shall not completely be dissociated from the individual’s intentions that constitute that collective. This leads to the quasi-collectivist account of collective responsibility. The author explains collective intentions as the intentions of the collective . He argues for collective responsibility as "an independent normative fact with its own sui generic character, and not just an aggregation of the responsibility of the participating individuals", moving towards justifying collective responsibility as the responsibility of collectives. The fourth chapter concerns itself with collectives with an agency of their own. In the previous chapter, he points out that with regard to an individual it is the individual agency that precedes individual intention, but with regard to the collective it is the other way round. Collective agency has been looked through the prism of moral responsibility as being a collective self-being primarily responsible for its actions or outcomes. The author argues for formulating such a collective agency in this chapter. He makes a detailed analysis of the philosophical discourses concerning agency, individual and collective. In his book he argues for a collective agency that is different from the shared agency, which is a single agential unit consisting of multiple individual agents. The author further explains that shared agency is a concept of unity with diversity , but collective agency is unity in diversity . He further connects the normative point raised in the previous chapter with collective agency. This collective agency, the author claims, is crucial for recognizing collective responsibility as the responsibility of the collective per se. The author also considers emotional attitude, with respect to sharing the moral burden, of the collective agency that shall bring forth the complete moral character. This forms the basis of the next chapter. The fifth chapter emphasizes the relationship between morality and emotion. The dominant view in early philosophy was that morality concerns itself with reason, and emotion has no role to play in it. However, recent discussions in philosophy have pointed towards a more intimate relationship between morality and emotion. The author focuses on the emotion of guilt in this chapter to understand how guilt affects moral collective responsibility. There are philosophical approaches that argue that there is no strong connection between an individual’s guilt and her ability to be moral. Another argument categorizes guilt as a negative emotion that has no positive role in shaping morality. The author disagrees with such approaches, stating that "the nature of guilt and its proximity to our moral conscience needs to be understood in a wider context" (Neog, 2024, p. 105), and not based on individual instances. Further, Neog examines the feeling of collective guilt and compares and clarifies its distinction with collective shame: shame is driven by agent-centric reconstruction, but guilt is driven by action-centric reconstruction . Confusion of guilt with regret may occur when we consider collective wrongdoing, but for Neog, regret is a feeling that can occur beyond the direct involvement of an agent in the wrongdoing. He observes that the three approaches to collective guilt feeling , (i) a summation of individual guilt feelings, (ii) a feeling of membership guilt , and (iii) collective feeling of guilt, are not adequate. He offers a fourth alternative to collective guilt that takes into consideration the singularity of agency and the plurality of the experiencing subjects and tries to reconcile these two. It is such an endeavor where collective guilt is, in the singularity context, a feeling of guilt for wrongdoing committed in the name of the collective, and on the other hand, in the plurality context, it is the plurality of the individual members experiencing guilt as contributors to the collective. He terms it as positional guilt feeling that "on the one hand, retains the phenomenological elements in its constitution, on the other, recognizes the importance of collectivity by maintaining a distinction between the singularity of the agency of wrongdoing and the plurality of the experiencing subjects" (Neog, 2024, pp. 117-118). Neog finally argues that when we consider the collective agency, as discussed in the previous chapter, we can very well locate a collective moral agency, with respect to positional guilt feeling. This account of positional guilt feeling helps us understand collective responsibility. The epilogue of the book touches upon a possible assumption on the part of critics that he is subscribing to a conceptual isomorphism between individual wrongdoing and collective wrongdoing. He responds to this criticism by arguing that there can be collective wrongdoings without there being any collective intention. For him an affirmative claim can be made that collective responsibility can be understood through collective intention: given his take on collective intentionality recognises the significance of individuating the phenomena of collectivity so that keeping it away from being an overarching metaphysical superstructure and also tagging along individual intentional attitudes of the members of the collective. This leads the collective to an internal evaluation towards executing a common goal, which results in the collective agency. This collective agency is able to form emotional responses, as articulated by the discussion on guilt. As he puts it, collective guilt is "an emotional state where the referred agent behind the collective wrongdoing is the collective agent itself, although the subjects of such a feeling are the individual members" (Neog, 2024, p. 128). Neog does consider that there may be certain cases where collective wrongdoing does not have a collective intention, such as the problem of global warming. But this does not stop us from taking a retrospective stand on such issues. The book also considers instances where there is no pre-existing collective agent. The example cited is that random strangers helping a person in trouble. For Neog, in such cases, the moral demand for coordinated action can help in forming collective intentional agency, which develops through an internal evaluative perspective that develops a normative standpoint. He claims that philosophical discourse has laid forth the complexity of collective responsibility and his book attempts to "handle some of the knots and tangles of the yarn" (Neog, 2024, p. 132). Collective agency and collective responsibility are issues of utmost significance to philosophers and social scientists, since human existence as a social animal depends upon intricacies related to them, this book deliberates upon issues that matter in the perspective of understanding human co-existence. The extensive detail in which the author has looked into philosophical literature concerning responsibility, intention, agency, and guilt both in the context of the individual and the collective makes this a comprehensive account that is a must-read for everyone interested in individual-collective discourse. The quasi-collectivist account proposed in the book takes this discourse a step further. The wide-ranging use of anecdotes and instances from movies and literature about every pressing issue that this book concerns itself with helps us form a clear understanding of the complex philosophical debates in the backdrop. In this respect, this book can be considered a starting point for unversed readers in the individual-collective debate.

Translating philosophy: DR Nagaraj's Allamaprabhu N S Gundur Professor, Department of Studies and Research in English, Tumkur University (Karnataka, India) Article # Jul 3, 2022 The New India Foundation’s idea of translating the scholarship in bhashas into English fascinated me. Because translating creative literature, especially poetry and fiction, has been favourite in the republic of translation, particularly in the Kannada context; it rarely pays attention to the translation of discursive prose—philosophy, criticism etc. As a teacher who offers a translation course to my postgraduate students, I have found that I am quite at home translating non-fiction, mostly from English to Kannada. As a result, I tried translating some European thinkers including Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault into Kannada. The NIF inspired me to try translating the Kannada scholarship into English. While I was pursuing my PhD at Karnatak University, Dharwad, I was drawn toward G S Amur ’s conviction that translation should happen from other languages to our own language. This, according to Amur, is primarily for two reasons: one, translation is a cultural need and it should be useful for us. Therefore, borrowing from other cultures would be a wise act. If, for example, a Kannadiga translates from the English language, the Kannada culture will be enriched. Secondly, translation is also a matter of linguistic competence. We are better at translating from our second or third languages to our own language, rather than doing it the other way round. After examining some bad translations of Kannada texts into English, I followed this conviction religiously and never tried my hand at translating Kannada texts into English. But the success story of Vanamala Viswanatha’s translation of a Kannada classic The Life of Harishchandra (Harvard University Press, 2017) changed my perception, and I began to realise the importance of translating our texts into English. Moreover, as someone doing academics in the English language, I now see my English writings as translations, because I think foremostly in Kannada. Among several factors, I must mention two that made me apply for the fellowship. First, the pride of joining the NIF community and learning from its stakeholders, if selected; second, the NIF understands translating scholarship as more than an act of translation; it is clearly mentioned in the programme description that it is a fellowship for research and translation. The seriousness with which the fellowship looked upon translation as research made me curious. Finally, translating the thought excited me, not to mention the huge amount of translation, which I came across for the first time. I, indeed, took more time to select the text than to write a proposal for it. Initially, I made a list of 5 to 6 works and took almost two months to decide on it. Thanks to friends and Kannada scholars who tolerated my endless discussions with them, and during one such conversation, my mentor Professor Prithvi Datta Chandra Shobhi, a D. R. Nagaraj's collaborator and translator too, categorically suggested Allamprabhu mattu Shaiva Pratibhe (1999). But my strategic thinking did not allow me to finalize it; I ruminated on which texts would get me the chances of obtaining the coveted fellowship. At times, I found DR’s work difficult to translate, and thought of some easily translatable texts. But my inner voice kept on reminding me of Professor Prithvi’s advice, and finally, I followed it. D. R. Nagaraj's (henceforth DR) work is an important contribution to the domain of Indian intellectual traditions. His two major books, The Flaming Feet and Other Essays: the Dalit Movement in India (2010) and Listening to the Loom: Essays on Literature, Politics and Violence (2012) are quite known to the non-Kannada reader. Allamaprabhu mattu Shaiva Pratibhe , which belongs to the mature period of his intellectual career, was published posthumously. It is the only monograph of DR that is not available in English. In fact, he wanted to write it in English or he himself could have translated it later, but he seems to have left it for my fortune. DR Nagaraj's book Allamma Prabhu Mathu Shaiva Prathibe In this book, DR was up to undertaking several intellectual ambitions, including decolonizing his own modes of inquiry and critiquing the historiography of Indian philosophy. Here, DR enters into a dialogue with contemporary historians of Indian philosophy by showing how Allama Prabhu , a 12th century Shaiva mystic, had conversations with Abhinavagupta, the Kashmiri Shaiva philosopher and Gorakhnatha, the mystic, and also with his contemporaries like Basavanna. While drawing our attention to the intellectual dimensions of the Veerashaiva movement, his close reading of Allama’s vachanas reconstructs the intellectual portrait of Allama as an argumentative Indian. Amartya Sen would have devoted a chapter on this theme in his The Argumentative Indian (2005) if this book were available to him in English. Further, the translation of this book, I am sure, would fulfill the NIF’s vision of ‘fostering comparative literature about different states and streams of progress’, besides creating ‘an expansive cultural reach for works which have thus far been confined to those who understand the original language of their composition’. As U R Ananthamurthy puts it ‘the classic work of DR has got the capacity to transform us, and DR tries to understand Allama not only in the context of medieval India but also from the viewpoint of our times; it addresses our cultural crisis.’ Those interested in the intellectual history of medieval India and understanding our dialogic traditions would be benefited from DR’s deep reflections and scholarship. If it is useful to maintain a conversation between the modern and the pre-modern, across languages and cultures, we need to engage with this kind of work. And this is how we achieve our country, by translating our thoughts for fellow Indians.

A Word of Caution to 'the Uniformist' and 'the Reformist' Ariba Zaidi Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Zakir Husain Delhi College Article # Feb 22, 2022 This article is part of the series of responses from philosophers on the hijab row . Through this piece of writing, my endeavour is to present my arguments to the Uniformist and the Reformist demonstrating that their attempts to get the practice of hijab banned are misplaced even if they have come to believe that their hearts are not. The term ‘Reformist’ here refers to the set of people who believe the practice of hijab or its imposition to be a regressive socio-cultural practice and therefore are calling for a prohibition by way of imposition. The term ‘Uniformist’, on the other hand, refers to the section that believes the practice to be incompatible with the various symbols of uniformity (uniforms in the current context) that are instituted to promote equality and fraternity, and through them, arguably, unity in a diverse society such as ours. Why the uniformist insistence on the hijab ban is untenable Given the current context and the likely grave implications that may follow, I would like to draw the attention of the Uniformist first. What does the symbol of uniformity represent? One may not disagree that the intent is to bring uniformity, but uniformity in itself doesn’t represent any merit in most societies unless it is a means to attain other social values, which are 'equality' and 'fraternity' and through such ideals 'unity' that binds the social fabric. My argument is – the spirit of uniformity is what gives meaning to the symbols of uniformity . Further, if a society is not able to appreciate what the spirit of uniformity means or what its significance is, and to what extent it can be pursued, the likely-hood of self-sabotaging the ends , i.e., equality, fraternity and unity for which such symbols of uniformity were instituted in the first place can’t be discounted. The spirit of uniformity is often mistaken to be seeking uniformity in all the spheres of social life. The error lies in not recognizing that not all domains of social life are equally amenable to a quest for uniformity. There are some domains where the quest for uniformity is a just and a meaningful pursuit, but there are also provinces where it cannot be accorded a justifiable place. Social, economic and political spheres are such domains where the quest for uniformity is arguably a legitimate pursuit. More so in the context of our society where economic and social hierarchies are deep-rooted, but regardless of the realities of a society, to have uniform basic minimum standards of dignified living, and absence of social hierarchies ought to be one of the prime objectives for any progressive society. Thus, the spirit of uniformity is a requisite quest in the foregoing domains. However, society is a union of more than these three stated sets. This brings me to the sphere of culture . Can we seek uniformity in the domain of culture, which in our society is composed of many diverse elements? Culture is a slightly different set than others, where each element (cultural element) of the set often happens to be the assumed identity of the ones who belong to that particular culture. For instance, should we seek uniformity in languages or dialects, in religion or its sub-sects, in rituals, customs and traditions etc.? Each of these elements can be a part of someone’s assumed identity. Any short-sighted attempt to dilute the integrity of such identities, as history indicates, are fraught with danger, often with detrimental effects to some of the goals for which the uniformity is sought in the first place, i.e., fraternity and through it unity in the society. Alternatively stated, uniformity becomes the instrument of sabotaging the same very goals to pursue which it was instituted in the first place. Thus, while instituting the symbols of uniformity such as uniforms, one ought to be guided by the spirit of uniformity, which is to strive for uniformity within the socio-politico-economic domains without undermining the diversity in the cultural domain . I am, therefore, urging all the Uniformists, who are in concurrence with the call for a hijab ban, to be guided by the spirit of uniformity. Otherwise, knowingly or unknowingly, they are grossly undervaluing the goals for which uniformity is sought. Why the Reformist insistence on the hijab ban is untenable The following sets of arguments are addressed to the Reformists, who, as I stated earlier, are those set of people who believe the practice of hijab or its imposition to be a regressive socio-cultural practice and therefore are calling for a prohibition by way of imposition. I don’t intend to keep the willful (autonomous) practice of hijab, with or without any justification, within the same bracket as the imposed or culturally-conditioned practice of it (even if some of the members fall within the intersection of the culturally-conditioned class and the autonomous class). The question is: Does the imposition of hijab or similar regressive practices regardless of their religious or cultural affiliation deserve a top-down imposition of ban or any other form of restriction? I agree with the Reformists that our society is a simmering ground of many regressive practices and arguably there is no religion that doesn’t contribute to it. It is significant for us, therefore, as a collective, to arrive at a generalization or a guiding framework to address such regressive issues and choose wisely when it comes to opting for a path to bring reforms. My attempt, through the following, is to demonstrate to the Reformists that a well-recognized framework already exists in most of the thriving democratic societies, and inference from such a framework doesn’t justify a top-down imposition of ban on hijab or similar practices. When it comes to socio-cultural reforms, one can immediately think of two preferred modes by most societies worldwide to carry out reforms viz., the consensus-based approach and the top-down impositions . One is likely to associate a consensus-based approach with a thriving democracy, but a top-down imposition isn’t entirely incompatible within a democratic political structure either. Of course, a consensus-based approach has to be the norm , but exceptions can be cited that often warrant a quick decision making, where waiting for consensus may prove to be debilitating. We have the instances of child marriage abolition, abolition of untouchability, the PNDT act, abolition of slavery in the US etc., where waiting for consensus would have proven self-defeating. I am inclined to keep abolition of sati too in this category although it was imposed by an imperialist regime. The question to be asked is what is the basis to determine whether a case for reform fits the consensus-based approach or the top-down imposition. The foregoing instances of top-down impositions and other similar incidents that have not found a mention here can probably be a promising source to inductively arrive at some generalization. In my humble attempt, I find that a breach of someone’s ‘right to life’ and ‘ right to live with dignity’ are two factors that provided the ground for impositions in all such instances. One may wish to keep disruption of peace and public order in this category, but it is also arguably one of the most misused basis by most governments to impose sanctions on our liberties. Thus, in my opinion, the breach of ‘right to life’ and ‘right to live with dignity’ seems to be the only basis for a top-down imposition in a democratic polity in most cases if not all. In all other contexts, a consensus-based approach should be the norm for any democracy to be meaningful to its citizenry. Now, the question is can school/college going hijab-wearing girls be seen as breaching any of these inalienable rights that warrant a top-down imposition. I am sure that our Reformist zeal is not blinded enough to see it that way, but there may be some who would still want to point that women forced to be behind the veil are living a less dignified life, and the situation according to the chosen parameters warrants imposition of the ban. I would like to argue that by forcing the issue of the hijab ban, it is the Reformist who is stealing the chance of a Muslim woman to live a dignified life. By forcing the issue, they are preparing a ground for many Muslim orthodox parents to not let their daughters see the corridors of schools and colleges and pushing the women who have autonomously adopted the practice to avoid such spaces. The Reformist enthusiasm of the hijab ban advocates is most likely to end up stealing a girl child’s right to education, her probably only chance to get out of this vicious trap in which her parents are trapped, her only chance to question her socio-cultural conditioning and associated cognitive biases, her only chance to make a decision for herself whether she wants to be behind the veil or not. Thus, at least to me, the Reformist demand for a ban on hijab and similar practices is unjust and uncalled for, and consensus mode seems to be the way forward. Consensus mode appears to be the way forward, but… Thus, the Reformists, if they are honest in their attempt to bring reforms, ought to pay more attention to devise ways to bring consensus amongst all the stakeholders. The essence of following this path lies in understanding what is central to building consensus . Central to any consensus building attempt, it can be argued, lies our ability to forge a constructive dialogue around the issues that require consensus. Any dialogue, as we all know, is composed of arguments, a logic-driven structure where claims are supported by premises. Likewise, the strength of the argument lies in its validity and soundness, where the truth of the premises plays a significant part. The question is where do these premises come from? In a society where education is still struggling to penetrate and expand its reach, it’s unreasonable to assume that their premises are likely to represent facts or truth by empirical standards. Most likely, socio-cultural conditionings, various forms of custom and tradition enforced beliefs or some form of authority are the general sources of many of their premises. What makes matters further complex is that almost all the sections of our society, in varying degrees, subscribe to such premises where each of these sections has its own sets of customs, traditions, social-conditioning, and authorities. A dialogue is probably difficult to conceive in a situation where participating members or sections of society appeal to different grounds of truth for many of their premises in the arguments advanced by them . Thus, what we get is a stalemate in return, and our Reformist zeal, instead of recognizing the true nemesis and finding a solution to it, pushes for the quick fixes , often in the form of top-down insensitive impositions as it can be witnessed in the context of the call for hijab ban. What a Reformist needs to do instead is to find a way to push through this stalemate and ensure that the dialogue happens , but how can they do it? The stumbling block in the dialogues seems to be ‘ the different grounds for truth ’ of their premises, but can we ensure uniformity in it. My preferred criteria would be empirical facts for obvious reasons, but can we push for it? I think we should not. Then what should be done? My take is that we ought to focus on the prospective participants in the dialogue, i.e. children and in them inculcate the skill of reflectivity . From reflectivity what I mean is the ability to challenge one’s own beliefs and those of others, the ability to seek justification for such beliefs and keep such justifications under constant scrutiny, the ability to identify fallacies and cognitive biases and the ability to overcome the conditionings enforced by the accident of birth. Given the fact that they are able to question themselves with the same intensity that they question others, participants of this kind in a dialogue are more likely to come up with some agreeable common grounds of truth for their premises and make their dialogue and consequently reforms more successful. One may ask why children alone? I am not pessimistic in this regard, but I have come to understand that, barring a few exceptions, the grown-up population is way too conditioned (even the educated ones) to give upon their rigidities. Efforts can nevertheless be made in this direction. What is it that the Reformists should do to actualise the foregoing? Considering that they are true in their intent to reform the society, and want to put an end to regressive practices without causing much of a social discord and discontentment, they should spend their energies in creating and shaping an education system that promotes reflectivity of the kind stated above in the students at the grass-root level. I am not implying here that all our social and cultural problems will be resolved once our citizenry is educated in the stated manner. It would be naïve to think so given the complexities at play, and I don’t intend to underappreciate the human tenacity to abandon reason when it suits them, but with all that could be there to impede dialogue, by adopting this course, surely we will give ourselves the best chance to reform our society without inciting social discord. These are my well-considered views, but I can be naïve in such considerations. __________________________________________________________________________________________ Read other articles in this series: Ariba Zaidi -- A Word of Caution to 'the Uniformist' and 'the Reformist’ Danish Hamid -- Back to Liberal Basics Hina Mushtaq -- Can women decide for themselves? Sania Ismailee -- The Karnataka Hijab row is about Right to Education...

Review of Modernity and its Futures Past Bhakti Gaikwad PhD Scholar, Savitribai Phule University Book Review # May 17, 2025 Book review of Nishad Patnaik's Modernity and its Futures Past (Palgrave Macmillan Cham 2023). The text Modernity and Its Futures Past by Nishad Patnaik revisits the ambiguity surrounding the concept of modernity and its historical evolution. The book challenges the dominant Eurocentric narrative that modernity is a monolithic, linear process. It instead proposes a pluralistic and nuanced understanding. By engaging with political theory, philosophy, sociology, and postcolonial studies, the book makes a compelling case for re-evaluating modernity’s foundations and considering alternative frameworks that better reflect the multiplicity of human experiences. One of the key tensions the author points out is between the conventional understanding of modernity, which assumes a break from tradition, and a more contextual approach that sees modernity as a continuous negotiation with the past. This reminded me of Walter Benjamin’s critique of progress. For Benjamin history is not necessarily forward-moving but rather a complex interplay between past and present. The book argues that modernity should not be viewed as a complete rejection of tradition but rather an ongoing process of reinterpretation and transformation. The author argues that modernity is not just a Western phenomenon but an evolving discourse shaped by various cultural, social, and historical forces. The book consists of several chapters, excluding a preface and acknowledgments. It begins by pointing out a reflection as well as a theoretical concern regarding the inadequacy of Eurocentric conceptions of modernity in explaining contemporary global realities. The text proposes alternative approaches that account for the experiences of societies outside the Western framework. It not only critiques the dominant narrative of modernity but also engages with diverse intellectual traditions, including postcolonial theorists, feminist scholars, and decolonial thinkers. The first section of the book dwells on a reflective theoretical need: Can we ever think of multiple modernities? The book attempts to not only answer this theoretical concern but also create a ‘theoretical toolbox’ for the same. Additionally, it revisits and re-reads debates in political theory, philosophy, and global history to construct an inclusive understanding of modernity. This, the author suggests, can help in reshaping the normative foundations of how we understand modernity and its futures. The book carefully maps out the ways in which different societies have grappled with modernity, emphasizing that there is no singular pathway to modernization. The text explores how we can do political theory and philosophy in a way that is not burdened by the dominance of Western frameworks. The author has referred to thinkers such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, Walter Mignolo, and Ashis Nandy to set the theoretical tone of the book. Along the lines of these thinkers, the book argues that modernity should be understood from within the realities of different societies rather than imposed as a universal model. The author critically engages with how the idea of modernity has been historically constructed, often to the exclusion of indigenous epistemologies and alternative ways of knowing. This reminded me of the Upanishadic saying: वादे वादे जायते तत्त्वबोधः, which implies that it is through diverse opinions that we get to know the truth. The book similarly advocates for a plurality of perspectives in understanding modernity, arguing that different cultures bring their own lived experiences and knowledge systems to bear on the modern condition. The book, while analyzing modernity, critically examines key elements from various domains, including religion, caste, lived experience, and the corporeal body. As Patnaik (2023) notes, “The conceptualized modern experience throws up two essential markers regarding the inadequacy of Eurocentric modernity. At the social level, the hyper-presence of local traditions and alternative rationalities needs a multi-pronged instrument of public debate rather than a unilateral notion of Western reason to articulate real and true modern experiences” (p. 101). The text further explores how globalization and digital modernity have transformed traditional understandings of modernity. The book suggests that in an era of technological advancements and rapid social change, modernity is no longer confined to a singular trajectory but is increasingly shaped by hybrid identities, transnational movements, and economic interdependence. At a time when globally, the nature of modernity is altering, this text makes a few pertinent interventions while keeping in mind lived realities. While trying to establish the idea of ‘multiple modernities,’ one can look at contemporary cultural productions such as films and literature that capture the nuanced relationship between modernity and traditional structures. The book acknowledges that modernity is not an abstract theoretical construct but something that is deeply embedded in the everyday experiences of people. In doing so, it argues that we must move beyond grand narratives and focus on the lived realities of individuals and communities as they navigate modern life. The author looks at religion as an important aspect of modernity’s social context. The book establishes that the role of religion cannot be underestimated in evaluating the political and social dimensions of modernity. This argument is reinforced by drawing from political thinkers like B.R. Ambedkar and scholars like Talal Asad. The text suggests that rather than viewing modernity and religion as opposing forces, it is more productive to analyze their complex interrelationship. This discussion also touches upon the limitations of secularization theory, arguing that the assumption that modernity leads to the decline of religion is not universally applicable. The book draws on examples from different societies to show how religious traditions have adapted to and shaped modernity in their own ways. The text further explores the question of crisis within modernity. It argues that modernity is not a stable or fixed concept but is continually in flux, responding to crises that emerge from within its own structure. The author examines various contemporary challenges; ranging from climate change and economic inequality to political instability and social unrest; as symptoms of modernity’s inherent contradictions. This discussion reminded me of Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of ‘liquid modernity,’ where he describes the increasing instability and fragmentation of modern life. The book extends this argument by suggesting that modernity’s future depends on its ability to transform in response to these crises. The text proposes alternative pathways for modernity that emphasize sustainability, inclusivity, and a more holistic approach to progress. In its concluding chapters, the book turns to the question of modernity’s future. Can modernity be reformed, or does it need to be fundamentally rethought? The author suggests that while modernity’s foundations are deeply problematic, there is still room for transformation. By embracing a more pluralistic and inclusive approach; one that values diverse epistemologies and challenges existing power structures; modernity can evolve in ways that are more just and equitable. This discussion resonates with thinkers like Ashis Nandy, who have argued for a reimagining of modernity that is not dictated by Western models but instead rooted in indigenous and alternative traditions. The book’s vision of modernity’s future is both critical and hopeful, acknowledging the deep-seated problems of modernity while also recognizing the potential for new possibilities. Modernity and Its Futures Past is a deeply insightful and timely exploration of one of the most pressing intellectual debates of our time. It challenges readers to reconsider their assumptions about modernity, offering a nuanced and multidimensional perspective that is both critical and constructive. The book is particularly valuable for scholars of political theory, philosophy, sociology, and postcolonial studies, but its accessible style and engaging analysis make it relevant to a broader audience as well. The book walks a fine line between critique and reconstruction, offering not only a powerful analysis of modernity’s limitations but also a vision for its possible futures. In doing so, it makes an important contribution to contemporary debates on modernity and globalization, urging us to think critically about the world we inhabit and the futures we hope to create. References ● Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity . Polity Press. ● Chakrabarty, D. (2000). Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial thought and historical difference . Princeton University Press. ● Mignolo, W. D. (2011). The darker side of Western modernity: Global futures, decolonial options . Duke University Press.