Search Results

IPN Writing Centre An important aspect of philosophers’ work is writing and publishing. It is also one of the areas that doctoral scholars and young researchers often find the hardest and have the least support for. IPN Writing Centre aims to address this gap through Writing Mentorship and Writing Rooms . Writing Mentorship This initiative is aimed at supporting researchers who would like to receive the guidance and feedback of peers on drafts of their written work (such as a research article or a thesis chapter). While many of us get feedback on our written work from our supervisors, advisory committee members and other senior faculty, it might be useful to have peers read and comment on them. For one, this provides a less ‘formal’ and freer environment, where Ph.D. scholars and others may feel more comfortable discussing their concerns and asking for feedback. ​ How it works Interested people, who would like to have their work reviewed, will have to register and indicate the area in which their written work is situated. Based on the area of their work, each registrant will be assigned a mentor by the IPN coordinators. This would take approximately 1-2 weeks. The registrant will be introduced to the mentor, and can share their work with them.The mentor will read the registrant’s work and provide them written feedback within 3 weeks. Depending on the preference of the mentor and the registrant, they may want to meet and discuss the feedback and comments. The first round of feedback will be coordinated by the IPN coordinator. The registrant and mentor can have further rounds of discussion and feedback based on their requirement and preference. ​ Who can apply : Philosophers in India (Ph.D. scholars and above) can apply. Even M.A. scholars who wish to work towards publication of their papers can also apply. Membership of IPN is not necessary. ​ How to apply: Those who would like to receive feedback on their work, please register here . Coordinators : Siddharth S (siddharth.nias[at]gmail.com) and Varun Bhatta (varunsbhatta[at]gmail.com) ​ IPN Writing Rooms This initiative aims at creating virtual meeting rooms for researchers who wish to write on a regular basis but haven't been able to execute it properly. IPN Writing Rooms will provide a shared space and would be of particular interest to those who like to have company while they are writing. ​ Who can apply : Philosophers in India (Ph.D. scholars and above) can apply. Membership of IPN is not necessary. ​ How to apply: Interested candidates, please register here . Coordinators : Jinesh Sheth (jineshrsheth13[at]gmail.com) and Siddharth S (siddharth.nias[at]gmail.com) ​

IPN Blog Guidelines The blog at IPN is a platform for philosophers and others to write about philosophy in India and also to express philosophically informed opinions. What kind of articles are published in the IPN blog? Philosophy for Society and Public – Articles that explore the questions and events of society from philosophical viewpoints. Life of philosophy and philosophers in India – Articles that explore and document the experiences of philosophers and the nature of philosophy – as a discipline/practice/profession – in India. Academic Philosophy – Articles that introduce (either to fellow academicians or the public) a specific topic in Philosophy. We publish brief, accessible summaries by researchers about their latest publications for wider dissemination. The articles can also be reviews of philosophy books. ​ Who can write for the IPN blog? Given the aim of the IPN blog is to enable a dialogue between philosophers and the public, we accept articles from both philosophers and the public. Philosophers who are not members of IPN, especially undergraduate and graduate philosophy students, can also submit. Kinds of submissions Articles related to the above themes can be sent to the blog-editorial team. If you have a topic for an article in mind, and want to check its viability, you can also send the abstract. Proposals for a series of articles can also be sent. In this case, please submit a concept note on the theme. ​ Submission Guidelines Please email abstract/article/series-proposal to ipnblogteam@gmail.com . The suggested length of articles is around 1000 words. While submitting the article, please share the document over google-doc. The article can also be submitted as a standalone docx file. The article can be in English or any of the vernacular languages. Please use Chicago Manual Style author-date in-line citations and end bibliography. Use endnotes instead of footnotes. Please use Grammarly or other tools to remove spelling and grammar mista kes. We have a non-negotiable policy against plagiarism. ​ Review process ​ The article will be reviewed by the editorial team and suitable comments will be provided Wherever necessary, the editorial team will reach out to other scholars for their feedback and recommendation. ​ Editorial team ​ Manohar Kumar (Faculty, IIIT Delhi) Sania Ismailee (PhD Scholar, IIT Delhi) Siddharth S (Faculty, Sai University) Sushruth Ravish (Faculty, IIT Kanpur) Varun S Bhatta (Faculty, IISER Bhopal) ​

Jinesh Sheth In conversation with Varun S Bhatta (Assistant Professor, HSS, IISER Bhopal) January 2022 Jinesh Sheth (jineshsheth[AT]philosophy.mu.ac.in), after completing his graduation in Sanskrit and Jainism, pursued an MA degree in Philosophy. He is currently pursuing PhD as a UGC-JRF fellow at the University of Mumbai. His thesis focuses on a critical study of the Jaina theory of anekāntavāda. It engages with some of the foundations of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Varun : Hello Jinesh! Thanks for taking time and being part of this conversation. From the IPN members’ sheet, I gather that you are currently doing PhD at University of Mumbai. Can you tell us more about it? Jinesh : Hello Varun! Glad to be having this conversation with you. Yeah, I started my PhD in 2018 and I am working on anekāntavāda (non-one-sidedness) under the supervision of Prof. Meenal Katarnikar. Given the centrality of this theory to Jaina philosophy, a lot has been worked upon and yet, as I can now see, a lot remains to be uncovered. The central argument of my thesis is to make a case for different senses of the doctrine - methodological, metaphysical, epistemological - to name a few - and then deal with some of the issues that I think requires further investigation. It has been a nice journey so far reading Prakrit and Sanskrit Jaina texts, engaging with the contemporary scholarship, and along with it, trying to situate anekāntavāda in a larger philosophical discourse. ​ Jaina’s theory of anekāntavāda has always fascinated me. However, till now, I had not had an opportunity to go beyond a superficial understanding of it. So, I am planning to make the best use of this conversation to know a bit more about it! First of all, what caught my attention is your translation of anekāntavāda as “non-onesidedness”. Why is this preferable compared to “many-sidedness”? The other question pertains to any notion of pluralism (in epistemology, metaphysics, etc.): how to make the stance more appealing without also accepting the trivial (and troubling?) dictum that “everything and anything is OK”? I am sure there would be at least one Nyaya philosopher who would have thrown this allegation at Jaina system. Would like to know your thoughts on these. I would be happy to discuss more on anekāntavāda . With respect to translation, the term non-one-sidedness is closer to the original Sanskrit as compared to any other translation. The emphasis in “non-onesidedness” is on the denial of a one-sided nature of reality, as captured by “ an ” (=denial), “ ekānta ” (=one-sided), and vāda (theory); therefore non-onesidedness. It is also possible to look at the term as “ aneka ” (not one, many) and “ anta ” (sided) but this interpretation appears to restrict the term to just ontology and is not a literal translation (the word 'anta' stands for 'dharma', which, in this context, means properties / characteristics). Some scholars translate it as ‘the doctrine of multiplexity of reality’. Non-onesidedness, on the other hand, can be taken as a theory which represents the Jaina view not only on reality, but also on thought (nayavāda, epistemic perspectives) and language (syādvāda, the theory of qualified assertion). As regards to pluralism and a kind of relativist approach towards everything, I find that these two can be differentiated to a certain extent. The interpretation of anekāntavāda along the lines of relativism is a very recent development. To say that ‘everyone can have a perspective’ is one thing, to say that ‘everyone is right from their own perspective’ is another thing and to call the latter as anekāntavāda lacks textual validation. (In the Jaina context, there is something like pseudo-nayas (false standpoints / false perspectives). Their falsity might consist in either the denial of their counterparts altogether or in seeing one part as the whole (like in the case of blind men and the elephant) or when they do not correspond to reality)). So far, I haven’t found any Jain text that would support such a view (=everyone is right from their own perspective). It is kind of self-refuting. To give an illustration from an altogether different context, Paul Feyerabend, who was greatly influenced by Thomas Kuhn as you too would probably be aware, while arguing for epistemological anarchism and for his own relativist understanding of science, builds upon Kuhn’s arguments but Kuhn never advocated such a relativist view and he even went on to categorically reject those relativist ideas while replying to his critics. So most of the criticisms of anekāntavāda - whether by Vedāntins (like Śaṅkara) or the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas (like Bhāsarvajña) or the Buddhists (like Dharmakīrti) - are more often than not directed either towards denying the possibility of two contradictory characteristics existing together in one thing or towards the problem of self-reference (is anekāntavāda absolutely true?) or some other issues. If you don't mind, may I also take the opportunity to know more about you, your philosophical interests and any current areas on which you might be working? Also, even though it has been a long time, I am curious about how did the transition happen from engineering to philosophy. ​ Thanks for the clarifications on anekāntavāda! Have a better understanding of them now. Coming to your question, there are a few factors for the late transition -- from engineering to philosophy -- in my case. Of course, due to the parochial state education system, while growing up I was largely ignorant of the discipline. It is only during the first year of bachelors, I realised my interest for a few topics. It took some meandering and trial/error to realise that what I am interested in is called "philosophy" and another couple of years to find the conviction to change the lanes. So, the transition from engineering to philosophy happened gradually at various stages (from the interest to read a few books when I am free to pursue it "professionally"). What is your story? How did you end up pursuing research in philosophy? I see. That’s quite an interesting journey. I was primarily interested in Jaina philosophy and literature from a very young age and, for which, I went to Jaipur for five years to study at an institute (kind of a gurukul). Along with it, I completed my graduation with Sanskrit as the major subject from a college (SDJA Sanskrit college) affiliated to JRRSU , Jaipur. It was during that time that my teacher suggested me to see if philosophy might interest me. Since then, it has been a great adventure and I am amazed how it has played a role in shaping my understanding of almost everything. ​ Jinesh, fascinating story! I want to know more about all of these “phases”. To begin with, I am jealous to know that you were interested in philosophy and literature from a young age! How did this happen? And what was your impression/understanding of philosophy in this phase (if you can recollect :) )? I am glad to know that you find it fascinating! I was fortunate to get that environment and culture where I was introduced to Jain principles from early childhood. There are paathshalas for various age groups run by the Jain community where children can get acquainted with basic ideas. My parents always motivated me to spend time going to paathshalas and some summer camps as well. My interests kept on advancing and I started listening to discourses by (non-academic) scholars which would, more often than not, involve texts. By the time I finished high school (10th grade), I can say that I might have covered basic Jaina philosophical concepts pertaining to metaphysics, epistemology and ethics that a one year diploma course in Jainology might offer. I was introduced to arguments that would deny the concept of creation of the universe by a supreme entity. I assumed I had gained some understanding of the doctrine of karma, suffering, the causes thereof, liberation, spirituality; and dualism (soul-body), consciousness, metaphysical pluralism, universals and particulars, substance, qualities, modifications etc. Of course, I had no idea about other philosophical traditions whether Indian or Western. I was also not aware of what exactly would constitute philosophy. Neither had I read any of the Jaina texts entirely. Just that now when I look back, I can locate what I had studied within a larger philosophical discourse. So it was during that time that I was given this opportunity, by my teacher as well by my parents, if I would want to study Jainism further and I eventually decided to go to Jaipur. Before we catch the thread of your story at Jaipur, I want to know more about the community paathshalas. I have heard about them, but know very little. The list of topics you mentioned does give an idea of the topics being discussed. Can you shed some light on other aspects of these communal educational practices? How were these nuanced topics taught by the instructors? And since most of the audience are young, how were these philosophical ideas made relevant to them? Given that you have studied in both traditional and university educational spaces, thought you might be in a good position to shed some light on the differences in pedagogic styles and methods. Yeah, sure. I am glad to revisit all those days because I don't recollect talking about them with great detail. If I remember correctly, I might have started going to paathshala when I was just 7 or 8. And as I reflect now, I am able to see many things which otherwise even I could not notice. And maybe I might fail to mention some other things which I don't remember now. Anyway, thanks for all the questions! Usually, most of the paathshalas are conducted in a temple. There are scholars who have written books specifically for the students at paathshalas. Along with the core topics related to Jaina philosophy, these books include poems, stories etc. as well. The books that I studied from had a conversational style (like Plato's Dialogues - the similarity being just of the style and not the content) which began with a question. Over a period of time, these have now become standard textbooks that are used almost all over India and perhaps abroad as well. Of course, this works within a community and other versions of something similar are not uncommon. The teachers are most of the time alumnis of the same paathshala or some other paathshala (if they have relocated). There were many co-curricular activities like plays, quizzes, art and craft etc. - all focused on making a particular topic easy to understand. And, of course, there were prizes. Nowadays, I also see quite a few inter-paathshala competitions taking place. Regarding how these topics were taught, I think the curiosity of the students, with respect to both knowing-how and knowing-that, was a major driving force. I too take a class once a week at the local paathshala and I am sometimes amazed at the kind of questions they ask - whether it's on ahimsa, or God, or karma or on the functioning of the universe. Sometimes, they come up with their own versions of the trolley car problem (what's the right thing to do?). Apart from that, the focus is also on memorizing the key concepts and much of the evaluation was based on that. Paathshalas used to prepare one for reading the texts (of course, the translations and not the original Prakrit or Sanskrit) and listening to discourses for further understanding. I hope I was able to answer the question. Adding here the cover page and the TOC of a few of them: The links to PDFs: Balbodh Pathmala, Part 1 , Part 2 , Part 3 and then it continues to intermediate ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) and advance levels ( 1 , 2 ). As mentioned earlier, I am sure there are many other books written by other authors and which are also used at various places. This is just one representation and from which I had studied. ​ After reading your description, I would definitely want to visit one of these paathshala. No wonder you were convinced to pick up philosophy by class X. Can you tell us about the Jaipur institute that you went to subsequently? What did you learn there? And, do not mind me asking again, how was the pedagogy in this institute? Yeah! I started reading philosophical works, and from a philosophical perspective (!), only after I got enrolled into the Masters program at the University of Mumbai. But I was surely interested in reading and learning more about Jain philosophy at that time. And whatever I learnt about Indian philosophy in my undergrad years was via Jaina philosophical texts. I must say that I could not have taken that decision on my own. It was because my teacher suggested so and then my parents always encouraged me to pursue it. So this institute at Jaipur ( ptst.in ) is named in the memory of an 18th century Jain scholar, Paṇḍit Ṭoḍarmal. It has been running since almost five decades and students come over there to study Jainism for five years, and simultaneously, they continue their studies in Sanskrit from another academic institute - thereby graduating with a degree of Śāstrī (शास्त्री) which is equivalent to B.A. The graduate course in Sanskrit also offered several papers on Jaina philosophical texts as electives and we opted for them as well. Here are the links for the syllabus - first year (for electives on philosophy, see p. 23ff), second year (p. 18ff) and third year (p. 16ff) - for the B.A. program at JRRSU, Jaipur. And the syllabus for the course on Jainism can be found here . Starting from basic concepts to advanced texts on Jaina metaphysics, logic, epistemology, ethics, narratives, and spirituality, I had a really good time learning from all the teachers. There used to be weekly seminars throughout the year; the experts would give their critical comments and I think we learnt more from each other than on our own. We also received training on how to teach and deliver discourses. That shaped our learning as well. One starts thinking not just as a learner, but also as a teacher. Of course, there is a downside that the focus might shift, but with some caution, it added to the overall development. Another key element was memorizing the texts in their original language - Tattvārtha Sūtra being the most commonly memorized one. Now that I have spent another 6-7 years studying philosophy and Jainism in an academic atmosphere, I can say that the time spent in studying Jainism and Sanskrit was a kind of perfect beginning for me and philosophy has played a major role since then. ​ There are several interesting aspects in what you described: importance of language training, weekly seminars, focus on teaching! Before we move further, I have one last question about traditional learning spaces that you have experience of (paathshalas and Jaipur institute). Your responses give a vivid picture of what happens in classrooms about reading/writing/teaching philosophy. Apart from discussions about “texts”, were there any other practices/activities/rituals that were taught or emphasised, either in the class or outside of the class? I am asking this for two reasons. First, I have heard that Buddhisht monastery pedagogy also emphasises on certain rituals and bodily practices (like meditation, dietary customs, etc.). Want to know whether you have experienced something similar in these places. The second reason pertains to the subsequent junction in your journey --- modern academic spaces, where “practice of philosophy” is largely understood as a mental activity and practice (writing papers, etc.), with no rituals, bodily practices being prescribed. I see. Among dietary customs, eating before sunset was an invariable practice. Students would gather in the temple (within the institute) and sing devotional hymns in the morning as well as evening. Outdoor sports like cricket, volleyball, badminton etc. were played almost throughout the year. One thing which worked in our favour during those days was not having access to the internet except while in the library. Smartphones were not allowed. All of this helped in gaining more focus and utilising time more efficiently. Of course, it seems impossible in the post-Covid world. Other activities like meditation etc. were not that much emphasized. Needless to say, all that I have mentioned so far is about one institute in which I studied and it is very much possible that other institutes might have different practices. I am sure the community living would have been quite an experience. How was your transition from this kind of place to a university system for your MA? Where did you do it and how was it? Did you find any noticeable difference in how philosophy, specifically Indian philosophy, is being taught in the university? True. It was a great experience. Having stayed away from home for five years, I wanted to come back to Mumbai. My teacher (the one who suggested me to go to Jaipur), who also happens to have a Masters degree in Philosophy, again helped me in deciding the career ahead. By the time I graduated, I had developed a further interest to pursue a career in academics. That is when I found the Master’s program at the University of Mumbai quite interesting. Besides, there is one faculty who specializes in Jain philosophy as well (my current PhD guide!). So I was thinking about spending another 7-8 years (MA + PhD) at the Department . I had not studied any of the Western philosophers until graduation. And hence I struggled a bit in my first semester, especially with contemporary analytic and continental philosophy. However, I received a lot of help from my friends as well as from a few senior members (who were pursuing PhD at that time) whenever I approached them. There is a wonderful departmental library as well. The faculty have always been kind and supportive. Also, events like seminars, guest lectures, conferences, workshops helped me in generating further interest into a diverse range of topics. I still vividly remember faculty members encouraging us (students) to ask questions and engage with resource persons! With respect to Indian philosophy, I think one of the major differences, in the modern space, is that the primary texts are not read that widely - unless the entire paper is on one text (=electives). While I read very little of (academic) secondary literature when I was at Jaipur and had no idea about contemporary developments in the field of Jaina studies, here the discourse (syllabus, suggested reading, lectures, events etc.) was more prominent on the secondary literature. Besides, as you might also be aware, students who come from a BA (Philosophy) program probably never get any exposure to Sanskrit. So that might also be a reason why a majority of students end up reading more on Western philosophical thought in comparison to Indian philosophy. The scholars who do have a strong background in Sanskrit and Indian philosophy are trained in the traditional way and are more comfortable in teaching in the same way. I hope I am responding to your questions! Jiinesh presenting a paper in a conference at University of Madras (7 January, 2020) Jinesh, I think you are raising very important questions relevant to the teaching of philosophy, especially, how Western and Indian philosophies should be taught? And I think your experience can inform and guide these questions. Therefore, would like to know your views about some of the hurdles you mention above. Let us focus on the last point: the way Indian philosophy is taught in university compared to traditional learning places. I completely agree with you that university curricula should also teach the required languages while teaching Indian and other philosophies (like Chinese and Islam philosophies). With no emphasis on language, as you mention, university education does not empower the students in pursuing these topics. With regard to the other point – primary vs secondary texts – one of the arguments for using non-primary sources (secondary sources) for teaching (either at BA/MA level) is that these texts provide an overview and presents a wider picture of a field/topic; primary texts become relevant only when focused research needs to be carried out. Thought of mentioning this argument to know your opinion. Since you have experienced both kinds of training – through primary texts (in Jaipur institute) and reading secondary texts (in the university) – what would be your suggestions for designing a philosophy curriculum? Do you think it is important to use and teach primary texts rather than secondary ones at BA/MA level? This response assumes that classical texts at the BA/MA level in the modern education space are more or less not introduced. If there are philosophy curriculums which offer a BA/MA degree in Philosophy and do involve the students into reading primary sources with respect to Indian philosophy, please let me / us know. I understand that there are always issues regarding what to include and what not to - even with reference to core philosophical topics. So further introducing primary texts would add the burden of learning a new language. Maybe summer programs/workshops can help the students to learn Sanskrit or maybe they are encouraged to take up a one-year certificate course during the BA program. Besides, the use of primary texts in the classroom at the undergraduate level need not be that rigorous (critical editions, going into the nuances of translations, manuscripts and variant readings, intensive grammar etc. can be ignored). I see quite a few students abroad who are in BA/MA programs, whether Indology or Religious Studies or Philosophy, and who are working on classical Indian texts, spending some time learning the primary language(s). Another issue that I think is that in the context of Indian philosophy, there are very few secondary sources which are completely objective and do justice to the text/tradition. I do not mean to say that being critical is not worth but that kind of critical scholarship is not helpful for an undergraduate student - especially when that student is getting introduced for the first time to a text/philosopher/tradition. I don’t think there is such a series of “Companion to” or a “very short introduction to” with reference to Indian philosophies and philosophers. Neither do we find good articles on each topic of Indian philosophy on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) or Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) (although they both cover a few topics) as we see with respect to Western philosophy. Lastly, from what I have observed, I also think that translating Sanskrit/Prakrit/Pali to English is not the same as translating Greek/German/French to English (though I hardly know anything about the latter three). So one can easily read “Republic” or “Critique of Pure Reason” (in English) without worrying to check the primary source at every instance but not so in the case of Sanskrit texts, and when there are very few good translations. So I think some access to the primary texts starting from the undergraduate level would go a long way in, as you rightly said, empowering the students in pursuing these topics. And maybe when the students pursue a Masters degree, they are equipped with skills for conducting further philosophical-textual research. Jinesh, thanks for these interesting points. I agree with your observations about the lack of academic works (like SEP, various Companions, etc.). I too miss this kind of ecosystem when exploring Indian Philosophy. However, I have a divergent opinion about Greek/Latin having a direct connection with the English language/tradition and this not being the case in the relation between Sanskrit and English. A lot of historical, social and political efforts have gone into establishing the seemingly no-gap between Greek and European traditions. Because of these efforts, it gives an impression that Aristotle and Kant are accessible in English. Also, another important query your response raises is the politics of language in the Indian context. Even though there are several classical languages relevant for studying Indian philosophies (Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrit), it's usually Sanskrit that is emphasised. So we need to discuss how to tackle this issue in our graduate courses. Probably, we can continue this conversation at a later point. Moving on, I want to know how you relate/work with different traditions of Philosophy like Analytic, Continental and even the various schools in the Indian context? Given that your current work is situated within one tradition (Jaina tradition), how do you think your work (at present and in the near future) will be? Do you want to situate yourself in a specific tradition? Or are you interested in working on specific threads that spawn across various traditions? Interested to know your views on these questions as you have straddled between different spheres of philosophical practices (traditional and modern university spaces) and also encounter doing philosophy in different languages (working on Sanskrit texts, but writing a dissertation in English). It was indeed an interesting discussion and would be happy to discuss it further on some other day. And thank you for these questions! Regarding my work, I see quite a few domains in which I can extend my current research on anekāntavāda further or maybe take up another project (within the Jain tradition) with some other fundamental topic. Some of the core areas in which I think I can work in the near future in the wider philosophical context vis-à-vis anekāntavāda are related to epistemology, ethics and logic. It is all still tentative and I too am unsure in which direction I would progress. Nevertheless, my time spent so far while doing research on anekāntavāda has certainly helped me in many ways. Given its meta-philosophical framework (this can be debated), I sometimes try to approach philosophical problems and arguments - whether emerging from continental or analytic tradition - in a non-one-sided way. Doing philosophy in different languages certainly has its own merits and demerits. On one hand, a wide variety of literature opens up for me and, on the other, writing in English was not easy in the beginning. Things have improved to a certain extent but there is a lot to learn! Translation is another issue that I constantly face. I haven’t yet published on areas central to my thesis though have been presenting them at conferences and looking forward to publishing a couple of papers by the end of my PhD. Some of the other papers that I have presented and/or published but are not directly connected to my ongoing work can be found here (researchgate) and here (academia) - not all are public but I can share via mail. I haven’t spent much time with Indian philosophy (in a comparative spirit) in the last few years such that it would result in some good output but I would like to revisit it in future. Moving forward, I would still want to continue specializing in a field related to Jain philosophy. Some of the other areas in contemporary philosophy which are of interest to me include consciousness studies, philosophy of science and hermeneutics. Comparative philosophy is another area which I would like to explore in future. So, coming to the final stages of this exciting conversation, I (and the readers as well) would like to know a little more about you, about your ongoing and upcoming research. And if possible, I would particularly be also interested in knowing how philosophy has shaped your research in natural science(s) and/or the other way round. Jinesh, thanks for your interest in my views. For me, most of the "philosophy of ___" enterprises (like philosophy of language, art, film, law, etc.) are important exercises and interventions where core philosophical tools are used to understand something else. So, the philosophy of science has primarily taught me how to apply philosophy in addressing other disciplines questions. At present, some of my works are situated in the area of philosophy of physics. I am currently developing on a topic that I could briefly cover in my PhD research: the philosophical analysis of interference phenomena in classical and quantum optics. After this, I would probably want to spend some time with specific questions of metaphysics (individuation and compositionality of objects) that have always excited me. I want to end this conversation by seeking your opinion on one last thing. According to you, what initiatives and activities would be helpful/useful for the academic philosophy community in India? How do you think we -- philosophers in India -- should organise such that it not only supports us but also creates a vibrant ecosystem for philosophy in India? Your suggestions and ideas might resonate with other readers and this could mobilise into something concrete. Not to mention, these suggestions of yours would play a crucial role in the shaping of IPN. It is fascinating to know about your current and future research. I would like to know more, hopefully, when we shall meet someday in-person! As a student and a young researcher , I think a few initiatives that might help in the long run would include: ​ Undergraduate and / or Graduate Peer reviewed Journal (I don’t know if there exist any) Conferences specific for graduate students (which could then also result into a publication into the above journal) Writing workshops / sessions (for PhD students) - I think writing sessions are a must for postgraduate students (I can volunteer for this if someone may guide). Database of submitted theses (and linking them with those which are available on shodhganga ) - I think if we do not know or if we do not have access to the PhDs submitted earlier, there is always a fear of reproducing what has already been done. Once in a quarter or six months, an online meet of IPN members - it could be informal as well: sharing experiences and problems that one faces in their respective areas (research, teaching etc.). Sometimes, this meet may also take shape of an academic event where a guest speaker might address the IPN community. I am not sure whether these suggestions or ideas are realistic. I am also not aware if something is already being planned. That being said, I am really grateful to all the moderators and founding members of IPN. The Telegram and WhatsApp groups have helped me. Once, I had a chance to listen to David Chalmers live! It would not have been possible if not for Phil-India Telegram / WhatsApp groups. The Google group too is great. I am indeed grateful to you for all the wonderful questions and your generosity that allowed me to express myself freely throughout the conversation. The errors are still mine and I am always happy to revisit my views. Lastly, thanks to the readers for their patient reading!

Traditional vs Colonial: Navigating Dichotomies of Philosophy in India Ankita Kushwaha and Megha Kapoor PhD scholars, Jawaharlal Nehru University and Delhi University (respectively) and Teaching Fellows, Sai University Dec 14, 2023 The realm of philosophy in India has diverse thinking traditions reflecting a blend of orthodox, heterodox, and various local cultural ideologies. Contemporary scholars find themselves caught in a pronounced dichotomy in the engagement with traditions, primarily shaped by historical forces. They are either charged for aligning with glorifying traditional concepts or critiqued for viewing the tradition through a colonial lens. Here, we seek to explore the challenges faced by contemporary philosophers of India while engaging with the philosophical concepts embedded in various traditional sources. We argue that in engaging with these concepts, philosophers are required to address the challenges posed by the above-mentioned dichotomous relationship. Moreover, as we navigate this dichotomy, our primary purpose is to stress the importance of thoroughly looking into traditional ideas. Noteworthily, in many instances, scholars accept the text without critical analysis and provide justifications that contribute to the glorification. In light of this, our primary objective is to emphasise an urgent need for a more rigorous and discerning philosophical inquiry that furthers the development of a more detailed understanding of the traditional ways of thinking. The Importance of Engaging with Traditional Ideologies How we perceive ourselves individually and socially is impacted by the environment in which we are born and grow. Any theorisation, therefore, cannot be in isolation. The theorisation must have an understanding of our traditions and local norms; at the same time, it must encompass our present lived experiences (Guru and Sarukkai 2012). Understanding various traditional sources is essential because they encompass the lived experiences of the past, which continue to shape our present experiences. The term "traditional" is often used to describe generational practices, values, and customs. These sources manifest in classical texts, typically composed in dominant languages like Sanskrit and Persian (Chandhoke 2019, 80), offering well-structured and organised insights into tradition. These local thoughts are embedded in diverse forms such as stories, folklore, fables, songs, and other cultural expressions. They not only provide a window into the historical aspects of a particular geographical location and community but also incorporate contemporary elements unique to their context. The recent discussion regarding the decolonisation of philosophy in India operates under the assumption that the colonisers have influenced the philosophical perspective. It necessitates a decolonisation effort to address the burden of Western thought that hinders the accurate representation of Indian intellectual traditions. However, the blame on colonisation from the perspective of Brahminism needs to be revisited. When colonisation occurred, Brahmins, well-versed in Sanskrit and holding higher positions, assisted the colonisers in shaping a new understanding of India, which led to the emergence of a form of Hindu philosophy that was dominantly Sanskritised, further resulting in the under-representation of thoughts from other traditions. Interestingly, despite being practised by a small portion of the population, Brahmanism managed to establish a subcontinental identity. Its popularity can be attributed to its ritual functions, ceremonies, and the adoption of Sanskrit as a common language (Thapar 1989, 209–231). The Dichotomy of Traditional vs Colonial The texts and ideologies of India represent various philosophical thoughts that provide insight into the intricate fabric of Indian society. Engaging with these texts and ideologies in a contemporary context allows for a deeper understanding of cultural heritage, providing a platform for critical dialogue. While acknowledging their historical roots, scholars must avoid absolutism to promote further an evaluative approach accommodating evolving perspectives. Therefore, in contemporary times, a conscious effort exists to critique colonial impact on philosophy in India by reviving and re-evaluating indigenous thought systems. However, the challenge lies in avoiding oversimplification and essentialisation. This task becomes even more complex, considering that many Indian intellectuals predominantly come from upper-caste backgrounds. This background gives them a privilege that does not necessitate them to critically examine their inherited traditions (Nanda 2010, 185). Consequently, this lack of critical examination from a segment of the intellectual elite further complicates the nuanced process of re-evaluating and revitalising philosophical traditions in India in the post-colonial context. This issue can be explored more closely by delving into the Mahabharata scholarship. When scholars discuss Mahabharata[1] as a foundational text for the Indian subcontinent, their use of terminologies and explanations may suggest that it is the greatest epic of all time for India. However, it is crucial to ask for whom it holds this esteemed position. Edward Dimock describes Mahabharata as the "founding library of Brahmin-Indian civilization," emphasising its role as an encyclopedia covering history, legend, edification, religion, art, drama, and morality specific to that civilisation (Dimock 1974, 53). Janaky adds another layer to this perspective, highlighting how the Bhrgus or Brahmins asserted authority over social, political, and moral realms not by controlling princes but through their influence on Mahabharata scholarship (Janaky 1992, 1997–1999). Overlooking this aspect universalises Mahabharata as a text for all, whereas, as Ambedkar points out, sacred texts of India contain a social philosophy responsible for the degradation of non-Brahmins (Ambedkar 2019, 393-395). Ambedkar further criticises the insufficient critical engagement with sacred literature, emphasising the detrimental impact of two contrasting attitudes: the uncritical commendation by a Brahmin scholar and the unsparing condemnation by a non-Brahmin. Both approaches, according to Ambedkar, hinder the progress of historical research ( ibid , 393). The disadvantage of such an approach is that either they miss the regressive ideas or articulate them in an oversimplified manner that ultimately glorifies the regressive Brahminical ideas. Therefore, there is a need for a more nuanced and critical examination of sacred texts to understand their implications on social history in the true sense. Moreover, another aspect of evaluation exists where scholars discard or appropriate various conceptions of Mahabharata because of evaluating certain aspects of the text from a colonial lens. For instance, German Indoligists interpreted Mahabharata as "framing Brahmans as 'priests,' and presenting themselves as reformers and liberators, while they collaborated with the Prussian (and later, Nazi) state" (Adluri 2016). As a response, a group of scholars in contemporary philosophy in India talk about the need for the revival of Indian traditional and religious thought. They hold that the modern liberal framework for conceptualising Indian society is the product of colonialism, as that has constantly undermined the significance of Indian traditional and religious thoughts. De Roover argues that even though liberalism "presents itself as a freestanding conception independent from any comprehensive doctrines or substantive conceptions of the good… [but] it continues to depend on a conception of the person and human social life that secularises protestant Christian ideas by transforming them into the topoi of political thought" (De Roover 2015, 237). Thus, he emphasises that Western liberal categories of thinking are not fruitful in conceptualising Indian society and polity as they are from different historical and political contexts. Even though the revival is significant and decolonisation requires discarding the underlying colonial mindset, the problem arose because of a similar pattern. There has been a constant effort to derive the themes or subjects of political thought from traditional ideas.[2] This pattern constrains critical engagement that further ends in accusing all liberal concepts as irrelevant to the Indian context (Nandy 1988, 189) merely because they are the products of Western civilisation (De Roover 2015, 234-239). Contrary to this, Patel says there is a need to engage with tradition without romanticising the past. She also emphasises that it should not also be a denial of all modern concepts. Thus, Patel emphasises a decolonial approach, which is "not a retrieval of premodern assessments that would consist of a folkloric affirmation of the past, nor an antimodern project of the kind put forward by conservative, right-wing, populist or fascist groups, nor a postmodern project that would deny modernity and would critique all reason" (Patel 2020, 10-11). Further, she suggests that there is a need for a new approach to social theorisation that critiques the Western conceptual framework through the inclusion of the experiences of the people. Additionally, the problem in reviving the traditional ideas is that India today no longer has the same structure as it used to have earlier. Various traditional concepts are not relevant in the theorisation of contemporary society. It is crucial today to theorise the contemporary issues along with the lived experiences of the ordinary masses. At the same time, we cannot accept the colonial framework without analysing its relevance to the lived experiences of the masses. When accepted without critical analysis, a philosophical inquiry may result in the glorification of either of the categories (traditional or liberal). The need is to not unquestioningly accept or discredit the traditional norms as well as the liberal frameworks of thinking altogether. Conclusion Navigating the dichotomies of glorification of tradition vs colonial mindsets presents a challenge for contemporary scholars. The revival of philosophy in India should not be limited to a mere glorification of tradition but should involve critical analysis that engages with the complexity and dynamism of the philosophical heritage. Therefore, a few critical questions arise in the discourse of philosophy today: what approach is suitable for philosophy in India? How can we decolonise philosophy without glorifying the past? What are its challenges? How will these challenges be resolved? Answering these questions necessitates a deep understanding of the challenges posed by the dichotomy. Hence, further research is imperative to engage with these intricate philosophical inquiries, offering a more comprehensive approach to the decolonisation of philosophy in India. [1] In reference to the Mahabharata, it’s important to note that there are multiple versions. Here, we specifically refer to the ancient Mahabharata of Krishna Dvaipayana, also known as Veda Vyasa. Our focus, in this context, pertains solely to the philosophical aspects of the text. [2] As de Roover argues that liberal ideas are the topoi of Protestant Christian ideas, various Indian political concepts are also topoi of Indian Tradition. For instance, in Gandhi’s thought, secularism refers to sarvadhrama sambhava. The idea of sarvadharma sambhava is rooted in the idea that the truth has many sides and cannot be grasped by human beings completely. Therefore, according to Gandhi, we should respect all conceptions of the good (see Gandhi 1995). References Adluri, Vishwa. 2016. “How We Should Approach The Phenomenon Of Studying Hinduism.” Swarajya , https://swarajyamag.com/culture/how-we-should-approach-the-phenomenon-of-studying-hinduism . Ambedkar, B.R. 2019. The Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar , edited by V. Rodrigues. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Chandhoke, Neera. 2019. Rethinking Pluralism, Secularism, and Tolerance: Anxieties of Coexistence . New Delhi: Sage Publication. De Roover, Jakob. 2015. Europe, India, and the Limits of Secularism . New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Dimock, Edward. 1974. The Literatures of India: An Introduction . University of Chicago. Gandhi, M.K. 1995. Hindu Dharma . New Delhi: Orient Paperbacks. Guru, Gopal, and Sarukkai, Sundar. 2012. The Cracked Mirror: An Indian Debate on Experience and Theory . New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Janaky. 1992. “On the Trail of the Mahabharata: A Response.” Economic and Political Weekly 27 (37): 1997–1999. Nanda, Meera. 2010. “Arguments for an Indian Enlightenment.” In Indian Political Thought : A Reader , edited by A. Singh and S. Mohapatra, 175–186. Routledge. Nandy, Ashis. 1988. “The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 13 (2): 177–194. Patel, Sujata. 2020. “Social Theory Today: Eurocentrism and Decolonial Theory.” Madras Institute of Development Studies . Accessed November 8, 2023. https://www.mids.ac.in/assets/doc/WP_240.pdf . Thapar, Romila. 1989. “Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for a Hindu Identity.” Modern Asian Studies 23 (2): 209–231. http://www.jstor.org/stable/312738 .

Translating philosophy: DR Nagaraj's Allamaprabhu N S Gundur Professor, Department of Studies and Research in English, Tumkur University (Karnataka, India) Jul 3, 2022 The New India Foundation’s idea of translating the scholarship in bhashas into English fascinated me. Because translating creative literature, especially poetry and fiction, has been favourite in the republic of translation, particularly in the Kannada context; it rarely pays attention to the translation of discursive prose—philosophy, criticism etc. As a teacher who offers a translation course to my postgraduate students, I have found that I am quite at home translating non-fiction, mostly from English to Kannada. As a result, I tried translating some European thinkers including Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault into Kannada. The NIF inspired me to try translating the Kannada scholarship into English. While I was pursuing my PhD at Karnatak University, Dharwad, I was drawn toward G S Amur ’s conviction that translation should happen from other languages to our own language. This, according to Amur, is primarily for two reasons: one, translation is a cultural need and it should be useful for us. Therefore, borrowing from other cultures would be a wise act. If, for example, a Kannadiga translates from the English language, the Kannada culture will be enriched. Secondly, translation is also a matter of linguistic competence. We are better at translating from our second or third languages to our own language, rather than doing it the other way round. After examining some bad translations of Kannada texts into English, I followed this conviction religiously and never tried my hand at translating Kannada texts into English. But the success story of Vanamala Viswanatha’s translation of a Kannada classic The Life of Harishchandra (Harvard University Press, 2017) changed my perception, and I began to realise the importance of translating our texts into English. Moreover, as someone doing academics in the English language, I now see my English writings as translations, because I think foremostly in Kannada. Among several factors, I must mention two that made me apply for the fellowship. First, the pride of joining the NIF community and learning from its stakeholders, if selected; second, the NIF understands translating scholarship as more than an act of translation; it is clearly mentioned in the programme description that it is a fellowship for research and translation. The seriousness with which the fellowship looked upon translation as research made me curious. Finally, translating the thought excited me, not to mention the huge amount of translation, which I came across for the first time. I, indeed, took more time to select the text than to write a proposal for it. Initially, I made a list of 5 to 6 works and took almost two months to decide on it. Thanks to friends and Kannada scholars who tolerated my endless discussions with them, and during one such conversation, my mentor Professor Prithvi Datta Chandra Shobhi, a D. R. Nagaraj's collaborator and translator too, categorically suggested Allamprabhu mattu Shaiva Pratibhe (1999). But my strategic thinking did not allow me to finalize it; I ruminated on which texts would get me the chances of obtaining the coveted fellowship. At times, I found DR’s work difficult to translate, and thought of some easily translatable texts. But my inner voice kept on reminding me of Professor Prithvi’s advice, and finally, I followed it. D. R. Nagaraj's (henceforth DR) work is an important contribution to the domain of Indian intellectual traditions. His two major books, The Flaming Feet and Other Essays: the Dalit Movement in India (2010) and Listening to the Loom: Essays on Literature, Politics and Violence (2012) are quite known to the non-Kannada reader. Allamaprabhu mattu Shaiva Pratibhe , which belongs to the mature period of his intellectual career, was published posthumously. It is the only monograph of DR that is not available in English. In fact, he wanted to write it in English or he himself could have translated it later, but he seems to have left it for my fortune. DR Nagaraj's book Allamma Prabhu Mathu Shaiva Prathibe In this book, DR was up to undertaking several intellectual ambitions, including decolonizing his own modes of inquiry and critiquing the historiography of Indian philosophy. Here, DR enters into a dialogue with contemporary historians of Indian philosophy by showing how Allama Prabhu , a 12th century Shaiva mystic, had conversations with Abhinavagupta, the Kashmiri Shaiva philosopher and Gorakhnatha, the mystic, and also with his contemporaries like Basavanna. While drawing our attention to the intellectual dimensions of the Veerashaiva movement, his close reading of Allama’s vachanas reconstructs the intellectual portrait of Allama as an argumentative Indian. Amartya Sen would have devoted a chapter on this theme in his The Argumentative Indian (2005) if this book were available to him in English. Further, the translation of this book, I am sure, would fulfill the NIF’s vision of ‘fostering comparative literature about different states and streams of progress’, besides creating ‘an expansive cultural reach for works which have thus far been confined to those who understand the original language of their composition’. As U R Ananthamurthy puts it ‘the classic work of DR has got the capacity to transform us, and DR tries to understand Allama not only in the context of medieval India but also from the viewpoint of our times; it addresses our cultural crisis.’ Those interested in the intellectual history of medieval India and understanding our dialogic traditions would be benefited from DR’s deep reflections and scholarship. If it is useful to maintain a conversation between the modern and the pre-modern, across languages and cultures, we need to engage with this kind of work. And this is how we achieve our country, by translating our thoughts for fellow Indians.

Review of Venusa Tinyi's book by Aribam Uttam Sharma Aribam Uttam Sharma Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, North-Eastern Hill University Dec 28, 2023 Book review of Venusa Tinyi's On the Foundational Concepts of Norms and Normative Systems (Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, 2023) The author, Venusa Tinyi, makes a case that formalizations that aim to clarify normative concepts like obligation, permission, and prohibition that have a bearing on our actions are inadequate. Based on this claim, the book offers to make amends by proposing a model that offers an alternative approach. The book assumes that there is more to logic than its concern for truth. If logic is understood as a language and the business of language is more than making assertions (Austin 1962), then it should not surprise us that logic's concern cannot be contained by the concern for truth. This wider concern now accorded to logic plays out in the book's take on the prescription/description distinction. Here, the distinction incarnates as that between "What ought to be the case" and "What ought to be done". Whether the logic of norms ought to be theoretical or practical in intent forms a motivational undercurrent of the book. At the center of logic is the notion of logical consequence, i.e., what follows from what. Deontic logic deals with the theoretical interests of how normative concepts contribute and act in logical consequence (McNamara and Putte 2022) . Since normative concepts are supposed to inform our actions, any study of them has to be sensitive to their pragmatic aspect. Thus, deontic logic inherits something of the tension between the prescriptive and descriptive in classical logic. Tinyi rehearses the problems inherent in the formalization of normative concepts and the logic of norms, especially deontic logic. He asserts that there is no aspect of deontic logic that is not fraught with difficulties. He gives attention to von Wright-Anderson debate on the attempts to reduce deontic logic to alethic modal logic. He does this to show that such reduction is futile. Jorgensen’s dilemma , which arises due to the difficulty of reasoning about norms within truth-functional logical apparatus, drives home this point. The particular difficulty encountered in interpreting negation prefixed to an act category also suggests that the logic of norms is a different beast altogether from other standard forms of logic. Deontic logic has been identified as modal logic (Sider 2010) . Yet, drawing parallels between it and other well-known modal systems is ungainly. The author notes that the Axiom of Reflexivity , which says that necessity implies actuality, cannot be adopted in deontic logic. An act, which is obligatory (read as necessary), need not be performed (read as actualized) with or without the pain of punishment. At least in this world, sinners do escape punishment. Around this difficulty, and on the question of the externality of sanction to norms, H. L. A. Hart’s critique of Hans Kelsen and J. L. Austin is given an exposition. The author enters these debates to stress that values, desires, and intentions cannot be divorced from norms. Any formalization, analysis, or reduction that attempts this divorce is deemed inadequate. The author forays into the nature of legal systems. von Wright, the pioneer of modern deontic logic, and whom the author credits for inspiring his book, erred, according to the author, when he tried to analyze deontic terms through legal terms like immunity, liability, punishment, and so on. The author takes this failure as a sign that deontic concepts do have an "axiological" tint that cannot be done away with without making it grate against our intuition. Difficulties and inadequacies give impetus for developments and corrections. This applies to the development of logic too. When one finds problem in the formalization of a domain of reasoning, the usual course of action can either be i) augmentation of the expressive power of the initial formalism, if the fault lies in the inadequacy of expressive power of the said formalism or ii) replacement or modification of the initial formalism, if there is a fundamental problem with the initial formalism itself (McNamara and Putte 2022) . Tinyi finds that the problem with the logic of norms (deontic logic) is of a fundamental kind. So, the book sets out to make amends by replacing/modifying the initial formalism. But he takes this amendment in a novel way. For the same reason, this is a high-stakes approach. When he proposes a quasi-theoretical or quasi-formal model named D-Model , he avoids overhauling the semantics of existing formalism that he has found faulty i.e., modal logic. Rather, he provides a model, which would capture our intuition about basic normative concepts that in one way or the other formed the conceptual base of hitherto existing formalisms. The heart of the book lies in the author's development of D-model that captures our intuitions about normative concepts and the roles they play in the normative aspects of our lives. The proposal is based on the author's conviction that the semantic tools meant for propositional logic (descriptive expressions) cannot determine the significance of deontic expressions. Here the book traces a genealogy of ideas that led to D-model. In this vicinity, a bit of caution is called for. In the D-model context, the reader must be ready to modify the standard understanding of models associated with the semantics of logical systems. And again, since there is already a well-known model called Model-D in modal logic, care could be taken not to mistake the D-model for its more famous kin. The construction of D-Model takes cues from possible world semantics. The basic normative concepts that play central roles in deontic logic are analyzed and put in relation through attendant concepts that are developed around this construction. Deontic heaven, deontic hell, repressive norms, restorative norms, and prospective norms are some of these attendant concepts. There are times one might feel that the author's focus on the analysis of normative concepts pays scant attention to questions of validity, proof procedures, soundness and completeness. But this relegation, to defend the author's intent, is understandable. The author takes D-Model to be "metaphorical". It is not intended to be part of a formal structure that would be prescriptive of normative reasoning. Metaphor, the author observes, is to be judged by the degree of illumination it affords. Measuring by this yardstick, D-model provides illumination on some alternate pathways to understand the core concepts operative in deontic logic, the logic of norms, and our intuitions about these concepts. Through the notion of a deontological gap — the difference between worlds like ours, and the worlds that we would like to be in — the purpose and significance of norms are analyzed as that which induce the narrowing of such gaps. Tinyi gives reasons for not amending the problems of deontic logic with a different formal apparatus. Logical principles, which were once considered unassailable — for example, the traditional laws of thought —- have been challenged via formalisms in which they are locally or globally made to break down. We find this in the logical treatments of paraconsistency, intuitionism, possibilism (Mortensen 1989) . The author cites this fact to warrant the novel approach he takes. Another, perhaps better, reason for this novelty, which the author mentions, is the difficulties that are engendered by a model-theoretic approach to the semantics of deontic logic. These are unique to deontic logic and are not encountered in other standard logical systems. Russell once said to Wittgenstein, "Are you thinking about logic or about your sins?" "Both," Wittgenstein replied (Russell 1968). One could take Wittgenstein's reply as an affirmation of a deep link between logic and ethics. The logic of norms therefore has held interests not only to logicians but also to those concerned by how one should act. Those with interests in logic, ethics, legal studies, the history of philosophy, and their interfaces would find Tinyi’s book engaging and rewarding. References Austin, J. L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words . Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. McNamara, Paul and Frederik Van De Putte, "Deontic Logic", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/logic-deontic/ Mortensen, Chris. 1989. "Anything Is Possible." Erkenntnis (30): 319-337. Russell, Bertrand. 1968. The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell: 1914-1944 . Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Sider, Theodore. 2010. Logic for Philosophy . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Indian Philosophy Network (IPN) is a network for professional philosophers in India, both within and outside academia. Currently, IPN comprises more than four hundred members from various avenues -- M.Phil/Ph.D students and faculty from various institutes, college teachers, and philosophy professionals working in non-academic spaces. Join IPN The current moderators of IPN are Siddharth S (Assistant Professor, Sai University) and Varun S Bhatta (Assistant Professor, IISER Bhopal) Home: Welcome IPN aims to build an equitable eco-system for philosophers in India to provide crucial peer support for research, teaching and other professional activities. The network enables better awareness of scholars working in specific areas, thereby facilitating interactions and collaborations. With members from institutes across India, IPN serves as a common platform to share information and resources pertaining to philosophy. Home: About

Review of Muzaffar Ali's book by Satya Javvaji Satya Javvaji MA student, KU Luven Oct 26, 2023 Book review of Muzaffar Ali's India, Habermas and the Normative Structure of Public Sphere (Routledge, 2023) In India, Habermas and the Normative Structure of Public Sphere , Muzaffar Ali sketches the theory and procedures of an adequate public sphere in India arguing that it has to focus on accessibility and acceptability of the individual participants. In a book that is comprehensive and accessible to a wide audience, Ali gracefully tackles the question of how to think through a native context while being aware of the overbearing Western hegemony on the one hand, and of the risk of delving into nativism or nationalism on the other. The context of the book’s conception starts with Ali’s personal discomfort with the rigid Western-Indian divide in his curriculum growing up. While authors from both geographies were being taught separately, there was a dearth of how to conduct native Indian political philosophy that neither preaches a pre-modern excavation of Indian values nor blindly adopts Western concepts and categories and applies them directly to the Indian context, which oftentimes much different. The book’s first chapter deals with precisely this question - “to figure out a way to deal with the West without a complete withdrawal and yet keep the elan vital of the decolonization project intact” (p. 13). Ali responds to it by arguing for a double native approach. Firstly, since a Western theory purports a universalism in its concepts, it remains essential for a non-western theory to engage with it and critically examine its shortcomings and exclusions. Secondly, these critical engagements have to form the basis of a native and decolonised Indian political theory that adequately captures the context of the society it is speaking with. An adequate theory does not stop at pointing out a historical or contextual exception to a Western theory, thereby proving it inapplicable. Rather, it captures the relevant conditions of possibility, that are socio-historically situated, to initiate a holistic theoretical basis that can, as is successfully carried out in this book, support an Indian public sphere. With this methodology in hand, in the second chapter, Ali discusses the notion of the public sphere in Habermas, whose contribution to its theory is considered field-defining in Western literature. The public sphere is the conceptual stage upon which members of a society exchange views of social and political significance that pertain to their collective life. In the Habermasian public sphere, citizens form a rational public opinion through the medium of linguistic communication which is seen as a reservoir of meaning. While everyone is theoretically invited to the public sphere, Ali points out that the notion relies on a singular universalizing idea and emphasizes the role of rationality disproportionately, thereby striving to keep the project of modernity alive. In doing this, it ignores that firstly, there might be multiple public spheres with diametrically opposed common concerns, and secondly, that since dialogue always already takes place within certain power structures, the marginal and historically excluded voices are either not heard or, to borrow Gayatri Spivak’s famous declaration, that the subaltern simply cannot speak. With these problems in mind and the direct non-applicability of this notion of the public sphere to India (that, according to Ali, is in part due to its heavy religious context), he discusses in the third chapter, that current Indian engagements with Habermas are either comparative or evaluative. Both these engagements pose challenges to the theory and provide critical ways of engaging with it, but either lose sight of the overall conceptual structure by focusing on particular historical examples/contexts or fail to offer a way forward in terms of moving out of the Western hegemonic shadow. Instead, what Ali aims for is a thick concept of the Indian situation that can, as a full concept, interact with the Habermasian theory of the public sphere. In the fourth and fifth chapters, Ali begins with the major chunk of his creative contributions to the idea of an Indian public sphere. He starts with the observation that existing critiques are mainly concerned about the lack of accessibility and acceptability of all to the public sphere. This leads him to frame these as the twin normative principles based on which he theorizes an imagined Indian public sphere. This is so that the public sphere is “gauged by the ease of access it offers to the communities and individuals of whom it claims to be on” and it accepts “the perspectives and viewpoints of all individuals sans any ifs and buts” (p. P. 117-18). He cautions again that he is not interested in a “nativist approach to portray the Indianness” but is instead aiming for a “native approach to conceptualize Indianness” (p. 84). For theoretical and socio-historical reasons, Ali chooses to focus on religion as the social entity that informs the Indian context, the historical idea of rationality in Indian literature and the burden of colonialism with respect to how it colours the reading of texts and consequently of understanding society. With respect to religion, Ali discusses the complicated nature of secularism in India, the socialized role of caste and the deeply political nature of these issues. Through the perspective of religion, it becomes clear that in the European context, the immigration of other religions forms a new conceptual problem while dealing with a universal and apparently secular public sphere. But when it comes to the Indian context, religion has always been part of the notion of secularism and is a “perennial entity within Indian societies” (p. 97). According to Ali, “majority-minority, upper caste-lower caste, powerful-powerless, man-woman binaries within the Indian situation are often anchored in religion” (p. 111). Additionally, he argues that the procedural communicative rationality advocated by Habermas does not apply to the Indian context if acceptability and accessibility are to be taken seriously in the public sphere, and that a combination of abstract rationality and contextual rationality has to be present. This takes seriously the notion that contextual examples cannot always be universalized and translated into abstract concepts and language. At the same time, it does not mean that context-based examples are simply supporting or adding legitimacy to a universalised social procedural reason. Ali proposes the term deuniversal rationality to understand the dual nature of rationality in the Indian context. He reformulates the two aspects of deuniversal rationality as abstract rationality and experiential rationality. With the help of Merleau Ponty’s theory of the embodied self, in combination with Gopal Guru and Sundar Sarukkai’s theory of how the social sphere translates into embodied experiences, Ali argues that not only critical reflection and consequent articulation but also other aspects of the individual’s public identity namely their embodied experience, cultural conditioning and their emotional aspects of existence must have unrestricted access to the public sphere since these are not subordinated to reason but are fundamental aspects of the individual’s self-identity and hence self-expression in the social sphere. Ali writes that the aim is “to grant an epistemic passage to the lived body to enter as a medium of communication within the public sphere. The lived experience emerges as … a parallel and meaningful category for conducting the debates within the public sphere” (p. 128). Ali argues for the co-originality, to borrow Habermas’ term, of both the abstract component and the lived experience component in making up deuniversal rationality. He hopes this not only allows more people, previously excluded, into the contextual Indian public sphere but also, in recognising that the public sphere is carried as part of the individual’s lived experience, and that these very experiences are accepted as contributions to interactions in the Indian public sphere. While Ali is successful at conceptualizing a thick notion of the Indian public sphere based on deuniversal rationality that equi-prioritizes abstract rationality and lived experience, questions follow about how issues are resolved at the theoretical level when these two components contradict or disagree with each other. This sits in the wider debate about the post-structural turn in philosophy emphasizing that discourse always already happens within certain power relations that not only oppress but also produce individuals. Since Ali’s focus was on expanding who is included in the public sphere, what could possibly be clarified further is how disagreements are to be resolved once everyone is in the public sphere. This is keeping in mind the hyper-mediatized society we live in and the possibility of a fragmented and polarized public sphere that is sometimes clearly visible during discussions pertaining to national identity. Additionally, some readers could argue that according to lived experience unqualified epistemic privilege of expressing the truth complicates matters of intra-group justice and brings up the issue of intersectionality. This is because individuals, while referring to their lived experience hardly ever refer to only themselves as isolated individuals but to the group they see themselves as belonging to and speaking as part of. However, since they are simultaneously part of multiple groups and identities, it becomes important to keep in mind that all these identities affect the articulation of their lived experience and cannot be neatly separated into compartments. These are additional remarks since the intellectual involvement and theoretical rigour with which Ali takes on the ambitious project of theorizing a native Indian public sphere is commendable making the book essential reading for political philosophers, political and social scientists, theorists from the global South and everyone who wishes to understand the complexities involved in thinking about the native. Image-credit: © Yann Forget / Wikimedia Commons

Review of Meera Baindur's novel by Manish Sharma Manish Sharma Assistant Professor, Kurukshetra University Nov 24, 2023 Book review of Meera Baindur's Sharvay (Speaking Tiger, 2023) When it comes to women philosophers in India, Maitreyi, Gargi, Meera, and Sulabha come immediately to mind. However, these are little more than names, since their philosophies and lives are rarely discussed, let alone their teachings. We need stories of the women who devised wings, dared to take flight in the gusty winds of oppression, and sailed to otherwise forbidden heights. It is equally important to understand how they were bruised, how they grieved, and most importantly, how they failed. Sharvay is one such attempt that envisions the journey of a mixed caste (mishra varna) girl from the claustrophobic confines of a palace where she was born and brought up. The novel presents the concrete circumstances of the socio-cultural and historical setting of south-central India in the 8th century. It depicts the life of a human being of that era from one of the most vulnerable sections of its society and explores what it might be like for her to become a philosopher. Besides presenting the obstacles on the way to becoming a philosopher, the writer also suggests what kind of position that philosopher would take in the given situations. Spider Web around the Elephant Statue This novel explores the socio-economic circumstances from the viewpoint of a mishra varna woman. It was the era of Buddhist Rinpoche Padmasambhava, Sankara, and Dantidurga's uncle and successor, King Krishna. The story takes us through several locations, starting in the palace and concluding in a little town called Kolahalpur after passing through jungles and towns like Amravati. Born as a child of unknown parentage, Sharvay, the protagonist, was fostered by a woman in service of the Queen. She grew up alongside the haughty princess as herpeekadhari and socha-upcharika holding a silver spittoon in her hands for the princess to spit out her chewed betel leaves. Here, Sharvay shows first signs of curiosity as she wonders how the green leaves turn red upon chewing. However, her desire to learn was limited by her duties towards her mistress, the princess. She secretly stole knowledge as much as possible in circumstances that came her way accidentally. Since the pursuit and practice of knowledge were generally restricted. Even though all her faculties including her hands were growing more capable with time, she still wasn’t allowed to reach for anything beyond the spittoon. “Both Sharvay and Karmani grew within the palace like lengthening shadows in the setting sun”, writes Mansi (pen name used by Meera Baindur), depicting precisely the desolate condition of working women in a place. In the very beginning of the novel, Sharvay is shown preoccupied by the sight of a spider building a web across the large carving of an elephant on one of the pillars. And she thought, “Can a spider trap an elephant in a spider web?” In this metaphor, we may see that Sharvay was wondering about her fate. Would she, a feeble spider with her delicate web, tame and fetter the giant, elephant-like oppression of regime and social structures? Can she overcome the overarching constraints with her little efforts? The picture does not change much as Sharvay moves to a new town with the princess when the latter gets married, until she meets a fatal accident which proves to be a blessing in disguise. This accident freed her from the bondage of her mistress and the tethers of her previous identity as a mishra varna. She comes across an exciting chance to create a new identity, a new name, and a different role in life. So now, Sharvay was Kumbaja, an upper-caste woman and because she now found a foster father in a Vaidya, she was a healer and medicinal practitioner. Thereon, she finds a friend till her last in Bakumi, a partner in Madhavakara, and a guide in Tara (a Buddhist Bhikkhuni). The community of healers dwelling in the forest, of which her foster father was a part, saw frequent visits by travellers, healers, and philosophers. In the favoured social circumstances, she could chase after her long-drawn curiosities, although not without the challenges of being a woman. Gradually Sharvay learns and grows bold and ultimately starts to emit what she has absorbed. She embarks on a journey that tries to free knowledge from the stranglehold of a few and make it ubiquitous. Quest for Self-discovery In this novel, you'll be enthralled by a woman's bravery in defying all social conventions to venture into the uncharted realm of knowledge. You might discover that she can still get support from other women and forge an affiliation with them even under the direst of circumstances. This is the story of a woman's struggle, bravery, uncertain future, and release from the shackles of prevailing socioeconomic and cultural conventions. Sharvay embarks on a journey of philosophical development and lives her life with various identities and names to find integrity eventually. In the novel the issue of identity is raised when Sharvay wonders, “Why am I called 'peekadhari?'… Am I a person who does the work or has my work itself become me?" (Mansi, 2023, pp 98-99) No philosophy can remain untouched by the social, economic, and cultural circumstances of its time, rather these circumstances of the philosopher's life shape her philosophy. I have attempted to view this novel written by Mansi based on this thought. The beauty of the novel lies in its ability to depict the philosophical viewpoint through the protagonist's decisions and actions taken in different situations instead of relying on lengthy arguments. This novel will give you a taste of the famous philosophical debates called Shastrarthas and the influence of their patronage on their workings both from the public and the kings. If Shastrarthas were organized by public funding, they were under the pressure of being entertaining. However, if they were funded by kings’ money then they were influenced by the king’s religious or philosophical preference. The author expresses curiosity about having heard the names of numerous women philosophers in India's history but is unable to access their concrete lives and philosophical ideas. Hence, it becomes impossible to create a clear thought about their life choices and philosophies. In this novel, the author attempts to portray a clear image of one such female philosopher; how they would have dealt with the discourses and situations of their time. Freedom versus Social Structure At times, this novel reminds us of Sartre’s notion of freedom and suggests that humans always have the choice to be free. Let’s look at this line of the novel, “Every time she was called Peekadhari, she repeated 'Sarvamedhini' to herself. She wanted a name that described who she was and did not just represent what she did.” (Mansi, 2023, p.100) This way of thinking implies that, despite being in more impoverished circumstances, a person can overcome them by having the proper kind of self-image. In another instance, the debate between social conditions and the so-called spiritual awakening is raised in a very subtle way when the author comments on the working conditions of Sharvay, the peekadhari, and her adaptation to these conditions. The author writes: She had learned long ago that being mindful in these moments only caused her to be upset and angry. It was best to be mindless, except as needed to make her body obey other people's words. She had trained her mind to stay in an indifferent state. (Mansi, 2023, p.40) These lines hint towards what Erich Fromm calls 'the pathology of normalcy' which suggests that there are certain aspects in every society where pathological behaviour is normalized. In the above situation, being aware would be problematic for Sharvay as her working conditions do not allow it. Thus, while accepting the will to be free, the novel does not emphasize the unlimited capability of human freedom but rather suggests the limitations of freedom by the given choices. Moral Dilemma: Truth or Freedom? In this novel, along with accompanying Sharvay on her philosophical journey, you also set out on a philosophical journey of your own, reflecting on your obstacles, readiness, and mysteries. Numerous circumstances in her life would shock you and cause you to ponder. For me, this moment comes when Sharvay had to camouflage as an upper caste woman and as a man to participate in a debate on the truth and metaphysics. Let’s see her dilemma, when she talks to herself while hiding her caste from her saviours, "Should she tell these people everything and go back to her old life? Or should she be free now and take her steps into a new life, away from the limits of her past?" (Mansi, 2023, p.103) At this juncture, philosophical debates appear to be nothing more than a farce. It awakens us to our lack of ability to hear the truth. Many times, we turn a common phenomenon into a mystery by giving it a mythological shape and tend to forget the truth in that mystery. In this condition, Sharvay had to choose between truth or freedom and she chose freedom over truth as the society was not ready to listen to her truth. Dialogue with the Author The author's philosophical vision can be inferred from various instances in this novel. For example, the author wants to portray a picture of a woman philosopher, but for this work, she tries to raise those philosophical thoughts in the mind of the reader through her story. Although, many times, as a reader, it came to my mind that it would have been better if the philosophical debate initiated in the novel had been longer. The novel's plot implicitly raises philosophical questions at many points. It occasionally reminds us of Sophie’s World and suggests the possibility of a similar book in the context of Indian philosophy. When it comes to the author's philosophical assumptions, she has been very explicit on the significance of Apta Pramana but not limited to some special ones. She has also emphasized the body's epistemological significance numerous times. In this context, the author has acknowledged the significance of Ayurveda , which emphasizes observation as an epistemological tool. Besides, the author seems to value observation and analysis over philosophy's speculation. In addition, she believes that the kind of philosophical speculation, that reduces people to objects, is the cause of social inequity. In this novel, she investigates the possibility of the philosophy that places the human body and experience at its core and that may be developed based on the reality that each person encounters. If I examine the author's presumptions regarding the freedom of women, her picture of women's independence with the family appears challenging. She thus presents Sharvay's figure as being more independent without family. In addition, despite emphasizing the importance of the body, the author did not highlight the impact of pregnancy on a woman's life, though it is a significant part of a woman's physical life. One explanation for this would be that she considers this trait to be a weakness in women. I also find the kind of comradeship portrayed in the novel among the women, especially between Sharvay and Bakumi seems quite imaginary and imposed from our times. I believe this kind of comradeship was absent at that time even nowadays. This is the main reason, women have not been able to become a political pressure group in Indian political discourses yet. This novel was also interesting to me because it portrays a vivid picture of the historical cities of Central and South India which are completely new to me. It brings up some historical characters that I was unaware of, being a North Indian. It provides detailed pictures of the cities, their economies, artists, and artworks. There is an unknown thrill while reading this novel, especially the character of the Buddhist Bhikhuni, Tara, who has been presented in a very mysterious and attractive manner. The character of the protagonist, Sharvay, is also heartfelt and real. It has not been portrayed in an unnecessarily romantic style. This is the reason why the novel has been quite successful in highlighting the inhumanity prevalent in the society of that time. This work will be thought-provoking and interesting to philosophy students, anyone who is interested in issues about women, and to the readers of historical fiction. This book may make you reflect on a variety of subjects, including the veracity of existentialist philosophy, freedom, and potentiality, questions of identity and integrity, the advantages and disadvantages of public and private funding, etc.

The Karnataka Hijab row is about Right to Education, not Freedom of Religion Sania Ismailee PhD Scholar, Department of HSS, IIT Delhi Feb 22, 2022 This article is part of the series of responses from philosophers on the hijab row . The Karnataka case is not a hijab ban case per se. It is the case of imposing a uniform which happens to impose a disadvantage over religious people who display religious symbols like hijab, turban, kirpan, etc. Note a rosary under my collar or a religious bangle/thread hidden under my sleeve will not be incompatible with a prescribed dress code. The central question is then whether the burden imposed by the uniform on religious students constitutes unfairness that must be accommodated for ensuring justice (here, equal opportunity for education). In this specific case, we know that forcing the uniform without accommodating the demands of hijabi Muslim women will hinder their access to education which will be detrimental to their development. It will curtail their opportunities, mainly because we know the economic backwardness of the Muslim community in general and how it may affect Muslim women's opportunities to access education and employment. Religious women will not take off their hijab to go to school but prefer sitting at home. This happened in France and reduced the integration of Muslim women into French society . Therefore, it is incumbent upon the state to accommodate their demands rather than marginalizing an already marginalized group. The uniform rule does not stop anyone from being a Muslim with a hijab but hinders her access to education by disallowing wearing hijab on school premises. This is a subtle but pertinent distinction. I don't think an essential practice test is required to arrive at a solution. The essential practice test is used by Indian courts to scrutinize a controversial religious practice. For instance, whether Hinduism stops women of menstruating age from entering the Sabarimala temple. In the Karnataka case, the central concern is not whether the religious practice is contentious given the specificities of the case. The centrality of the hijab to the integrity and identity of these women is sufficient to accommodate their demands without curtailing their access to education. The centrality of hijab to their "ethical integrity" and identity offers valid grounds for distinguishing the hijab from other clothes like shorts or clown caps. The burden of making education accessible is on the state, not on the religious student. Therefore, the salience of these issues renders insufficient the "I want to distance myself from the BJP to support the Muslim woman" argument. Sundar Sarukkai's argument on the relationship between uniform and equality doesn't address the central issue by eliminating the Muslim figure. Besides, uniforms do play a role in ensuring equality, other things remaining equal. A cursory theme of the Karnataka row is whether the hijab is a patriarchal and forced practice or a case of false choice. Or whether the Quran prescribes hijab as a specific dress code or whether "it is high time for Muslims to accept social reform and move on." We often conflate what is practiced in Muslim societies as Islamic. This is an unconscious jump because oppressive practices by patriarchs (men and women) are justified in the name of Islam. But that doesn't necessarily mean it is indeed an Islamic practice. Here, I disagree with the claim that the hijab is a forced practice "always" (see Nilüfer Göle's study on the different reasons women do hijab--not always religious but not always forced as well). I am not saying hijab is "never" forced. I agree with the argument from control over women's bodies: imposing upon the woman to cover or not to cover is exercising control over their bodies. Take the case of triple talaq or nikaah halala. Powerful Muslim women's movements have used the Quran and sharia to fight patriarchy. So, claims that the Quran is an archaic text are false. Because if it was an archaic seventh-century text with no relevance, how do these religious women use it to secure their rights? (See the brilliant work by MUSAWAH on Muslim family law reform around the world). I am not suggesting that religion is never a tool for oppression. Over here, it is crucial to realize that religion can be a powerful source for reform. Liberal scholars like Martha Nussbaum and Ayelet Shachar have explained how the liberal dismissal of religion as patriarchal leaves the religious woman in a dilemma where either you can be religious or be liberated; there is no middle ground. This is a false dilemma. You can be religious and liberated. Powerful Muslim women's movements around the world are challenging this dilemma rooted in the Western liberal feminist framework along with fighting against orthodox religious interpretations and state repression of minority voices (see Amina Wadud's and Asma Barlas' works). The liberal feminist framework projects itself as a false universal such that if you fall short of its standards, you are branded as illiberal. Discourses on decolonizing theory have pointed this out. So the Muslim woman does not "need saving" from Islam by liberals ( Lila Abu Lughod ). Most people don't know anything about Islam's position on women and mistakenly conflate oppressive practices of Muslim societies with Islam. Of course, it is never enough to say this is not Islamic, even if it is justified in the name of Islam (similar arguments made in the context of violence in Islam and terrorism). But one must acknowledge religion as a powerful tool for reform. For instance, Raja Rammohan Roy used Hindu scriptures, not secular reasons, to argue against sati. For a philosophical piece defending the hijab in the French ban context, see Cecile Laborde . ___________________________________________________________________________________________ Read other articles in this series: Ariba Zaidi -- A Word of Caution to 'the Uniformist' and 'the Reformist’ Danish Hamid -- Back to Liberal Basics Hina Mushtaq -- Can women decide for themselves? Sania Ismailee -- The Karnataka Hijab row is about Right to Education...

Reading Groups IPN enables focused philosophy reading and research groups. The details of currently active groups are given below. Please get in touch with the respective moderators to join a specific group. Metaethics Reading Group Themes : moral epistemology, moral motivation, moral reasoning, moral judgement, moral normativity, moral realism/irrealism and history of metaethics Moderators : Sushruth Ravish (PhD Student, IIT-Bombay) and Vivek Kumar Radhakrishnan (PhD Student, Manipal Academy of Higher Education) ​ Contacts: sushruth.ravish[AT]gmail.com or vivek.logos[AT]gmail.com Realism/Anti-realism and Philosophy of Mind Reading Group Themes : epistemological and metaphysical realism/anti-realism; scientific realism/anti-realism; Kantian transcendental idealism; epistemic humility; mind-body problem; mental causation; self-awareness. Moderators: Siddharth S (Sai University, Chennai) and Nishant Kumar (PhD Scholar, IIT Madras) Contacts: siddharth.nias[AT]g mail.com or nishant.iitmadras[AT]g mail.com

Hareesh A G In conversation with Siddharth S (Assistant Professor, Philosophy at Sai University, Chennai) August-September 2021 ​ Siddharth: Hello Hareesh! Thank you for agreeing to this interview. It would be nice if you can begin with a brief biography, to let our readers know about your background. Hareesh: I am currently working as an Assistant Professor at the department of Humanities and Social Sciences, BITS Pilani KK Birla Goa Campus. I did my Ph.D. at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Indore where I learned and explored different aspects of philosophy. All my studies before Ph.D. were in Kerala—bachelor’s and master’s from the Calicut university and B.Ed. from Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. I was born and brought up in a remote village of Kerala called Kondazhy (Thrissur District). In fact, it was life in that village that influenced me and shaped me to become a philosophy scholar. ​ The last point you made is really interesting. But before we get to that, can you tell us what your research interests are? My specialisation during my doctoral study was in the area called the philosophy of biology and the title of my thesis was ‘Evolution and Ontological Realism: A Critical Interpretation’. It is still one of the major areas of my research interests. It is an area that has been meagerly explored in our country. I got into this topic through wondering about organic life. Since it is my focal research area, I have published some research papers focusing on the ontological issues related to evolutionary biology (' Ontological Indeterminism and Immanence – Some Aspects of the Metaphysics of Organism' ; 'Realism Through Relativism: Looking at the Possibility of Metaphysics in Species Problem' ; 'A Note on ‘Two-Way’ Ontological Practice in Biology' etc.) Apart from this, I have an intense interest in the metaphysics of science, philosophy of language (Frege, Wittgenstein, the concept of meaning and its relation to syntax). I am working on a project proposal focusing on the ontological aspect of meaning. Besides all these, I am developing an immense interest in the Indian philosophy; specifically, the naturalistic threads of Indian philosophical systems regarding the mind. In the future, I also would like to work on the ontology of memory. Could you tell us a little more about the philosophy of biology as an area of study—what are some of the key questions explored in it—and your doctoral work? In my doctoral studies I had focused more on the ontological issues related to the concepts which are unavoidable in biology. More specifically, I had analysed the ontological issues from an evolutionary point of view as it is a stringent belief that evolution theory of Darwin had given the theoretical base for biology. Remember Dobzhansky’s word that ‘nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution’. However, what interested me was the persistence of metaphysics even in our molecular biological explanations over the biologists’ claim that Darwin ‘murdered’ God by introducing a mechanism called natural selection. It is right that Darwin had put a full stop to the conventional mystic metaphysical explanations surrounding creationism. But that was not the end of the story. On the one hand he abandoned the metaphysical presence of God/deity/intelligent designer/creator etc. but on the other hand he paved the way to a new wave metaphysics concerning concepts without which the whole of biology become void. Say, life, organism, and species. Can we imagine a biological literature without a grounding in these concepts? No. But, biology still cannot define what they are. Evolution theory has an ontological commitment toward them and we take evolution theory as the theoretical framework for our explanation of living phenomena. So, I delved into these to find out a possible answer to the question of ‘why’ metaphysics in biology. How has your experience been of studying and being a part of academic philosophy in India? It was when I thought of doing bachelor’s, after higher secondary studies in science, that I first heard about philosophy. No one in my acquaintance has any idea about what-is-this-thing-called-philosophy. It was fortunate that I have got admitted to a bachelor’s programme in philosophy as the second last person among 60 students. At the time of admission, the Head of the Department told me, ‘Your mark/grade is very low, but don’t feel inferior. Study well’. Those words influenced me to move forward without humiliation. And the very first class was on logic which I found very interesting. After a few days, I held the first position in an internal assessment. And at the end, I graduated at second position in my college and came in the top 10 in the university. The master’s journey amazed me by taking me on a philosophical tour through different topics like science, mind, language, etc., which shaped my rudimentary research interests. I feel that the study of philosophy in Indian universities at bachelor’s level gets students well acquainted with the basic aspects. It is right that post-graduation is an advanced level, but most of our universities offers variety of courses that are still ‘introductory’. Instead of broadening the syllabus with different topics with superficial content, it would be better to focus on specific topics aimed at deep understanding. Could you share your reflections on philosophy as a discipline in India? How do you foresee the development of the discipline? I am proud to be a philosophy scholar in India which has an old philosophical tradition, since the Vedic period. However, I am greatly worried about the status of philosophy in India by realising the stagnancy after the establishment of conventional systems. What I mean by ‘conventional systems’ is the traditional philosophies—six orthodox systems and three heterodox systems (plus some related philosophers’ views, ancient and contemporary, on them). I am not indeed condemning contemporary Indian philosophy; there is merit in it, but it seems they have not explored enough to deal with the nuances of pragmatic life. It seems to me that Indian philosophy binds its explanations/descriptions with ethical threads whereas western traditions are bound with epistemological threads. This might be a reason for the above. Instead of preaching/teaching the conventional stuff, scholars should be ready to explore the hidden possibilities of our philosophy. We still teach different topics like philosophy of science or mind or language etc. by referring to western philosophers. Why don’t we think about the possibilities of developing our own contributions? Say, Indian philosophy of language or mind or science. I am happy that the emerging associations in India like Indian Philosophy Network and the Philosophy of Science Group in India etc. are aiming at the exploration of different aspects of philosophy. Yes, we need all philosophies irrespective of region/race. Every philosophy has its merit. May be, a comparative study of different philosophies would hint at the different hidden possibilities. Apart from these, it is our duty to make society understand the importance of philosophy in life by wiping out misconceptions about philosophy. Your mention of comparative approaches in philosophy raises an interesting question. It seems to me that in comparison to some of the other areas in philosophy, philosophy of science is still largely located within western philosophical traditions. Do you think there is scope for other traditions to contribute to philosophy of science and biology? ​ What I find is that there are central and marginalized areas in philosophy. Most areas are centred around the west (western traditions). In eastern philosophies, such as Chinese, Indian and Middle-Eastern philosophies, we can see that there are nice contributions to medicine, and to philosophy of biology, especially from the middle-east. Whenever we check a syllabus of philosophy of biology or philosophy of science, we see that what is covered will be mostly, eighty to ninety percent, with respect to the western philosophy of science. I see very few philosophy of science or biology syllabi with mentions of eastern or middle-eastern contributions. We need to explore this. ​ Why these became marginalized, I feel, is due to our own activities. I have searched the BA and MA Philosophy syllabi of almost all Indian universities, and I see that there very few universities introduce a critical approach to thinking and topics which people can themselves explore. In Calicut University, during my BA and MA programme, we studied the six orthodox and three heterodox systems and some contemporary Indian thought. This is the conventional practise. I believe that this will change if we give a chance—to teachers and students—to explore and put their views forward. I don’t think that Indian universities give the liberty to teachers to modify the syllabus, apart from IITs and central universities. At IITs, we have at least some liberties to modify. Of course, it is necessary to learn and teach the conventional philosophies, but apart from these, there should be room to discuss our own points—what we believe and what we think about these (conventional systems). Do you think such an approach can help in integrating Indian philosophical thought with philosophy of science? ​ Yes. In the final year of my PhD, I learnt that many Indian contributions have greatly influenced scientific development. But they are not considered as contributions towards philosophy (of science). We started calling something as ‘science’ only after the seventeenth century. Even before that, we have made good contributions to scientific and astronomical fields. Before the seventeenth century, everything (in the west) was considered as Philosophy. But we don’t consider our ancestors who contributed to astronomy or mathematics as philosophers. When we consider them as philosophers and their contributions as philosophical contributions, and consider how these changed worldviews and social systems, we can then philosophise about them and understand them better as philosophy of science. ​ You made a very interesting observation earlier, that it was life in your village that shaped and influenced you to become a philosophy scholar. Could you elaborate on this? I was born and brought up in a remote village. You can find that the people who lived there, or even now, are full of misconceptions, myths and false stories. For example, they believe that mumps and plagues are because of witches and witchcraft. Such kinds of misconceptions were there. I did my +2 in science and then shifted to the arts. When I started philosophy, my first aim was to concentrate on civil services. But, after a point in time, I understood that there were many questions that were unanswered in my mind since my childhood. Something like, ‘What is God?’. We all believe, we all go to temples, we all do prayers, we offer many things to God. Why do we do all these things? These were the questions that triggered me when I started doing philosophy. Then I found that many different answers could be found in philosophy. But, sometimes, our questions can be easily addressed by philosophical discussions. And we find that many of these philosophical discussions, at some point in time, will soothe our urge to know how or why something happens. One of the reasons why I became a philosophy scholar is because, I found that philosophy is solving, answering and at least partially addressing the questions that were formed in my mind through the interactions with my villagers. This is one way [in which my village life shaped my interest in Philosophy]. In my village, no one studied philosophy as a topic or as a subject for their degree. I was the first one—actually, I think I am still the only one who has studied philosophy in my village. When I joined the philosophy program, the educated people in my village blamed me: ’Why are you taking this subject. After you graduate, you are not going to get any job, or any opportunities that you can explore in the future’. My first motto was to focus on civil services. I believed that philosophy could help me in this. After my graduation, I stopped studying completely. I went to work as a truck cleaner in a quarry. I worked for almost one and a half years there. But while working in quarries and trucks, I understood that the questions in my mind were not completely answered. There were remaining questions, and I was not able to discuss them with anyone. My acquaintances then were mainly truck drivers and cleaners, and I was not able to discuss with them the questions that were on my mind. After a point, I understood that I need to go back to academics, and that my mind would cool down only if I get some answers to the different questions. It was not only metaphysical questions, but many questions that I had in my mind at that time. So, I re-joined academics, as a postgraduate student at Government College, Chittoor (Palakkad), in MA Psychology. At the same time, I got admission into MSW at Amrita University, MA Criminology and Juvenile Justice at Madras University, and MA Sociology at Loyola College, Trivandrum. I dropped all of these and joined the MA programme in Philosophy (at Calicut University). My villagers asked, ‘Why are you doing this? You belong to a family that is economically poor and you have to take care of your family. You have to focus on an area that will give you a job. Why are you focusing on philosophy?’ At that time, I did not answer them. Later, in the second year of my PG, I told them I knew how to get a job in philosophy. Apart from getting a job, in our lives, we have to address some of the basic questions that emerge in our minds. I believed that Philosophy could help me answer those. This was my answer to their questions. Apart from these, I was interested in the spiritual practises—we can even call them ‘black magic’ and sacrificial practises—in my village. When I used to watch these things, I used to ask the question, ‘Why?’. I later understood that many of the things that my family members and villagers do are nonsensical. I don’t want to be a nonsensical man in my life. This is how my village influence me in becoming a philosophy researcher. There could be some confusion when I say that some of these practises are nonsensical. It is nonsensical from a philosophical point of view, but it is very much sensible for them. What I understood was—people are going to temples, praying to God and offering many things because it soothes their mind at that point in time. Or they believe that it reveals some truth to them, or solves their problems. They believe in some ultimate reality which they call by different names. But, whenever they are doing something, they are rationally doing it, because they believe that there is a higher being that exists, which either created everything or is the cause of everything. And if we please that cause, our problem will be solved or we will get what we want—this is the rationale behind their activity. So, we cannot say that they are utterly nonsensical, but from a modern, rational point of view, or say a Marxist point of view, we might say that it is nonsensical. But there is a rationale behind it. You mentioned that after your bachelor's, you worked as a truck cleaner and you really felt the need to answer certain questions, which brought you back to academics. This, I think, raises an interesting question about the nature of the philosophy itself. Do you think that common people—people living in villages or those working in physically demanding jobs—engage, or can engage, in philosophy and philosophising? Or is philosophy restricted to academia and other ‘secluded’ institutions? I worked at an NGO sometime in 2008, which was working with sex-workers on problems related to their health. This happened before I joined as a truck cleaner—so I first finished my academics in 2008, joined this NGO and then worked as a truck cleaner. What I understood from these experiences is that everyone follows some philosophy in their lives. We can see that many of the complicated philosophical concepts are easily applied by the layman, without knowing that they are philosophical concepts. What I understood better was—they do what they need. We philosophy scholars may explore many different problems and a wide variety of concepts. Ordinary people focus, knowingly or unknowingly, only on the concepts or theories they need. What kind of career paths in philosophy are you interested in, and think are available in philosophy in India? Teaching still holds the major share among different career possibilities for philosophy scholars in India. And, in fact, I see teaching as a great profession to explore philosophy. It is good that professional and technical institutions also encourage teaching philosophy for their students by realizing its importance. What are some courses you have taught, at BITS or elsewhere? As a discipline, philosophy is dependent on dialogue and discussion, perhaps more so than other disciplines. How do you incorporate this in your teaching practise? I teach Introductory Philosophy and Applied Philosophy for UG students and Philosophical Foundations for Liberal Studies for the M. Phil. Students. As I am teaching in a technical institute, very detailed discussions on philosophical topics, beyond the syllabus, would be too ambitious. We have to stick to the syllabus and make them understand the subject. This is not easy for a large class of students whose orientation is towards technology. Some students are more enthusiastic towards philosophical discussions, so they keep asking doubts and clarifications. More or less, students have a logocentric attitude, in deconstructive terms, towards different disciplines. Most of them are scientistic in nature; an adamant attitude that what the sciences say is right. Thank you Hareesh, for a very interesting and lively conversation. I hope we get to meet each other in person sometime soon!