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Academic writing support for philosophers in India IPN Colloquium This is a bimonthly colloquium, held every Saturday, 10.30-1200 PM, where a philosophy scholar (faculty or research scholar) will present their work, published or work-in-progress. Through this colloquium, we aim to build a platform through which philosophers become familiar with the works of their colleagues, and create a space where researchers can share early drafts of their work for comments and suggestions. The colloquium will be open to all philosophy scholars. If you would like to attend the colloquium, please write to colloquiumipn@gmail.com . If you would like to present at the colloquium, please fill this form and we will get back to you. The current moderators of IPN Colloquium are: R. Krishnaswamy (Jindal Global University), Shinod K (University of Hyderabad), Shruti Bhat (Thapar University), Siddharth S (Sai University), Sushruth Ravish (IIT Kanpur), Varun Bhatta (IISER Bhopal) and Vivek Radhakrishnan (Krea University). The below sheet lists the talks in IPN colloquium till now. (Click here to view the google-sheet.)

Indian Philosophy Network (IPN) is a platform for academic philosophers in India. Indian Philosophy Network (IPN) is a network for professional philosophers in India, both within and outside academia. Currently, IPN comprises more than five hundred members from various avenues -- M.Phil/Ph.D students and faculty from various institutes, college teachers, and philosophy professionals working in non-academic spaces. Join IPN The current moderators of IPN are Siddharth S (Assistant Professor, Sai University) and Varun S Bhatta (Assistant Professor, IISER Bhopal) Home: Welcome IPN aims to build an equitable eco-system for philosophers in India to provide crucial peer support for research, teaching and other professional activities. The network enables better awareness of scholars working in specific areas, thereby facilitating interactions and collaborations. With members from institutes across India, IPN serves as a common platform to share information and resources pertaining to philosophy. Home: About

Review of "Quick and Concise: Philosophy" Shivangi Shanker Independent Scholar, PhD from JNU Jul 22, 2025 Book review of Shamik Chakravarty's Quick and Concise: Philosophy (Hachette India, 2025). Writing an introductory book to a discipline as rich and diverse as philosophy is profoundly challenging. Quick and Concise: Philosophy (Hachette India, 2025) by Shamik Chakravarty not only overcomes this challenge but also broadens the scope of the genre, despite its compact size. It is a pocket-sized book with themes including both Indian and Western traditions of Philosophy. The book offers a discourse on the fundamental questions of philosophy concerning meaning, free will, morality, knowledge, personal identity, and art. Shamik’s endeavour stands out as an attempt to present a comprehensive philosophical dialogue which reflects philosophical inclusivity on two levels: conceptual and contextual. Conceptual inclusivity is evident in Shamik’s incorporation of non-Western philosophy, while contextual inclusivity emerges through the integration of culturally familiar situations, names, and cities into deeper philosophical enquiries. The use of familiar Indian backdrops, such as the workplace dilemma (p.74) in a corporate context or the affirmative action (p. 71) example, makes it especially relatable to the Indian readers. What distinguishes the text further is that it does not bridge the gap between different knowledge systems through mere exposition but an application of the Socratic (Blondell 2018) and the Hegelian Dialectical methods (Houlgate 2024) [i] . In the analogy between Buddhism, deontology, and utilitarianism, or Buddhism and virtue ethics. Or its comparative analysis with Kantian ethics, which puts forth a reconciled ethical position from the point of view of Buddhism. (Chakravarty 2025, 64-70). The process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis [ii] is evident. Shamik selects a broad range of topics as compared to Bertrand Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy (Russell 2020), Thomas Nagel’s What Does It All Mean (Nagel 1987), and Edward Craig’s Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (Craig 2002). As far as the structure of Quick and Concise: Philosophy is concerned, it resembles Nagel’s What Does It All Mean and Edward Craig’s Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. But the curation of topics and the execution of the discussions surrounding it is wider and more inclusive in Shamik’s book. While Shamik includes a range of classical Indian views, Craig focuses mainly on Buddhism. All of these texts either ignore or mention in passing the discussion on the notion of art. Whereas, Quick and Concise: Philosophy not only elaborates on it, but discusses Indian Philosophy of art— Nāṭyaśāstra . Suggesting that art and aesthetics are not peripheral topics but central to philosophy. Shamik shows a shift from traditional metaphysical speculation to recent philosophical and psychological integration, bringing out an intersection of ethics, psychology, metaphysics, and applied philosophy. He discusses how Psychology deals with the dichotomy of choosing the right over the wrong by applying psychological mechanisms (pp. 68-70). The notion of free will includes an extended reference to determinism, compatibilism, agent causation, AI, neuroscience (p. 89), and ethical psychology, along with other interdisciplinary enquiries. He presents a more critical than expository outlook to the problems, which sometimes may feel overwhelming to beginners in Philosophy. But his writing eliminates this obstruction with various shifts in the tone. Given that Russell, Nagel, and Shamik write in different eras, there are differences in how they approach their work. The Problems of Philosophy offers 20th-century analytical and epistemological views, which makes it denser and limited in scope. Shamik’s work overcomes these challenges by employing a conversational style where he speaks to the readers (p. 1) [iii] . He simplifies complicated ideas, recognising the significance of critical thinking in the learning process. The book is a reflection of interactive teaching-learning techniques. Its examples and questions are relatable to the wider audience. The application of both pedagogical and philosophical methods makes the book comprehensible for general readers as well as students of philosophy. The book has eight chapters (excluding references and index), which reflect the diverse scope that the author has created. The chapters are structured thematically to make reasoned analysis, back-and-forth through thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, excelling in the pedagogical spirit. Each chapter explores a fundamental question or a theme within philosophy and presents the diverse philosophical views and critical analysis under sub-themes. The initial four chapters provide a clear orientation to its readers. It includes topics like what philosophy is. What do philosophers do? And introduces the readers to the main branches of Philosophy (p. 20), that is, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ontology, and Logic. In these chapters, the author explores the questions: What is the meaning of life, and meaning in life? What is morality? What is free will and determinism? The latter four chapters enquire into scepticism, what constitutes personal identity, the role of determinism in free will, whether people are responsible for their acts, what is art and how it relates to expression, rasa , value, and emotion. Throughout the book, the author discusses answers to these questions, then the responses are either challenged or supported by other views. The chapter’s structure reflects the integration and application of the Hegelian Dialectical (Houlgate 2025), Socratic [iv] , and philosophical argumentation (inductive and deductive) methods. For example, in the first chapter, the author explains that the job of a philosopher is to seek truth through systematic argumentation. He then questions the nature of truth itself and presents the idea of relativism of truth (p. 15). In the second chapter, the discussion on the meaning of life begins with an investigation of what meaning is [v] , rather than assuming a theory of meaning. Thereafter, it presents a thorough integration of philosophies from different traditions to show how each framework evaluates or creates meaning. For instance, the elucidation of the dilemmas in the Bhagavadgitā, that one faces amid the process of understanding the metaphysical and the ontological meaning of life, is explained through the concept of yoga ( jñāna, karma, bhaktī ). Or the snake and rope example, and in its analogy with Descartes’ dream argument. In this, the author shows the relationship between Nyāya and Descartes’ scepticism, and the reference to Vātsyāyana’s (p. 144) commentary on the Nyāya Sūtra and highlights the views of opponents of the Nyāya school. These explanations offer an integration of primary and secondary literature in a much-synthesised manner. The author intends to inform their readers about the wide-ranging concepts, opposing views, and the evolution of the philosophical debate. When he explains the notion of cultural relativism, in the third chapter, and points out the problem in accepting this view. He first creates a sense of awareness that there are subjective moral beliefs, which means there are no universal moral principles acceptable to all cultures. Then, through a representation of the problems posed by cultural relativism, the author makes the reader question the notion of moral subjectivity. Interestingly, the discussions about relativity and the presentation of a discourse on it point out the interdisciplinary nature of philosophical inquiry. Relativism is a philosophical idea, but the notion of “cultural relativism” (p. 45) is studied often by anthropologists, sociologists, linguists, philosophers and psychologists. Every discipline approaches an issue from a specific vantage point and methodology. Disciplines are said to draw from philosophical methods and concepts, and vice versa. It highlights that concepts are interconnected (pp. 2-3), thereby signifying the relevance of an interdisciplinary approach. The book explicates that Philosophy is multidimensional and that the truth of a philosophical matter revolves around a debate. Structurally, the book offers an integrated study of concepts and continuity, as we see in the sixth chapter on scepticism. The discussion on Descartes’ philosophy develops into the discussion of contemporary externalist responses, including the debate over the dream argument and the application of the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment (pp. 118, 129-130). What could have otherwise come across as a literature survey, mentioning multiple philosophers and concepts in quick succession, develops into a dialectical exploration. It gives away that the author’s intent is not to find settling answers but to inform the readers about the overall debate. For example, in the seventh chapter on Personal Identity, epistemological and metaphysical discussions are made concerning several philosophers: Derek Parfit, Sydney Shoemaker, John Locke, David Hume, and Buddhist philosophy. The dialogue between Milinda and Nāgasena (pp. 167-168) on the questions of personal identity goes beyond knowing “who am I”. And the chapter ends with an unanswered question on the nature of the soul. A similar integration is evident in the eighth chapter, which explores art from a vantage point of expression, representation, flow, meaning, pleasure, and aesthetics. The author presents the formalist, expressivist, aesthetic, and rasa theories of art, capturing the integration of philosophical subdisciplines: metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics—and thereby, rounding off the broader enquiry that initially begins with the mind-body problem and the questions of meaning and life. While the book’s scope is broad, there are certain areas whose inclusion may have added to its expansive nature. Such as the theory of Justice from the aegis of philosophers like Plato, John Rawls, and Amartya Sen. The book does not include the discussions of Philosophy of language, which is central to Epistemology, Logic, Ethics and various other disciplines. An introduction to the central figures like Wittgenstein, Frege, Austin, Searle, or Putnam may have provided a meta-enquiry of the notion of meaning. While we are introduced to Sartre’s view on meaning, Nietzsche’s contributions to understanding meaning in life are missing. The references to other orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy, and the modern Indian thinkers like Sen, Aurobindo, Vivekananda, Mohanty and others may have complemented the book’s scope. Still, the text compensates for its limitations as seen in the eighth chapter—“What is art”, though introductory in tone, explores intersecting domains: experience, emotion, rasa , value, and flow. The chapter draws on Plato’s (p. 173) and Wittgenstein’s direct and indirect contributions (p. 189) to understanding the meaning of art, informing the reader about the wider scope of their philosophical viewpoints. Another remarkable strategy is the blending of the classical Indian Philosophy and the attempts to overcome the limitations of philosophical parochialism (Konstantinović 2021) [vi] , usually prominent in the introductory level texts. Be it the integration of Buddhist ethics or the Bhagvadgītā’s teachings (p. 38), the Nyāya Philosophy (p. 143), or the Rasa theory from Natyasastra (p. 198). Alongside its philosophical inclusivity, the book employs effective pedagogical tools which engage the learner through culturally relevant (Rattanawong and Thongrin 2023) [vii] puzzles and prompts, for the initiation of a relatable understanding of concepts. Some of the culturally familiar examples or cases that the author creates in the book are worth noting. Such as the description of the experiment by Joshua Greene and Michael Koenigs (pp. 70-71), in the chapter on morality. He demonstrates the probable application of the experiment in the Indian system of Affirmative Action policies. The experiment used moral dilemmas like the trolley problem and the crying baby scenario to depict the difference that people show in emotional and cognitive responses when faced with personal moral dilemmas versus impersonal dilemmas. This experiment showed that the synthesis of deontological and utilitarian ethics can solve larger practical problems. It also helps the Indian readers to comprehend the theory in resonance with a familiar context. The author creates engaging philosophical dialogues to help the readers build an understanding step by step. The question, “If the soul isn’t the subject of experience, what is? It’s time for you, the subject of experience, to start thinking at time t 1 and come up with an answer at t 2 !” (p. 171), demands that the reader pause, think, and reflect. This approach is visible in the questions he raises: whether the comedian with a banana and duct tape produces art? And the contemplation around free will. What is more important in these endeavours is the embedding of the Socratic style that invites the readers to think independently and critically. The way the author eases philosophical perplexities with a deft shift in the tone and strategic placement of provocative phrases shows the application of an integrative teaching and learning style. In the opening chapter, the debate surrounding the mind-body problem is framed using views of several philosophers. Before the chapter gets too dense with the debate, the author lowers the intensity of the discourse with a discussion on relativism about truth. Shifting to a more familiar topic, especially one illustrated through examples like jackfruit ice cream and cultural subjectivity, eases the reader back into conceptual clarity. Even though there is a shift to a slightly casual tone, the philosophical message is never diluted, but rather enriched. For instance, “But hang on with me. There is an evil demon who is deceiving you…so you think you have hands but you don’t” (p. 117). These deliberate stylistic techniques, which maintain a balance between the academic and the casual tone, keep the readers hooked throughout the reading process. Complex discussions are eased out with similar acts by saying, “Now try to apply this to Descartes’ demon argument and the brain-in-a-vat argument and see whether it begs the question or not. Sweet dreams!” (p. 144). This sort of closing to a topic as complex as scepticism leaves the readers smiling but unsettled, forging critical reflection. Overall, the book offers both relevance and depth through the contextualisation of foundational problems in philosophy. It presents broad concepts and recent philosophical developments. The book can be beneficial for a diverse range of audiences, including undergraduate or master’s students, lay people, and young scholars. For the latter, it may serve as a useful starting point for research when supplemented with further readings. Owing to its expansive scope and pedagogically conscious style, Quick and Concise: Philosophy is a significant contribution to introductory-level philosophical literature. Footnotes [i] Refer to the discussion by Stephen Houlgate, on “Hegel's Dialectics”, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy , ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2024 Edition, accessed July 12, 2025. [ii] A way to understand the evolution of the ideas and how integration of opposing views can lead to its further development. [iii] “One of the reasons I became a philosopher…..is to argue.” [iv] Ruby Blondell, The Socratic Method: Plato's Use of Philosophical Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). [v] Different views culminate into a meta discussion on meaning of life. [vi] Mostly books in the genre of introduction to philosophy has for long ignored the discussion on Indian Philosophy. See parochialism in Radomir Konstantinović, The Philosophy of Parochialism , trans. Ljiljana Nikolić and Branislav Jakovljević, ed. Branislav Jakovljević (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2021). [vii] There is a strong relationship between the learner’s thinking process and the cultural context. References Blondell, Ruby. The Socratic Method: Plato’s Use of Philosophical Drama . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Chakravarty, Shamik. 2025. Quick and Concise: Philosophy . Bangalore: Hachette India Craig, Edward. Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Houlgate, Stephen. Hegel’s Dialectics.” The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy . Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Summer 2024 Edition. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Accessed July 12, 2025. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/hegel-dialectics/ . Konstantinović, Radomir. 2021. The Philosophy of Parochialism . Translated by Ljiljana Nikolić and Branislav Jakovljević. Edited by Branislav Jakovljević. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Nagel, Thomas. What Does It All Mean? A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy , New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Rattanawong, Amonrat, and Saneh Thongrin. “An Exploration of Culture in Listening and Speaking Materials from an English as an International Language Perspective.” LEARN Journal: Language Education and Acquisition Research Network 16, no. 1 (January-June 2023): 652–75. Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy . Mumbai: Sanage Publishing House, 2020. Originally published in 1912.

The Karnataka Hijab row is about Right to Education, not Freedom of Religion Sania Ismailee PhD Scholar, Department of HSS, IIT Delhi Feb 22, 2022 This article is part of the series of responses from philosophers on the hijab row . The Karnataka case is not a hijab ban case per se. It is the case of imposing a uniform which happens to impose a disadvantage over religious people who display religious symbols like hijab, turban, kirpan, etc. Note a rosary under my collar or a religious bangle/thread hidden under my sleeve will not be incompatible with a prescribed dress code. The central question is then whether the burden imposed by the uniform on religious students constitutes unfairness that must be accommodated for ensuring justice (here, equal opportunity for education). In this specific case, we know that forcing the uniform without accommodating the demands of hijabi Muslim women will hinder their access to education which will be detrimental to their development. It will curtail their opportunities, mainly because we know the economic backwardness of the Muslim community in general and how it may affect Muslim women's opportunities to access education and employment. Religious women will not take off their hijab to go to school but prefer sitting at home. This happened in France and reduced the integration of Muslim women into French society . Therefore, it is incumbent upon the state to accommodate their demands rather than marginalizing an already marginalized group. The uniform rule does not stop anyone from being a Muslim with a hijab but hinders her access to education by disallowing wearing hijab on school premises. This is a subtle but pertinent distinction. I don't think an essential practice test is required to arrive at a solution. The essential practice test is used by Indian courts to scrutinize a controversial religious practice. For instance, whether Hinduism stops women of menstruating age from entering the Sabarimala temple. In the Karnataka case, the central concern is not whether the religious practice is contentious given the specificities of the case. The centrality of the hijab to the integrity and identity of these women is sufficient to accommodate their demands without curtailing their access to education. The centrality of hijab to their "ethical integrity" and identity offers valid grounds for distinguishing the hijab from other clothes like shorts or clown caps. The burden of making education accessible is on the state, not on the religious student. Therefore, the salience of these issues renders insufficient the "I want to distance myself from the BJP to support the Muslim woman" argument. Sundar Sarukkai's argument on the relationship between uniform and equality doesn't address the central issue by eliminating the Muslim figure. Besides, uniforms do play a role in ensuring equality, other things remaining equal. A cursory theme of the Karnataka row is whether the hijab is a patriarchal and forced practice or a case of false choice. Or whether the Quran prescribes hijab as a specific dress code or whether "it is high time for Muslims to accept social reform and move on." We often conflate what is practiced in Muslim societies as Islamic. This is an unconscious jump because oppressive practices by patriarchs (men and women) are justified in the name of Islam. But that doesn't necessarily mean it is indeed an Islamic practice. Here, I disagree with the claim that the hijab is a forced practice "always" (see Nilüfer Göle's study on the different reasons women do hijab--not always religious but not always forced as well). I am not saying hijab is "never" forced. I agree with the argument from control over women's bodies: imposing upon the woman to cover or not to cover is exercising control over their bodies. Take the case of triple talaq or nikaah halala. Powerful Muslim women's movements have used the Quran and sharia to fight patriarchy. So, claims that the Quran is an archaic text are false. Because if it was an archaic seventh-century text with no relevance, how do these religious women use it to secure their rights? (See the brilliant work by MUSAWAH on Muslim family law reform around the world). I am not suggesting that religion is never a tool for oppression. Over here, it is crucial to realize that religion can be a powerful source for reform. Liberal scholars like Martha Nussbaum and Ayelet Shachar have explained how the liberal dismissal of religion as patriarchal leaves the religious woman in a dilemma where either you can be religious or be liberated; there is no middle ground. This is a false dilemma. You can be religious and liberated. Powerful Muslim women's movements around the world are challenging this dilemma rooted in the Western liberal feminist framework along with fighting against orthodox religious interpretations and state repression of minority voices (see Amina Wadud's and Asma Barlas' works). The liberal feminist framework projects itself as a false universal such that if you fall short of its standards, you are branded as illiberal. Discourses on decolonizing theory have pointed this out. So the Muslim woman does not "need saving" from Islam by liberals ( Lila Abu Lughod ). Most people don't know anything about Islam's position on women and mistakenly conflate oppressive practices of Muslim societies with Islam. Of course, it is never enough to say this is not Islamic, even if it is justified in the name of Islam (similar arguments made in the context of violence in Islam and terrorism). But one must acknowledge religion as a powerful tool for reform. For instance, Raja Rammohan Roy used Hindu scriptures, not secular reasons, to argue against sati. For a philosophical piece defending the hijab in the French ban context, see Cecile Laborde . ___________________________________________________________________________________________ Read other articles in this series: Ariba Zaidi -- A Word of Caution to 'the Uniformist' and 'the Reformist’ Danish Hamid -- Back to Liberal Basics Hina Mushtaq -- Can women decide for themselves? Sania Ismailee -- The Karnataka Hijab row is about Right to Education...

Review of R. Krishnaswamy's Book Adreeja Sarkar PhD Scholar, Jawaharlal Nehru University Jun 2, 2024 Book review of R. Krishnaswamy's book The Call for Recognition: Naturalizing Political Norms (Routledge 2023). In our decision-making procedures, our reasons for actions are ushered by norms, whether they be of the informal kind or in the form of decrees and sanctions. Norms are effective means to acquire and conserve social welfare. Like symbiotic fungi that enable nutrient transfer and ecological restoration, norms are the ties that bind us in a system of social cooperation and collective growth. The relation between norms and agents is thus, a mutual one. Agents in any social group or collective need norms for the proper functioning of the group just as norms require performing agents to coordinate and cooperate so that the overall normative framework of the group can evolve for the better. The relation is also dynamic because in order to evolve together, both norms and behavioural attitudes and actions of agents demand flexibility and openness to change as prerequisites. The structure of norms appears to be (a) heavily influenced by the socio-cultural contexts from which they arise while simultaneously aiming towards (b) a 'transcendence' through the attainment of universalizability. Even though parochial socio-cultural group beliefs may differ in character, there prevails some homogeneity among the contents of specific norms despite differences. There is an everlasting debate regarding whether normativity [1] arises through social agreement (anti-foundationalism) or is it entirely objective in nature (essentialism), i.e., where the truth or 'rightness' of values have an 'essence' (independently) existing out there in the world, free from any subjective preferences. Analyzing the structure of social norms constitutes a critical step in the process of interpreting social justice. If norms are solely anthropological, then they eventually suffer from absolute relativism. Contrarily, if norms are solely objective or universal then justice or fairness becomes a very rigid domain ignoring socio-cultural specificities. The sources of these norms aren't easy to decipher, more so, when one delves into their formation, functionality, purpose and impact in our everyday lives. One also needs to bring into the discussion the concepts of identity, autonomy, intention, motivation, behaviour and action in both individual and collective contexts. Krishnaswamy’s book can be considered as an inquiry into the grounds of normativity involving these aspects. He takes up questions like – what constitutes our social and political norms, how do we understand social agency (in theory and praxis) and how a right political institution can be crucial in enabling the required grounds for these norms. In the process of doing so, he provides a panoramic picture of the traditional and current interpretations of political agency and the interactions between socio-political principles and subjecthood. The book, as he states in his introduction, can be divided into two phases. In the initial chapters, he performs the job of a critic by assessing the various traditions of political theories and citing the incompatibilities or dis-connect existing between their notions of the right political institution and social agency. The latter chapters focus more on constructing a different perspective in viewing norms, social agency and the roles of a political institution. At the heart of his normative framework lies the shaping of our identity as political subjects on the basis of ‘recognition’. Simply put, he provides a recognitional model [2] as a normative ideal in understanding our behaviour as social agents. In a recognitional model, political agency is understood from an inter-subjective perspective as in, how we recognize the other and are recognized by them. To recognize any entity, he states, is to apply a social identity to that entity which further reveals the various relations that the said entity exists in, within a community. We are first and foremost, social beings and any talk on normativity has to take into consideration our existence in relations. However, this model of recognition is not a mere static representation of reality for the author. He considers it to be a dynamic and flexible process where we not only learn how to situate each other socially but also moderate social categories while acknowledging novel experiences individually and collectively. Recognition, to him, acts as a way out of the extremities of subjectivism and objectivism in the analysis of normativity. The normative agency in a recognitional model is a social given. There are no prior conditions that might act as a foundation to what an agent ought to do. In fact, that one is an agent is sufficient enough a reason to consider her as a legitimate subject for (a) dispensing social categories and (b) being the bearer of social norms. Krishnaswamy argues that the need for equal normative status is justified by the mere existence of a 'society' and the existence of people living in the society. Social violence or silencing occurs when any agent is denied their fundamental normative right i.e., the right to participate in any normative discourse within the society. One of his major claims in the book is that only a recognitional political framework, through its non-essentialist, relational ethic can help us arrive at the legitimacy of norms in attaining collective welfare. The method he cites in developing such a recognitional framework is to first situate agency and autonomy as inseparable from the natural and social environments they are based in. Accordingly, he goes on to explain that intentionality/self-realization emerges as a normative quality guided by biological forces. He interprets internalization of laws as the recognition or knowledge that – "the patterns of behavioural change are consequences of other normative rules which dictate how naturalistic laws inform our agency".[3] In the following phase of the analysis, he aims to show that the standards for normative actions are public in nature by virtue of containing shared intentions. Norms become public due to the intentional performance of the individuals of a group and eventually become historical, capable of providing motivational impact over longer periods of time. Regarding the interrelation between normative behaviour and natural dispositions, Krishnaswamy (following anti-essentialist claims) argues that our reasons for actions cannot belong to a different cognitive realm from the actions themselves. Here, he uses the example of learning languages (where one needs to follow rules but a cognitive grasp of the rules prior to speaking doesn’t necessarily help in actually speaking the language) to reiterate that situating norms in a different realm separate from pre-cognitive level of conscious actions would rarely help in comprehending the structure of our normative behaviour. Norms are constructed out of the interpretations and reactions of multiple agents of the collective towards each other and their immediate environment. Social coordination among individuals of a collective arise due to shared intentions.[4] Planning structures of individual agencies form the connecting link between individual and shared agencies. Our capacity for planning agency, as Bratman puts it, is a core capacity that underlies interrelated forms of mind-shaped practical organization: cross-temporal organization of individual agency, shared agency, social rules, and rule-guided organized institutions. One function of our capacity for planning agency is the preference for these forms of practical organization.[5] These planning structures lead to the continuity between individual agency and shared agency. In order to establish the larger aim of his thesis – that rules or norms have to emerge out of people’s natural and social contexts – he points at how intentions while being collective also need to be cognitively 'recognized' by agents. Normative political programmes will always be lacking in their discussions about justice and fairness if they ignore the realities of our practical lives. The far removal from practical predicaments would result in a dissonance between how people cognize they should act and how they actually act in everyday circumstances. According to him, norms are created through collective action by 'joint agreement'. Mutual commitments and obligations arise from the moral grounding that our social and cultural realities provide. Our understanding of moral right or wrong arises from our lived experiences. Practical instances in life almost often inculcate implicit agreements that make joint action towards shared goals possible. This differs from how joint agreement works in social contract frameworks where agreement is required to be individualistic and explicit. Krishnaswamy claims that the fact that we can plan and intend goals is what gives us the capacity to commit. Following Gilbert[6], he argues that collective goals are separate from personal goals, and normative commitments are social in nature. He shows how singularist accounts of intentionality and normative commitments lead to individualist political philosophies. To create a good social and political theory of obligation we ought to begin with exploring how norms are a natural part of our collective existence. He further argues that if norms are public and are generated out of collective behaviour then rules of social action get their power to be obligatory only when they are recognized by all the members of that group. The formal conditions for institutional behaviour is based on collective dispositions, i.e., the recognition of norms along with relevant normative expectations shared by agents. The recognition of norms entails the acceptance of that norm and the readiness to bind ourselves to the norm. Political institutions since they aim to regulate behaviour through collective rules need continual performative reinforcement by the people to whom those rules are directed. It becomes important that institutions then take into consideration the natural social conditions of the people by analyzing pragmatic instances. It is through this that social silencing and injustice can be checked. Political injustice occurs either through coercion or the deliberate or non-deliberate overlooking of contextual differences prevailing in intersubjective recognition. Recognitional ethics requires equal participation of agents as well as institutions in rule formation and enactment. Krishnaswamy quite aptly puts forward one limitation of such a normative framework. While normative reflexivity of agents is a product of inter-personal interactions, interpretation of norms is bound to vary from person to person. Demands for conformity among group members may lead to coercion or ostracization if some members do not conform to the group identity. He holds the opinion that group conformity might not always ensure the absence of discrimination. In order to avoid such cases, political institutions must create safe spaces where silencing and feelings of hurt and discrimination can be conceptually addressed. The book aims to analyze natural social conditions phenomenologically to find solutions to the limitations of the objectivist idea of justice. His stance of political naturalism is a novel interdisciplinary attempt to bridge the gap between objectivist and relativist approaches to social reality and justice. A Few Challenges The author does not, however, draw a very distinct line as to where the 'natural' ends and the 'social' begins in the 'natural social conditions' that he talks about. As such, the sources of normativity or normative agency remain a bit hazy. Intersubjective understanding and knowledge demands detailed analysis of how a recognitional model would define collective intentionality. Whether collective intentionality and group agency are reducible to individual intentions or whether it is the case that one common intention is jointly shared by all the members need to be assessed. The recognitional model has to explain how to bridge the gaps between emotivism and intuitionism when it comes to intersubjective interpretations. (Assuming that a recognitional model implements the concepts of empathy and trust for its functioning, it also needs to be addressed how empathy and trust would function in intersubjective interpretations.) If joint agreements imply individual planning capabilities for forming norms and institutions, what ensures agent A that another agent B would respond likewise? If we base our inter-subjective interpretations on ‘collective intentionality’ while simultaneously retaining intentional capabilities of individual agents, then this would lead to the problem of circularity. How should we then understand the plurality of subjectivity in contexts involving collectives like institutions as well as contexts including random groups? Again, in a country like India, for instance, with diverse inherent contextual features, how should the justification of uniform truths/norms be done? Krishnaswamy’s book initiates interesting arenas for further discussions on the concepts of coordination, agreement and collaboration in dealing with epistemic injustice. His recognitional model takes up a naturalistic approach to social construction. For the model to be seen as an explanation, some clarification about its justification is needed. The Call for Recognition: Naturalizing Political Norms sets up room for interdisciplinary analysis and will be an intriguing read for scholars of law, social and political philosophy, social epistemology, meta-ethics and social ontology. Endnotes [1] Normativity is the capacity to describe any claim as action-guiding in the sense of right/wrong and good/bad. [2] Influenced by Hegelian anti-essentialism. [3] Chapter 6: Socio-Natural Embeddedness, p-123. The Call for Recognition: Naturalizing Political Norms . 2023 [4] Bratman, 2014; Gilbert, 2006; Velleman, 2000 [5] Bratman, Planning and Its Function in Our Lives , Volume41, Issue1 Special Issue:Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Lecture 2023 Symposium , p-1-15, feb 2024. [6] Gilbert, 2006. References Bratman, Michael. (2014). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together . Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. —- Planning and Its Function in Our Lives , Volume41, Issue1. Special Issue:Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Lecture 2023 Symposium , p-1-15, feb 2024. Gilbert, Margaret. (2006). A Theory of Obligation Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society . Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Velleman, David. (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason . Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Review of "Quick and Concise: Philosophy" Neeraj Umesh PhD Scholar, BITS Pilani (Hyderbad) Jul 17, 2025 Book review of Shamik Chakravarty's Quick and Concise: Philosophy (Hachette India, 2025). Overview and Structure of the Book Shamik Chakravarty’s Quick and Concise: Philosophy serves as an accessible and engaging introductory work for readers who are in the early stages of their intellectual journey into rational inquiry and philosophical reflection. This book touches upon key philosophical problems associated with the discipline, including metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology, while skilfully avoiding the complex formalism and symbolic logic often found in academic texts. Written in a clear and conversational style, it raises questions that general readers and laypersons have likely encountered in everyday life but may not have pursued with philosophical precision. The introduction is especially notable for its tone, which adds what may be described as a ‘human touch.’ Rather than treating philosophy as a remote or purely academic exercise, Chakravarty invites the reader to see it as a deeply human pursuit, rooted in the necessity of questioning, reasoning, and examining the implications of one’s beliefs and values. This rhetorical move effectively situates philosophical inquiry in the reader’s lived context, a strength rarely seen in traditional textbooks. A particularly thoughtful inclusion is the reference to the Bhagavad Gita , which introduces Indian philosophical perspectives into the broader narrative. The author cites the famous dilemma faced by Arjuna, “This dilemma isn’t just one between a moral and an immoral choice but between two choices that have values that are compelling”, as an example of ethical conflict not easily resolved by standard normative theories. This framing reflects the nuanced character of real-world moral dilemmas. However, the analysis might have been enriched by a discussion of classical or contemporary objections to this framing, particularly from within Indian traditions themselves. One of the book’s commendable features is its pedagogical sensitivity. Rather than overburdening readers with formal logic, Chakravarty introduces logical tools gradually and in small, digestible portions. This scaffolding allows the reader to develop reasoning skills organically without the need for prior exposure to analytic methods. In the next section, I offer a closer look at several key chapters that illustrate the strengths and occasional gaps of Chakravarty’s approach. Chapter Highlights The chapter on morality is a demonstration of the philosophical depth and clarity that the author wishes to bring to his readers in his book. It surveys a broad array of ethical theories along with their standard criticisms, enabling readers to consider the strengths and limitations of each. The chapter could have benefited from engagement with contemporary moral psychology, particularly theories of moral cores or innate ethical intuitions, and examining certain positions in a bit more depth, such as Jonathan Wolff’s ‘ An Introduction to Moral Responsibility’ . Its restraint is understandable given its target audience. Chakravarty aims to provoke reflection rather than to exhaust debate. The chapter on epistemology, titled "What is Knowledge?" takes on one of the most discussed problems in the field, the Gettier problem, and presents a range of responses. The treatment is systematic and coherent. However, the transition into this topic may feel abrupt, especially for readers unfamiliar with the basics of epistemology. A more gradual introduction, perhaps beginning with the sources of knowledge such as perception, reason, and testimony, would have provided a smoother entry. In this regard, Robert Audi’s Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge offers a model worth emulating. Further, since the chapter revolves around the concept of knowledge, a brief discussion on theories of truth (correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, etc.) and the distinction between absolutist and relativist views would have significantly enhanced the general reader’s understanding. These additions could have grounded the discussion more fully and helped bridge the conceptual leap from earlier chapters. Nevertheless, the concluding section on "The Ideal Knower" is particularly engaging. The author's attempt to bridge the gap between truth and justification while integrating insights from Nyāya philosophy is a refreshing and welcome gesture toward cross-cultural dialogue in epistemology. It broadens the book's scope and invites readers to appreciate the depth of Indian philosophical traditions alongside their Western counterparts. The chapter on skepticism also deserves mention. While well-argued and rich in content, it may have been more effectively placed earlier in the book. A skeptical mindset is foundational to both philosophical reasoning and inquiry. Introducing it earlier could have framed the reader’s engagement with subsequent chapters more critically. That said, the chapter does a commendable job of introducing important concepts such as abduction and common fallacies like begging the question, which are essential tools for any aspiring philosopher. The seventh chapter, on personal identity, is arguably the most well-executed section of the book. Chakravarty presents both essentialist and anti-essentialist frameworks with clarity and balance, guiding the reader through well-established positions in the debate. The inclusion of the dialogue between Nāgasena and King Milinda is particularly effective, offering a lucid and engaging account of the Buddhist theory of non-self. This is presented with enough clarity that even readers unfamiliar with Buddhist thought can grasp its philosophical implications. For those interested in exploring this theme further, the work of Jay Garfield, especially Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration , is a valuable complement. Garfield’s argument from moral phenomenology strengthens the case that the self, while not metaphysically substantial, plays a central role in our experience and ethical life. His treatment of non-self as a lived, moral insight rather than a merely metaphysical denial is especially relevant to readers seeking to understand the ethical stakes of identity. The final chapter on aesthetics brings the book to a compelling close. Chakraborty addresses enduring questions such as “What is art?” and “What does it mean to call something a work of art?” His brief inclusion of a discussion on Nāṭyaśāstra and the concept of rasa is particularly valuable, as it introduces readers to Indian aesthetic theory, a domain often overlooked in introductory texts. Academic Perspective Shamik Chakravarty’s Quick and Concise: Philosophy is an impressive and inclusive introductory text for the general reader. It navigates difficult philosophical terrain with clarity, balance, and accessibility. While some chapters could benefit from deeper scaffolding or further engagement with counter-positions, the book as a whole succeeds in its core aim: to initiate general readers into the world of philosophical thinking without condescension or oversimplification. Beyond general readability, the book also raises questions about its utility in academic settings, especially as a possible text for undergraduate instruction. One element missing from the book, especially if used in an academic context, is a reflective feedback mechanism. Most introductory texts include end-of-chapter questions or prompts that help students consolidate learning and develop their own philosophical positions. The text is quite informative, but I feel it lacks 'Nurture' that would allow students to engage with these ideas more effectively. Perhaps incorporating a question that prompts students to form their own opinions could be beneficial. Learning philosophy and doing philosophy are two distinct activities, though I do not deny that they overlap to some degree; however, in my opinion, this text focuses on Learning Philosophy, especially from the way it is structured and would be better suited to be supplementary material for students. In sum, this work succeeds in being an accessible and culturally thoughtful entry point into philosophical inquiry. While it is not a substitute for more rigorous academic resources, it offers instructors and self-learners alike a meaningful way to begin thinking philosophically with an eye toward both Eastern and Western traditions. References Audi, Robert. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge . New York: Routledge, 2011. Garfield, Jay L. Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration . New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2022. Wolff, Jonathan. Introduction to Moral Philosophy. 2nd ed. S.L.: W W Norton, 2021.

A Word of Caution to 'the Uniformist' and 'the Reformist' Ariba Zaidi Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Zakir Husain Delhi College Feb 22, 2022 This article is part of the series of responses from philosophers on the hijab row . Through this piece of writing, my endeavour is to present my arguments to the Uniformist and the Reformist demonstrating that their attempts to get the practice of hijab banned are misplaced even if they have come to believe that their hearts are not. The term ‘Reformist’ here refers to the set of people who believe the practice of hijab or its imposition to be a regressive socio-cultural practice and therefore are calling for a prohibition by way of imposition. The term ‘Uniformist’, on the other hand, refers to the section that believes the practice to be incompatible with the various symbols of uniformity (uniforms in the current context) that are instituted to promote equality and fraternity, and through them, arguably, unity in a diverse society such as ours. Why the uniformist insistence on the hijab ban is untenable Given the current context and the likely grave implications that may follow, I would like to draw the attention of the Uniformist first. What does the symbol of uniformity represent? One may not disagree that the intent is to bring uniformity, but uniformity in itself doesn’t represent any merit in most societies unless it is a means to attain other social values, which are 'equality' and 'fraternity' and through such ideals 'unity' that binds the social fabric. My argument is – the spirit of uniformity is what gives meaning to the symbols of uniformity . Further, if a society is not able to appreciate what the spirit of uniformity means or what its significance is, and to what extent it can be pursued, the likely-hood of self-sabotaging the ends , i.e., equality, fraternity and unity for which such symbols of uniformity were instituted in the first place can’t be discounted. The spirit of uniformity is often mistaken to be seeking uniformity in all the spheres of social life. The error lies in not recognizing that not all domains of social life are equally amenable to a quest for uniformity. There are some domains where the quest for uniformity is a just and a meaningful pursuit, but there are also provinces where it cannot be accorded a justifiable place. Social, economic and political spheres are such domains where the quest for uniformity is arguably a legitimate pursuit. More so in the context of our society where economic and social hierarchies are deep-rooted, but regardless of the realities of a society, to have uniform basic minimum standards of dignified living, and absence of social hierarchies ought to be one of the prime objectives for any progressive society. Thus, the spirit of uniformity is a requisite quest in the foregoing domains. However, society is a union of more than these three stated sets. This brings me to the sphere of culture . Can we seek uniformity in the domain of culture, which in our society is composed of many diverse elements? Culture is a slightly different set than others, where each element (cultural element) of the set often happens to be the assumed identity of the ones who belong to that particular culture. For instance, should we seek uniformity in languages or dialects, in religion or its sub-sects, in rituals, customs and traditions etc.? Each of these elements can be a part of someone’s assumed identity. Any short-sighted attempt to dilute the integrity of such identities, as history indicates, are fraught with danger, often with detrimental effects to some of the goals for which the uniformity is sought in the first place, i.e., fraternity and through it unity in the society. Alternatively stated, uniformity becomes the instrument of sabotaging the same very goals to pursue which it was instituted in the first place. Thus, while instituting the symbols of uniformity such as uniforms, one ought to be guided by the spirit of uniformity, which is to strive for uniformity within the socio-politico-economic domains without undermining the diversity in the cultural domain . I am, therefore, urging all the Uniformists, who are in concurrence with the call for a hijab ban, to be guided by the spirit of uniformity. Otherwise, knowingly or unknowingly, they are grossly undervaluing the goals for which uniformity is sought. Why the Reformist insistence on the hijab ban is untenable The following sets of arguments are addressed to the Reformists, who, as I stated earlier, are those set of people who believe the practice of hijab or its imposition to be a regressive socio-cultural practice and therefore are calling for a prohibition by way of imposition. I don’t intend to keep the willful (autonomous) practice of hijab, with or without any justification, within the same bracket as the imposed or culturally-conditioned practice of it (even if some of the members fall within the intersection of the culturally-conditioned class and the autonomous class). The question is: Does the imposition of hijab or similar regressive practices regardless of their religious or cultural affiliation deserve a top-down imposition of ban or any other form of restriction? I agree with the Reformists that our society is a simmering ground of many regressive practices and arguably there is no religion that doesn’t contribute to it. It is significant for us, therefore, as a collective, to arrive at a generalization or a guiding framework to address such regressive issues and choose wisely when it comes to opting for a path to bring reforms. My attempt, through the following, is to demonstrate to the Reformists that a well-recognized framework already exists in most of the thriving democratic societies, and inference from such a framework doesn’t justify a top-down imposition of ban on hijab or similar practices. When it comes to socio-cultural reforms, one can immediately think of two preferred modes by most societies worldwide to carry out reforms viz., the consensus-based approach and the top-down impositions . One is likely to associate a consensus-based approach with a thriving democracy, but a top-down imposition isn’t entirely incompatible within a democratic political structure either. Of course, a consensus-based approach has to be the norm , but exceptions can be cited that often warrant a quick decision making, where waiting for consensus may prove to be debilitating. We have the instances of child marriage abolition, abolition of untouchability, the PNDT act, abolition of slavery in the US etc., where waiting for consensus would have proven self-defeating. I am inclined to keep abolition of sati too in this category although it was imposed by an imperialist regime. The question to be asked is what is the basis to determine whether a case for reform fits the consensus-based approach or the top-down imposition. The foregoing instances of top-down impositions and other similar incidents that have not found a mention here can probably be a promising source to inductively arrive at some generalization. In my humble attempt, I find that a breach of someone’s ‘right to life’ and ‘ right to live with dignity’ are two factors that provided the ground for impositions in all such instances. One may wish to keep disruption of peace and public order in this category, but it is also arguably one of the most misused basis by most governments to impose sanctions on our liberties. Thus, in my opinion, the breach of ‘right to life’ and ‘right to live with dignity’ seems to be the only basis for a top-down imposition in a democratic polity in most cases if not all. In all other contexts, a consensus-based approach should be the norm for any democracy to be meaningful to its citizenry. Now, the question is can school/college going hijab-wearing girls be seen as breaching any of these inalienable rights that warrant a top-down imposition. I am sure that our Reformist zeal is not blinded enough to see it that way, but there may be some who would still want to point that women forced to be behind the veil are living a less dignified life, and the situation according to the chosen parameters warrants imposition of the ban. I would like to argue that by forcing the issue of the hijab ban, it is the Reformist who is stealing the chance of a Muslim woman to live a dignified life. By forcing the issue, they are preparing a ground for many Muslim orthodox parents to not let their daughters see the corridors of schools and colleges and pushing the women who have autonomously adopted the practice to avoid such spaces. The Reformist enthusiasm of the hijab ban advocates is most likely to end up stealing a girl child’s right to education, her probably only chance to get out of this vicious trap in which her parents are trapped, her only chance to question her socio-cultural conditioning and associated cognitive biases, her only chance to make a decision for herself whether she wants to be behind the veil or not. Thus, at least to me, the Reformist demand for a ban on hijab and similar practices is unjust and uncalled for, and consensus mode seems to be the way forward. Consensus mode appears to be the way forward, but… Thus, the Reformists, if they are honest in their attempt to bring reforms, ought to pay more attention to devise ways to bring consensus amongst all the stakeholders. The essence of following this path lies in understanding what is central to building consensus . Central to any consensus building attempt, it can be argued, lies our ability to forge a constructive dialogue around the issues that require consensus. Any dialogue, as we all know, is composed of arguments, a logic-driven structure where claims are supported by premises. Likewise, the strength of the argument lies in its validity and soundness, where the truth of the premises plays a significant part. The question is where do these premises come from? In a society where education is still struggling to penetrate and expand its reach, it’s unreasonable to assume that their premises are likely to represent facts or truth by empirical standards. Most likely, socio-cultural conditionings, various forms of custom and tradition enforced beliefs or some form of authority are the general sources of many of their premises. What makes matters further complex is that almost all the sections of our society, in varying degrees, subscribe to such premises where each of these sections has its own sets of customs, traditions, social-conditioning, and authorities. A dialogue is probably difficult to conceive in a situation where participating members or sections of society appeal to different grounds of truth for many of their premises in the arguments advanced by them . Thus, what we get is a stalemate in return, and our Reformist zeal, instead of recognizing the true nemesis and finding a solution to it, pushes for the quick fixes , often in the form of top-down insensitive impositions as it can be witnessed in the context of the call for hijab ban. What a Reformist needs to do instead is to find a way to push through this stalemate and ensure that the dialogue happens , but how can they do it? The stumbling block in the dialogues seems to be ‘ the different grounds for truth ’ of their premises, but can we ensure uniformity in it. My preferred criteria would be empirical facts for obvious reasons, but can we push for it? I think we should not. Then what should be done? My take is that we ought to focus on the prospective participants in the dialogue, i.e. children and in them inculcate the skill of reflectivity . From reflectivity what I mean is the ability to challenge one’s own beliefs and those of others, the ability to seek justification for such beliefs and keep such justifications under constant scrutiny, the ability to identify fallacies and cognitive biases and the ability to overcome the conditionings enforced by the accident of birth. Given the fact that they are able to question themselves with the same intensity that they question others, participants of this kind in a dialogue are more likely to come up with some agreeable common grounds of truth for their premises and make their dialogue and consequently reforms more successful. One may ask why children alone? I am not pessimistic in this regard, but I have come to understand that, barring a few exceptions, the grown-up population is way too conditioned (even the educated ones) to give upon their rigidities. Efforts can nevertheless be made in this direction. What is it that the Reformists should do to actualise the foregoing? Considering that they are true in their intent to reform the society, and want to put an end to regressive practices without causing much of a social discord and discontentment, they should spend their energies in creating and shaping an education system that promotes reflectivity of the kind stated above in the students at the grass-root level. I am not implying here that all our social and cultural problems will be resolved once our citizenry is educated in the stated manner. It would be naïve to think so given the complexities at play, and I don’t intend to underappreciate the human tenacity to abandon reason when it suits them, but with all that could be there to impede dialogue, by adopting this course, surely we will give ourselves the best chance to reform our society without inciting social discord. These are my well-considered views, but I can be naïve in such considerations. __________________________________________________________________________________________ Read other articles in this series: Ariba Zaidi -- A Word of Caution to 'the Uniformist' and 'the Reformist’ Danish Hamid -- Back to Liberal Basics Hina Mushtaq -- Can women decide for themselves? Sania Ismailee -- The Karnataka Hijab row is about Right to Education...

Review of Muzaffar Ali's book by Satya Javvaji Satya Javvaji MA student, KU Luven Oct 26, 2023 Book review of Muzaffar Ali's India, Habermas and the Normative Structure of Public Sphere (Routledge, 2023) In India, Habermas and the Normative Structure of Public Sphere , Muzaffar Ali sketches the theory and procedures of an adequate public sphere in India arguing that it has to focus on accessibility and acceptability of the individual participants. In a book that is comprehensive and accessible to a wide audience, Ali gracefully tackles the question of how to think through a native context while being aware of the overbearing Western hegemony on the one hand, and of the risk of delving into nativism or nationalism on the other. The context of the book’s conception starts with Ali’s personal discomfort with the rigid Western-Indian divide in his curriculum growing up. While authors from both geographies were being taught separately, there was a dearth of how to conduct native Indian political philosophy that neither preaches a pre-modern excavation of Indian values nor blindly adopts Western concepts and categories and applies them directly to the Indian context, which oftentimes much different. The book’s first chapter deals with precisely this question - “to figure out a way to deal with the West without a complete withdrawal and yet keep the elan vital of the decolonization project intact” (p. 13). Ali responds to it by arguing for a double native approach. Firstly, since a Western theory purports a universalism in its concepts, it remains essential for a non-western theory to engage with it and critically examine its shortcomings and exclusions. Secondly, these critical engagements have to form the basis of a native and decolonised Indian political theory that adequately captures the context of the society it is speaking with. An adequate theory does not stop at pointing out a historical or contextual exception to a Western theory, thereby proving it inapplicable. Rather, it captures the relevant conditions of possibility, that are socio-historically situated, to initiate a holistic theoretical basis that can, as is successfully carried out in this book, support an Indian public sphere. With this methodology in hand, in the second chapter, Ali discusses the notion of the public sphere in Habermas, whose contribution to its theory is considered field-defining in Western literature. The public sphere is the conceptual stage upon which members of a society exchange views of social and political significance that pertain to their collective life. In the Habermasian public sphere, citizens form a rational public opinion through the medium of linguistic communication which is seen as a reservoir of meaning. While everyone is theoretically invited to the public sphere, Ali points out that the notion relies on a singular universalizing idea and emphasizes the role of rationality disproportionately, thereby striving to keep the project of modernity alive. In doing this, it ignores that firstly, there might be multiple public spheres with diametrically opposed common concerns, and secondly, that since dialogue always already takes place within certain power structures, the marginal and historically excluded voices are either not heard or, to borrow Gayatri Spivak’s famous declaration, that the subaltern simply cannot speak. With these problems in mind and the direct non-applicability of this notion of the public sphere to India (that, according to Ali, is in part due to its heavy religious context), he discusses in the third chapter, that current Indian engagements with Habermas are either comparative or evaluative. Both these engagements pose challenges to the theory and provide critical ways of engaging with it, but either lose sight of the overall conceptual structure by focusing on particular historical examples/contexts or fail to offer a way forward in terms of moving out of the Western hegemonic shadow. Instead, what Ali aims for is a thick concept of the Indian situation that can, as a full concept, interact with the Habermasian theory of the public sphere. In the fourth and fifth chapters, Ali begins with the major chunk of his creative contributions to the idea of an Indian public sphere. He starts with the observation that existing critiques are mainly concerned about the lack of accessibility and acceptability of all to the public sphere. This leads him to frame these as the twin normative principles based on which he theorizes an imagined Indian public sphere. This is so that the public sphere is “gauged by the ease of access it offers to the communities and individuals of whom it claims to be on” and it accepts “the perspectives and viewpoints of all individuals sans any ifs and buts” (p. P. 117-18). He cautions again that he is not interested in a “nativist approach to portray the Indianness” but is instead aiming for a “native approach to conceptualize Indianness” (p. 84). For theoretical and socio-historical reasons, Ali chooses to focus on religion as the social entity that informs the Indian context, the historical idea of rationality in Indian literature and the burden of colonialism with respect to how it colours the reading of texts and consequently of understanding society. With respect to religion, Ali discusses the complicated nature of secularism in India, the socialized role of caste and the deeply political nature of these issues. Through the perspective of religion, it becomes clear that in the European context, the immigration of other religions forms a new conceptual problem while dealing with a universal and apparently secular public sphere. But when it comes to the Indian context, religion has always been part of the notion of secularism and is a “perennial entity within Indian societies” (p. 97). According to Ali, “majority-minority, upper caste-lower caste, powerful-powerless, man-woman binaries within the Indian situation are often anchored in religion” (p. 111). Additionally, he argues that the procedural communicative rationality advocated by Habermas does not apply to the Indian context if acceptability and accessibility are to be taken seriously in the public sphere, and that a combination of abstract rationality and contextual rationality has to be present. This takes seriously the notion that contextual examples cannot always be universalized and translated into abstract concepts and language. At the same time, it does not mean that context-based examples are simply supporting or adding legitimacy to a universalised social procedural reason. Ali proposes the term deuniversal rationality to understand the dual nature of rationality in the Indian context. He reformulates the two aspects of deuniversal rationality as abstract rationality and experiential rationality. With the help of Merleau Ponty’s theory of the embodied self, in combination with Gopal Guru and Sundar Sarukkai’s theory of how the social sphere translates into embodied experiences, Ali argues that not only critical reflection and consequent articulation but also other aspects of the individual’s public identity namely their embodied experience, cultural conditioning and their emotional aspects of existence must have unrestricted access to the public sphere since these are not subordinated to reason but are fundamental aspects of the individual’s self-identity and hence self-expression in the social sphere. Ali writes that the aim is “to grant an epistemic passage to the lived body to enter as a medium of communication within the public sphere. The lived experience emerges as … a parallel and meaningful category for conducting the debates within the public sphere” (p. 128). Ali argues for the co-originality, to borrow Habermas’ term, of both the abstract component and the lived experience component in making up deuniversal rationality. He hopes this not only allows more people, previously excluded, into the contextual Indian public sphere but also, in recognising that the public sphere is carried as part of the individual’s lived experience, and that these very experiences are accepted as contributions to interactions in the Indian public sphere. While Ali is successful at conceptualizing a thick notion of the Indian public sphere based on deuniversal rationality that equi-prioritizes abstract rationality and lived experience, questions follow about how issues are resolved at the theoretical level when these two components contradict or disagree with each other. This sits in the wider debate about the post-structural turn in philosophy emphasizing that discourse always already happens within certain power relations that not only oppress but also produce individuals. Since Ali’s focus was on expanding who is included in the public sphere, what could possibly be clarified further is how disagreements are to be resolved once everyone is in the public sphere. This is keeping in mind the hyper-mediatized society we live in and the possibility of a fragmented and polarized public sphere that is sometimes clearly visible during discussions pertaining to national identity. Additionally, some readers could argue that according to lived experience unqualified epistemic privilege of expressing the truth complicates matters of intra-group justice and brings up the issue of intersectionality. This is because individuals, while referring to their lived experience hardly ever refer to only themselves as isolated individuals but to the group they see themselves as belonging to and speaking as part of. However, since they are simultaneously part of multiple groups and identities, it becomes important to keep in mind that all these identities affect the articulation of their lived experience and cannot be neatly separated into compartments. These are additional remarks since the intellectual involvement and theoretical rigour with which Ali takes on the ambitious project of theorizing a native Indian public sphere is commendable making the book essential reading for political philosophers, political and social scientists, theorists from the global South and everyone who wishes to understand the complexities involved in thinking about the native. Image-credit: © Yann Forget / Wikimedia Commons

Review of Bhaskarjit Neog's Book Abhishek Anant Nowbagh Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University May 16, 2024 Book review of Bhaskarjit Neog’s book What Responsibility? Whose Responsibility? Intention, Agency, Emotions of Collective Entities (Routledge 2024). The author, Bhaskarjit Neog, in the prologue of this book, provides instances of collective wrongdoing, along with the observation that "one of the reasons behind the disappearance of moral resentment from public memory is the fact that we do not always have a clear understanding of the simple question - who is responsible when a group or collective is held responsible?" (Neog, 2024, p. xiii). The author brings forth the difference between the idea of attributing moral properties to groups and collectives in general everyday moral vocabulary, easily understood in general terms, and the analytical understanding of collective responsibility, which poses serious conceptual problems. When the philosophical analysis of collective responsibility is attempted through the concept of individual moral responsibility, the idea of collective responsibility begins to emerge as a concept that needs extensive discourse. It is this discourse that the author initiates. The book has seven sections: a prologue, five chapters, and an epilogue. The sections take us through an extensive discussion related to collectivizing responsibility through collective intentions, collective agency, and collective emotions. In the first chapter, the author looks into how the structure of moral responsibility, based on the actor’s knowledge and control in individual acts, can be ascribed to collective contexts. Analysing the concept of collectives, he argues that both structured and unstructured collectives can be brought under the concept of moral responsibility. He searches for wider criteria for moral agential status for the collective beyond the argument that does not ascribe moral status to a collective. The second chapter brings forth two approaches to collective responsibility. The first is the collectivist position, which is committed to the reality of collective responsibility. The second is an individualist position that is somewhat non-committal concerning collective responsibility. The author then draws our attention to two specific issues that need to be addressed further: first, concerning the distribution of responsibility among the members of the collective and second, the relationship between individual responsibility on the one hand and the responsibility of collectives on the other. Here, the author proposes an account that "argues for a space where one is required to see things from the collective's point of view without thereby neglecting how things appear for the individuals within the collective concerned" (Neog, 2024, p. 35). He refers to this account which is neither fully collectivistic nor fully individualistic as a quasi-collectivist or non-individualist account. The author then elaborates on the justification of the proposed quasi-collectivist account from three perspectives concerning a collective: intention, agency, and guilt, which leads us to the next three chapters. The third chapter deliberates upon the intentional make-up of collectives. The author discusses the viewpoints of John Searle, Micahel Bratman, Raimo Tuomela, and Margaret Gilbert who have approached collective intentions without any metaphysical entity in their explanation; he expresses his apprehension whether such a view can encompass the understanding of collective moral action or collective moral responsibility. Firstly, he elaborates on the common-sense views about collective intentionality. Secondly, he asks the pertinent question: where does this collective intention, which drives collective action, reside? He addresses this issue by identifying two ways of approaching this concern: taking individuals as a group or taking them as a group of individuals . The author acknowledges that this is a contentious issue that has no easy answers. Thus, he analyses the views of Bratman, Searle, Tuomela, and Gilbert to draw a comprehensive picture of collective intentionality. In this context, the author takes into consideration collectivity, which he terms as the "essence that makes a particular intentional state inherently collective" (Neog, 2024, p. 59), further contemplating upon interrelationality and the collectivity of collective intentions. He argues that genuine collective intentions shall firstly not be overpowered by an authority that takes control over individuals. Secondly, collective intentions shall not completely be dissociated from the individual’s intentions that constitute that collective. This leads to the quasi-collectivist account of collective responsibility. The author explains collective intentions as the intentions of the collective . He argues for collective responsibility as "an independent normative fact with its own sui generic character, and not just an aggregation of the responsibility of the participating individuals", moving towards justifying collective responsibility as the responsibility of collectives. The fourth chapter concerns itself with collectives with an agency of their own. In the previous chapter, he points out that with regard to an individual it is the individual agency that precedes individual intention, but with regard to the collective it is the other way round. Collective agency has been looked through the prism of moral responsibility as being a collective self-being primarily responsible for its actions or outcomes. The author argues for formulating such a collective agency in this chapter. He makes a detailed analysis of the philosophical discourses concerning agency, individual and collective. In his book he argues for a collective agency that is different from the shared agency, which is a single agential unit consisting of multiple individual agents. The author further explains that shared agency is a concept of unity with diversity , but collective agency is unity in diversity . He further connects the normative point raised in the previous chapter with collective agency. This collective agency, the author claims, is crucial for recognizing collective responsibility as the responsibility of the collective per se. The author also considers emotional attitude, with respect to sharing the moral burden, of the collective agency that shall bring forth the complete moral character. This forms the basis of the next chapter. The fifth chapter emphasizes the relationship between morality and emotion. The dominant view in early philosophy was that morality concerns itself with reason, and emotion has no role to play in it. However, recent discussions in philosophy have pointed towards a more intimate relationship between morality and emotion. The author focuses on the emotion of guilt in this chapter to understand how guilt affects moral collective responsibility. There are philosophical approaches that argue that there is no strong connection between an individual’s guilt and her ability to be moral. Another argument categorizes guilt as a negative emotion that has no positive role in shaping morality. The author disagrees with such approaches, stating that "the nature of guilt and its proximity to our moral conscience needs to be understood in a wider context" (Neog, 2024, p. 105), and not based on individual instances. Further, Neog examines the feeling of collective guilt and compares and clarifies its distinction with collective shame: shame is driven by agent-centric reconstruction, but guilt is driven by action-centric reconstruction . Confusion of guilt with regret may occur when we consider collective wrongdoing, but for Neog, regret is a feeling that can occur beyond the direct involvement of an agent in the wrongdoing. He observes that the three approaches to collective guilt feeling , (i) a summation of individual guilt feelings, (ii) a feeling of membership guilt , and (iii) collective feeling of guilt, are not adequate. He offers a fourth alternative to collective guilt that takes into consideration the singularity of agency and the plurality of the experiencing subjects and tries to reconcile these two. It is such an endeavor where collective guilt is, in the singularity context, a feeling of guilt for wrongdoing committed in the name of the collective, and on the other hand, in the plurality context, it is the plurality of the individual members experiencing guilt as contributors to the collective. He terms it as positional guilt feeling that "on the one hand, retains the phenomenological elements in its constitution, on the other, recognizes the importance of collectivity by maintaining a distinction between the singularity of the agency of wrongdoing and the plurality of the experiencing subjects" (Neog, 2024, pp. 117-118). Neog finally argues that when we consider the collective agency, as discussed in the previous chapter, we can very well locate a collective moral agency, with respect to positional guilt feeling. This account of positional guilt feeling helps us understand collective responsibility. The epilogue of the book touches upon a possible assumption on the part of critics that he is subscribing to a conceptual isomorphism between individual wrongdoing and collective wrongdoing. He responds to this criticism by arguing that there can be collective wrongdoings without there being any collective intention. For him an affirmative claim can be made that collective responsibility can be understood through collective intention: given his take on collective intentionality recognises the significance of individuating the phenomena of collectivity so that keeping it away from being an overarching metaphysical superstructure and also tagging along individual intentional attitudes of the members of the collective. This leads the collective to an internal evaluation towards executing a common goal, which results in the collective agency. This collective agency is able to form emotional responses, as articulated by the discussion on guilt. As he puts it, collective guilt is "an emotional state where the referred agent behind the collective wrongdoing is the collective agent itself, although the subjects of such a feeling are the individual members" (Neog, 2024, p. 128). Neog does consider that there may be certain cases where collective wrongdoing does not have a collective intention, such as the problem of global warming. But this does not stop us from taking a retrospective stand on such issues. The book also considers instances where there is no pre-existing collective agent. The example cited is that random strangers helping a person in trouble. For Neog, in such cases, the moral demand for coordinated action can help in forming collective intentional agency, which develops through an internal evaluative perspective that develops a normative standpoint. He claims that philosophical discourse has laid forth the complexity of collective responsibility and his book attempts to "handle some of the knots and tangles of the yarn" (Neog, 2024, p. 132). Collective agency and collective responsibility are issues of utmost significance to philosophers and social scientists, since human existence as a social animal depends upon intricacies related to them, this book deliberates upon issues that matter in the perspective of understanding human co-existence. The extensive detail in which the author has looked into philosophical literature concerning responsibility, intention, agency, and guilt both in the context of the individual and the collective makes this a comprehensive account that is a must-read for everyone interested in individual-collective discourse. The quasi-collectivist account proposed in the book takes this discourse a step further. The wide-ranging use of anecdotes and instances from movies and literature about every pressing issue that this book concerns itself with helps us form a clear understanding of the complex philosophical debates in the backdrop. In this respect, this book can be considered a starting point for unversed readers in the individual-collective debate.

Review of Social Scientists in the Civic Space Shami Ulla Independent Scholar (PhD from University of Delhi) Mar 24, 2025 Book review of the volume Social Scientists in the Civic Space: Ethical Perspectives on Democratic Involvement, edited by Arundhati Virmani, Jean Boutier, and Manohar Kumar (Routledge 2024). Have you ever wondered how social scientists address the practical and ethical challenges of civic space? This excellent edited book will answer your questions and ignite your passion for understanding the role and challenges of social scientists in the civic space. Compiling 15 chapters, this scholarly work motivates us to understand how the complexities of civic space challenge social scientists and how their involvement and detachment shape ethical and political decision-making in various ways. The book holds great academic significance for those who wish to understand the role, challenges, various kinds of pressure (such as political and cultural, etc.), and the relationship between their academic integrity and public responsibility. The book talks about defining ground for civic space, interventions, and involvement of social scientists in civic space for public debate regarding policy-making and decision-making in five principal parts: part one deals with ‘Challenges of the Context’ and consists of chapters 1-3, the part two deals with ‘Interventions in the Civic Space’ and consists of chapters 4-7, the part three deals with ‘Involvement in Public Debates’ and consists of chapters 8-11, the part four deals with ‘Ethical Politics of Democracy’ and consists of chapters 12-14 and the last part five deals with ‘Perspectives’ which consist of chapter 15. The book explores the role of social scientists in civic space and examines four major questions. First, what is civic space, and how do social scientists face the challenges of defining their role within it? Second, should social scientists engage in the public domain, or should they maintain a distance from civic space? Third, how do social scientists balance their dual responsibilities—one as academicians tasked with producing knowledge and the other as civilians who engage in public debates or activism? fourth, in the era of digitalization, how can social scientists protect themselves from misinformation? The book deals with these core questions, contributing significantly to the ongoing debate on the roles and challenges of social scientists in the civic space. To be more specific, Part One of the book Challenges of the Context deals with the historical grounding for civic space. In chapter 1, Jean Boutier discusses the place and role of historians between the two World Wars. The chapter interrogates the historian’s responsibility in times of political instability, economic turmoil, and ideological extremism. Boutier raises the question: should historians’ work remain confined to academia, or do they have a duty to intervene in public affairs? Scholars such as Henri Pirenne, Max Weber, Marc Bloch, and Lucien Febvre provide a nuanced response to political crises ( p. 15). However, the chapter does not provide a clear framework for how modern scholars should navigate this tension in the face of misinformation, climate change, or political extremism that exists in civic space. In Chapter 2, Rouzean explores how a historian became an activist while researching the Rwandan genocide (p. 26). He candidly reflects on his personal biases, uncertainties, and ethical dilemmas, making the chapter a compelling meditation on the responsibilities of historians. As he admits, "I could not shy away from a form of civic commitment that I had so far rejected" (p. 27). However, the chapter leaves an important question unanswered: if writing history objectively is impossible, what ethical standards should historians adopt when engaging with politically charged topics? Despite being deeply reflective and intellectually courageous, the chapter does not fully resolve this issue. In Chapter 3, Virmani discusses the significance of contextual freedom and how nationalistic political pressures hinder the writing of true history. She argues that an activist or social scientist can achieve greater objectivity by maintaining distance and dislocation when researching the history of other countries. According to Virmani, historians from foreign countries may be better positioned to produce unbiased historical narratives, as they are less susceptible to domestic political pressures (p. 55). This perspective suggests that geographical and cultural detachment could help scholars maintain academic objectivity more effectively. Part Two of the book Interventions in the Civic Space deals with what types of interventions are being practiced and the challenges faced by social scientists in the civic space. Intervening in public debate requires a different form of expertise. In chapter 4 , Théry redefines expertise as a balance between scientific rigor, civic engagement, and democratic participation (p. 74). He argues that expertise is not a singular, monolithic practice but rather unfolds across three distinct models—service expertise, consensus expertise, and engagement expertise, which help mediate between knowledge production and civic responsibility (p. 58). In civic responsibility, all experts carry a dual responsibility or identity. For example, economists often function as public figures, as seen in the cases of Manmohan Singh, Mario Monti, Lucas Papademos, John Maynard Keynes, Paul Krugman, and Amartya Sen. Similarly, historians such as Paxton and Ginsborg, shape and enrich public debates through their engagements. (Virmani, 2024, p. 69). In Chapter 5, Virmani explores how public writing is not merely a means of communication, but a democratic responsibility. For example, Balakrishnan’s critique of the Silver Line project in Kerala exemplifies how economists can use their expertise to question state-led development narratives (p. 73). Such interventions demonstrate that economists are not merely technocratic advisors but also active participants in ongoing democratic conversations. In Chapter 6, Ashwani Kumar examines the success and failures of the MGNREGA policy in India, highlighting the realities of six districts. It explores the role of bureaucracy, political clientelism, and local power structures in shaping welfare delivery. Kumar showed that Jalpaiguri (West Bengal) and Tiruvannamalai (Tamil Nadu) implemented innovative solutions, where political competition positively transformed the livelihoods for thousands of workers. However, in other districts like Bagalkote (Karnataka), Seoni (Madhya Pradesh), Nagaur (Rajasthan), and Gaya (Bihar) welfare programs were manipulated by local politicians for vote bank politics. Additionally, the existing upper and lower caste gap hindered equal welfare delivery (p. 86-92). In chapter 7, Trannoy discusses why economists rarely emerge as public intellectuals. Trannoy argues that professional incentives, writing styles, and the technical nature of economic research limit economists' engagement in broader public discourse (p. 100). Thus, the chapter has great virtues, but a question remains: How do digital media and its influence on the dialogue between experts and the public shape economists as public figures? Part Three of the book Involvement in Public Debates deals with how experts and the public influence policy and decision-making. In Chapter 8, Swaminathan presents a critical understanding of India’s food security policies. She evaluates the Public Distribution System (PDS), debates the merits of targeted vs. universal food security, and examines the role of activism in shaping welfare policies ( p. 118). She argues that India’s food security crisis is not caused by food shortages but rather by policy failures and exclusionary welfare mechanisms (p. 123). She makes a strong case for a universal PDS, citing its proven success in states like Tamil Nadu and Chhattisgarh, where it has led to higher food security and reduced corruption. She critiques neoliberal approaches that emphasize targeted welfare and fiscal restraint. In her words, “The shift from universal to targeted PDS has neither led to a reduction in budgetary subsidies nor has it benefited the large majority of food-insecure households in the desired manner” ( p. 127). The chapter could be developed by comparing India’s food security policies with global models such as Brazil’s Bolsa Família or China’s grain distribution system, providing a broader perspective. In chapter 9, Aucante offers a comparative analysis of the role of social scientists in democratic policymaking in Scandinavia and France. Aucante argues that while Scandinavian social scientists engage with the state in a structured manner, their French counterparts are more often positioned as critics, public intellectuals, or independent commentators (p. 138). In chapter 10, Bozon presents a comparative analysis of anti-gender movements in France and Brazil. He explores their emergence, evolution, and how conservative political and religious actors weaponized gender studies, feminism, and LGBTQ+ rights as threats to national identity and social stability (p. 155). In Brazil, Bolsonaro explicitly attacked gender studies and feminist movements, cutting funding for social sciences and promoting a conservative Christian identity as the foundation of national culture. Similarly, in France, mass protests erupted in 2012–2013 against the legalization of same-sex marriage ( Le Mariage pour Tous ), led by conservative Catholic organizations and right-wing intellectuals. French conservatives accused gender scholars of corrupting children, undermining family values, and promoting radical leftist ideologies (p. 159-160). While France’s anti-gender discourse was driven by intellectual and cultural arguments, Brazil’s was more populist and religious, illustrating different pathways to the same ideological goal. In Chapter 11, Rajeshwari argues that civic space is neither neutral nor universally accessible but is shaped by structural inequalities related to gender, caste, class, and religion. Rajeshwari demonstrates how feminist research both critiques and contributes to civic discourse in India. Engaging with major feminist movements, digital activism, and contested public debates, the chapter provides a nuanced exploration of how feminist engagement challenges dominant power structures and expands democratic participation ( p. 165). Part four of the book Ethical Politics of Democracy deals with the role of the knowledge of expertise in the civic space. In chapter 12, Origgi reflects on how expert knowledge interacts with democratic principles, such as equality, neutrality, and legitimacy (p. 182). She raises questions like: Can democracies maintain both respect for expertise and genuine citizen participation, or does reliance on experts inevitably create a knowledge elite that weakens democratic legitimacy? (p. 184). She argues that the legitimacy of expertise is not automatic—it must be continually negotiated through transparency, public debate, and accountability mechanisms. Thus she writes that “Social scientists play a crucial role in mediating between expert and lay knowledge... by advancing new models that give a voice to the needs and values of society” (p. 188). This raises the question of how social media, misinformation, and alternative media platforms influence public perceptions of expertise. In chapter 13, Fatimah, Khan, & Natarajan, discuss data-driven journalism and its challenges. It highlights that journalists and social scientists need data science skills (e.g., coding, statistical modeling, machine learning), yet most professionals lack formal training (p. 197). In chapter 14, Manohar examines the role of civility in democratic discourse and protest movements. Kumar critiques the positions of Rawls and Habermas, arguing that norms of civility often privilege dominant groups while excluding marginalized voices. The chapter critiques the weaponization of civility, showing how it has been used to delegitimize disruptive but necessary movements for justice. Kumar suggests that democratic movements must balance radical disruption with strategic engagement (p. 206). Kumar states, “Disobedience uncovers a dimension of civility not as opposition, but as necessary coexistence that captures the messiness of democratic politics” (p. 216). Part five of the book Perspectives consists of the last chapter, 15. Samaddar discusses the role of social sciences in contemporary governance and policymaking and gives a metaphor of Sisyphus. The chapter questions whether social sciences, in their current form, can still serve a radical, emancipatory function or whether they have become mere tools of administrative governance (p. 222). Kumar argues that due to data-driven social science and research funding influenced by government or corporate interests, social scientists have turned from being social inquirers or whistle-blowers against power to becoming skilled practitioners of a discipline. consequently, the author urges social scientists to rethink their role in civic space (p. 226). The book is significant as it expands discussions on scholars' social roles—Weber’s detachment, Gramsci’s organic intellectuals, and Bourdieu’s public intellectuals—by addressing modern issues like digital misinformation and civic engagement beyond academia. The book explores emerging engagements like data journalism, grassroots activism, and ethical challenges in digital scholarship. The book links classical theories to modern knowledge production, showing how scholars navigate ethical dilemmas in today’s public sphere. This book aligns with Medvetz’s Think Tanks in America (2012) on expert policymaking influence and Calhoun’s Social Science for Public Knowledge (2008) on broader scholarly engagement. This book takes a global, interdisciplinary approach to ethical dilemmas in digital spaces, complementing Melzer’s The Public Intellectual: Between Philosophy and Politics (2003) by examining activism versus neutrality. The book excels in presentation. Boutier’s chapter advocates balancing public engagement and neutrality, but his historical analysis lacks a modern framework for misinformation. Rajeshwari’s chapter challenges detachment in structural inequalities. Fatimah, Khan, and Natarajans’ chapter stresses data skills but overlooks AI’s driven ethical risks. The book also misses a systematic Global North-South comparison. The book lacks discussion on social scientists in authoritarian regimes and underrepresents scholars in Africa and Latin America. It also overlooks AI-driven misinformation, surveillance, and algorithmic governance. The book could improve with chapters on social scientists under authoritarian regimes, AI’s role in civic engagement, and a Global South vs. North comparison approach to civic engagement. Adding participatory action research (PAR) would highlight scholar-community collaboration for impactful social science. Addressing these gaps would have enriched its analysis and provided a more comprehensive view of public scholarship today. Overall, the book Social Scientists in the Civic Space Ethical Perspectives on Democratic Involvement provides a thoughtful and valuable resource for students, researchers, and policymakers engaged in public domain research. The book successfully achieves its objectives, offering contextually relevant examples and ethical dilemmas that social scientists encounter in the civic space. References Calhoun, Craig. "Social science for public knowledge." Academics as public intellectuals (2008): 299-318. Medvetz, Thomas. Think tanks in America . University of Chicago Press, 2012. Melzer, Arthur M., Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman, eds. The public intellectual: between philosophy and politics . Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.

Muzaffar Ali In conversation with Varun S Bhatta (Assistant Professor, HSS, IISER Bhopal) July - August 2021 Muzaffar Ali (mamalla[AT]unipune.ac.in | younusmalla[AT]gmail.com) is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Savitribai Phule Pune University, Pune, India. He received M.Phil and PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Prior to joining Savitribai Phule Pune University, he taught philosophy at Hindu College, University of Delhi. He specializes in social and political philosophy and contemporary Indian philosophy with an emphasis on the idea of the public sphere and its normative implications in the Indian context. He is a DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst) scholar and has published in prestigious journals such as JICPR, Sophia, Culture and Dialogue, and Journal of World Philosophies. A co-edited volume, The Imbecile's Guide to Public Philosophy (2021) is published by Routledge. Varun : Muzaffar, let us start this interview by knowing a bit about your personal history. Can you please tell us where are you from? What about your earlier education and interests? Muzaffar : I am from Kashmir and studied there till my Bachelors in 2008. While my education (up to HSC) took place around my village, I moved to Srinagar city for Bachelors in 2006. My primary education took place at a school next door of which ours was the first batch. I need to mention that we were lucky to get quality education at our primary stage in education and much of the credit goes to the then collective of teachers at this school. Quite interestingly, it was my failure to secure a seat in the State MBBS entrance examination which marked my shift to Social Sciences for my Bachelors; more specifically to Psychology! The shift was initiated through advice from some close friends who were of the view that I can do better with human psychology than human physiology! Interesting to hear about the rural educational experiment. Probably, if we have time, would like to know more about this initiative and how it is doing at present. Also, fascinated to know about the twist of fate: from physiology to psychology! How was your Bachelors’? Curious to know how and why you transited from psychology to philosophy. The school was a community initiative within our village to provide quality education as an alternative to the State-run schools. However, within a matter of two decades, the shift in primary education was more towards a neo-liberal one, one where paradoxically entrepreneurship and education are supposed to share the plate! Gradually my school had a strange death as it could not withstand the shift. At the college, the social science stream (as it was then called) was offered in clubbed subjects and one had to choose one such club. With an eye on psychology, I happened to choose a club that had philosophy in it. And you won’t believe within the first year itself when I studied Greek Philosophy, I was fascinated to the core. I straight away decided that philosophy is what I am going to pursue. At the college, we hardly had teachers who could teach philosophy and I struggled to finish my undergraduate studies. I got help from a few friends who had either studied philosophy or were interested in it. A gentleman who had retired as a Govt officer but had done post-graduation in philosophy in the 70s helped a lot. The boat somehow sailed through. Once my undergraduation was over, I did not apply to any other subject as I knew philosophy awaits me somewhere. Can you tell us what aspects of philosophy caught your attention during the first encounter? In my first encounter with philosophy at college, I was handed W T Stace’s introductory book on Greek Philosophy. The moment I started going through it, the metaphysical questions raised by the early Greek philosophers captivated me. It was as if these philosophers (Thales, Pythagoras, Anaximenes, Heraclitus etc) were eager at capturing the ‘ultimate reality’ at a conceptual level. The evolution of Greek philosophy with Plato and Aristotle talking about a kind of moral nature of politics was not only interesting but refreshing as well. Unfortunately, the syllabus during those days was based on the Indian-Western binary (and it still carries much of that baggage). The binary-based curriculum did not allow us to move to the specifics of any particular tradition at the college level. Before we move on, do you remember the name of this retired government officer and any information about him? Want to imagine this person...who does post-graduation in philosophy (in the 1970s), joins a government job and at the same time assists students! As far as I remember, he was a retired horticulture officer who had done his MA at Aligarh Muslim University during the early 1970s. After his MA, he had even got an opportunity to move abroad for further studies in philosophy after securing a fellowship. However, he decided to move back to Kashmir and do a government job instead. Actually, since there were few or no teachers of philosophy available, colleges used to hire him after his retirement to teach and assist students. At times, he would not even be paid, but he would still continue to assist students like me at an informal level. I can’t remember his exact name as of now, though we fondly called him Malik Sahab. Wonder why the person did not pursue higher studies. Coming back to you, what happened after your undergraduate degree? Looks like you were clear about pursuing a Master's in philosophy. How did that go? I applied to two universities for my Master’s: Panjab University Chandigarh (PU) and Hyderabad Central University (HCU). However, as fate would have it I had to join Panjab University as the selection letter from HCU wouldn’t reach me on time due to the 2009 agitation in Kashmir following the Asia-Neelofar rape case. Interestingly the Dept at PU was imbibed with a sense of openness and seriousness for philosophy. It had a charged and vibrant atmosphere with weekly seminars, discussion groups and Professors took a keen interest in offering pedagogical clarity during and after lectures. That training gradually played its part in shaping my research interests. Dr Lallan Baghel who currently heads the Dept prodded us to submit abstracts to attend seminars and conferences at the national level. Informal discussions on concepts related to classical Indian philosophy and other subjects were a routine exercise. I fondly call the Dept as being my stepping stone as it became a platform for me to have a glimpse of global philosophy. From Habermas to Daya Krishna, Dharmakirti to Jayanta Bhatta, Husserl to Deleuze, Foucault to Chantal Mouffe, I got acquainted with a diverse range of philosophers and concepts. In essence, the groundwork for my research interests was done and the imperative need was to shape and cultivate it further. With this ground set, how did you proceed further? I secured admission to the integrated M.Phil-Ph.D programme at the Centre for Philosophy, Jawaharlal Nehru University. The Centre was small at that time and I completed my M.Phil in 2013 with my focus on the concept of sovereignty within the “Deterritorial Empire”; a concept put forward by the Political Philosophers Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt. It was during my M.Phil that I figured out that not much work is being done in the realm of political philosophy from the perspective of the Indian context. The trigger was an essay by Bhiku Parekh, “The Poverty of Indian Political Theory.” It occurred to me that the philosophical domain is overwhelmed by a kind of Western captivity which if I borrow from K. C. Bhattacharya can be considered as a part of ‘cultural subjugation.’ I was not thinking of closing myself to the West and becoming a nativist. Rather I seriously started to interrogate into the blind deployment of notions and theories that have origins in the West. The lament was that even Indian political theory is not able to offer anything beyond a certain point. After a lot of reading and discussions with faculty at JNU and outside, I was sure that my PhD research topic has to focus on this often neglected problem. Muzaffar (far left) along with his friends in Mumbai University, attending the Afro-Asian Philosophy conference (2010). I can relate to the tension between the west and Indian that one encounters while practising philosophy in India. I want to delve more into the points you mention and hear in detail. Before that, let us complete the current strand of conversation. Please tell us about your PhD research. Since I had a bit of clarity about the wider context of my research problem, I chose to understand the imagined Indian public sphere in normative terms by evaluating the Habermasian conceptualization(s) of the public sphere. The title is, “Understanding Indian Public Sphere through a Critique of Jurgen Habermas.” In my research, I didn’t evaluate or inquire into the Indian situation from the vantage point of Habermas’s normative idealization of the public sphere. Rather I employed the contemporary Indian situation as my standard measure of evaluation and inquiry into Habermas. The methodological insight for this inquiry is based on Samvada as propounded by two contemporary Indian philosophers, Daya Krishna and M. P. Rege. Among other issues, a major issue that I argue about is that the concept of rationality -- be it the enlightenment one or the communicative rationality, which shoulder the shifts and evolution of the Habermasian public sphere -- is inherently insufficient to be deployed for the understanding of Indian public sphere. As an alternative, I propose the concept of contextual rationality, as propounded by B. K. Matilal and others can be ‘finetuned’ and used for understanding and envisioning the normative conceptualization of the Indian public sphere. The fine-tuning involves the possibility of replacing the ‘illustrational’ component in the classical model of contextual rationality with the notion of ‘lived experience’ as a viable vector of meaning for a shared discourse within the public sphere. I may add that the project is still a work in progress even after I have completed my PhD and I look forward to putting it in the public domain soon. I can see how you in the PhD research successfully attempted to come up with a novel Indian political theory by making the existing concepts/theories have a conversation with the Western ones. As a person who has not delved into political philosophy, I want some clarification about your research domain and the project. (i) In what ways do you think the Indian public sphere differs from the Harbemasian one? (ii) And, even though you have clarified that you are not a nativist, but do you think concepts developed in the Indian context (like Matilal’s contextual rationality) have better conceptual compatibility to explain Indian phenomena (like the Indian public sphere)? To put it briefly, I can say that a public sphere’s publicness is to be theoretically gauged by the in-principle access it offers to individuals who intend to participate in it. The overemphasis on the concept of rationality by Habermas, (as I M Young, Nancy Fraser, and others charge) becomes an obstacle for that in-principle accessibility itself. The reason being that Habermas creates a procedural format to conduct the critical-rational debates within the public sphere. A simple way of putting this point is this. Think of a situation where matters of caste discrimination are to be discussed by everyone apart from the one’s who suffer it, primarily because they are not able to speak in the language and format as demanded by the Habermasian public sphere. The Indian public sphere, if we can imagine and theorize one, cannot simply rely on or overemphasize procedural rationality alone. While on one hand, the Indian public sphere needs to resolve the problem of accessibility and operationalize it through an alternative format and procedure for debate within it. On the other hand, such operationalization should not dilute its normative potential which may otherwise end up making it redundant. Coming to your second question, the notion of contextual rationality looks promising on these fronts if reworked and employed in an appropriate way. Matilal himself draws on the Nyaya conception of debate and makes sure that contextual rationality as an operative within debates satisfies the needs and demands of participants. While doing that, the in-principle accessibility option for the general public who can become participants is kept intact by making illustrations and examples a necessary ingredient of contextual rationality. So while the arguments cater to the debaters’ demands, the parallel woven examples and illustrations cater to the general public who are potential (not actual) participants in the debate. I play with this illustrational component to make it more tenable for an imagined Indian public sphere so that contestations present within our society can be properly responded to, at least at a theoretical level. I do not strictly adhere to the compatibility issue in my research. But at the same time, I am of the opinion that concepts developed within a certain context do share a kind of fetal relation with the context itself. And it is necessary that we as doers of philosophy underline the existence of such relation. I like the way you put it - “fetal relation”. Are there any works (published, forthcoming, work-in-progress) on the above topic that one can read? Please do also introduce us to your other research works. Yes, there are a few. Up to now, I have been more concerned about the Contemporary Indian philosophical strand of my research. In 2017, as part of a collaboration, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions: Daya Krishna on Counterposition and Dialogue ” was published in the journal Culture and Dialogue. I took it a bit further in 2018 with “ Indian Philosophy and Ethics: Dialogical Method as a Fresh Possibility” published in Sophia. The first treatment of the Social and political arena within my research is part of an upcoming co-edited volume, The Imbecile’s Guide to Public Philosophy published by Routledge. The volume is going to be out by September 2021. Apart from this, I have written a few articles on Contemporary Indian philosophers such as Margaret Chatterjee and Feminist Philosophy. Apart from the publications, I have been occupied with the malestream nature of philosophy as a discipline. I did a project under the UGC’s University with Potential for Excellence grant at my university so that the relationship between patriarchy and philosophy can be studied. The findings of the study are available as an occasional paper published by the University. Taking the focus on this question forward, I and a few colleagues from Universities in India founded the Collective for Women Philosophers in India last year. The CWPI is a voluntary effort to study the gender gap within Indian philosophical academia from multiple methodological perspectives. To begin with, we have started interviewing Women philosophers based in India to understand their perspectives on the nature and extent of the gender gap in Philosophy. We look forward to taking it further with collaborations and projects on national as well as international levels. Given that you have been through the various stages of academic philosophy, and have dabbled not only with regular academic activities (like teaching and research) but also proactively attempting to address some of the problems of the discipline, what has been your experience of doing philosophy in India? Let us (for the moment) separate doing philosophy in India into two categories; studying philosophy and practising philosophy. As far as studying philosophy is concerned, we get exposed to a lot of non-Indian philosophies, thanks to the evolution of Indian academics post-colonial influence. Unfortunately, this exposure is not symmetry-based and deep down the Indian-Western binary is inherent to it. In other words, it seems that colonial authority has paved the way to a kind of epistemic authority within philosophical discourses. If this exposure was founded on a principle of epistemic symmetry then the condition of philosophy as a discipline may have been altogether different. The asymmetry is bound to shape the practice of philosophy as well. It leaves the practitioners of philosophy with a conundrum of being faithful to both traditions simultaneously. Most of us, I think, remain entangled with solving this conundrum throughout our careers, and my experience is of similar nature. I find it difficult to strike a balance between the two traditions given the fact that the Indian-Western binary has been foundational to my career as well. J. L. Mehta, Daya Krishna, J. N. Mohanty, Ramchandra Gandhi, Margaret Chatterjee are examples of India based philosophers who have suffered this conundrum and attempted to find a way (whether successfully or unsuccessfully is a different question altogether) out of it. Honestly speaking, I am inquisitively searching this forest to look for a way out of it. Another characteristic problem within our philosophical circles is the lack of dialogue within. Much of the communication is limited to friendly circles and senior fellows. Young scholars and researchers hardly get opportunities to interact with each other. With regard to the last point you mentioned, what are the critical difficulties and concerns you think that the community of young philosophy scholars in India encounters? And what initiatives and steps we can proactively take to tackle these? One of the major predicaments that we face is to prove that philosophy is (still) relevant. I think a young philosophy professional is used to facing questions and doubts regarding the relevance and use of philosophy every now and then. The doubts do not emerge from a vacuum. Rather the general atmosphere, academic as well as non-academic, is bulldozed by a technocratic and positivist invasion which leaves very little scope for a sustained train of thought. Further, the instrumental nature of education plays a role in sidelining criticality and inquisitiveness. It falls on us to either submit to the onslaught or to keep up the ante. Our predecessors have not witnessed a difficulty of such magnitude, I believe. There are a few administrative and academic hardships as well. Administratively, there is hardly any scope for a young professional to receive focused impetus from the national councils such as the ICPR or ICSSR to sponsor research stays in acclaimed institutions. ICPR has senior fellowships among others, but I hardly find it offering a special young faculty program. Academically, it becomes difficult for any young scholar in India to share and have a conversation on his/her work. The reason is the attitude that “senior is better” which I think needs to be revisited. It is quite easy for anyone to get a senior professor’s inputs on research and teaching, but very hard (almost impossible) to get a shared or even contested view from peers. We have to figure out alternatives, such as having platforms and collectives like IPN, CWPI, etc., to communicate with each other and share works of interest. While the academic part of this difficulty has to be resolved by us and the senior colleagues in philosophy academia, the administrative one has to be sorted elsewhere. One of the challenges that I constantly encounter as an academic philosopher is the guilt of doing philosophy only in English and not doing enough of it in my mother tongue (Kannada). Even though this question resonates with the India-vs-West problem that we discussed above, they are different. Working in one’s provincial language is a way the philosopher connects to his/her immediate locale. Thought of asking your thoughts on this as I want to know what does asking this question in the context of Kashmir entail? The question is both important and interesting. The vernacular medium definitely offers a lived way of doing philosophy (or for that matter any discipline which is articulation and argumentation centric). I would have preferred to get schooled in the Kashmiri language. But alas, English as a “language of power” has so permeated our being that during my schooling Kashmiri was not even a subject in the curriculum. Even now, after being introduced, it is taken quite casually. The result of sheer neglect towards the vernacular languages has been quite drastic. We are more like hybrids. Now that I am based in Pune, a cursory comparison makes me feel that English is more commonly deployed in the northern states. States like Maharashtra, Bengal have (to a good extent) managed to preserve their vernacular languages. On a different note, while English distances me from my immediate locale, it simultaneously brings the outer world closer to me. It (as if through its sheer power) throws the world open to me, and that needs to be underlined. Somehow, we forgot to strike a balance between the openness that English offers and the belongingness that the vernacular bestows. Thanks for pointing out how vernacular and cosmopolitan languages can complement each other. Having discussed the various hurdles and characteristics of Indian academics, I want to know how all of these have come to shape your pedagogy. How do you think philosophy should be taught in India? My pedagogy has indeed been shaped by this tumultuous-yet-interesting experience. I have made it a point to rid the courses (that I teach) from the sweeping Indian-Western binaries. The courses now have a mix of Indian and non-Indian philosophers without any underlined segregation. I hope that helps free the caged bird. Second, since philosophy is a vast discipline and in India, it has been more involved with the history of philosophy, I make sure that contemporary scholars across the wider social sciences get their place (at least) in my teaching. Coming to your second question, I am of the view that we need to teach ‘philosophy as philosophy’ without reducing it to spiritual enterprise, religious conservatism or other comprehensive doctrines. The argumentative value inherent to philosophy, its inquisitiveness to interrogate, its inclination to offer and sustain critique need to be the vectors of teaching and doing philosophy.

Philosophy Education and Job Competencies Nishant Kumar Assistant Professor, Joy University (Tirunelveli, India) Nov 6, 2022 I recently switched to one private University in Tamil Nadu - Joy University. I had been assigned to frame the curriculum and course structure for BA Philosophy. While framing the curriculum, I stuck with a few questions that I thought to discuss with Indian Philosophy Network (IPN) members. Therefore in the IPN mailing, I raised a few questions in the hope to receive some responses. The questions were: what is the current trend in the job market, and how an undergraduate Philosophy student could easily get a job? Is there a job apart from academics and research for Philosophy UG students? If a Philosophy student has to go into journalism, law, HR, consultancy, etc., then why shouldn’t the student will study journalism, law, etc. respectively, and get a degree in that particular subject, instead of studying a few years of Philosophy? How Philosophy as a subject could generate jobs? These questions strike some IPN members as important to be discussed. In this regard, I acknowledge here sincere thanks to Sudakhya, Jobin Mathew Kanjirakkat, Mohan K Pillai, Siddharth, and Varun for discussing with me and giving me insight on these questions. While framing these questions, I thought that these questions would again land up to the fundamental question about philosophy - "what is philosophy?". Bertrand Russell has answered it as the love of wisdom whereby wisdom is having a comprehensive picture of reality. However, the sentence "comprehensive picture of reality" is contentious and raises further questions. How do we get a comprehensive picture without experiencing all the aspects of life? Suppose, I am a poor philosopher that earns so little that I can hardly sustain myself. However, I have been given a task to explain the life of a rich person. Can I be able to provide a comprehensive picture of a rich person without experiencing that life? Can I be able to know "what it is like to be a rich person"? Is it meant that we can never be able to provide a comprehensive picture because of our limitation to experience various aspects of life? If that would be the case, does philosophical knowledge get reduced to knowing some buzzwords, which upon hearing by common people would create an impression that philosophers are 'intellectual' persons? Is philosophy just about discussing random thoughts? Or does philosophy have some practical relevance in our day to day life? For Jobin, who is an independent philosophy scholar, the aim of philosophy is to "clarify the ideas and develop a reasonable concern for our fellow human and non human beings. Business or job-providers, on the other hand, are interested in increasing production, consumption and profits." Jobin’s statement consists of two parts (a) aim of philosophy (b) aim of job providers. Jobin has nicely summed up the aim of philosophy that having philosophical skill helps to understand various ideas in a much better manner than not having that skill. Further, by studying philosophy we would get exposure to ethical theories and thereby would be concerned for sentient beings. However, I am unsure why Jobin wants to completely differentiate the aim of philosophy from the aim of job-providers. If we differentiate it completely without considering "what it is like to be a job-provider" we are certainly restricting ourselves to know one aspect of life, i.e. aspect of a job-provider. This is because, to know about what it is like to be a job-provider, entrepreneur, business person, etc. we have to experience that state. Then only we could explain what it is like to be that person. Maybe Jobin’s view to differentiate the two aims is to point that the primary objective of philosophy is not to generate jobs and further there is less probable chance that an undergrad in philosophy could land up in high paying jobs. However, this does not seem implied from his other statement- "if an undergraduate [philosophy] program can include components of relevant aspects of business and environmental studies, it will be very helpful I think." This statement of Jobin conveys that if we will study philosophy through integrating other subjects then the importance of studying philosophy will increase among those students who want to get immediate jobs after their undergrad. The similar view is also maintained by Mohan, Sudakhya, and Siddharth. Mohan, a Trainee Counselling Psychologist, believes that learning only philosophy without integrating with other subjects or skill does not help undergrad students. He said "I do not think majoring purely in philosophy is of merit to students." Majoring purely in philosophy "does not equip you with a marketable skill, it does not familiarize you with a domain of work, it does not even give you a generic skill like teaching." However, "philosophy is an invaluable companion to other subjects". It equips ones "with the basic tools and exposure to reason and deeply understands the foundations and processes of any subject." For him, by studying philosophy we would develop self-reflecting skills as he said "philosophy offers a powerful set of tools to navigate the confusion and trials of young adulthood — where one is at that crucial phase of questioning, figuring out, and reconciling existential questions." In terms of getting a high paying job, his opinion is to combine philosophy with other subjects/domains/disciplines. This will, as he argued, "really elevate a person’s job success, and more importantly, life satisfaction." A similar opinion is also maintained by Sudakhya, a research scholar at University of Delhi. She suggests to include more subjects of applied philosophy in a curriculum of undergrad philosophy course. Her suggestion included "Philosophy of Technology, Ethical implications of IT, Business ethics/Corporate ethics, Philosophy of Law, Philosophical Counseling". According to her, these courses will help to "build practical skills" that are required in a job market. Siddharth, a philosophy faculty at Sai University, thinks the nature of philosophy is "to look beyond the immediately useful". That is, the primary aim of Philosophy course is to transcend the practical living and hence not to get involved in jobs, as he said- "I do not mean that a UG in philosophy is not likely to help you find jobs, but that this is not the primary aim of the programme". One question can arise here; isn't any phenomenon would have more than one primary aim? If it is so, why not studying philosophy courses would have two primary aims - (a) to look beyond the immediately useful (b) get a job. Why should we simply reject the practical way of living as not one of philosophy’s primary aims? I requested Siddharth to reply on this question. He responded that his comment "philosophy often seeks to look beyond the immediately useful" should not mean that philosophy does not "helps us transcend practical living and hence not get involved in jobs". Instead, it should be implied that philosophy wants us "to look beyond the immediate, to reflect on the practical (including jobs)." This last statement does not contrast with my viewpoint that philosophy course would have two aims. Furthermore, Siddharth thinks that philosophy is an important and crucial tool to help us in living in this world, and also as far as jobs and careers are concerned. This is because, philosophy can provide certain skills like "(a) reasoning in a systematic manner, (b) identifying concepts and assumptions the underlie issues, which trains them to be better at identifying problems and thinking about alternatives, and (c) an ability to organize their communication in a clear manner (especially written communication)." These skills "together be called critical thinking and communication skills." I agree with Siddharth that studying philosophy courses equips us with critical thinking and communication skills, which are essential skills for any student. According to Varun, who is a philosophy faculty at IISERB, there are two ways of thinking about the relation between philosophy and the job opportunities: (1) jobs specifically/traditionally associated with the discipline of philosophy and (2) the role of philosophy for any kind of profession. The often mentioned criticism of the discipline entailing a few choices of professions arises when we focus on just (1). Indeed, at present, we have only a limited set of imaginations of being a professional philosopher. Now, is this a "problem" or a "feature" of the discipline? Also, other Humanities and Social Science disciplines -- like literature, history and anthropology -- share these narrow possibilities of professionalism when compared to sciences and engineering. (Here, Mohan points that other Humanities and Social Sciences degrees, unlike philosophy, do offer the job opportunities as school teachers and researchers at think-tanks and other NGOs. This is yet to happen for philosophy degree holders.) Varun, thus, thinks that the job entailments should not be decided only based on (1). In contrast to this, when we consider point (2), we see that philosophy -- unlike any other discipline -- is in fact useful to a wide and diverse range of professions. Critical thinking and argumentative skills, exposure to ethics, and other philosophical perspectives are essential in every profession. Sketech by Nishant Kumar I agree with Varun and Siddharth that by studying philosophy courses, a student would be able to equip themselves with 'critical thinking and communication skills', or in short 'philosophical skills'. A philosophy student not only learns how to articulate a particular problem succinctly, but can also provide new arguments or can find the fallacies in existing arguments of any idea. However, I disagree with Siddharth that the primary aim of philosophy is not to get into a job. Instead, I strongly think that one of the primary aims of philosophy is to get into a job (a) to sustain itself (b) to get the experience of one aspect of reality, i.e. being into a job or to know ‘what it is like to be in that job’. Now two questions arise that (a) how a philosophy student can compete with other discipline/branch students to get hired by a company (b) how a company will profit by hiring a philosophy student. My opinion is that a philosophy undergrad student must take any kind of basic technical skills of their choice after their undergrad or during their undergrad to become a first preference for any company. Philosophy undergrad students will definitely learn faster because of having thinking skills that they acquired during their undergraduate program. With that technical skill they can easily get hired by any company that works in that technical domain. After getting hired, they must ensure that they will go through a training program of that job profile so that they will understand the job profile in a much better manner. With the experience of training program in company, having acquired technical skills, and having philosophical skills they can be a true asset for that company. This is because, a philosophy student with their knowledge of different cultures can understand the user demand of a product, and can explain succinctly to the team members for improvisation and innovation of any product, and can lead the team effectively. With their technical skills they can improvise a product and also can innovate new products as per the user demand. Although a philosophy student will be an asset for a company, I am skeptical that a philosophy student will stay forever in one company for the job. As Siddharth has mentioned that one of the aim of philosophy is to transcend practical living, I think that a philosophy student will definitely continuously switch to other companies to know various aspect of practical living or will go into research to find the comprehensive picture of reality.